Chapter One Hundred and Ten
To Atlanta or Hell
Part III
Cold Spring Church (April 26-28, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“After Hardee retreated from Allatoona Pass, Grant determined to move around Hardee's left flank and steal a march toward Dallas. Hardee anticipated Grant's move and sought to ambush the Union forces at Cold Spring Church. Grant mistakenly concluded that Hardee had a token force, as he expected Hardee to hold the line of the Pumpkin Vine Creek is his advance was to be contested at all. As a result Grant ordered Eugene Carr’s XIII Corps to attack. This corps was severely mauled. On April 27 both sides entrenched…
On the morning of April 28th Grant's army tested the Confederate line. Later that same day Churchill had elements of his corps probe part of the Union defensive line held by Logan's XVII Corps, to exploit any weakness or identify any possible withdrawal. Fighting ensued at three different points, including an extremely sharp if small scale engagement between the brigades of Brigadier General Manning Force and Brigadier General Colton Greene. Churchill called halt to the probes before serious casualties were incurred. Hooker’s force was tasked with looking for a way around Hardee's line, and on May 1 doubling back on itself, the leading element of Hooker’s army, Robert Minty’s cavalry brigade, occupied Allatoona Pass, which had a railroad and would allow his men and supplies to reach him by train. Upon receiving the news that Hooker has secured the Pass, Grant abandoned his lines along the Racoon Creek on May 4 and moved toward the railhead at Allatoona Pass, forcing Hardee to follow…
The ground favoured the Confederates at Cold Spring Church
Burnt Hickory (May 5, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“After what was effectively a Union defeat at Cold Spring Church, Grant ordered Logan to attack Hardee's seemingly exposed right flank with the potential threat to any march on Allatoona that Hardee might be considering. The Confederates, primarily of William Preston’s and St John R. Liddell’s divisions were ready for the attack, but Logan’s XVII Corps attack was powerful and concentrated. Troops under John McArthur threatened a break in Churchill’s lines but this was ultimately plugged by the timely redeployment of States Right Gist’s brigade with further support from Ben Helm’s division. Eventually the Confederates repulsed the attack, but with high casualties on both sides…”
When Hooker found Hardee entrenched in the Marietta area on May 20, he drew up his own lines to match the Confederate lines. On Grant’s arrival he began extending his lines beyond Hardee’s lines, forcing Hardee to redeploy some elements and seek to refuse others. On May 18–19, Hardee, seeing envelopment in his current position was inevitable, moved his army to a new position, previously selected by Thomas Churchill, astride Kennesaw Mountain. The Confederates entrenched in an arc-shaped line to the west of Marietta. This would protect Hardee’s supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Grant, in spite of Hooker’s misgivings, prepared to attack this position…”
Kennesaw Mountain (May 22, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Grant's plan was first to induce Hardee to thin out and weaken his line by ordering Warren and Ord to extend his army to the right. Then Hooker was to make a feint on his extreme left —the northern outskirts of Marietta and the northeastern end of Kennesaw Mountain — with his cavalry under George Crook and a division of infantry (Anson G. McCook’s), and to make a major assault on the southwestern end of Little Kennesaw Mountain. Meanwhile, Carr and Logan were to conduct the principal attack against the Confederate fortifications in the center of their line, and Ord was to demonstrate on the Confederate left flank and attack somewhere near the Powder Springs Road "as he can with the prospect of success” (Grant).
At 8 a.m. on May 22, Union artillery opened a furious bombardment with over 200 guns on the Confederate works and the Rebel artillery responded in kind. General William F. Barry wrote, "Kennesaw smoked and blazed with fire, a volcano as grand as Etna." As the Federal infantry began moving soon afterward, the Confederates quickly determined that much of the 8 miles wide advance consisted of demonstrations rather than concerted assaults. The first of those assaults began at around 8:30am, with three brigades of Brigadier General Albert L. Lee's division (Major General Eugene Carr's XIII Corps, Army of the Mississippi) moving against Cleburne's corps on the southern end of Little Kennesaw Mountain and the spur known as Pigeon Hill near the Burnt Hickory Road. If the attack were successful, capturing Pigeon Hill would isolate most of Cleburne's corps on Kennesaw Mountain. All three brigades were disadvantaged by the approach through dense thickets, steep and rocky slopes, and a lack of knowledge of the terrain. About 5,500 Union troops in two columns of regiments moved against about 5,000 Confederate soldiers (under Preston Smith), well entrenched…
On the right of Lee's attack, the brigade of Brigadier General William P. Benton was forced to advance through a knee-deep swamp, stopped short of the Confederate breastworks on the southern end of Pigeon Hill by enfilading fire. They were able to overrun the rifle pits in front of the works, but could not pierce the main Confederate line. To their left, the brigades of Colonels James Keigwin and Daniel W. Lindsey crossed difficult terrain interrupted by steep cliffs and scattered with huge rocks to approach the brigade of Brigadier General William B. Bate. Some of the troops were able to reach as far as the abatis, but most were not and they were forced to remain stationary, firing behind trees and rocks. When General Carr rode forward, under fire, to judge their progress, he determined that many of his men were being "uselessly slain" and ordered Keigwin and Lindsey to withdraw and entrench behind the gorge that separated the lines…
About 2 miles to the south, Logan's troops were behind schedule, but began their main attack against William Preston's division at 9 a.m. Two divisions totaling about 9,000 men under Brigadier Generals John E. Smith and John McArthur, advanced in column formation rather than the typical broad line of battle against the Confederate division of Brigadier General William Preston, entrenched on what is now known as "Preston’s Hill." On Smith’s left, his brigade under Brigadier General Manning Force attacked through dense undergrowth, but was unable to break through the abatis and fierce rifle fire. On his right, the brigade of Brigadier General Mortimer D. Leggett charged the brigade of Brigadier General John C. Brown and was repulsed. During a second charge, Leggett was seriously wounded…
McArthur's division, to the right of Smith's, also advanced in column formation. While such a movement offered the opportunity for a quick breakthrough by massing power against a narrow point, it also had the disadvantage of offering a large concentrated target to enemy guns. Their orders were to advance silently, capture the works, and then cheer to give a signal to the reserve divisions to move forward to secure the railroad and cut the Confederate army in two. Brigadier General Hugh T. Reid's brigade advanced down a slope to a creek and then crossed a wheat field to ascend the slope of Preston Hill. When they reached within a few yards of the Confederate works, the line halted, crouched, and began firing. But the Confederate counter fire was too strong and Reid's brigade lost two commanders (Reid wounded and his replacement, Colonel Adam G. Malloy, killed), nearly all of its field officers, and a third of its men. Malloy was killed on the Confederate parapet as he slashed with his sword and shouted "Surrender, you rebels and traitors!" Colonel William Hall's brigade on Reid's right suffered similar losses. Brigadier Thomas E.G. Ransom’s brigade never made it beyond the abatis. After ferocious hand-to-hand fighting, the Union troops dug in across from the Confederates, ending the fighting around 10:45 a.m. Both sides nicknamed this place "Bloody Angle"…
To the right of McArthur's division, Major General Francis J. Herron's division advanced, but did not join in the attack for reasons that he was never able to fully justify. Logan’s distaste for Herron was only increased by this failure. Considerably farther to the right, however, was the site of the only success of the day. Ord's XVI Corps had been assigned to demonstrate against the Confederate left and he was able to put two brigades across Olley's Creek without resistance. That movement, along with an advance by Major General John Wynn Davidson's [the former commander of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry returned from injury] cavalry division on Ord's right, put Union troops within 5 miles of the Chattahoochee River, closer to the last river protecting Atlanta than any unit in Hardee's army…
Grant's armies suffered about 4,500 casualties in comparison to Hardee's 1,000. The Union general was not initially deterred by these losses and he twice asked Carr and Logan to renew the assault. "Our loss is small, compared to some of those [battles in the] East" Grant felt. Black Jack Logan was willing as he still had Brigadier General Isaac Quinby’s division in reserve, but Eugene Carr’s response, however, "Another such assaults if what Hardee wishes for most and, if out of hand, would use up this army." Grant weighed the professional Carr’s opinion and demurred from further attacks. A few days later Hooker wrote to a friend, "We are all becoming more like Grant with each passing day, regarding the death and mangling of couple thousand men as a small affair, a scuffle"…”
It was a bloody business before the Confederate works
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“Grant was not fixated on large-scale frontal assaults as some of his critics have asserted, some like Richardson’s attack at Allatoona were not on his orders. However he felt constrained to try at Kennesaw for logistical reasons, but also so that he could keep Hardee guessing about the tactics he would employ in the future. In his report of the battle, Grant wrote, "I perceived that the enemy and our officers were in some doubt as to whether I would assault fortified lines or look to outflank. An army to be efficient - it must not settle down to a single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I mean therefore to promote that doubt for its moral effect on the enemy, thus resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory"…
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Hooker considered Grant’s attack at Kennesaw Mountain a significant tactical defeat. "Hardee has won a minor defensive triumph. Grant did not press the attack as he should once started”. It seemed to reignite Hooker’s ambition to replace Grant in united command of the armies…”
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
"It must be admitted that Ord's success on the right gave Grant a great advantage, and the federal commander quickly decided to exploit it. The opposing forces spent seven days facing each other at close range, but on May 29, with good summer weather near at hand, Grant sent the Army of the Cumberland and Crook's cavalry around the Confederate left flank and Hardee was forced to withdraw from Kennesaw Mountain to prepared positions at Smyrna…”
Smyrna and Chattahoochee (June 5, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“On June 5, Grant had Warren and Ord demonstrated against Hardee’s positions at Smyrna, while directing Hooker to outflank Hardee again by sending Granger and Davis to cross the Chattahoochee near the mouth of Soap Creek, the last major geographic barrier to entering Atlanta…”
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
“Cleburne withdrew from the positions at Smyrna in the face of Ord and Warren. Grant was focused on Hooker’s flanking movement and therefore the decision to press their advantage fell on the more senior Ord who pressed on…
Cleburne had a second line of defensive works at MacRae’s Hill. Having lured Ord and Warren forward, some distance from their support in the form of Carr’s Corps, Cleburne paused to watch the Federals halt to assess these new works…
The last thing Ord was expecting was that Cleburne would abandon his works and attack, yet that is what Cleburne did that afternoon. Ord’s troops had not yet commenced serious preparation of their own positions; his artillery support was still coming up; and Ord was unsure of his authority to press matters against a second line. Cleburne, realizing that he had at least comparative numbers resolved to attack the unsuspecting Federals…
The attack of Polignac’s small but angry brigade of Texans on the federal right flank rolled up Dodge’s division of Ord’s Corps and drove them from the field. Matters quickly deteriorated for the Federal force from there. Ord was quick to respond. He ordered Warren’s XV Corps back to the first line of abandoned rebel works, while Ord’s own XVI Corps acted as a rearguard. When Ord came to fall back, Warren would be in position to do the same for him, as Ord's troops streamed past…
A fighting retreat is a messy business and to the Federals credit they managed it well. Ord’s stand as rearguard was brief but bloody and he promptly ordered his divisions to the rear. Warren’s stand at the Smyrna line lasted longer and many commanders distinguished themselves. Hugh Ewing, Joseph Lightburn and Joseph Mower would be commended by Warren, as was Warren himself by Ord…
As night fell Cleburne was back in his Smyrna lines having inflicted three times as many casualties against Ord and Warren as he had himself received. His position was tenuous now as Carr had joined Ord and Warren. Logan’s location was still unknown as the Federals appeared to be preparing for a more organized attack…”
The aggressiveness of Cleburne's Corps surprised E.O.C. Ord
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Hardee knew that Grant would try to flank him and cross the Chattahoochee River. As General Granger's XXIII corps advanced on the river, his scouts identified a Confederate pontoon bridge there which appeared to be defended by dismounted cavalry. They were driven away by Major General Jacob D. Cox’s division of XXIII Corps. The bridge, although damaged, was captured. Granger’s orders were to force a crossing, which he sought to do in the face of increased Confederate opposition. Hardee had ordered William W. Loring, commander of the Atlanta garrison, to bring up his forces to the river. With a motley division of troops Loring held until Hardee could rush troops from Churchill’s corps across the river to his support…
After five separate attempts by both Cox’s and then Steedman’s divisions the crossing was still in Confederate hands and Granger called off the attack…
Hardee withdrew Cleburne from his exposed position at Smyrna overnight and withdrew his whole army across the Chattahoochee River. Grant was not pleased. His commanders had been tricked again by Cleburne and Hardee still held the river – the last major geographical obstacle before Atlanta…
One element of good news reached Grant on June 6 – George Thomas had defeated Buckner and Cheatham and taken Knoxville. East Tennessee was liberated and Thomas had been order to take his small, corps sized, Army of the Ohio to join Grant. Grant decided to wait for Thomas before making his final move against Atlanta…”
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“Hardee, now free of the continuous pressure coming from Grant, had a brief window to plan accordingly. Although Atlanta was only 30 miles away, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee had done well. What it needed to do, though, was ensure that their Union counterparts suffered another large defeat somewhere before Atlanta. Jeff Davis, the Confederate President, more or less demanded it though Secretary Breckinridge and Chief of Staff Johnson did their best to shield Hardee from direct interference…”
