Part Twelve
Japanese Response
That the Japanese would undertake equally sweeping, if not greater changes than the USN despite winning the battle, indicates how significant an impact the result of this battle made. Japan won the battle to conquer Midway Island, but the presence of an equal number of RN and RNN carriers, in the wake of the earlier NEI operations, bought home the strategic imbalance of forces facing Japan in the longer term. That the Allies were now in a position to release significant forces from operations in the European theatre would only increase the level of force imbalance facing the IJN in the Pacific. With no sign that the U.S. would seek peace in the wake of the battle as Yamamoto hoped, his country faced a daunting prospect in the longer term.
Although the Japanese would continue to secure more territory, with operations in the SW Pacific and securing Nauru, it would only be a matter of time before the U.S. would move to a state of naval parity and eventually supremacy which would only be exacerbated by allied support. The Battle of Midway redefined the central importance of air superiority for the IJN. Without any form of air superiority, the Japanese would never again be in a position to launch a major offensive in the Pacific or conduct effective defensive operations.
After the battle, with the Tosa still undergoing repairs following the Coral Sea Operation, and soon to be joined in dock by Akagi and Hiryu. This left the Shōkaku and Zuikaku as the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still operational. Of Japan's other fleet carriers, the two improved Shokaku-class, (Watatsumi and Kuroakami laid down in 1940) where working up but striking the same issues Ozawa highlighted regarding the impact of fuel restrictions on aircrew training. With the Taihō, which would not be commissioned until early 1943, represented the only fleet carriers available with Shōkaku and Zuikaku; until the arrival of the first of the Unryu-class vessels currently under construction in 12 months. The three vessels of the Junyo-class would all be available to supplement these shortly and, although technically classified as fleet carriers, were smaller civilian conversions offering less effectiveness in that role. For the foreseeable future, much of the naval aviation capabilities would rely on the increasing number of light carrier conversions just becoming operational. In the time it would take Japan to replace carriers, the U.S. Navy had more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers building thanks to the shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act of 1938.
The heavy losses in carriers had a similar flow-on effect on personnel. Not only had the loss of veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weaken the Imperial Japanese Navy. These heavy losses in veteran aircrew (perhaps over 50% of the aircrew embarked on the carriers) were not permanently crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrews at the start of the Pacific war. But the loss of over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers, with the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews, were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet and would take time to replace. The prospect of constant attrition of veterans during further operations would be the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.
Awareness of these prospects made the IJN almost immediately set in place steps to address the issues. Plans to accelerate the training of aircrew were prioritized. Analysis by Admiral Ozawa on the relative skills of the pilots of the 5th Air Fleet emphasized the requirement for increased training and greatly increased fuel allocation required to produce effective air groups. This would become the highest priority to the IJN to maintain a viable air asset by 1943, and much of the operational tempo of the carrier force would be cut back whilst its personnel and aviation assets were rebuilt. The securing of the NEI oil fields helped but a crash program to develop and expand the existing Sakhalin Island fields was prioritized. In many ways, this would be fortuitous as by 1945 these, and their proximity to the Japanese home islands, would represent the only oil resource available to Japan in face of the otherwise overwhelming US naval blockade.
Further measures were introduced to preserve aviation personnel. Evacuation of air group personnel from damaged or sinking vessels was prioritized. Measures such as the greatly increased deployment of seaplanes and submarines to recover downed aircrew included in future operations along with directives to aircrew to seek recovery reiterated. As a result of the battle, new procedures were adopted whereby more aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck, rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines was adopted, along with a review of damage control training measures. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment, with more carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques.
In terms of aircraft, it was forced to be recognized that allied aircraft were rapidly improving and that soon would exceed the performance of current operational models of the IJN. Ozawa in particular was at the forefront of the introduction of change and improved models after the battle. His emphasis accelerated the development and acceptance of the Shiden. Though very large for a carrier aircraft and a handful for all but the most experienced of pilots, two or three chutai of this aircraft would eventually be deployed aboard each large fleet carrier of the IJN as standard from 1943 on, to act as a counter to the newer American designs. Rapidly recognized as the equal to the best allied fighters by both sides, its reputation was enhanced by using the cream of the IJN to fly them and generally known as honchos in their hands. Also accelerated was the development of the successor to the Zero, the smaller A7M Reppu, which would start to appear in some numbers by 1944 and be deployable on all carriers. Both would prove superior fighters and help maintain to a degree parity of performance with the USN, though not in numbers required as the war progressed. In addition, plans to greatly increase production rates were introduced to some effect, but never in sufficient quantity to match the overwhelming production might of the US.
Ozawa, strongly backed by Yamaguchi, was also strident about lapses in the specific employment of fighters as a result of the 5th Air Fleets experience. He emphasized the need to acquire radar urgently, highlighting the effectiveness of RNN attacks on returning aircraft and his second strike, even to the extent of seeking urgent assistance from Germany. The lack of adequate warning hampered the effective employment of the CAP. As a result of the battle, it became IJN doctrine to deploy a ‘bubble’ of scout planes from the screen out 50-70 miles down a threat access as Yamaguchi had done, to provide adequate warning in the absence of radar. He also advocated better aerial management of defensive fighters to prevent over-commitment of the CAP too soon. Though never matching the capabilities of the allied air controllers these changes would significantly improve the defensive performance in later battles.
Major improvements were instituted in anti-aircraft armament aboard ships. Employment of the excellent 100-mm Type 98 and lighter 80mm Type 98 guns were accelerated. Perhaps the most significant change was to accelerate the replacement of the Type 96 25-mm gun with the Type 00 40-mm version to supplement the lighter gun as the standard close-range gun of the IJN. Already under limited production, it would become the crash priority to fit on all surface vessels in mass numbers. Though lacking a high-velocity shell and thus the range of its allied 40-mm equivalents, it nevertheless was significantly more damaging than the type 96 it replaced, and become the feature of the towering ‘flak-castles’ of Japanese ships later in the war. A flow on of this would be the re-armament of most of the older Japanese light cruisers with a variety of 127, 100, and 80mm weapons for employment in the anti-aircraft role. Secondly it became the tactical model to employ these vessels as intimate close support to carriers in fleet operations. They would prove far more effective later in the war in this employment, rather than their original destroyer-leader role.
All these represented a major sea-change in policy to the IJN, and there would also be further changes involving the aviation support industries that would flow on from this. It was noticeable how little real opposition was expressed by the previously strong ‘battleship’ lobby of the IJN to these changes. In some way, this lies with the recognition and contribution of the RN involvement in the battle. In many ways, the RN remained the institutional founder of the modern IJN, with much of its professionalism and ethos drawn from those beginning. The involvement of significant RN forces helped to shatter the institutional blinkers of the battleship lobby and their preoccupation with the ‘decisive battle’ concept solely with the USN. The ‘decisive battle’ had been won with aviation assets and yet still there existed major surface forces beyond those of the USN to contend with.
Most historians now acknowledge that these changes represented the start to the middle or ‘attritional’ phase of the Pacific Theatre, which, while achieving some notable tactical successes, would ultimately prove to be a strategic failure for Japan in the faces of the allied and in particular US logistical might. Whilst failing to counter the eventual outcome of the war the new strategies and doctrine adopted would inflict far more on the allies in terms of eventual casualties and losses in subsequent battles before victory was achieved.
Longer-Term Operational and Strategic Implications.
It would not be until November, with the arrival of the last two of the Yorktown-class carriers Bon-Homme Richard and Ticonderoga, both still in work-up phase in the Atlantic post-commissioning, that the allied carriers would begin to be released from the Central Pacific. Both the Lexington and Pacifica required extensive emergency repairs before being able to proceed to the US to be fully repaired (indeed it was Admirals King’s irrational direction that the lightly damaged Hornet be docked first that nearly resulted in Pacifica sinking in Pearl Harbor, and ultimately lead to his dismissal). The result of this was that the balance of the battles in the SW Pacific for the next six months would be largely fought by the smaller carriers of both sides and the higher importance of land-based assets in this upcoming campaign.
The long deployment greatly improved the inter-operability of the allied forces and the USN, developing both familiarity, trust and procedures which would be the basis of aviation operations between the allies for the remainder of the war. The presence of the Dragonfly aircraft in Hawaii greatly assisted the USN in developing aerial tactics to cope with the highly maneuverable Zero. Acting as ‘enemy’ during this period the RN/RNN component helped polish tactics like the Thatch Weave and improved the effectiveness of USN fighter tactics, and greatly helped the inexperienced air groups of the new carriers, along with improving the standard of air control of these forces. Both Terra Australis and Bulwark would undergo urgent repairs when space became available in Pearl Harbor before being released for operations in the SW Pacific in late October. They would be followed by Audacious and Illustrious from late November. By this time the repaired Saratoga would return to join the other three fleet carriers to form the basis of US Carrier forces for operations in the Central Pacific for 1943.
For Japan, the occupation of Midway for all its cost failed to generate any real long-term strategic benefit, except to perhaps deny a closer USN submarine base to Japanese waters. Initially, Japan was able to repair and operate an airbase there, but it was never large enough to be employed as a springboard for operations against the Hawaiian chain. The US in November began a relentless night area bombing campaign, Operation Woodpecker, by the Hawaiian-based B-17 force. By April 1943 the repeated bombing of the tiny island area had rendered it inoperable as an airbase except for a few seaplanes operating from the atoll lagoon. The constant attritional cost of attempting to keep it supplied was a logistic failure and after the 2nd Battle of Midway in 1943 what forces remained were largely withdrawn before its recapture later that year.
Thus, Midway was the first of the great carrier vs. carrier battles of the Pacific Campaign and resulted in a hiatus in the central Pacific for the second half of 1942, with attention switched to SW Pacific. Both sides used this period to recover and analyze the battle, in preparation for a renewal of the wider conflict in 1943. The sheer size and intensity of the aviation forces involved was unprecedented in any naval operation conducted in the war up to that point. Aside from stunning the leadership of both sides with the losses involved, it also bought to prominence and confirmed the vital importance that naval aviation and air supremacy would have in all subsequent naval operations for the remainder of the war.
END OF MIDWAY DIKKI.
OK everyone, that concludes the end of my Midway Battle Chapter and I hope you bear in mind that it is part of an increasingly difficerent AU here from the events IOTL. The sheer force levels involved should make that clear, but I have included it because even if I sound defensive, believe it I do appreciate the critiques and value the feedback and have already included a couple of things raised to change my draft. Please feel free to respond and ask if you want to elaborate on the rationales or changes presented, and I welcome others perspective but remember that IMO we are sailing in new waters and events IOTL are providing context and not necessarily rigidly fixed here. I hope you have enjoyed this and have found it interesting a I look forward to what you come up with. Regards T. (PS. I will in due course run the second half of the personal interlude up the flagpole shortly for your enjoyment.)