Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

The Allies were not looking that far ahead even IOTL. We had orders for aircraft, 10, 000 or more, that were literally canceled starting in early 45 and were dumping ammunition, trucks, jeeps and other items over the rail on transports while they were being shipped over seas.

Building a road that won't be used till 18 months? Not a problem lets get it built and give us another way to supply China. Remember they were not expecting to have a port that was working in any amount even after the war to supply the KMT.
 
There are many things that could be done to improve communications between Burma and China, whether it's improving the Burma Road, building a better road, building a railway or whatever. The issue is that, for the moment, the British are going to be focussing all their infrastructure efforts on improving communications from Burma to Thailand, to supply their army for the northern prong of the drive on Bangkok. And once Thailand is liberated, are the British (who never really cared about the Chinese) going to burn resources on a road they aren't using, just so the US can send more supplies to China?
How does that explain Tulip Force (Mission 204) which the British sent to China in early 1942?
 
How does that explain Tulip Force (Mission 204) which the British sent to China in early 1942?
180 soldiers on a training mission is a tiny commitment compared to the manpower and resources required for the Burma Road.

China is a low priority for Britain, so low cost support like Tulip Force are fine and may even expand a bit. But anything major will need the US deciding its a priority, because it won't be a British one.
 
180 soldiers on a training mission is a tiny commitment compared to the manpower and resources required for the Burma Road.

China is a low priority for Britain, so low cost support like Tulip Force are fine and may even expand a bit. But anything major will need the US deciding its a priority, because it won't be a British one.
If you read the history on the subject it took a considerable effort for the British to send even 180 soldiers to China. At the time the British were severely stretched far more than the Americans by the effort.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The Burma Road seems to be causing a lot of controversy, within the community, to which I am sure my last post only served to add fuel to the fire. So let’s get back to basics, and examine the controversy at its most basic level, and try as far as is possible to quench the fire. IOTL as ITTL the Burma Road exists, work started on it in 1937, and by 1938 it was in use, and it was paid for by the Chinese. It is now 1942 ITTL, and unlike IOTL Burma hasn’t been conquered by the Japanese, which closed the road and thus there was no land link to the western powers until the completion of the Ledo Road in 1945. So given that the road exists, and given that the Chinese will be exerting considerable political pressure on the Americans, via their extensive China lobby in the United States, to support their efforts against the Japanese. The US administration will exert pressure on the British, to support the road, as it is going to be the principal route for Lend Lease supplies going to China. The China lobby is made up predominantly of evangelical Christians who have been supporting missionary groups in China for years, going back to before the turn of the century. They represent a substantial voting bloc in America, one that the president needs to keep onside, as he does other special interests groups. Personally I doubt that FDR has any real interest in China or the Burma Road, but politically he does, and this will influence the decisions made about the road.

So we have a very torturous road that links Burma to China, it exists and thanks to the difference in the result of the Japanese attempt to invade Burma, being different ITTL to what it was in ours, it still exists. The priority for the British is supporting their forces in attacking the Japanese in Thailand, which is a two pronged attack, with forces coming north from Malaya and East from Burma, hopefully meeting around Bangkok, which will relieve tremendously the pressure on the supply chain. As once Bangkok is taken the vast majority of supplies can be bought in by sea, and landed in the harbour, thus enormously shortening the supply line. Yes this will require the British navy to gain control over the Gulf of Thailand, but it needs to anyway to prevent the Japanese navy from interfering with the land campaign. And while the Americans will have other areas that are a far higher priority than the Burma Road to invest in, it is and will still be somewhere that they have a high interest in. If the Americans and British spend a third of what they spent in establishing and running the India China air lift, on just improving the road, they will get a return on their investment far greater than they got from the air lift. By 1943 Burma will be a backwater with no active fronts in the ongoing conflict, it’s only contribution to the war other than as a supplier of materials, especially rubber, will be the Burma Road, the only land route for American Lend Lease to get to China. But the road exists, and will until the liberation of FIC and the reinstatement of its rail link to China, or the liberation of a major port in Southern China, be the only land link under the control of the Anglo Americans. Thus it can not be left in the deplorable condition it is, and will have to be improved as best it can, with what little resources are available. I seriously doubt that the anyone on the Anglo American side or the Chinese side are proposing that it is developed into a nineteen thirties/forties sealed all weather two lane highway. But significant improvements can and should be made until it’s usefulness is rendered mute by developments elsewhere, such as in FIC or China, when until significant changes in both the Chinese and Burmese economies require such a link again. Post war it will, as has happened IOTL, be allowed to slowly revert to nature, and other than among those with a serious interest in military history, be very much forgotten.

RR.
 
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And while the Americans will have other areas that are a far higher priority than the Burma Road to invest in, it is and will still be somewhere that they have a high interest in. If the Americans and British spend a third of what they spent in establishing and running the India China air lift, on just improving the road, they will get a return on their investment far greater than they got from the air lift. By 1943 Burma will be a backwater with no active fronts in the ongoing conflict, it’s only contribution to the war other than as a supplier of materials, especially rubber, will be the Burma Road, the only land route for American Lend Lease to get to China. But the road exists, and will until the liberation of FIC and the reinstatement of its rail link to China, or the liberation of a major port in Southern China, be the only land link under the control of the Anglo Americans. Thus it can not be left in the deplorable condition it is, and will have to be improved as best it can, with what little resources are available. I seriously doubt that the anyone on the Anglo American side or the Chinese side are proposing that it is developed into a nineteen thirties/forties sealed all weather two lane highway. But significant improvements can and should be made until it’s usefulness is rendered mute by developments elsewhere, such as in FIC or China, when until significant changes in both the Chinese and Burmese economies require such a link again. Post war it will, as has happened IOTL, be allowed to slowly revert to nature, and other than among those with a serious interest in military history, be very much forgotten.
I think there's an important point being missed here. There's a war on, and not using every means at their disposal to hurt their enemies (Japan, Germany and Italy) isn't going to be acceptable. And compared to OTL, they've got a veritable cornucopia of supplies available: with a successful North African campaign, the astonishing logistical effort that required isn't needed. However, they don't have the amphibious shipping available to invade Italy nor the forces to cross the Channel - that means the land campaign in the Far East is going to be lavishly supported compared to OTL.
Now if you look at what is now available, it's a lot of merchant shipping (can't remember the amount - offhand it's well in excess of a million GRT even before you think about the fact that ships can now make it through Suez), fuel, trucks, food, etc. That's most valuable in China, and the US has the engineering expertise and equipment available to radically improve the Burma Road. The China Lobby is a thing, but it's pushing at the open door of the US having a lot of stuff to hand over to people fighting and very few candidates to give it to. I think a significantly improved road and even potentially a railway are quite plausible ITTL.
 
Burma is a *long* way from the USA in 1942, and the most direct sailing route, across the Pacific, now (in 1942) goes through a war zone, so routing further south, possibly via Australia, is required.
I don't think the USA is going to be shipping much to Burma by sea, any time soon in this timeline, unless they're buying it locally in India or forcing Churchill to buy it in India. Or not until the Liberty Ship building dispenser really starts to spam out vessels, and there's enough shipping to go around for everything.

Edit:
Although I guess that doesn't preclude the USA from planning for when they have more ships...
 
Burma is a *long* way from the USA in 1942, and the most direct sailing route, across the Pacific, now (in 1942) goes through a war zone, so routing further south, possibly via Australia, is required.
I don't think the USA is going to be shipping much to Burma by sea, any time soon in this timeline, unless they're buying it locally in India or forcing Churchill to buy it in India. Or not until the Liberty Ship building dispenser really starts to spam out vessels, and there's enough shipping to go around for everything.

Edit:
Although I guess that doesn't preclude the USA from planning for when they have more ships...
You need to remember that the existing shipping was supporting a major campaign in North Africa. New York to Suez via the Cape of Good Hope is 12,000 nautical miles. San Francisco to Sydney is 6500 nautical miles, followed by another 5,500 to Rangoon. Essentially Rangoon and Suez are the same distance from US ports.
I'm having trouble working out how much was shipped to North Africa, but it was a LOT: the Italians and Germans delivered about 2.7 million tonnes and they were significantly weaker in terms of materiel than the British. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons the Liberty Ships were so badly needed: world trade patterns were massively screwed up and that meant ships travelling much further than pre-war and in an inefficient convoy to boot.
 
... that ships can now make it through Suez), fuel, trucks, food, etc. ...
But can they? Even though Italian North Africa has been eliminated, they still have Sicily, Italy and forces in Greece to worry about. Vichy France will not want to allow them to sail close in shore due to the possibility that Germany may see this as breaching the armistice. So although they may not be attacked from bases in Africa, they will still be vulnerable to attacks from the north.OTL TORCH allowed for air bases and ports to be used to cover the convoys. This hasn't happened ITL.
 
But can they? Even though Italian North Africa has been eliminated, they still have Sicily, Italy and forces in Greece to worry about. Vichy France will not want to allow them to sail close in shore due to the possibility that Germany may see this as breaching the armistice. So although they may not be attacked from bases in Africa, they will still be vulnerable to attacks from the north. OTL TORCH allowed for air bases and ports to be used to cover the convoys. This hasn't happened ITL.
You're missing the point. If Suez remains closed, the saving is **only** the million GRT of shipping they used to supply North Africa and the several million tonnes of supplies they delivered there, all looking for an alternative use.
If you can reopen Suez, the saving gets to be more like 5 million GRT - it isn't just the savings in routing, it's also that you can move much closer to pre-war trade patterns and so use that tonnage vastly more efficiently, as well as get better use out of the industry that shipping was built to serve.
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There is also the fact that the Burma Road remaining open means that the Western Powers can fob off to a certain extent Stalins demands for another front in Western Europe.

"Sorry Old Bean, we're busy propping up the Chinese as well against the Japanese, you know, the ones you seem to be doing your best to avoid fighting."
 
The US has the resources to support all that and more. This isn't some game, the US was building aircraft in 1942 that were functionally obsolete or obsolescent and still bringing new aircraft on line in amounts that the Axis weren't even close to building. Up until the actual surrender of Japan in September the US was actually placing contract for everything from uniforms up to B29's, tanks, C rations, Liberty Ships and cancelling partially built CV's and BB's still on the stocks not even a 1/3 completed without even batting an eye. A good example of to look at was the ALCAN highway. Did we actually need it? No but we went and built it any way and still use it today. The Burma Road would be expanded and redone because you cannot ship things to China until you not only have a port taken but that port has to be redone and brought back online including the connection to the interior of the country. Right now you are not looking at that happening within the time period you stated for them to have the road brought up to snuff.
 
You need to remember that the existing shipping was supporting a major campaign in North Africa. New York to Suez via the Cape of Good Hope is 12,000 nautical miles. San Francisco to Sydney is 6500 nautical miles, followed by another 5,500 to Rangoon. Essentially Rangoon and Suez are the same distance from US ports.
I'm having trouble working out how much was shipped to North Africa, but it was a LOT: the Italians and Germans delivered about 2.7 million tonnes and they were significantly weaker in terms of materiel than the British. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons the Liberty Ships were so badly needed: world trade patterns were massively screwed up and that meant ships travelling much further than pre-war and in an inefficient convoy to boot.
And in this timeline, unless Roosevelt has thrown his hands in the air and scrapped 'Germany first', much or all of the original timeline shipping going to Suez via Cape of Good Hope will (if not still needed to support UK armies in Suez), I guess, be going to a faster USA buildup in the UK, gettting bases and air-strips constructed faster and/or be going to support the liberation of Norway/The Channel Islands/whatever else Roosevelt decides to do instead of original timeline Torch.

The Axis could presumably get a lot more cargo delivered (per ship per month) with what shipping they had, since the trips to North Africa and back were much shorter than New York to Suez, although RN submarines (and RAF aircraft, I think, unless those came from elsewhere?) operating out of Malta did their best to take a tithe of Axis shipping.
 
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You're missing the point. If Suez remains closed, the saving is **only** the million GRT of shipping they used to supply North Africa and the several million tonnes of supplies they delivered there, all looking for an alternative use.
Okay
I think I get it now. You are saying that without the continuing campaign in NA, the UK does not have to keep shipping out men and munitions to replace losses and build up to defeat the Axis. So that million GRT is now not needed for that task and can be re-allocated elsewhere.
There will still be the problem of running convoys through the Med and that may force someone somewhere to decide to do something about Vichy NA.
 
My vote is with those that would expect USA to build a two lane Class A road with rest stops/breakdown areas *and* a pipeline *and* a railroad...albeit narrow gauge to permit tighter radii and moderate bridge tonnages...just due to the fact that that's USA's approach to doing anything related to infrastructure and logistics, and a full effort against Germany would not have precluded also doing a good job of supporting China's survival against Japan's attempted conquest...whether or not the infrastructure would be completed enough sooner than alternatives to be economically efficient.
 
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And in this timeline, unless Roosevelt has thrown his hands in the air and scrapped 'Germany first', much or all of the original timeline shipping going to Suez via Cape of Good Hope will (if not still needed to support UK armies in Suez), I guess, be going to a faster USA buildup in the UK, getting bases and air-strips constructed faster and/or be going to support the liberation of Norway/The Channel Islands/whatever else Roosevelt decides to do instead of original timeline Torch.
My understanding is that the UK really couldn't have absorbed the tonnage much faster than it did - for all the scares, the UK never had any serious shortages and the effort to build up bases for the US to arrive is very significant and will take quite a while. One of the big reasons for Torch was that it could be largely carried out by forces operating from US ports due to the relatively weak opposition expected and the fact that the Mediterranean coast is relatively sheltered. It's really the only place worldwide with those combination of attributes, so my view is that those troops can't now be used in Europe in a way acceptable to Roosevelt.
They'll no doubt try to accelerate a build-up in the UK, but it's hard to see how much faster they could have gone than OTL. Whatever happens, you've got a vast amount of supplies and shipping tonnage available and south-east Asia is the only sensible place for it to go. That means either a much stronger campaign, more support over the Burma Road, or a combination of the two.

The Axis could presumably get a lot more cargo delivered (per ship per month) with what shipping they had, since the trips to North Africa and back were much shorter than New York to Suez, although RN submarines (and RAF aircraft, I think, unless those came from elsewhere?) operating out of Malta did their best to take a tithe of Axis shipping.
Correct. Not sure the Italians had a huge amount of shipping, but they delivered nearly 3 million tonnes of stores. My point was that the 8th Army had a huge materiel superiority over the Afrika Corps, so the amount delivered to North Africa must have been much greater than 3 million tonnes. That has to go somewhere.

Okay
I think I get it now. You are saying that without the continuing campaign in NA, the UK does not have to keep shipping out men and munitions to replace losses and build up to defeat the Axis. So that million GRT is now not needed for that task and can be re-allocated elsewhere.
There will still be the problem of running convoys through the Med and that may force someone somewhere to decide to do something about Vichy NA.
San Francisco => Sydney => Rangoon is the same distance as New York => Cape Town => Suez. Opening the Mediterranean is really interesting because it cuts down a lot of tonne-miles and they're virtually there already (Germans and Italians out, Vichy wavering at worst), but it isn't critical.
 
...They'll no doubt try to accelerate a build-up in the UK, but it's hard to see how much faster they could have gone than OTL. Whatever happens, you've got a vast amount of supplies and shipping tonnage available and south-east Asia is the only sensible place for it to go. That means either a much stronger campaign, more support over the Burma Road, or a combination of the two...
My understanding of the graph Churchill gives in Volume V ('Closing the Ring') off his WW2 memoirs (first few pages of Chapter I ('The Command of the Seas')) is that merchant shipping build doesn't overtake merchant shipping losses until mid to late 1943 (the graph is kind of crude, without monthly subdivisions.) Although that said, the accompanying chart indicates that in 1943 the new build was fairly monstrous in size - producing a net change for that year of in excess of plus ten million 'gross tons' of merchant shipping. (I think that's referring to the quantity of the ships rather than cargo capacity.)

Hmmm. Air attacks on British ports are still a problem in 1942, which makes it difficult to use full capacity there. I don't know if that can be much changed by North Africa being cleared early. Stalin is always happy to receive Lend-Lease by Arctic Convoy though, which I think had to be slowed down for original timeline Operation Torch. Maybe if there are enough escorts, he can get more deliveries (and that fits 'Germany First').
 
I wonder if, with less immediate call from the Brits for anything the Americans can provide in terms of armoured vehicles, that there might be more resources to throw at earthmoving and other heavy engineering vehicles, that could help speed up construction projects in the far-east?
 
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