Chapter One Hundred and Fifty Three
Military Odds and Sods
Part III
From "The Plains Wars" by Marcus Tamboro
Burlingame 1985
“Buford's War (also referred to as the Bozeman Trail War or the War Horse Campaign) followed the Stoneman debacle. It would see the United States Army once again square off against the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Northern Arapaho, this time in both the Dakota and Montana territories. The war was fought over control of the western Powder River Country – effectively the lands watered by the rivers that flowed north east from the Big Horn Mountains. This land had traditionally been Crow tribal land, but the Lakota had recently driven them out. The Crow tribe held the treaty rights to the disputed area, according to the major agreement reached at Fort Laramie in 1851 and this was to be a significant factor in Buford’s campaigns…
The success of the attack on Stoneman’s command emboldened the Lakota and their allies. Small scale raids and attacks on soldiers and civilians increased. The War Office concluded that decisive action had to be taken...”
Brigadier General J.N.O Buford
From "Kearny's Army - The United States Army from the Civil War to the Emperors' War"
MacArthur University 2007
“E.O.C. Ord, commanding the Department of the Plains, developed a rather plodding campaign plan. Using infantry regiments near at hand he planned to sweep the Powder and Tongue Rivers in two grand marches north east from the Bozeman trail during what was left of the summer and during the fall. John Reynolds, polite and understated as always, simply described it as “
an artilleryman’s plan”…
The Plains Sub-Department commander, J.N.O Buford, was asked for his opinion in direct correspondence from Philip Kearny. Buford proposed pulling together the 5th Cavalry from its various detached garrisons in the Dakota Territory, and adding several available companies of the 10th and 13th Cavalry. Colonels John Wynn Davidson of the 10th and Eugene A. Carr of the 13th would both be in command even though their full regiments were not available. The 5th would be commanded by Buford’s old comrade Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Devin, who had signed on from volunteer service to the regulars at the pressing of both Buford and Kearny…
Buford’s objective was to strike against the Lakota alliance while they were at their most vulnerable: when in winter camps. They Fear His Horses, Hump, Crazy Horse and their followers were known to be on the Powder, Tongue, and Rosebud rivers. Buford's force would consist of almost 1,300 men which, aside from the main cavalry force, would include some infantry, civilian packers, and a the odd supernumerary newspaper reporter. One key element of Buford’s plan was the use of the 13th Cavalry. Carr’s initial recruits had been from the Indian Territory but was still short on numbers. Buford proposed encouraging Crow, Pawnee and Omaha recruits. Only a handful of Pawnee and Omaha joined and most of these were army scouts in any event. However at the urging of Wolf Bow many Crow warriors would join the 13th forming company H...
On receipt of Buford’s plan Kearny simply appended the word “THIS” with his signature and sent it on to E.O.C Ord to set the wheels in motion. Time favoured Buford as winter was still almost three months off...”
From "The Plains Wars" by Marcus Tamboro
Burlingame 1985
“Buford's opponents, the nomadic hunting and warrior societies of the Lakota Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho, had advantages in mobility, horsemanship, knowledge of the country, guerrilla tactics, and the capability to concentrate their forces to achieve numerical superiority. They also had many weaknesses as a fighting force, especially in organization and weapons…
During the winter the scarcity of natural resources resulted in the tribes living in small, scattered autonomous groups. In late summer and fall they congregated into large encampments for ceremonies, to make political decisions and to plan collective action. Bands were highly decentralized and individual tribesmen often felt little obligation to obey group decisions. The Lakota consisted of seven independent bands, each made up of numerous sub-bands, all of whom operated independently. The Cheyenne had a more structured and centralized political organization...
Some historians have estimated that the warriors in the Powder River area numbered up to 4,000 men. The total number of Lakota was estimated to be about 14,000. The Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho numbered about 3,000, adding up to a total of about 17,000 Indian men, women, and children, but thousands of the people in all three of those tribes were not in the Powder River country. Many others stayed aloof from the on-going strife fearing retribution…
As had been typical of United States militias, tribal warriors were part-time warriors. They had to spend much of the summer and fall each year hunting buffalo and other game to feed their families. In the late winter and spring, they were limited in mobility until the grass turned green and their horses could recover their strength after the severe winters of the northern Great Plains. The effectiveness of Indian forces were diminished by their lack of cohesion and organization…”
Buford's plan for a winter campaign was a brave one
From "A Soldier’s Life" – the Biography of J.N.O. Buford by James W. Pelham
Buffalo 2001
“Snow had fallen the day before Buford and his command left Fort Reno. The troops marched north on the Bozeman Trail toward the Powder River. This column, the larger of the two, included 14 full companies of cavalry, 80 wagons pulled by mules, six ambulances filled with forage and a pack train consisting of five divisions of 80 mules each. The newly raised Crow company of the 13th accompanied Buford well…
Sword in the Bear was the unofficial ‘company sergeant’ of Company H under Captain George Wynstra, primarily as he was considered the fiercest warrior. However he was also an exceptional tracker and knew the country well. He and Hump had raided one another in the past and he had an unerring sense of where Hump’s camp could be found…
Buford and his men attacked the Miniconjou camp of Hump on the Powder River in what is now southern Montana. Carr recalled that the village “
was bountifully provided with all that a tribesman could desire, and much besides that a white man would not disdain to class among the comforts of life.”…
The village was situated under some bluffs, and the Miniconjou gained the higher ground from which they drove Buford’s force back. The undisciplined nature of the newly recruited tribesmen was largely responsible. Buford was not deterred and while Carr kept the hostiles fixed on the bluffs, Buford personally led three companies of the 5th on to their flank and up an unguarded defilade…
The defeat of Hump’s band heartened the troops who, though suffering from the bitter cold, also had an ample supply of meat and furs thanks to Buford’s preparations. From there they marched north west toward the mouth of the Rosebud river…
Carr observed “
the long line of mounted men, white, black and red, stretched for more than a mile like a river of color against the somberness of the white snow.” The wagons formed “
an undulating streak of white that seemed to merge with the color of both snow and clouds”.
To Buford’s surprise the first force they encountered was 16 Shoshone warriors, dispatched by their chief, Washakie, to help the army fight their old enemies, the Lakota. That was only part of the story. Washakie had also tasked them with observing how the warriors who had joined the ‘long knives’ were treated. A far sighted chief, he wished to know whether the Shoshone warriors should be encouraged to join or not…
According to Carr, Buford said of his objective, “
We don’t want to kill the Indians, we only want to make them behave themselves.” His Crows had found three camps along the Rosebud in close proximity guarding two large pony herds. This was an opportunity to strike a crippling blow…
The soldiers struck at dawn; they found a narrow entry through the natural shelter of bluffs and ridges and bountiful cottonwoods and willows that provided protection to the village along the creek such that two companies of the 10th were able to deploy to charge.
Forty Lakota died in that first charge, as the rest scrambled for the bluffs. Buford’s troops burned their tipis while taking possession of their clothing and winter food supplies. As the temperature plunged Buford sent out a proposal to the beleaguered Lakota: surrender your arms and agree to be taken to Fort C.S. Smith and the army would provide food, furs and warmth. The Lakota refused and the temperature that night fell to thirty below zero. Two men, four women and nine babies froze to death that night the Lakota confirmed when they surrendered the next day. While giving no outward sign, Carr believed Buford stricken by their count of the dead. The men of the 13th believed it their “
just fate” (Sword in the Bear). The Shoshone warriors reported back to Washakie that War Horse (Buford) was a great war chief but he was generous to his enemies to the point of foolishness...”
Buford’s victories at the Battles of Hump’s Camp and the Rosebud, along with Wynn Davidson’s successes along the Bighorn River, as well as the loss of several pony herds would cripple a large proportion of the Ogalala, Hunkpapa and Miniconjou warbands for many seasons to come...”
Chief Washakie would come to see the 13th Cavalry as a lifeline for the Shoshone