An AH Battle: 1st Battle of Midway, 17 - 21 June 1942

1st Midway Dikki - 1
  • Part One

    SUPPLEMENT ONE

    DIKIPEDIA
    (An Alternate History Factoid by JPD)

    The First Battle of Midway​

    The First Battle of Midway was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that took place on 17-21 June 1942, six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and one month after the inconclusive Battle of the Coral Sea. An Allied force including U.S., British, Nieustralis, and French elements under Admirals William Halsey, Frank J. Fletcher, Raymond A. Spruance (USN), Arthur Lyster (RN), and John Grace (RNN) were defeated by an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Tamon Yamaguchi, Jisaburō Ozawa, and Nobutake Kondō near Midway Atoll, inflicting severe damage or sinking the majority of available operational fleet carriers of the USN.

    The Japanese intent for the battle was luring the American aircraft carriers into a trap and occupying Midway was part of an overall "barrier" strategy to extend Japan's defensive perimeter, particularly in response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo. The success of this operation was also considered preparatory for any subsequent offensive operations against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself. The initial plan of battle was based on faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and assessment of the forces arrayed in opposition.

    The USN, which had command of the operation for the allies, also based their plan of battle on several faulty assumptions. Most significantly, American cryptographers were in the belief that they were aware of the date and location of the planned attack, along with the force composition of their opponents. This belief underpinned USN preparations and the disposition of its forces to prepare its ambush.

    The subsequent battle would be noted for the unprecedented size and intensity of the aerial conflict, with both sides suffering severe casualties. The faulty assumptions involved on both sides would have a significant impact on the outcome of the battle. The Japanese forces achieved their desired result in successfully occupying Midway, sinking four of the six USN fleet carriers in the Pacific Theatre at the time, and damaging the remaining two. The failure of the IJN to anticipate the presence and size of the RN and Allied elements denied them the opportunity to capitalize on the destruction of the USN carrier force and inflicted severe losses on the aviation forces involved in the battle. It would represent by far the largest naval battle of World War 2 at that stage and was to remain one of the largest to occur during the conflict.

    After Midway and its impact on the IJN aviation assets, the subsequent exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands and Central Pacific campaigns was telling. Japan's capacity to replace its losses in materiel (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well-trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace.

    Most historians now consider the Battle of Midway a turning point in the Pacific War, in that it marked the end of the aggressive or expansion phase of Japanese operations in the Pacific Campaign. It represented both the peak of capabilities for the IJN and the nadir of fortune for the USN. It also was the first action that was to incorporate significant Allied forces acting in conjunction with the USN in operations against the IJN in the Central Pacific. Subsequently the size and capabilities of the USN would only increase whilst future IJN deployments, event when offensive, would be largely attritional to support a strategically defensive posture.

    Background​

    After expanding the war in the Pacific to include Western outposts, the Japanese Empire had attained the majority of its initial strategic goals quickly, taking British Hong Kong, the Philippines, Borneo, and sections of the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia). The latter, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Despite these successes, its failure to fully occupy Malaya and capture Singapore, along with the failed assaults on Java, Bali, and East Timor, denied it the opportunity to form a continuous southern island barrier to secure its expansion. Because of this, preliminary planning to try to define revised objectives for the second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942.

    It is interesting to note the degree of institutional blindness that seems to have the blinkered operational analysis of the situation by the IJN. Despite the acknowledgment of the failure to fully secure its southern objectives and some significant losses to those forces involved, the Japanese strategic perspective remained almost entirely focused on countering operations of the USN. Despite the size of the opposition forces involved in the setbacks of the southern operations, the total absence of consideration of how the allied forces involved in inflicting those setbacks might now be employed is inexplicable. The consideration that RN and allied vessels might support USN operations in the central Pacific simply fails to appear in operational planning for the IJN at this time. Where combat had occurred, a culture of automatic acceptance of damage claims and losses inflicted upon allied forces seems endemic and would later be referred to as the ‘victory disease’ by the IJN. This lack of critical analysis of loss figures, and tendency to maximize enemy losses, especially when involving a Japanese failure, also hindered accurate assessment of opposing forces and their likely employment.

    Because of strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army (IJA) and Imperial Navy (IJN) and infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942. Admiral Yamamoto finally won the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted. Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16 United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the vulnerability of Japanese territory to American bombers.

    This, and other successful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the Central Pacific Theatre, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle. Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on the main U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleets to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based airpower on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7 December attack the previous year, he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly.

    Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,300 miles (1,100 nautical miles; 2,100 kilometers) from Oahu. This meant that Midway was outside the effective range of almost all of the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian Islands. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously. The U.S. did consider Midway vital: after the battle, as the establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway would allow submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-provision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 miles (1,900 km). In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.

    Yamamoto's Initial plan: Operation MI

    Typical of much of early Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's initial battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex. It required the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of the open sea. This design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence and inflated loss reports which understated the available balance of forces the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Finally, much of the planning assumptions, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale, which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months. It failed to sufficiently recognize the degree of aggression and anger behind the USN planning decisions that still lingered in the wake of Pearl Harbor.

    Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his carriers) would be concealed from the Americans before the battle. Critically in this concept, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers would trail the carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle. This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of the time.

    When formatting this concept, what Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan to the enemy. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support the others. The carrier force expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks was very light considering the forces available. The only warships in the initial plan larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two Kongō-class fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. In contrast, the trailing forces had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which were immediately available to support the carriers if required. The light carriers and battleships of the trailing forces were too slow to keep pace with the carriers of the Kidō Butai and so could not have sailed in company with them. The Kido Butai would sail into range at best speed to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the enemy toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, the Kido Butai would make the best speed to defend them. Hence the slower ships could not be with the Kido Butai. The distance between forces would have had grave implications if surprise was lost. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of the scout planes carried by the cruisers and carriers, as well as the additional antiaircraft capability of the trailing forces, was unavailable in immediate support.
     
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  • Part Two

    Inclusion of the Aleutian invasion

    To obtain support from the Imperial Japanese Army for the Midway operation, the Imperial Japanese Navy agreed to support their invasion of the United States through the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska, part of the Alaska Territory. In the wake of the Doolittle raid the IJA insistence on the occupation of these islands to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U.S. land-based bombers across Alaska. It also represented a gesture to recover from the loss of face lost incurred by the forces in light of the raid. The inclusion of this concept to the overall plan of battle diverted ships to what could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. This operational aspect was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway.

    The fundamental flaw in this entire plan rested in another unquestioned appreciation of the entire strategic situation. The whole detailed process rested on the one assumption, that the Americans would be surprised. To assume the opposite – something the Japanese refused to do until it was impossible not to – would result in a cascade of very different conclusions. If the Americans were not caught unawares then the Aleutian diversion merely dispersed Japanese strength, and it would be the Americans rather than they who would do the pouncing around Midway, on a carrier force isolated from any possible support.

    Some of these fears were expressed when Ugaki put the plan through a series of war games in mid-April. In one exercise several Japanese carriers were sunk by an unexpected American strike, but Ugaki, in his role as umpire, hastened to undo this decision by rewriting the rules. Some of the participating admirals were not so easily put off. Vice-Admiral Kondo, just back from the Java Sea, and Rear-Admiral Yamaguchi, who had commanded carriers at Pearl Harbor, were not impressed by the plan. They disliked the widespread dispersion of forces and argued that at least the carriers should be wielded as a cohesive force. Nagumo’s Air Operations Officer in the Kido Butai, Commander Genda, strongly endorsed their views. The plan should be rooted in a carrier-centric premise. As it now stood a few carriers had merely been appended to a plan rooted in the traditions of the battleship era.

    This was perceptive thinking, but Yamamoto, apparently worn by the long struggle of institutional infighting necessary to gain acceptance of the plan, proved uncharacteristically unreceptive to alteration to the plan. He remained adamant; Operation Midway would commence in late May. The die had apparently been cast. However, in late April Yamamoto was reluctantly forced to abandon the entire Operation Mi plan. The reason – the only conceivable reason – was the Japanese discovery that their staff code had been broken by the Americans.

    USN possession of Navy Codes

    During the first six months of the war there had occurred several strange incidents and coincidences spread throughout the Japanese sphere of operations. In isolation these seemed random but when subject to analysis they presented a worrying trend. Commanders in different theatres failed to notice several similar ‘coincidences. But staff officers in Tokyo, drew the possible connection when sifting through the various reports. Certain circles had suspected as much for several weeks, but in another example of the institutional narrow-mindedness of sections of the IJN, the thought that the code had been broken was inconceivable. But could it have fallen into enemy hands?

    Each Japanese warship carried a codebook weighted with lead to take it swiftly to the bottom should disaster strike. Analysis of the record of those Japanese ships sunk since the war’s beginning soon narrowed down attention to one. Submarine I-124 had last broadcast its position on 19 January, as outside Darwin harbor in northern Australia. It had been assumed sunk, but where? Suppose it had been depth-charged either in or just outside the harbor? Examining the available oceanographic charts and found that the water in-harbor was a mere 140 feet at the deepest point, quite within the limits of a thorough salvage operation.

    These suspicions were presented to Rear-Admiral Fukudome, the Naval General Staff Chief of Operations in early April. The latter was impressed and, without informing Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet Staff, decided to test this theory. Information was relayed in code by Japanese warships in the Pacific about imaginary problems with the water-distillation plant on Guam. A week later one of Japan’s agents in Hawaii reported that the information had come through. The code had indeed been broken.

    Yamamoto was informed of this by Fukudome on 28 April. He had no choice but to accept that the details of the Coral Sea and Midway operations, which had been flooding the Pacific radio waves for several weeks, were now known to the enemy. With much of the operational movements already underway former went ahead but with late modifications in intent relayed to the commanders of the elements involved. The entire structure of the Midway operation would have to be rethought. But, having accepted this fait-accompli, it also offered Yamamoto an entirely new range of strategic options to achieve the original objectives of the Midway operation.
     
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  • Part Three

    Prelude

    American reinforcements

    To do battle with an enemy expected to muster a minimum of five or six carriers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas needed every available flight deck. He effectively had four fleet carriers already available, and with the situation in the Atlantic seemingly stable, and still lacking an effective battle line after the Pearl Harbor losses, he had successfully lobbied the CNO of the USN, Admiral Ernest King, to transfer a significant portion of the available Atlantic forces to the Pacific theatre. As such in late May he was to receive a further two fleet carriers (Ranger and Wasp) and a further eight cruisers, bringing the number available for the operation to fifteen. Despite worries about their fragility and ability to absorb damage, in light of the assessed threat in the theatre, the decision had been made to transfer them to reinforce the existing carrier numbers in the Pacific. With these, he planned to increase both TF16 and TF17 to three carrier groups, each with a screen of six to eight cruisers, rather than create a third two carrier group unfamiliar with operations in the Pacific Theatre.

    Despite this increase in force availability, Nimitz remained worried about the potential size of any Japanese attack force. This worry is reflected in Nimitz’s instructions to his carrier admirals on the eve of battle which were cautious enough:

    ‘… you will be governed by the principles of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean avoidance of exposure of your forces to attack by superior enemy forces without the prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage on the enemy.’

    – but the mere fact of sending six carriers against a potentially far larger enemy force questions the mindset underlying such caution, and suggested a continuing sense of American optimism despite the potential disparity in force levels involved. The mitigating circumstance was the belief that the USN had broken the Japanese naval code. This belief that they ‘had the drop’ on the Japanese provided Nimitz and his colleagues with a large degree of confidence that they could control the conduct of the battle.

    On 25th May the light cruiser USS St. Louis arrives at Midway and disembarks Companies "C" and "D," 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, and a 37 mm gun battery of the 3rd defense Battalion. The aircraft ferry USS Kitty Hawk brings Marine reinforcements including a detachment of a 3inch (76.2 mm) antiaircraft group of the 3rd defense Battalion, a light tank platoon, and additional personnel for Marine Air Group Twenty. With the Japanese operation now imminent, these would be the last supplies to reach the island before the Japanese attack. In preparation for the upcoming conflict, the US had significantly increased the aviation forces deployed at Midway By 4 June a total of 126 aircraft were stationed there. This force included four squadrons of PBYs Catalinas for long-range reconnaissance duties, a mixed array of bombers including Grumman TBF Avengers, Douglas SBD Dauntless, Vought SB2U Vindicators, whilst the USAAF contributed a squadron of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses and four Martin B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes. For defense, a total of 28 fighters were available, 21 Brewster Buffalos and seven Grumman Wildcats.

    Allied reinforcements

    The US decoders based at Pearl warned Admiral Nimitz of a proposed action by the Japanese aimed at the mid-Pacific, with the most likely target to be Midway Island, and the probable suspension of operations in the southwest Pacific until the conclusion of the Midway operation. On 3rd May he, therefore, passes the intelligence on to Admiral Somerville in the day's dispatches, asking him if it will be possible for the Royal Navy either to help by organizing distracting operations in the SE Asia area or sending a force to help.

    As a result of this communication, on May 4th an urgent meeting is held in Singapore between Somerville, Alexander, Blamey, Park, and the other available area commanders to discuss Nimitz's intelligence and proposed operations. The arrival of the monsoon now limiting surface force options in the SE Asian theatre and the analysis of the signal traffic has convinced Somerville that a major operation will take place shortly, even if it is not at Midway. The other out of theatre possibility is a continuation of the recent SW Pacific operations. The Solomons/New Guinea area is vulnerable to a large Japanese offensive but would only bring limited gains. They would also put the Japanese navy at the end of a long logistic supply line, and there is nothing immediately critical to the Allies in the area - an invasion of the Solomons or another attempt on New Guinea would have to be countered, but the tying down of the Japanese fleet in support would be to the advantage of the Allies who could concentrate on them from two directions.

    Bearing this in mind, Somerville suggests the following. A task force of three fleet carriers plus supporting ships can be sent in 24 hours; it will take some 18-20 days to reach Hawaii. To maintain a high speed the force will need to refuel; this will be done first in Australia and will also allow the force to be halted if it proves necessary. Sending the ships this far is low risk but is best done now while further discussions are made - it would be unwise to wait due to the transit time required. He will still hold two fleet and two light carriers in Singapore. Even if the entire Japanese fleet were to be used, he can always do as he planned in December and fall back to Ceylon while he is reinforced from the Mediterranean but considers this highly unlikely - the IJN would be putting their ships into a noose of his submarines and torpedo planes. To protect the China Sea area, all Allied submarines will be pulled back into defensive positions, and the RAF will use its long-range reconnaissance aircraft to give the maximum warning. By deploying the force, it would also be well placed if the Japanese objective is the SW Pacific option.

    As a result, units of the fleet are ordered to make final preparations and sail for northern Australia within 24 hours. This is preparatory to making a final decision as to its destination. While the proposed task force is still a risk, the possibility of a crushing defeat of the Japanese carrier force is felt to make this risk worthwhile. Thus, on May 6th elements of Force Z, consisting of the fleet carriers HMS Implacable, HMS Bulwark, and the new carrier HMS Audacious, supported by the battleships MNS Richelieu, HMS Anson, and HMS King George V, with supporting cruisers and destroyers, leaves Singapore heading east. Somerville has also ordered for a tanker to be sent to Fiji as a matter of urgency; this will allow the force to refuel and so keep up a higher passage speed. On11th May the force reach Darwin during the night to refuel and sails soon after dawn, heading east along the north coast of Australia. On the 18th it arrives at Fiji where it is redesignated as Task Force 58. There several tankers have been sent to provide the force with fuel. The force pauses only to refuel and take on water, then heads north, destination Pearl Harbor.

    On 26th May Vice Admiral Lyster, the commander of the newly designated TF58, lands at Pearl Harbor by carrier plane to discuss the operation with Admiral Nimitz and his staff. Given the operation planned, command of the RN force has been given to him due to his experience in multi-carrier operations. The size of the RN force has made discussions of who is to command somewhat delicate (the USN and RN forces are of a similar size), but Somerville has already decided with Nimitz that the American local knowledge and territory mean they should be in overall command. Nimitz has agreed that Lyster will have as free a hand as possible over the use of his ships, particularly if the RN carriers can get off a night strike, something outside of the existing USN capability. The RN Force arrives at Pearl Harbor on 27th May. Overnight the fleet is refueled, and US navy communications personnel and their equipment are hurried on board along with a USN deck landing officer to each carrier each in case any US aircraft need to be recovered (the landing procedures and signals are different in the two navies. Preparations have been made during their voyage to Hawaii to add the US radio equipment to allow them to communicate with the US Task Forces and aircraft. A US light cruiser will also accompany the force to aid in this.

    It had been hoped that TF58 would arrive in time to integrate it with the US carrier forces now on their way to Midway, but there was no time before the Japanese sailed. Current intentions are for the TF58 to move east of Midway, to catch the Japanese force between forces. Located south of the US forces this place them in a position to employ the attached battleships in a surface action role in the event the Japanese attempt to bombard Midway. As with the USN ships, flags and markings are painted on the ships to reduce the chance of misidentification and on the evening of the 28th, TF58 departs.

    Inclusion of Task Force 44

    The formation of the last element of forces involved at Midway resulted due to the fortunate coincidence of several ship movements. With the increased Japanese threat in the Pacific in February the RNN carrier HMNS Terra Australis was detached from service with Force H in Gibraltar to return to home waters at Nieustralis request. Returned via Durban where it was docked and completed an overdue boiler clean before continuing to Freemantle with a RN escort of two cruisers and two destroyers. No longer with the immediate need for them in the Indian Ocean theatre, they were routed to Melbourne and joined by the light carrier Pacifica, which had just finished repairs from damage received in operations around Java. At Sydney, the carrier Australia was just leaving dock after repairs to collision damage sustained after ramming and sinking the destroyer Voyager in night landing exercises in February. Originally tasked to provide air cover for the four RNN cruisers of Task Group 44 in the Coral Sea Operation, the carrier had missed the Coral Sea Operation but now rejoined TG44. These two groups were merged under the command of Admiral Jack Grace and renamed TF44 and dispatched to Fiji to be available for operations in the SW or Central Pacific as required. The intent initially was that with carrier forces available at Hawaii and Singapore the allies were positioned to respond to threats in the China Sea or Central Pacific. The other possible operational threat was a thrust towards the SW Pacific/ Solomons and placing carrier assets, though of weaker strength, in Fiji waters would be well placed to counter this possibility.

    Employment of the three-carrier TF44 in the Midway operation was initially considered unfeasible due to the priority given to the rapid transit of TF58 for tanker support and the initial date given for the Japanese move. Moving the TF to Fiji was considered a prudent option in event that the Japanese forces had some other target other than Midway. The sinking of the replenishment oiler Sepulga (AO-20) by submarine on 21 May meant the high-speed transit option was unavailable and initially that TF44 would arrive too late to participate in the Midway Operation. However, as signals intelligence indicated a delay in the anticipated arrival date of the Japanese forces, cruising at economical speed allowed arrival at Pearl Harbor on late 4 June. As before with TF58 the group was urgently refueled and restocked whilst taking on USN personnel and left Pearl Harbor early on June 6th, accompanied by a USN light cruiser and three destroyers. These represented the last available USN surface forces available in the Central Pacific.

    Arriving almost as an add-on late to the operation, little consideration appears to have been given to specific operational employment of TF44 before its arrival. On 11 June Admiral Grace flew from Terra Australis to confer with Admiral Lyster onboard Audacious to confirm the roles envisioned for TF44 in the upcoming conflict. At this meeting, he had inquired if he should marry up with TF58 and consolidate the two commonwealth groups into one. Admiral Lyster confirmed that whilst tactical control of the RN/RNN elements remained with him, operational command rested with Halsey. He indicated that Halsey wished to preserve the limited logistic support available for the offensive operations, to the two USN task groups and TF58, with the intent of destroying the Kido Butai if possible. As such TF44 was to continue to close with the balance of the allied forces but do so in a manner to maximize the endurance of the group and to be prepared to operate as directed. He clarified Halsey’s intent to target the fleet carriers of the IJN as a priority, including prosecuting a vigorous pursuit if possible, and that TF44 role in this plan would be to cover Midway Island to free the balance of the allied forces to pursue this action. If possible TF44 would be involved in prosecuting attacks on the Invasion Force and Occupation Group vessels once the IJN covering forces had been driven off or destroyed. This was considered an operational possibility to free USN forces to pursue or destroy the carriers of the Kido Butai in detail if the opportunity was presented. It was with this understanding that Admiral Grace returned to TF44 and continued to close with the balance of allied forces at an economical 15 knots. In many ways its employment in the upcoming battle and given the overall weaker air element, was to largely act as a backup contingency force available to respond to unforeseen changes to the overall operation. As such TF44 was still about 90 miles to the SE of TF58 and closing slowly as the initial stages of the engagement opened.

    The arrival of TF44 represented the final available reinforcements in the Central Pacific for the upcoming battle. The disposition of the Allied force was a total of 12 carriers in four operational groups, each of three carriers with screen, deployed in a rough arc to the north and east of Midway.
     
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  • Part Four

    Yamamoto's Adjustments to Operation MI

    The news of the US code-breaking success forced a fundamental reassessment of the plan as it existed. It invalidated a number of the critical assumptions used to base the structure and disposition of the forces as originally deployed. In the absence of surprise, the dispersal of strength as planned simply offered the USN an opportunity to engage and destroy the forces in isolation. With this knowledge, Yamamoto amended the plan to reflect more on the ‘double-bluff aspect rather than surprise. The original plan would serve as a feint for the new one, and to this end, the broken code was continued in use throughout May. Naturally, the information transmitted was somewhat selective. The Americans would expect Nagumo’s carriers north-east of Midway, and dispositions would be altered to take advantage of this expectation. The Americans would also expect a diversion in the Aleutians. With the original maneuvering to get IJA approval for the plan, Yamamoto still had to honor that commitment, but now with an entirely changed force allocation.

    At the urging of Ugaki, Genda, and several other officers, the plan became much more carrier-based. With the loss of the battleship Ise and damage to the Hyuga as a result of operations against the Allied forces in the South China Sea, nine operational battleships were immediately available for the IJN. The Aleutians operation would still proceed, but now with the two oldest of those ships Fuso and Yamashiro, and two light carriers Hosho and Ryuho in support, and with orders to proceed only after the decisive naval engagement had been fought. The three carriers Oiyo, Junyo, and Ryujo and the cruiser elements of their screen would now be part of the main Midway operation.

    Emergency repairs enabled the availability of Amagi (damaged on a grounding at Truk), and Shokaku (flight deck damage after the Coral Sea Operation) and restored the Kido Butai to its available operational strength of seven fleet carriers. With the three Aleutian carriers and four light carriers he had a total of fourteen operational carriers available, virtually the entire naval aviation capability of the IJN at this time, and certainly the largest ever assembly of carriers in an operation in the war to date. Too many to operate as a single group, the Ryujo (36 aircraft) and Zuiho (30 aircraft) were allocated to support the main force for the assault on Midway itself. The remaining twelve, carrying over 800 aircraft were to operate in three air fleets, each of four carriers, and these would be the main offensive weapon used in the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet. For the first time since Pearl Harbor, the Kido Butai would be restored to eight carriers split into two operational four carrier elements, each carrying over 320 aircraft. The 1st Air Fleet under Admiral Kondo, with Kaga, Amagi, Akagi, and the smaller Junyo. The 2nd Air Fleet under Admiral Yamaguchi with Zuikaku, Shokaku, Hiryu, and Soryu. The last element was the newly formed 5th Air Fleet with 160 aircraft in the four smaller carriers, Oiyo, Hiyo, Chitose, and Chiyoda, and under the command of Admiral Ozawa.

    The Main Carrier striking force was the eight carriers of the first and second air fleets. Recognizing that this was too unwieldy to operate as a single entity, each air fleet would operate independently, though remaining within close proximity of each other to provide support if required. Each fleet would include a significantly larger escort force than originally planned. Each fleet had attached a division of two of the fast Kongo-class battleships, a squadron of four heavy cruisers, and a scout plane cruiser in addition to a destroyer squadron screen. Trailing the carrier striking force, but much more closely than the previous plan, would be the main body of the invasion fleet. This would include the remaining three battleships, Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato, with Yamamoto flying his flag on the Yamato, the carrier group of Ryujo and Zuiho, and screening forces. These covered the trailing occupation force, and support and supply groups each with its own screen.

    Due to the importance and size of the operation, Yamamoto elected to command the operation himself, particularly after Nagumo’s hesitant performance at the recent Coral Sea Operation. In the amended plan his carriers would approach southwest of Midway Island, in the general direction of the Hawaiian group. This was partly to avoid any American submarines deployed to cover the original planned approach, and partly to pull the American carriers south, towards the surprise element of the new plan. This was the second carrier force of the 5th Air Fleet under Admiral Ozawa moving northwards on an interception course in complete radio silence. If the American carriers retreated to the east rather than seek battle with the Japanese force, then Ozawa’s force would be in a position to cut them off. Whatever happened the US carriers would find themselves outnumbered and outmaneuvered, and swiftly dispatched to the ocean floor. The plan secured both Yamamoto’s strategic goals, eliminating America's carrier forces and establishing an outpost at Midway to extend the Japanese security perimeter in the Central Pacific. Only once these objectives were attained could the Imperial Navy possibly consider future plans for raids on the West Coast of America or Panama, or an assault on Fiji to cut the US/Nieustralis lines of supply.

    For the assault, both the 1st and 2nd air fleets were reinforced with additional screening elements and to remain within 40 miles of each other whilst the slower invasion force, thanks to the additional time by the delayed starting date, was also to be in trailing much more closely than the previous plan so that all elements could move to support each other in a shorter timeframe if required. But both invasion groups were now under strict orders to assault their objectives only after the decisive naval engagement had been fought. This time, however, the main battle fleet would be in close attendance with severely limited objectives for the convoy of troopships for the seizure of Midway. Lastly, due to the requirement for the 5th Air Fleet to approach from the south, and to allow the full deployment of a Japanese submarine screen for the operation, the invasion date was deferred back from the 5th of June to the 11th. From22 May the array of Japanese forces commence moving from Truk in the Carolines and Saipan and on 24 May Yamamoto’s Main Fleet had upped anchor in Hiroshima Bay and threaded its way in single file down the Bungo Channel to the ocean.
     
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  • Part Five

    Allied Deployments

    Initially unaware of the deferred date, much of the preparation and arrangement for deployment was rushed in expectation of the anticipated 4th June start date. Task Force 16, centered round the carriers Lexington and Enterprise and the newly arrived Ranger, with seven cruisers and screen, was placed under the command of Rear-Admiral Spruance, originally the screen commander, due to the hospitalization of Admiral William ‘Bull’ Halsey, the senior American carrier admiral, due to a debilitating skin disease. Rear-Admiral Frank Fletcher led the other Task Force 17, comprising the carriers Hornet and Yorktown and the other transferred carrier Wasp, with eight cruisers and destroyer support out to sea on 23 May. These represent nearly the totality of available USN surface combatants available in the Central Pacific at this time. 16 of the 19 available submarines would be deployed in two patrol lines in an arc to cover the northwestern approaches to Midway. With the Allied TF58 departing Pearl Harbor on the 28th of May followed by the final element TF44 departing on 6 June.

    Receiving news from the US code breakers that the arrival of the invasion force would be delayed to ‘army movement issues’, and despite his persisting skin issues, Halsey left hospital and was flown to the Enterprise on the 7th of June and assumed command of the US and Allied carrier forces. During the handover brief before resuming command of the TF 16 screen Spruance and discussed the deployment of the available force. The three task forces were deployed in a general north-south line to the NE of Midway to engage the Japanese approach from the NW. Separated by about 40 miles each, TF16 was central with TF17 to its north, whilst TF58 occupied the southern-most position, about 90 miles NE of Midway Island. This was due to the Allied battleship component of TF58 and in the event, Japanese forces attempted bombardment of Midway then it was in the best position to be employed in a surface action. The vitally important refueling group of tankers and escort was some 70 miles to the east of TF16 to support any pursuit options that may develop. This deployment indicated the confidence and Halsey's aggressive mindset leading up to the engagement. Such confidence was also much evident aboard the ships, with sailors and fliers buoyant and eager to get a crack at the despised enemy. As the weakest of the task forces, TF44 with three smaller carriers figured little in the deployment discussions as there were insufficient fueling resources for it to be involved in any subsequent pursuit, which by default had evolved into being included as a primary operational objective for the planned battle. When discussed, it was given the general task of covering Midway to free up the other task forces for offensive and pursuit operations. The only offensive task nominated was a generic observation to “engage the invasion element if the opportunity presents itself.” It was to maximize endurance and operate economically as possible concerning this task. As such the TF44 closed on the balance of the Allied forces at an economical cruise and as the action commenced it was still some 90 miles ESE of Midway and over 100 miles separated from TF58, the southernmost of the carrier groups.

    Operational Issues in the Prelude

    Much of the confidence of Admirals Nimitz and Halsey rested in their belief that they had one critical advantage. Since early 1942, the U.S. had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF", subsequently determined to be Midway Island. With the amount of message traffic, it was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle. As a result, the Americans entered the battle believing they possessed a good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. This belief strongly influenced both the deployment of the carrier forces and the available US submarines. These submarines, deployed in two picket lines to interdict the anticipated approach from the NW, would be largely nullified by the actual SW approach, and only three would eventually be in a position to engage Japanese forces. Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in both American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands before the battle, Japanese plans were not changed as it removed a potentially significant threat without any action on their behalf.

    The Japanese, in contrast, remained largely unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began. Japanese strategic scouting arrangements before the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (despite the deferred start date), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected. A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine H8K "Emily" flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor before the battle and detect whether the American carriers were present, part of Operation K, was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals—was now occupied by American warships because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March.

    Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Though missing the US carrier forces transit, nevertheless a force of some nine IJN submarines had been deployed to detect such movements. In place, before the subsequent movements of both TF58 and TF44, they failed to detect the movement of either force. This remains perhaps the critical scouting failure of the operation for the IJN and to this day no logical explanation has been determined as to why this lapse occurred. If the movement of either of these forces and their structure had been detected, then the entire prosecution of the IJN plan would have been markedly different.

    Both sides at this time still employed the pre-war antiaircraft fit out which had disadvantages. Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration deficiencies that limited their effectiveness. They would later develop the Model 98 100mm gun which was an excellent weapon but the standard 25mm gun lacked range and stopping power which limited its effectiveness at repelling US air attacks. Similarly, the US 1.1-inch gun also was inadequate for its intended role, and it would only be later that the more effective 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors mounts proliferate and prove a much more effective air defense.

    In terms of aircraft, the main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft was the "Val" dive bomber and the "Kate", which was predominantly employed as a torpedo bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable A6M "Zero". For a variety of reasons, production of the "Val" had been drastically reduced, while that of the "Kate" had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses. In addition, many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable.

    The US strike aircraft were the Dauntless dive bomber and Devastator in the torpedo bombing role. The Devastator was already obsolescent, though it was not realized at this time, and it would suffer fearsome losses in this battle highlighting that fact. The main fighter was the F4F Wildcat, a sturdy design that lacked the maneuverability of the Zero. Despite the provision of information from the British experience combating the Zero in the DEI which had been freely provided, there persisted a general lack of appreciation of this fact in the USN fighter groups. With few exceptions (VF-6 aboard Hornet, with Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach in command), the fighter groups would readily engage in turning dogfights to their great disadvantage in the coming battles and suffer serious losses. Another factor limiting the effectiveness of the embarked carrier air groups was the small size of the fighter groups at this time. Pre-war doctrine emphasized offensive action and larger torpedo and bomber groups. The smaller fighter numbers resulted in limited numbers available for fighter support to air strikes or limiting the size of CAP retained for carrier defense. Both issues would be highlighted in the upcoming battle.

    The Allied carrier aircraft employed a range of British designs, from the obsolescent Swordfish biplane, still carried in limited numbers in TF44 and employed in the ASW role, to the exceptional Dragonfly fighter. This was not only the only current allied aircraft capable of equal or better performance than the Zero in a turning fight, but it also possessed a secondary capability in the dive-bomber role which was unknown at this time to the IJN. The Martin-Baker Cormorant was carried on TF58 in the dive-bomber role, with adequate performance and roughly equal to the US Dauntless. TF58 and TF44 both carried the Fairy Seabattle in the torpedo bomber role and a squadron of the very capable Bolton Paul SeaLance were also embarked aboard the Audacious. Both TBR types possessed better performance than the Devastator, with that of the new SeaLance, in particular, being outstanding.
     
    6
  • Part Six

    Battle

    Initial air attacks

    At about 09:00 on 16 June, PBY from Midway spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nautical miles (580 miles; 930 kilometers) to the west-southwest of Midway. Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found the transport group 570 nautical miles (660 miles; 1,060 kilometers) to the west. Harassed by heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Although their crews reported hitting four ships, none of the bombs hit anything and no significant damage was inflicted.

    At 04:30 on 17 June, the initial attack on Midway itself was launched, consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers, escorted by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. From Junyo and Amagi of the 1st Air Fleet. At the same time, Kondo launched twelve search aircraft (8 "Kates" from Akagi and Kaga, and 4 "Jakes" from Tone. Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were in an arc to the northeast and east of the task force, initially hampered under poor weather conditions in that region. While this initial strike was to neutralize Midway’s air assets, if possible, its primary role was to trigger a response from US Carrier forces, which the reconnaissance aircraft could locate and report.

    At this time 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns, and at 06:34, one reported sighting two Japanese carriers, and another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later. Midway's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and interceptors were scrambled. As the islands unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remained behind to defend Midway. At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based fighters intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though managing to destroy eleven attackers. After the attack, only two of the original 28 fighters remained airworthy. American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, destroying three additional Japanese aircraft and damaging many more.

    Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in this attack, 11 were destroyed (including three that ditched), and 43 were damaged to some degree. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway, as American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force, and most of Midway's land-based defenses similarly remained intact. Japanese pilots reported that a subsequent aerial attack on Midway's defenses would be necessary before troops could go ashore. This was expected as the initial strike was only the first step of the aerial campaign and eliciting an American response was desired. Hence only employing the air groups of two carriers for the first strike.

    Having taken off before the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several uncoordinated attacks on the 1st Carrier Fleet. The Japanese repelled these attacks, losing three fighters while destroying seventeen of the 53 attacking aircraft. Having sustained no damage from the attacks Kondo determined to defer another immediate attack on Midway and proceeded to rearm a strike force armed for anti-ship operations.

    The Carrier Exchanges Commence.

    Some 240 miles north-east of Midway the three Allied Task Forces waited under a clear blue sky. Halsey, with nothing as yet to attack, had only launched his search planes at first light. The Admiral, according to one of Enterprise’s few survivors, was as tense as ever on the eve of action, pacing up and down the bridge, cracking nervous jokes about Japanese incompetence. At 06.35, a message came through from Midway Island. The radar there had picked up the incoming Japanese strike force some thirty miles out. Five minutes later Halsey got his precise fix. One of the Yorktown dive-bombers launched on search duty had found the Japanese Fleet south of the anticipated axis of approach, 135 miles west-north-west of Midway, pursuing a south-easterly course. The Admiral signaled to his own fleet: south-southwest at full speed. It would take three hours to be close enough to launch a strike.

    It was 07.25. From the Yamato’s bridge, Yamamoto watched his fleet repairing the damage done to its formation. Kondo had just radioed news of the Midway attack, advising that Fuchida thought that there was no need for an immediate second attack and that he concurred. Though the airstrip was still operational, the Japanese could concentrate on the American carriers they hoped were within some 300 miles, away to the northeast. Accordingly, Yamamoto ordered that the air groups arm for shipping strikes. Barring a calamity there would be time to bring in the returning first strike while the Americans were still out of range. Reinforcements were sent up to join the Zero patrols above the fleet. And then, again, a period of waiting.

    By 08.20 the Amagi and Junyo’s planes were set down on the flight decks and being rushed below for re-arming and refueling. Simultaneously on the other carrier’s aircraft were brought up from the hangar decks, already primed for action against the American Fleet. By 09.00 the process had been completed without any ominous sighting of approaching American planes. There was still no word of the enemy carriers. The search planes should be on the return leg of their sweeps by this time. If the Americans were where they should be, then they would soon be sighted. Either that or things were not working out according to plan. And that would entail some radical rethinking of the operational plan.

    It did not prove necessary. At 09.24 a report came in from the Akagi scout plane – ‘a large enemy force’. Ten minutes later came the composition. The force included three carriers and was steaming south-westward some 120 miles northeast of Midway. This was Halsey’s TF16. With this, the ready airstrike of the 2nd Air Fleet was released from the flight decks and into the air. This wave was mostly composed of Pearl Harbor veterans who had been deliberately held back by Yamaguchi for this moment. It was the cream of the Navy air arm. Soon over two hundred and forty planes – roughly equal numbers of Vals, Kates, and Zeros – were forming up overhead, and soon after 10.00, the order was given by flight-leader Egusa to proceed northeast against the enemy. Some forty of the Zeros remained behind, hovering above the Japanese carriers of the 2nd Airfleet. Yamamoto elected at this stage to retain some flexibility in his responses till he confirmed enemy dispositions, especially with four other carriers moving in from the south. Despite the risk involved in keeping fully laden aircraft on deck, he retained the ready strike on the Akagi and Kaga, ready to respond to any change. The wisdom of this policy was soon proven when some ten minutes later a second group of three carriers north of the initial group was reported. Kondo immediately released the ready strike of 120 aircraft on Kaga and Akagi, and within minutes both were clearing their decks of the laden aircraft. The speed of this action was fortunate as even as the last aircraft launched and the carriers resumed their positions within the screen, the destroyer Hatsuyuki reported a large enemy force approaching from the north. The aircraft of TF16 had arrived.

    Since 06.00 Halsey had been hurrying his carriers, southwards to get within range of the Japanese Fleet, and by 09.20 his planes were lifting off from his three carriers. TF17 was also moving south, but due to the initial deployment, still was about 40 miles north of TF17 and Fletcher elected to delay an immediate launch to close with the Japanese location more before committing his aircraft. TF58 initially some 90 miles to the south was moving east and had closed to within 60 miles of Halsey. This meant that the strike of TF16 of some 210 aircraft was on its own. In their brief communication, Halsey appeared happy with this situation and indicated his intent to use subsequent strikes from TF17 and 58 to follow up and engage the survivors of the initial strike. This intent would soon be subject to the reality check of the IJN aviation capabilities. Shortly after this, the report came in from the searching aircraft of the location of the second group of four carriers some miles to the NW of the first reported group. Despite the sudden doubling of the size of the enemy carrier forces, Halsey appears to have been initially little troubled by this news, merely ordering Fletchers TF 17 to launch the full-strength strike marshaled on its decks. There appears to have been little immediate recognition or appreciation to the implications on the fact that the strength, dispositions, and location of the enemy forces were increasingly different from the intelligence assumptions on which his plan was based.

    With the sighting of the Japanese 1st Airfleet, the American pilots found themselves plowing through the dense flak of the screen as they elected to concentrate on the three largest carriers visible, to a large degree disregarding the smaller Junyo. The dive-bombers, arriving just ahead of the slower torpedo-bombers, and bore the brunt of the 40 Zeros’ already aloft as the CAP. The 58 strong Wildcat escort outnumbered the Zeros of the CAP considerably but was hampered by the poor tactics employed, losing some 38 of their number in a large confusing melee as they attempted to prevent the Zeroes from engaging the strike. Nevertheless, they succeeded in limiting the attacks of the high elements on the dive bombers. Despite the disruption, the dive bomber element totaled 90 aircraft and portions succeeded in reaching their targets. The disjointed attacks of the diving Dauntlesses managed to score multiple hits on all three of the large carriers. The Amagi and Kaga each received three hits, whilst the Akagi received two.

    Whilst the dive bomber occupied the CAP the twenty ready Zeros of the Junyo and Amagi, scrambling to gain height, had closed on the descending torpedo-bombers. Here again, they did brutal execution on the obsolescent Devastators, but the 71 aircraft of the three air groups again simply swamped the defensive fighters. Despite losing nearly 40 of their number and having to contend with the ships’ anti-aircraft fire some thirty managed to cut through to launch their torpedoes. Here they were cruelly served by the failure of the USN Bureau of Ordnance and the defective fuses of the torpedo warheads. At least three torpedoes struck carriers without failing to detonate. Despite this, all three of the Carriers were hit, as well as the Battleship Hiei but at a brutal cost. Only 17 of the 71 Devastators exited the area, and only five of those would be deemed airworthy when returning to TF16.

    Of the three carriers, Amagi immediately suffered fatal damage. Stuck by two torpedoes that did detonate and five bombs, it is probable that it would have sunk anyway. But Laden with fueled and armed aircraft in preparation for a second strike immediately suffered a massive series of secondary explosions. The two torpedoes struck close together amidships disabling its engines. The carrier, holed beneath the water-line, shuddered to a halt, listing violently to port. Lacking power and with no pressure for the water mains, the flames from the exploding ordnance in the hanger spread unchecked and the carrier was soon burning from end to end as the crew attempted to abandon ship. She would still be burning fiercely when finally sinking that evening, taking over 900 of her crew with her. Akagi likewise took two torpedoes, one to port and one to starboard, but both on the main belt of her armor, resulting in the influx of several hundred tons of water. Despite this, she was able to remain under power and maneuverable, though at reduced speed. The single bomb hit that she suffered struck at the base of the island super structure. The detonation would not affect flying operations, but flying shrapnel Killed Admiral Kongo and injuring several of his flag staff, including Captain Genda, architect of the original Pearl Harbor attack. Kaga was also struck by two bombs and a single torpedo. The single torpedo hit well forward had little effect aside from causing a list of a few degrees and reducing her speed. One of the two bombs struck a 5-inch mount destroying it whilst the second penetrated the side of the flight deck just behind the trunked funnels and detonated in the hanger below. Unlike the Amagi the hangar was devoid of flammables and explosives. Though initially fierce the fire resulting from this hit was rapidly bought under control and within the hour Kaga was capable of resuming flight operations after some temporary repairs to the flight deck. The departing American aircrew would report three burning and sinking carriers upon their return. But the 210 aircraft suffered brutal losses in achieving this with barely 90 successfully returning to the location of TF16. Meanwhile second in command Rear Admiral Chuichi Hara, assumed command of the 1st Air fleet.

    It was now after 10.00 and whilst this strike was in progress, in a series of cascading actions every carrier group on both sides had either launched or was in the process of launching an airstrike, and at one point a total of six flights of planes were airborne. The first American strike from TF16 on the 1st Airfleet was returning to its carriers. The first Japanese strike from the 2nd Airfleet was nearing those carriers and would shortly be attacking. A second American strike from TF17 which had just taken to the air was forming up and heading to the reported location of the 2nd Airfleet. Each of these strikes totaled over 180 aircraft. The final smaller strike of some 110 aircraft from the Kaga and Akagi was in the process of heading for TF17. At this point, Halsey was very confident and ordered TF58 to go ahead and mount a strike at the 1st Air fleet survivors.

    In this interlude, Halsey and his subordinate Fletcher had been exchanging animated signals as to the second group’s composition. Halsey, true to his nature and the Japanese expectations, was inclined to throw everything he had at the enemy. Fletcher, who seems to be the first allied flag officer badly worried by the tactical picture and showing greater reverence for the cautious aspect of Nimitz’s initial instructions, and also uncomfortable due to the size and location of the reported Japanese forces wished to keep most of the fighter strength back for defense against the inevitable Japanese attack. Already far different from the anticipated enemy plan, it was better to weaken the American attack, he argued than to lose the carriers. Also, he urged that the two US TF merge for mutual support. In the face of the size of the Japanese carrier force. the attack by TF58 could only further weaken the Japanese force, and further strikes could be ordered once initial results were known. Earlier Halsey, uncharacteristically – there is evidence that he was feeling the strain of his illness on this day – agreed to a fatal compromise with the composition of the TF17 strike. Neither enough fighters were sent with the attack to make it count, nor enough kept behind to ensure adequate protection. But Halsey ordered TF16 about to close with TF17.

    While this was happening the Japanese finally located TF58 closing from the east. To say the sudden and totally unexpected appearance of a new three-carrier group caused consternation in the Japanese command, would be a vast understatement. Suddenly all the comfortable assumptions and confidence in the situation was lost. With the carriers of the Kido Butai now unexpectedly outnumbered, Yamamoto could no longer afford to keep the presence of the 5th Airfleet secret. Some 250 miles to the south and closing, Admiral Ozawa was to launching a strike at this new presence from his still undiscovered fleet. His planes would have twice as far to fly as those from the other two rapidly converging fleets. They would be making their appearance in about two hours. In the meantime, he ordered all the fleet elements to close on the 1st Airfleet location for mutual support in the face of the sudden increase in enemy forces.

    Even as the 150+ strike from TF58 left for the 1st Airfleet location, a report arrived from TF44 of a new Japanese carrier force to the south. This burst as a complete surprise to the Allied forces as at no stage had they received the slightest hint of its possible existence. At this point, it is fair to say that whatever prior plans had been made, both sides had been totally surprised by the unexpected presence of significant enemy forces. Each side was forced to make rapid tactical adjustments at short notice, with command decisions shrouded in the fog of war and sudden uncertainty as to what they faced. What Halsey thought will never be determined because even this latest report was being processed the incoming strike of the 2nd Airfleet was being detected by TF16s radar. Before any response was formulated, TF16 became locked in a vital struggle for survival as the 240 strong strike force swept into the attack.

    What was to follow was often referred to as perhaps the most clinically precise major air strike by a carrier force in the Pacific campaign. The strike group composed of many Pearl Harbor veterans and under the experienced command of Lieutenant Commander Takahashi from the Shokaku represented perhaps the peak of the IJN aviation at this time. Composing almost equal numbers of Kate’s, Vals and Zeroes they were met about 20 miles out from TF16. Despite the advantage of early warning the 48 available Wildcats were again disadvantaged by poor tactics and outnumbered by over 60 Zero’s, which proceeded to sweep them aside. Losing over 30 of their number at the cost of 11 zero’s they were unable to disrupt the attacking formations. Without interruption Takahashi was able to marshal and coordinate the attack to maximum effect, only disrupted by the desperate anti-aircraft fire as the screen attempted to protect the carriers. With almost uncanny synchronicity dive bombers came diving out of the sun at the carriers, whilst hammer and anvil attacks from two axis’s by torpedo bombers came lancing in across the waves through the screen of covering ships. Arriving almost simultaneously the Ranger and Yorktown were overwhelmed from multiple directions.

    The Ranger was the first purpose-built carrier of the USN in the early 1930s, lightly built as a weight-saving measure and designed to carry the maximum number of aircraft on a barely armored hull. Lacking the protection of subsequent classes, the decision to employ her in the Pacific theatre had been considered risky but accepted to defend Hawaii. The error of this decision was soon apparent as struck rapidly by four bomb hits and three torpedoes; she was almost immediately reduced to a sinking wreck. Ablaze for two-thirds of her length and listing rapidly port as she slewed to a halt. Less than 40 minutes after the first impact she would capsize and sink shortly thereafter, the second-fastest sinking of a carrier in the war, and take over 1500 of her 2150 crew down with her. Her unfortunate fate however was to be exceeded by the Yorktown being attacked simultaneously less than a mile away.

    The thoughts passing through Admiral Halsey’s mind at this time will never be known. In minutes his expectations of victory must have turned to the nightmare knowledge of certain defeat. He did not have to suffer such thoughts for long. The target of veteran aircrew from Shokaku and Zuikaku was immediately hit by at least five 500 lb bombs – three on the flight deck, one on the bridge, one on the rear of the superstructure – and two torpedoes close together amidships, and a third on the port bow. There were several large explosions in quick succession and one enormous convulsion. At least one or two of the ship's magazines detonated breaking the ship's back. With the bridge destroyed and both Admiral Halsey and the ship's captain dead the was no hope of recovery. Within five minutes of receiving the first bomb, the ship was on her way to the bottom, racked by internal explosions and her back broken. The flaming flight deck would slip under the sea barely 25 minutes after the first impact. It was the fastest sinking of a carrier in naval history to date (see Addendum at Post 87), and the surrounding escorts would recover only 238 survivors of a crew of over 2200.

    The fate of the final carrier Lexington was not quite as brutally abrupt and followed a few minutes after her two companions. Subject to the same synchronized hammer and anvil attack whilst being dive-bombed, she benefitted to a degree from the proximity of the one modern anti-aircraft cruiser of the screen Atlanta. Her dense and concentrated fire badly disrupted one arm of the torpedo attack, downing three Vals damaging several more. This was achieved at the cost of attracting the attention of a chotai of Kates from the Hiryu, which pressed an attack on the Atlanta to close range before releasing their torpedoes. All three were shot down, but two of the three torpedoes released struck, one in the second engine room and one near the propellers. One of the burning Kates also flew into the rear superstructure, causing further damage. Despite Atlanta's defense, Lexington was still struck on the port side by three torpedoes. These all struck near the stern quarter, destroying the rudder and propellers, and rapidly bringing her to a halt. The rapid loss of speed and resultant sharp swing to port, fortunately, caused most of the dive bombs to miss closely ahead. Nevertheless, a further three bombs struck the forward flight deck and blew the forward lift out of the hanger, whilst the near misses forward sprung plates near the bow. Despite having no aircraft in the hanger and aviation fuel secured, a severe fire took hold and proceeded to burn out of control. Left stationary and battling to control the fires and flooding, Lexington still maintained power and pressure to her water mains and pumps and was not in immediate danger of sinking. Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of the crew and supporting vessels, the fire could not be extinguished, nor could the influx of flooding, worsened by sprung plates forward be contained as the carrier steadily began to settle by the bow. Requiring counter flooding to prevent capsizing, her hull soon began settling deeper and as the water gained ground. By mid-afternoon, this threatened to flood the engine rooms and deny power to fight the damage. Around 1600 hours that afternoon the captain gave the decision to abandon ship with the flight deck less than 20 feet above the water. The accompanying destroyers closed to recover the wounded directly lowered onto the decks and swimmers from the water. This was concluded shortly after 1700 and as the ships withdrew the destroyer Owens fired torpedoes to scuttle the still burning hulk. In a further damning indictment on the torpedoes, the first three fired at the stationary target all struck and failed to detonate. It was only after the fourth and fifth detonated that Lexington slowly rolled onto her side and sank around 1735 with the loss of 228 of her crew. With her loss, the carrier element of TF16 had ceased to exist.

    In a final insult to injury the heavy cruiser Chester had been struck amidships by a torpedo dropped at a target on the far side of the screen, losing an engine room and reduced to a maximum speed of twelve knots. The final loss for the strike by the Japanese was 49 aircraft and well worth the cost for the destruction of half the US carriers in the Pacific. With the remaining seven cruisers, two damaged, (Atlanta would have to be scuttled that evening after dark), and nine destroyers Admiral Spruance was again left in command of the remnants of the TF16 screen. Till TF17 joined his priority was to recover survivors from the water and organize the scattered and damaged vessels remaining.
     
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  • Part Seven

    The Second Wave strikes

    Even as the surviving aircraft from the initial strikes were returning the second wave of aircraft were approaching their targets. The first of these to arrive was the 189 strong strike from TF17 on the four carriers of the 2nd Air Fleet, consisting of 38 Wildcats, 78 Dauntlesses, and 83 Devastators. Despite lacking radar, the Japanese force was not surprised due to Admiral Yamaguchi deploying a screen of floatplanes from his cruisers down the threat axis of the American carrier force. These detected the approaching strike some 70 miles out from the Japanese force, enabling the Japanese to have the entire fighter strength of 47 Zeroes deployed at altitude for the approaching strike, which they intercepted still some 15 miles short of the Japanese ships. Again, the US fighter force was lacking the necessary numbers to defend the strike effectively and was again hampered by the poor tactics employed, losing 26 of their number for the loss of 9 Japanese fighters. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the strike swamped the Japanese CAP, though much of the raid cohesion was disrupted, and again the slow Devastators received the brunt of the attention of the Japanese fighters, losing over 50 aircraft whilst pressing home their attack. The 2nd Carrier Division consisting of the carriers Hiryu and Soryu were to receive the brunt of this attack, being the closest to the axis of the attack. Admiral Yamaguchi had deployed the two battleships in support of his force on this axis and both Haruna and Kirishima had orders to remain close to the carriers to defend them. Their defensive fire combined with the again defective performance of the US torpedoes largely wasted the bravery of the torpedo bombers with several hits failing to detonate, with only two hits on the Soryu detonating and a single hit on the Haruna. The hit on the Haruna was shrugged off by its armor, but the damage to the Soryu was more serious, destroying one engine room and rapidly slowing her. The majority of the Dauntless dive bombers again targeted the 2nd carrier division, with less than 20 attempting to engage Carrier Division 5. those that did attempt to engage the Shokaku and Zuikaku had been badly disrupted by the fighter screen and only achieved several near misses. The balance of the dive-bombers, approximately 45, proceeded to concentrate on the Hiryu and Soryu. The rapidly slowing Soryu proved to be an easy target and was hit no less than six times and despite the absence of aircraft onboard, reduced to a flaming wreck that would subsequently sink some four hours later. The Hiryu was hit three times, and despite serious fires aboard, was able to maintain power and maneuverability, but the surviving strike aircraft would report both as being in a sinking condition. But this was achieved at great cost with well over half of the strike aircraft failing to return. With both the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets now down a carrier, Yamaguchi now assumed command of both elements of the Kido Butai as the two groups moved to consolidate as a single force.

    As this was occurring the strike force of 113 aircraft from Kaga and Akagi was reaching TF17. As with the first strike on TF16, this group was also composed of the cream of the Kido Butai, experienced veterans of Pearl Harbor, and the battles of the opening phase of the Pacific campaign. However, unlike that strike, they lacked the numbers to simply swamp the US defenses to the degree of the first strike. Secondly, the defending Wildcats, most notably those of VF6 off the Hornet, employed superior tactics and avoided melee turning fights, and were able to inflict roughly equal casualties on the escorting Zeros. Nevertheless, with roughly equal numbers (39 Zeroes to 35 Wildcats) the fighter groups effectively neutralized each other, both losing approximately half their numbers in the exchange, whilst downing only a few of the attacking aircraft. The majority of the strike aircraft concentrated on two carriers, Yorktown and Wasp the Wasp had been designed under the WNT restrictions. To meet these limitations in the available tonnage she had almost no armor and a lower top speed. Like the Ranger in TF16, it proved vulnerable to the three torpedoes and three bomb hits the Japanese strike inflicted upon her. Despite retaining power, the resulting fires and flooding from these hits proved impossible to contain. Her captain would order the ship abandoned shortly after 4 pm that afternoon and the Wasp would still be burning when she sank later that evening taking over 300 of her crew down with her. Yorktown also was badly damaged by the strike, being torpedoed twice and receiving four bomb hits, one of which struck the bridge structure killing Admiral Fletcher. Retaining power and maneuverability she was left reduced to only moving at a few knots. With a destroyed flight deck and her stern quarter fiercely ablaze her ability to operate aircraft was gone even if not in immediate danger of sinking. The final carrier of the group Hornet benefited from the proximity of the anti-aircraft cruiser San Juan and only being attacked by a small number of Val’s. She survived with only a single bomb hit striking her port after 5-inch mounts, destroying them and causing slight damage to the flight deck. As the surviving Japanese aircraft withdrew the screen commander, Admiral Kincaid assumed command of the Task Force leaving the US forces with only two carriers remaining afloat of the original six, Hornet and Yorktown, and only the Hornet capable of operating and recovering aircraft.

    The final strike of the initial exchanges was of 154 aircraft from TF58, consisting of 44 fighters, 59 TBR (48 Sea-Battles and 11 of the new more powerful Spearfish), and 52 Cormorant DBR on the three remaining carriers of the 1st Air Fleet. Not released by Halsey till after 1000hrs and having the furthest to travel it did not arrive till after noon. This strike had the misfortune of being detected some 60 miles out by search aircraft earlier dispatched to confirm the location and composition of the reported force, enabling the entire Japanese CAP 62 Zeros to be airborne to engage the incoming strike. Despite being outnumbered the 44 escorting Dragonflies more than held their own downing 26 of the defending fighters for the loss of 19 of their own. Nevertheless, with so many defenders nearly a dozen of the Zeros were able to break through to engage the strike, with roughly equal numbers engaging each group. Insufficient to break the groups up, they nevertheless managed to disrupt the attacking groups. These were further disrupted by another 18 Zeroes arriving in dribs and drabs during the melee as Yamaguchi redirected some of the returning strike escorts from the closing 2nd Air Fleet, now less than 20 miles distant. The resultant disorganized melee prevented any cohesive single attack from forming. This led to several small groups attacking all three remaining aircraft carriers, with the two largest carriers Kaga and Akagi bearing the brunt of the attention. The presence of the two battleships with their large AA array and orders to protect the carriers again played a major role in the survival of the Akagi and Junyo, both near one of battleships. The smaller carrier Junyo attracted the least attention during the strike and emerged surprisingly unscathed, whilst the Akagi was to receive an additional two torpedoes and two bomb hits. Despite this, she remained underway and subsequently extinguished her fires and would eventually successfully return to Japan thanks to the heroic efforts of her crew. Unable to operate aircraft she would take no further part in the battle and would not return to operational duties until the second half of 1943. The remaining carrier Kaga would prove less fortunate. Already with underwater damage from the TF16 strike earlier, she would receive four further torpedo hits and two bomb hits. This damage was too extensive and the flooding was impossible to contain. Afire and rapidly listing to starboard she would sink less than two hours later, taking over 600 of her crew with her. During the strike, the Hiei received one additional torpedo on top of that from the first strike, and Kirishima two, as well as a single bomb, hit each. Though damaged and forced to reduce speed both had sufficient armor to survive and remain in support of the carriers. To achieve this cost the air groups of TF58 69 aircraft, largely due to the ability of the fighter escort to counter the highly maneuverable Zero. As the strike departed, they left the 1st Air fleet with only a single operational carrier, the remarkably undamaged Junyo, scrambling to recover the remaining aircraft aloft. Being the smallest carrier of the Kido Butai, she was forced to ditch many of the damaged aircraft over the side whilst crowding as many aircraft aboard as possible. With the 2nd Airfleet closing, many were directed to land there, but nearly 20 planes were forced to ditch by screen elements as they ran out of fuel.

    By early afternoon the surviving units of the 1st and 2nd fleets had closed and consolidated as a single force, with Admiral Yamaguchi now in command. He was faced with a force that had lost three of the eight carriers present that morning, with two further damaged carriers afloat but unable to operate aircraft, and two of his four battleships also significantly damaged. His remaining three operational decks, Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Junyo, were packed and had about 220 operational aircraft available. Even as he organized this force, confident that he had badly damaged the US carrier groups he was being updated on the information from Ozawa’s 5th Air fleet about a further carrier force to the south and the result of that engagement. As he organized his remaining air groups for a strike on the now located TF58 he contacted Yamamoto and urged him to close and consolidate their forces, whilst he committed a further strike on the as yet unengaged TF58.
     
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    Interlude One: A tough Day at the Office for a Fighter Ace Pt.1
  • Part Eight

    (SPOILER: As I alluded to earlier, this is my first ever attempt at writing and I'm probably being far too ambitious. What I am trying to do is to put a first person POV every few chapters to personalize my wider narrative. This my weak area and too often the result seems to me too wooden and one-dimensional. Nevertheless, here is the first part of my 'Midway' effort. The "Dikkipedia' battle account will follow and parts are pre-empted her, but I hope you enjoy this attempt, and feel free to critique not just my AU but grammar as well. Have fun and look forward to hearing how its perceived. T)

    INTERLUDE ONE: - “A Tough Day at the Office for a Fighter Ace.”

    0430 hours 17 June 1942 – HMNS Australia.
    Task Force 44, 90 miles ESE Midway Island.

    ‘Are you awake Sirs, it’s 0430?”
    Lt John McDaid, (Jimmy or Stretch to his peers), was lying on his bunk naked except for a pair of shorts. Already half-aware in expectation of this call, managed to grunt out a response, but failed to stop a firmer knock on the hatchway and louder repetition from their hovering steward in the passage outside, “Are you awake Sirs, its reveille?” This time his roommate, Pete Driscoll, responded more loudly from the lower bunk, “Yes, we’re awake and moving,” flicking on the lamp above his bunk, the sudden brightness making Jimmy wince as it flooded the narrow-cramped cabin with light.

    Now awake Jimmy carefully reached up to the light fitting above his own head, and by feel, disengaged the bayonet fitting in the socket, feeling the gentle wash or air cease over his sweaty chest, as he swapped back in the bulb, he had earlier removed that night. With his own top bunk now lit, he carefully moved the small personal fan to the improvised shelf by his head, checking the already cracked and brittle Bakelite plug for damage and gently rolling the frayed cord up. One of the very first purchases on his initial visit to Hong Kong in 1938, the fan itself displayed a fine patina of cracks, but belying its cheap cost and acquisition in one of the myriads of tiny back lane shops of the crown colony, it still continued to work and remained a lifesaver in the tropics. Despite the attempts to improve ventilation during its reconstruction during the 30s, the fact remained that Australia was a pre-WW1 ship, designed for the North Sea, and poorly suited for the vastly increased crew and employment in the tropics. Already he could feel the fine sheen of sweat drying clammily on him, and at action stations with the already inadequate fans turned off, the room would rapidly become a humid still sweatbox. Undoubtedly it was his prize possession on this deployment, and reflecting this Jimmy treated it with deliberate care, valuing above most of his other items of personal kit, simply for the meagre cooling effect it offered in his current situation. This vital task done he then joined Pete in the well-practiced and finely choreographed routine of two men sharing a confined space conducting their daily routine to start the day. This done and both now in uniforms already losing their creases as sweat made them cling, he followed Pete out into to the dimly lit passage outside. A quick glance at his watch and he said, “Still some time to go. Deck, Irish?” he posed, receiving the expected muffled “good enough,” response and they both proceeded to head to the first set of ladders leading up to the flight deck.

    Two minutes later they both shuffled through the blackout curtain and dimmed tactical light, exiting the island onto the still empty flight deck, both silently welcoming the fresh air and breeze blowing from the ships passage. This was the best time of the day, actually, just before dawn. The Pacific stars were still shining, the flight deck still wet with perhaps a little spray misting up from the bows. The island loomed, a large shadow against the stars, and looking at the dull shapes and angles of a Seabattle, tail ran out onto the nearest outrigger, broke the immediate view aft. Curious how it was all dark but you could still see and define shapes by their bulk. There was the sound of waves brushing the ship’s side, steadily, on and on, with their own sort of rhythm. No heat yet, no action, no gunfire, no adrenalin, no shouting or tumult, just an impression of coolness and welcome contrast to the heat and confines of below. This was another simple communion and true indication of shared friendship needing no words as both just quietly enjoyed the ambiance. After a while the faint wash of pale light began to define the horizon behind the ship, and soon the brief ting of alarm indicated the aft elevator dropping into the hangar deck below, and the first of the aircraft handling parties commenced their tasks of marshalling the first sortie of the day. Recognizing that their brief quiet interlude was done, both turned almost in unison to reenter the island and head for the squadron ready room below, even as the ships Tannoy crackled to life and called the crew to dawn action stations. The timeless routine of a ship of war, sanctified by tradition and experience had begun again for another day.

    Shortly thereafter they entered 712 Squadrons slowly filling ready-room one deck down seeing the Commander (Air) and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander (Flying), Wings and Little F, as they were always known, already in deep discussion with the Squadron CO Lt- Comd Phillip Carstairs ‘Skipper”. Once flying operations actually commenced you would rarely see them outside Operation Room in the island or Flyco, the small open space with a parapet overlooking the flight deck, where they oversaw the conduct of all the ships aviation operations. But till then they would continue to liaise directly with the aircrew when possible.

    Skipper made that point with some force at the command ‘huddle’ — gesturing at a proffered document, then obviously getting the expected response, nodded once and broke from the group moving to the dais at the front of the room, while Wings and Little F moved off to one side, and would leave shortly, returning to the island as the crackling Tannoy ordered the ship to action stations. At this point they were joined by the last two of the squadron’s internal hierarchy Michael Phelan, the Senior Pilot, or SPLOT, and in effect the skipper’s exec, and Andy ‘Dusty’ Rhodes, the other flight commander of the squadron. For administration purposes, at the moment Australia operated two ‘type’ Squadrons, 712 with 24 Dragonfly and 709 Squadron, the TBR/Scouting Squadron with 16 Seabattles, giving it an embarked air group of 40 aircraft at full strength, though these usually broke down and operated in flights of four within the squadron. The four Lieutenants, all experienced and senior most officers of the squadron, exchanged greetings and moved to the front of the ready room as a group, dropping as a block into the front row, the in effect bringing quiet to the room and the remaining Sub-lieutenants rapidly gained seats and paid attention. This air of at tentativeness was disrupted as a last pilot, gear obviously in disarray and thrown on in a hurry banged his way through the door. Even as he received the SPLOTs evil eyed glare, Skipper spoke up, “So nice of you to join us Tangles, take a seat and we can get this show on the road.”

    “Righto,” he commenced, “from now on the task force will be maintaining a CAP during daylight hours until otherwise notified. This will be a single flight of four at this stage, though all non-alert carriers will also have an additional flight each at normal Alert and Standby readiness. For today Aunty has the starting shift for the airborne flight, followed by us tomorrow and then Placid,” quoting Pacifica’s callsign. “We will continue to maintain this rotation until the situation changes. What we now have is the Wing order from Aunty (Terra Australis) outlining the task force operations order in event of encountering major enemy forces. This will be an all-out strike, employing all available squadron aircraft that were serviceable, from all three carriers. The details of the strike package are in the op-ord which will be available here,’ gesturing to the document, but I will provide a brief outline so that all pilots are aware of the Wings intent.”

    “The strike package will consist of three elements, a TBR element, callsign Heron, Divebombing element, Callsign Magpie, and fighter escort, callsign Kestrel. The balance of unassigned fighters will remain as TF defense and identified as callsign Sparrow. The planned breakup of these elements as follows. Heron element will consist of the full Seabattle complement of Aunty and Lady Oz, hopefully 32 aircraft. Auntie’s four flights will be Heron One and our 16 709 squadron SeaBattles will be Heron 2. Now we get down to the nitty-gritty for us. Magpie element will be 24 dragonflies in the dive-bombing role. Lady Oz will contribute 16 aircraft in this element. I’ll be leading element one with two flights. Stretch," nodding to Jimmy, "you will be Magpie Two with the remainder. Since you’ve apparently achieved your bag limit already this year Stretch, I’m afraid we’ve got to get dropping bombs this round, so the rest of the squadron can start working on their own scores,” He delivered this line with a slight smile, as it generated the expected laugh from the gathering, and whilst responding with a smile, Jimmy again winced internally at the unsolicited notoriety generated by his leading ace hood. Continuing on Skipper resumed, “Placid will proved Magpie Three with a further, eight bomb equipped Dragonfly to round out the package. Depending on final availability numbers the Magpie element may be rounded out by an additional flight of four from Placid to act in the close escort role for the strike, but that will only be confirmed on available numbers at the time. The balance of the escort will consist of hopefully 24 Dragonfly’s from Aunty as Kestrel 1,2 and 3, to operate in the fighter role. These figures are for maximum effort and assumes 100% availability,” generating a raspberry from the pilot group. “I know, but there’s sufficient flex in organization to massage these numbers if needed,” he responded. “This breakup leaves us with up to 32 Dragonfly employed as the Sparrow element for defense, with eight from Placid and us, sixteen from Aunty. For control purposes Chill you will lead the Sparrow elements in event of a major attack,” nodding to the SPLOT. The final element is the Stringbags off Placid, these will be callsign Crow, and will continue their usual patrol taskings as directed by Wing. That in general term is the deployment overview for the planned strike if the task force is required for a major attack. A final confirmatory brief and detailed orders will be issued prior any actual strike. I’ll hand over to Schoolie now for the balance of the normal daily brief, but when that’s done, Stretch I’ll get you to duck down a get an update on the timing and availability status on our down birds.,” nodding to the status board to the side of the ready room.” “Will do sir,” taking in at a glance that there were currently two down checked aircraft on the board, before concentrating on the remainder of the brief. With one of his ‘George’ jobs being the squadron maintenance officer, and he was quite familiar with its expectations, so just spent the remainder of the briefing recording the usual details, frequencies, heights, and weather on his knee pad and map, as normal preparation for flight ops. Till the ship stood down from dawn action stations his duty station was here, when not flying, and he would remain seated, going over some of the upcoming issues with the other three Lieutenants present. With its conclusion and a brief confab with the other Lieutenants as to any issues, he then headed down to the hangar spaces as the remaining pilots were corralled by the flight commanders and settled into the daily taskings of any operational squadron.

    Soon the announcement crackled out over the Tannoy, announcing stand down from Dawn action stations, replaced by a new voice. “This is the captain speaking, all hands be advised we have just received news that Japanese aviation forces have just commenced air attacks on Midway Island. At this stage there is no further updates, but be aware that there are significant enemy forces now operating in our proximity, be aware and alert as the next action stations may very well be for real and no drill. I expect you to listen well to your officers and attend to your duties. We will keep you informed as we receive further update. Until then carry on.” And the voice cut off with a crackle. With this triggering a murmur of discussion, and after a brief check on the status board, Jim ducked out, heading forward and down a deck for the hangar and the squadron maintenance offices. Stepping out into the huge dim enclosed box, it was abustle in activity as usual. Shared home of the two squadrons of Lady Oz’s embarked air group it was capable of holding 32 aircraft currently, though with a deck park and outriggers on the flight deck above, this had been stretched to 40 in wartime. By their very nature the two types had roughly polarized the hangar into two areas, with the larger SeaBattles, needing a longer takeoff, were customarily mustered to the aft of the hangar space, while the smaller more numerous Dragonfly filled out the balance forward. This generalization was subject to the reality of a slow, constant almost Brownian-like motion as airframes were bustled to and fro, in the endless dance of maintenance work and marshalling for launching, all notionally under the management of the ship’s aircraft handling officer. This almost tribal division within the air group itself meant that 712 Squadron offices were located forward on the opposite side to the ships island, and 709’s located aft.

    Stepping into this openness of the largest single compartment of the ship Jim was pleased to see that at the moment both the elevators at either end were down, currently allowing a wash of light in at either end, and the welcome movement of air from the ships passage to course through its crowded expanse. In more temperate latitudes this steel enclosed box, crowded holding 30-odd aircraft, could be a pleasant enough workshop for the boys. Here however in the tropics it could become hell upon earth. In a daytime temperature of anything up to 120-130 degrees Fahrenheit, the slightest movement produced a stream of perspiration. Fortunately, it was still early and the temperatures were for now more reasonable, but this would change with the lifts up and ships ventilation fans stopped in the event of action. Taking this familiar sight in, Jimmy briefly scanned the view, before ducking across the hangar deck between the closely packed airframes and avoiding the bustling aircraft handlers, many of them already shirtless and sweating, undertaking the daily array of tasks and checks, implicit in keeping the aircraft flying, His brief scan had not revealed his own aircraft, side-number A-22, It was RNN practice for each carriers embarked aircraft to have a specific prefix for the carrier and aircraft number in white, located immediately to the blue and white roundels of Nieustralis aircraft in the Pacific. Thus, Australia’s airframes bore a ‘A’, while the other wings respectively had a ‘P’ and ‘T’ for Pacifica and Terra Australis. Not seeing his own aircraft immediately visible, he didn’t bother searching and made for the heart of the squadrons ground support, The hatchway leading to the712 Squadron maintenance and administration office opposite.

    Entering the compartment was to enter realm of the senior non-commissioned ranks who formed the institutional backbone of the squadron. Well aware that his hat might be as its maintenance officer, but in reality, this was just a figurehead for the vast experience and knowledge that was collectively gathered here. The intricate web of choreographed actions required when an aircraft was flown regularly without mishap rested on the foundations managed here. Each airframe was controlled, for all that its servicing was a straightforward, uncomplicated procedure. Every 30 hours it underwent an ever-increasingly rigorous overhaul culminating—if it lasted long enough! —in a truly major one which was tantamount to taking the whole thing apart and re-building it. It was also subjected to a daily check—tyre pressures, oil, hydraulic and air pressures, the correct functioning of ignition, instruments, radio and guns. If an aircrew was fortunate and their aircraft was in the right place at the right time, this daily check could conveniently be carried out on the flight-deck. If they were not so lucky, however, the daily check had to be done in the hangar, that ill-lit, noisy, and here in the tropics unbearably hot dungeon where aircraft were lashed down cheek by jowl, surrounded by straining, swearing mechanics clad only in a pair of shorts—wringing wet from perspiration—and gym-shoes. Here they toiled, fuming at obstinate nuts, red-hot pipes and sparking plugs; and with the roll or pitch of the vessel calling constantly for a change of balance. Their hands never ceased to clear sweat from their eyes and within ten minutes their faces were covered in greasy filth and grime, rendering them almost unrecognizable. It was an alien yet inextricable partnership to his own role as pilot. There were times when the state of serviceability called them to slog it out in the hangar until the early hours of the morning. Yet each new day found them again repeating their tasks, at times after only two- or three-hours’ sleep, an example of professional endurance and pride, often characterized by an almost possessional degree of moaning that a happy lower deck considered almost a right.

    Conscious of his own intrusion into this specific small microcosm, he approached the Squadron Chief Petty Officer, greeting him “Morning Chief,” unsurprised at seeing a familiar copy of the op order already in his hands. “I see you’ve got a head start on me as usual.” “Aye Sir, I’ve taken the liberty of sending Maggs, down to the bomb magazine and he’ll check the grease and plungers of the fuses as well as prep sixteen for our full strike portion. Sixteen will be the full load out we hope. I see from them readiness board before I came down two are down checked. Aye, that should be updated soon. 247 was down checked with radio problems, but we found it to be just simply a loose wire and connection, and given a quick test it should be available within the hour. Actually, our only doubtful problem child stopping a full deck could be 244. It appears to have blown a head and I’ve got a full crew working on replacing that and, barring any new issues we hopefully will be closing her up before 1000. That will give us a full board technically, but only without doing a full engine test to seat the replacement and run it well in, which I’d rather we do if we get the chance before launching. “As always chief, yours and the crew chief will have the final call. Aside from the 500-lb eggs I see that the op order has us launching with drop tanks? " "Aye sir, it’ll be a maximum weight launch, with all Magpie elements to carry the smaller 45 gallon drop tank in the plumbed outer pylon. From there the discussion briefly devolved into the technicalities of total aircraft weight and probable fuel consumption rates and ranges as Jimmy confirmed details to present at as part of the squadron brief if the strike was launched. The final confirmatory point was made by the Chief, that all the strike aircraft had been fitted and tested with the newer more powerful windscreen heating element, and reminded Jimmy that this would need to be engaged before commencing any attack, otherwise diving bombing from height through moist tropical layers of air would cause fogging, obscuring targets. Thanking him for this reminder, Jimmy ducked back out of his hair, retracing the route back to the ready room, noticing in passing a small group of aircrew laboring over the raised cowling of one Dragonfly. “Our sole problem child he concluded before ducking back up into to start preparing reviewing the updates and preparing his own briefing points if needed.

    Sitting in the ready room proved to be more trying than normal, waiting for further updates whilst trying to get immersed in some of the relentless processing of paperwork that was required in his role as flight commander, hearing first that an enemy carrier force had been located unexpectedly southwest of Midway and then the shortly after 0920 the news that the Americans had launched a major strike. Combined with this he was just one of several plotting the rough positions on the board in the ready room. It came as no surprise when the news came down that Placid had been tasked to dispatch a flight of her Stringbags to search to the south and west of the task force, even as he could feel the increased thrum underfoot as the ship increased speed to close on events. Glancing at the board he noticed that the full complement of aircraft where now available, and then at around 100 the entire ready room was galvanized by a report cut short from one of the Stringbags of enemy carriers 200 miles to the south. Even as this was being processed and the steps to marshal the ships strike aircraft for launching, a second confirmatory report, also cut, short, confirmed the carrier’s presence. A previously unknown Japanese carrier force was to their south and closing.

    Even as the Tannoy blared to announce "Now hear this. Search has located two enemy carriers roughly two hundred miles south-southeast. Ship is to assume flying stations. Stand by for strike orders.” As Jimmy checked his watch, which said 1120. Even as. Skipper strode hurriedly into the ready room, saying, “As you were.” Jimmy joined the brief conference at the front with the others, adding the couple of information points and then they quickly returned to their seats. Putting some papers on the lectern, the CO immediately began the strike briefing. “We’ll be launching soon, so listen carefully and write the numbers down. No changes in the mission order, so both Magpie and Heron elements leaves together. Once formed up the strike will cruise at one hundred thirty knots, Heron at eleven and Magpie at twelve thousand feet as previously detailed. Wings orders are to proceed to the target independently if separated but coordinate our attack by radio with Heron Lead, if possible. I will be Magpie Lead with Red and Green flights, Stretch you will be Magpie Two, with Blue and White flights. Magpie three is from Placid with Gold and Orange flights,” he concluded as the pilots frantically scribbled down details. Late changes, we will have Yellow Flight of four Dragonfly as Magpie four to act as our close escort. If we encounter fighter opposition it will be at the discretion of each element lead as to which if any flights jettison their loads to act to protect others of the strike element. Kestrel element will conform to the Heron element and act as its close escort as first priority. The sense of urgency continued to come through as Skipper spoke rapidly, “Course to the target zero zero eight, and distance should be one hundred seventy-five. Wind one two zero at twelve. All the pilots were writing rapidly. The reports indicate that there are increasing incidence of tropical squalls to the south, though we should be above most of the frontal weather upon approach. The frontal weather could cover the target area: “If the Japs are under the clouds, we might have to do some hunting, but the frontal weather has been patchy, so we should be able to find a whole task force with two carriers. With the fuel load and range we should have a little time to loiter for the torpedo planes to arrive.” Jimmy thought, that’s if we aren’t immediately engaged. Without radar, the Japanese have to do all their fighter direction visually. As long as we are able to locate their carriers and make our dives, the frontal weather at the target could be an advantage for us. Skipper continued, “Stretch told me to remind you to switch the windscreen heater to max before commencing any dive. With the humidity and thunderstorms there is a high chance of fogging if you don’t. The Task force will maintain the present course south heading directly for the enemy to shorten our return. On the way back, both Manchester and Melbourne will be launching Walruses, Callsigns Duck 2 and Duck 3, to act as search and rescue for damaged returning aircraft. If you are in trouble, contact them on the guard frequency, and also gave a ditching point to aim for if you cannot communicate. At launch we will be at max gross weight with full fuel and a five-hundred-pound bomb.” Then the Tannoy announced, “Now hear this. All strike crews and escort, man your planes[JD1] .” Skipper finished by addressing the SPLOT. “Chill you’ll be boss of the TF CAP and Sparrow elements, with Aunties FDO (Fighter Direction Office) in control. As soon as the strike is cleared, get the rest of the fighters on deck, and a second flight into the air, Understood?” Receiving a nod, he turned to the pilots and, raising his voice, said, “Good luck all and I’ll see you on the other side!” As the pilots stood up, Jimmy grabbed his heavy lined flight jacket along with his parachute and plotting board and checked his Mae-west lifejacket. It could be cold above 10,000 feet, despite the tropics. As all the pilots were heading for the flight deck, he took a final look at his watch, it had only been about forty minutes since the search results were announced. Emerging from the island into a hot, sunny day to be faced by a packed flight deck. With the Seabattles stacked to the very stern round down, even tightly interlocked the leading Dragonfly was level with the bridge. As the various plane captains and handling parties were swarming over the last few planes to be brought up. The 709 pilots were already heading aft to their ranked charges as the 712 pilots scattered to their own dragonfly at the front of the marshalled strike. so as not to hold up the launch when their turn came.

    Jim noted that Skipper had paused ahead of him, gathering the 7 pilots of his element in a huddle for a final word and elected to copy him. Grabbing the attention of the pilots from his Blue and White flights, he gestured them close, suddenly again conscious that this kind of skill was not his forte. “OK guys, are there any final questions?” He quietly posed, and after a brief pause to shape his words went on. “Right, from here on just treat this as another day at the office,’ he continued, ‘no frills and unnecessary risks, just concentrate on the task in hand and do it cool, calm and steady. Watch your fuel state. We have plenty, but if they are in squalls we may have to stool around a bit and hunt around for business, “getting nods from the gathering. “Drop tanks first and punch them individually as they go dry, and then just do each task to the best of your ability.” Feeling he was finishing lamely he just gave a brief nod to the group and said, “Good luck and mount Up,” turning to head for his aircraft as the others also broke up to head for their aircraft.

    Knowing his position in the strike he headed for the third row of marshalled Dragonfly seeing the plane captain, Chief Rigger Monsen watching him approach. He walked up to A-22, his ‘Three Belles’ skirting around the forewings to the left side. Greeting the CPO with an “All set to go Chief” and receiving his confirmation he did his quick walk around, inspecting the control surfaces and pitot tube and for no obvious sign of leaks, not that any was expected but a condition reflex for all pilots. Completing his circuit, he glanced down and seeing a chalked message on the 500-pounder on the center pylon under the fuselage, ducked closer to read “Dragon Droppings” clearly. Despite the serious ness of the moment, he couldn’t help but quirk a grin as he straightened. It was an RNN tradition for the ground crew to hold a competition to see who got to apply the art to any bombload. Turning to the CPO he asked with a gesture “Who?” still smiling and received a grin in response as he replied “Gillman.” “The tall thin armorer from outback Queensland?” he posed, searching his memory and getting a nod in response. “Actually, I think that's pretty damn good, so pass on my thanks,” he finished with a smile as Jimmy stepped up onto the wing root. He paused briefly here, not registering the six rows of victories stenciled on the fuselage, rather just doing his own personal pre-flight routine for luck, bringing his fingers to his lips before touching them to the nose art of his three girls just forward of the cockpit, then touching the small photo inside his vest pocket, before the athletic scramble to get seated followed by the plain captain as he assisted him.

    Lowering himself into the concave bowl of the seat, designed to fit a packed parachute on which he sits., he pushes his feet forward to the rudder pedals. Being six foot three inches tall had given him his nickname ‘stretch’ but also meant that he was a very tall man to fit into the cockpit, making it comparatively cramped in his case. Between his backside and the parachute, is a one-man dinghy, carefully stowed into a canvas case and attached to the parachute harness by a webbing lanyard. Slipping the spare water bottle he carried into the convenient recess by the seat, he straps himself in, first, into the parachute harness, then into the safety harness, assisted by the Chief standing on the wing and tightening the straps. Donning his helmet and goggles and connects the R/T lead and oxygen pipe, he’s ready to start up and with the thumbs up settles as his chief who jumps down to reappear forward of the left wing. In front of him are ranged the controls, levers, switches, dials—in all, about 90, with which he is thoroughly familiar. Commencing, he runs through his check-off list. Magneto switches off; Control locks off; check that rudder, elevators and ailerons are all turning ‘the right way’ in response to movement of the controls. (They have been known to have been reversed, with dire consequences.) Nose wheel locked; the propeller control is in fully fine pitch; Mixture control to full rich, to give the engine plenty of petrol to get her started. Elevator and aileron trimming tabs in neutral; Five degrees of right rudder trim; cooling gills open; oil coolers and intercoolers open; petrol cock turned on to main tank. This self-sealing container, holding 350 gallons, is positioned immediately behind the cockpit, in front of the engine, is supplemented at the moment by the two small 45 gallon drop tanks, one under each plumbed mounting in the rear wing immediately outside the retracting undercarriage. (Consumption, as a matter of interest, is about 60 gallons per hour at cruising speed and no less than 100 at operational speeds.) All this conducted in only a few seconds as almost a conditioned reflex. Glancing now out of the cockpit to confirm to the Chief, visible forward to one side below him, that the magneto switches are off. With this the Chief signals a fitter, invisible at the rear of the airframe to commence. The fitter grasps the propeller blade nearest to him and rotates it once or twice ‘the wrong way’, blowing out; tough going, this, against the compression of 14 cylinders. Now the Chief moves back and gestures to the pilot who turns on the master electrical switch, rendering all systems ‘live’ and gives the priming switch two or three short but squirts, injecting a shot of neat petrol into the cylinders. Again, looking to the fitter, who signals to him that no one is standing within range of the great propeller. The pilot turns the magneto switches to ‘on’ and presses the starter switch, firing the Koffman starter with a deep-throated tiger’s cough. It jerks the propeller into life, back-fires once, then settles into the comforting roar which signifies a good, clean, fire-free start. Jimmy seeing the all clear relayed, moves the mixture control to auto-rich and advances the throttle to give 500 revs per minute on the rpm indicator, watching as the oil pressure gauge awakens and climbs too normal. Concurrently scanning the dials before him, hydraulic pressure is normal, oil temperature is rising to normal, the ‘artificial horizon’ is vibrating slightly, showing that it, too, is awake and healthy. He switches on the radio and a crackling quick test confirms the set is functioning satisfactorily. With all showing normal he opens up the throttle steadily to 1,000 revs and, keeping an eye on the rev counter, turns off one of the magneto switches. The revs drop by 50. He switches back to ‘Both’. A pause; then he turns off the other. Now the drop is only 30. Both are acceptable, for anything up to a loss of 100 is safe. Everything is OK for him to move. He throttles back and gestures both thumbs up to the Chief receiving a snappy suit in return.

    The start-up routine now done, he scans the masses aircraft to his front, now a sea of blurring propellers as the engine warms up and he awaits the takeoff release. Looking up he can see the green light on Pri-Fly lit to approve takeoff and sees ahead the launching officer gesture then drop his flag, and the launch was underway. His view limited by the massed airframes of Magpie One ahead, he can see little as Skipper leads off with the first element, only becoming visible as it lifts into view climbing and turning to port. Gradually the deck ahead clears, and things seem to be progressing trouble free till the sixth aircraft, two ahead obviously runs its engine to full power in preparation to launch, when suddenly there is a loud bang, audible even over his own engines roar, and a sharp black puff then ragged banging clatter as the engine erupts a cloud of grey smoke. In a well-trained rush he can see the deck crew run forward to push it aside to continue the launch. Seeing the fuselage number A-44 as it is cleared from ahead, he can help but recall that this was this morning’s problem child, and obviously the attempt to get it ready for the strike was unsuccessful. Finally, the deck ahead was clear and he is the next cab off the rank. Running up to full throttle and checking the gauges are clear he quickly rehearsed the takeoff in his mind. Meeting his eyes he waves his hands crisscross once in front of his face and gives a thumbs up to Fly One, who gestures the chocks clear and swings his flag down, as Jimmy released his brakes and starts down the deck. When the bow looked to be about two hundred feet ahead, Three Belles lifted off with its usual elevator like sensation, the Dragonfly needing little stick rotation once it reached flying speed. After the slight bobble crossing the bow, it commenced its climb, feeling heavy and cumbersome with its load, as he followed the aircraft ahead as they turned left and began to circle to wait for the third element and escort flight to join them. Throttled back to climb power as his wingmen cut inside his turn to close up on his plane; he then raised the landing gear and flaps, seeing Magpie one ahead. Looking back, he could see that all of Magpie Two was off successfully as they formed up on him, as the first SeaBattle of 709 now trundling down the vacant expanse of deck, struggling airborne with its torpedo underslung. Circling steadily as they climbed, he could see the Dragonfly from Placid rising to join Magpie lead to its port, as his own element shook out to starboard. Clearly one short, he heard the brief, “Three to Magpie Lead, joining with six, one went in on launch,” came the terse update, as the final flight of four joined assuming a cover position above the three Magpie elements, and distinguished only by the larger 90 gallon drop tanks in the fuselage pylon rather than the 500-pound bombs of the rest. Now marshalled the whole strike group departed, assuming the attack heading even as it continued to climb. Compared to normal it was undoubtedly sluggish, but it was still the best climb rate and the entire Magpie package matched Skippers lead shaking out into a looser transit formation. Even as his eyes continued the relentless rove of the sky of a fighter pilot, he couldn’t help but feeling 22 of a possible 24 dive bombers was good result and going to be a serious problem for someone. With the sweeping clear vision at the moment, he could see the mustered SeaBattles slightly below and lagging with their slower cruise and the cloud of their escort hovering now above. An hour later they began to see more broken cloud forming as they were approaching some of the frontal weather. There were cumulus clouds, some fairly dark, but there was a lot of space between them, and they could maintain their cruising formation, only occasionally flying through small wisps of cloud. By this time, they had leveled off at 14,000 feet, still below the tops of the highest towers of clouds beginning to hump up over the horizon well to the south.

    After another twenty minutes, as Jimmy scanned the sky, he heard a crackle and a voice from Kestrel One reporting spotting a large formation of airplanes off to one side headed north. “Two o’clock, looks like an enemy strike group heading north,” came over the radio. “Kestrel lead, I see them too. Leave them for now, our mission is the strike,” before relaying the update to Aunty and the Task Force. Now, on top of the risks of their own mission, Jimmy knew their ships would be attacked before they got back, possibly disabled or sunk. Having already twice experienced the loss of his own ship this thought left a cold feeling in his stomach. They droned on. Another three quarters of an hour went by broken only as the various aircraft jettisoned their empty drop tanks. They passed over many small and much more broken cloud in the overcast at about 8,000 feet in a long streamer to the formations port, but saw no ships. Ahead rising in a much more pronounced rampart of clouds stretched right to left across the horizon ahead, some parts towering well above their own height. Before this Jimmy could see a large opening in the overcast ahead and to the left of their course. Suddenly there was a crackling in his earphones. “Magpie Lead here. Tallyho! Directly below.” Glancing down he could see nothing immediately, then checking the clock on the instrument panel, which read 1302. He also looked at the outside air temperature on the gauge, which read 36. He shivered thinking how cold that was and glad he’d kept the canopy closed now. With this change and humidity, he was almost certain fogging was going to be an issue as he followed the formation around in a shallow turn to the left, circling counterclockwise towards the wide opening ahead, staying over the clouds mostly out of sight from below, but still not seeing what had triggered Skippers ‘Tallyho.”

    Now coming up to the opening, he got a start at realizing how much it was like coming to the edge of a stage and for the first time he could clearly identify the wakes of ships below in the distance, all seemingly heading north. He led his section slightly to the right to get out of sight again over the clouds and then followed the planes ahead in a shallow left turn. His tension increased, but they were lucky so far and it was inexplicable to find no Japanese CAP up high, even if the formation was still some distance away. The Dragonfly formation continued in a large circle skirting the opening. Now they were southwest of the opening in the clouds and could see that the Japanese task force was headed away from the black squall line with heavy rain clearly forming to the south. If they had to wait a long time for the torpedo planes, this opportunity might disappear into that squall. Jimmy could now for the first time glimpse the leading carrier through the clouds, unusually seeming to have a green hull, in contrast to a sand-colored flight deck. Clearly visible was a large red meatball in the center of the fore deck. She had turned into the wind and was obviously launching aircraft and he could see the small dark green crosses seemingly to slowly lumber off the bow before gaining height. Slightly more distant he could now confirm the second square deck of another carrier, also launching planes, and both odd looking in his eyes with the absence of an obvious island.

    Others that had taken off earlier were climbing in the distance and for the first time he thought he might have detected the specks of a distant CAP near their height, but if it was it had made no move toward their formation. They were very lucky to be out of sight while they waited, but they would get a hot reception when they made their dives, and the fighters might keep climbing and find them. Watching almost God like from up here he could see that the leading carrier had almost finished launching and would soon be free to use the approaching the rain squall. Skipper came on the radio again: “Heron Flight, be aware the carriers have flushed their birds and our windows closing’!” At first there was no reply till about four minutes later, the radio crackled: “OK, Magpie, Herons starting in.” With this Skipper transmitted, “Kestrel, this is Magpie Lead, you’ve got a dozen plus diving in on you from about Angels 10, and they’ve just flushed their decks, so it looks like there’s another bunch coming up low. I’m releasing my escort to assist, but it looks like they’re going to dogpile you". "Understood Magpie. You heard the man boys, it looks like we’re about to get busy,” came a faint response. As there obviously began a furball of aircraft in the distance, and already one or two trails of smoke streaking the sky. That must be them, meaning they had the Japanese task force in sight and were starting the run in to the target.

    Feeling surreally like a spectator, Jimmy followed Skipper in one final circle to the left on the southeast side of the opening in the clouds. This was good for concealment, because the Japanese were now closer to the northwest. Jimmy paused, wondering however if they would be able to dive from that side, because the ships below now seemed fully aware of their exposure, obviously turning away from the developing attack north, and heading for cover under the clouds below. Jimmy felt his adrenaline flowing as Skippers final instructions came over the Radio. “Magpie Two, take your element and engage the nearer, westernmost of the pair. I’m going to extend East with Magpie One for a moment and engage the second more distant one. Understood?” “Copy One”, he responded, as Skipper continued, “Three hold for the moment and observe the results. If we miss, follow up targets at your discretion, copy?” “Roger that," came the response as Jimmy already was preparing for his dive.

    Not wasting any further time, he ordered Magpie Two to echelon left, as he watched One continue on for a moment, before adjusting his own final heading, bringing the now charging carrier below to be visible at about the 11 O’clock position to his own nose. A glance at the dashboard clock revealed It was 1318 as he did a brief final check of the seven trailing Dragonfly shaking out in a loose spaced line to his left. In contrast to his one previous live dive-bombing attack this was almost surreally like a peacetime exercise with training bombs. For all it was no peacetime target barge being sedately towed below him, the contrast with his memory of the mad scrambling attack from 6,000 ft under overcast at a wildly turning Japanese cruiser was unbelievable. Naturally it had missed, but here everything just seemed so much comparatively simpler. Hopping to repeat that peacetime accuracy of his last attack on a barge target, he was suddenly felt calmly in the zone as his target slid into his view.

    Pulling down his goggles, and sliding back his canopy as it locked, and felt the icy wind, as he tightened his harness and gave his last command, “Everyone make sure the windscreen heater is set to full,” before his perception said everything was just right, and said, “Attacking now.” With this he could feel the tension peak as his gaze rivetted on the carrier seemed to slide virtually under his wing. She was not a Japanese fleet carrier and was beginning to make vigorous evasive maneuvers, leaving a snakelike wake, but she would do.

    He put out the dive flaps and went through the routine, feeling Three Belles slow sharply as the large, perforated flaps of the rear wing popped open: supercharger low speed; propeller low rpm; mixture rich; and carburetor heat on. He closed the throttle and snap rolled up and over into his dive. As he straightened out and found the aircraft steadied out in a 70-degree dive, airspeed stable at about 280 mph, as the carrier appeared in his windshield directly ahead of him as he hung from his straps. Already passing through 10,000 feet, for the first time the experience seemed to differ from a drill as a few antiaircraft bursts appeared ahead. In his calm state of concentration, he suddenly was not very afraid of the antiaircraft fire because it was late, and he was coming down so fast that there was only a small chance that the gunners would get the range right. That was a big advantage of dive bombing, some part of his mind abstractly mused, as he lined up the gunsight on the rapidly growing carrier ahead. Vaguely a few seconds later, he peripherally registered a fogging beginning to form around the windshield edges and he hoped the others also remembered the windscreen heater. But it was effective, and he could still see the outline of the carrier clearly in the center of the windshield. The wind appeared to be from the southeast as his target began to drift, so he rolled ninety degrees to fly northwest and tried to aim off for his release point to the southeast of the carrier as it twisted and turned. Again, he had a distant feeling of lucid clarity, as if he had all the time in the world as the altimeter showed him passing through 3,000 feet, everything seemed startlingly clear and simple as he gathered the large red meatball of the carrier deck into his sight, adjusting slightly to where he thought it would be on the point of release. Dropping his left hand on the bomb release lever as he was passing through 2,000 feet, the normal release height, he held steady another long second before releasing at 1,400 feet. Even as doing this he briefly triggered a one second burst of the Dragonfly’s cannon to trip the gun camera for record. Feeling the slight bump as the bomb dropped clear, he started a smooth steady pullout as his body was suddenly being pressed firmly into the seat pan by the rapidly rising g-force, quickly ramping up to over 6-g. As the blood rushed from his head his vision began to gray out, becoming almost tunnel like though it did not quite disappear, and the sudden surge of voices in his headphones lost as a waning murmur.

    Unbeknownst to him, the 500-pound semi-armor piercing bomb released by him tracked perfectly, striking the flight deck of the IJN light carrier Chitose just some three feet to right of the center line marking. Part of the Fifth air fleet and operating with her sister ship Chiyoda as the 11th carrier division, both had just finished launching their remaining fighters and were seeking to duck into the squalls to the south when the strike from TF 44 arrived. Concentrating on the approaching torpedo aircraft threat from the north, there is little doubt that the threat of dive bomber attack from the Dragonfly element was not recognized until that attack was fully developed, with hardly any defensive fire until the first bomb was already falling. Easily piercing the wooden flight deck it then punched through the hangar deck to finally detonate, striking the. Starboard steam turbine and destroying the engine room and all propulsion. In itself, this hit was probably sufficient to have sunk the light carrier. Being barely 15,000 tons the three strikes which rapidly followed doomed the lightly built conversion. Afire from fore to aft and racked by internal explosions and fewer than 150 of its 1100 complement and air group would be recovered from the water.


    [JD1]
     
    9
  • Part Nine (the Dikki continues). Enjoy!

    The Southern Engagement – TF44 and the 5th Air fleet.

    With both opposing forces made up of smaller carriers, this action is often depicted as a sideshow to the main conflict. This perception does not reflect the actual impact on the eventual outcome of the battle, nor the intensity and losses incurred by the opposing TF44, and 5th Air Fleet involved. Following the original guidance given TF44 was still about 90 miles to the SE of TF58 and closing slowly as the initial stages of the engagement opened. Approximately 220 miles to the south, Admiral Ozawa and the newly formed 5th Air fleet were moving north under radio silence tasked to surprise and cut off any USN force once committed. To achieve this, he had Carrier Division Eight, Hiyo and Oiyo, detached from their original role to support the Aleutians Operation, and the two light carriers Chitose and Chiyoda of Carrier Division Eleven and supporting forces.

    In terms of strength, the two groups while significant were smaller than the other carrier groups in the battle. Ozawa’s four decks carried 168 aircraft (Oiyo and Hiyo 54, Chitose and Chiyoda 30 each) while the three TF44 decks held 116 aircraft (Terra Australis 48, Australia 40, and Pacifica 28). Offsetting these numbers, the air groups of the three RNN carriers were composed predominantly of veteran aircrew, all experienced in conducting combat operations since the war commenced. The Japanese aircrew lacked this experience in comparison to those of the other IJN air fleets and had had their training restricted due to aviation fuel shortages leading up to this operation. Ozawa’s screen was the four heavy cruisers, a Light Cruiser, and the seven destroyers. The screen of TG 44 was seven light cruisers (RNN (4), RN (2), and the USS Concord) and eleven destroyers (RNN 6, USN 3, and 2 RN). These were the forces that would become involved after the opening exchanges between the main forces commenced on 17 June.

    With the detection of the initial strike on Midway Island at 0605, it became apparent that the main Japanese force was further south than originally anticipated. As the balance of allied forces was to the north and west of him, Grace ordered a sweep to the south and southwest to determine if other Japanese forces were also located further south than anticipated. and increased speed to 20 knots to close with the other allied groups, now heading southwest to close on the Japanese forces located.

    The initial exchanges between the main forces went as described, with both sides being shocked at the size of the opposition as the initial blows were exchanged. The presence of the three RN carriers south of the USN forces was perhaps the more profound as the Japanese had never remotely factored such a presence into their plans. With the location of the RN force tentatively identified shortly after 1100 Ozawa was directed to launch a strike at ‘three British carriers”. Monitoring the developing action to the north it had come as a distinct shock when the CAP of his force had engaged and destroyed a ‘British’ biplane. Initially, this report was received with disbelief, but when a second such aircraft was destroyed at 1125, (both patrolling Swordfish aircraft dispatched from the Pacifica) he was faced with the prospect of what he was facing another force to his north. These were part of the search pattern launched by Grace and were able to send a contact report before their destruction and were able to alert TF44 to the existence of Ozawa’s force.

    With the presence of three carriers and a location, he launched the prepared airstrike shortly after 1130. The strike eventually totaled 122 aircraft, 40 torpedo bombers, 40 dive bombers, and an escort of 42 fighters, whilst retaining 32 fighters as aircover for his force. The inexperience of the air groups delayed its departure and resulted in some disorganization when it eventually departed to the reported location some 200 miles to the north. The strike had barely departed when the search aircraft earlier dispatched reported the location of a force of three carriers, some 60 miles to the southeast of that first location received. The initial report was cut off but confirmation was received from another search aircraft redirected to that location. This gave greater detail and confirmed three ‘Nieustralis’ carriers before contact to was also lost. This was sufficient for Ozawa and he ordered that the new location be transmitted to his airborne aircraft and that the strike be redirected there. The sum effect of these actions was that rather than a single cohesive force the strike would arrive over TF44 in roughly two disorganized groups about ten minutes apart.

    In TF44, much in the same fashion as the Japanese, the proximity of the Japanese carriers to the south was unexpected and a disconcerting shock. The initial sighting report was of two aircraft carriers before contact was lost. These were the Chitose and Chiyoda as the other two carriers were obscured by a squall line at the time of location. With the confirmation of this by a second search plane before it to was shot down, TF44 rapidly prepared a strike from his three carriers and launched additional surveillance to establish more detail on the composition of the enemy force. A 72 strong strike was launched from TF44, consisting of 26 torpedo bombers, and 46 Dragonflies, 22 configured for the dive-bombing role carrying 500lb bombs, and the remaining 24 to act as a fighter escort for the strike, departing shortly after 1155. Admiral Grace retained 32 fighters available to defend TF44. Whilst preparing for this strike he also notified the other task elements of the allies of the location of this new enemy force. As they were already involved in a struggle for survival with the main Japanese forces, there was little that could be done other than acknowledge receipt of this update. The dogleg involved in the redirection of the Japanese strike resulted in both strikes arriving over their opponent at approximately the same time after 1300.

    Expecting a counterattack, Ozawa had deployed a strong CAP of 16 Zero’s over his force, whilst maintaining the remaining 16 Zeroes on deck ready for a rapid launch. Lacking radar for early warning, the incoming strike was only detected a few miles out. The ready aircraft were launched but there was insufficient time for them to gain height to engage the approaching force, and they were directed to engage the descending torpedo bombers, which were considered the greater threat. The CAP aloft incorrectly identified the approaching bomb-equipped Dragonflies at altitude as fighters, due to their distinctive cruciform silhouette, and elected instead to also engage the approaching Seabattles as they descended to attack. The result of this was to draw the Cap into an intense confused action at a low level as the 24 escorting fighters attempted to protect the 26 attacking Seabattles from over 30 Zeroes. The final result was that the Japanese CAP effectively nullified the torpedo strike, shooting down 18 of the attackers, and 13 of their escorting fighters, whilst suffering 13 losses of their own fighters. Of the remaining Seabattles all but two would ditch or be written off on return to TF44. The sole success of the torpedo strike would be to place a single hit in the engine room of the light cruiser Tatsuta from an already burning Seabattle before it crashed, which would result in her eventual sinking late that evening.

    This sacrifice would not be in vain however as it drew the Japanese fighters down to sea level. As a result, the 22 bomb-equipped Dragonflies arrived over the Japanese formation virtually undisturbed and were able to conduct the subsequent attack in a deliberate manner opposed only by the anti-aircraft fire of the ships involved which proved largely ineffective. Unopposed the Dragonflies proceeded to roll into their 70-degree dives, targeting the exposed Chitose and Chiyoda scoring three and four hits on each respectively. Even though being only 500lb bombs, both light aircraft carriers were of less than 12,000 tons displacement, and neither was robust enough to cope with this degree of damage and the sinking of both by late afternoon. With this outcome obvious the final seven dive-bombers diverted to engage the Oiyo and were only able to score a single hit right on the very bow of the vessel before it regained the cover of a rain squall. This hit forward would not endanger the vessel but would limit its ability to launch aircraft for the remainder of the battle. The surviving untouched 19 aircraft of the dive-bombing group were able to exit the battle largely undisturbed by the dispersed Japanese CAP and successfully regrouped as a single formation as they withdrew. The balance of the strike was suffering much more battle damage and dispersed as the result of the action, formed up in a much more disorganized straggle of small groups as the surviving aircraft headed back to their carriers.

    The final act of this strike would involve the relatively untouched group of returning dive-bombing Dragonflies, joined by two of the original escorts. This group of 21 aircraft, free of their bombload could now act in their primary fighter role. Directed onto the returning vector of the Japanese raid, by the still operating radar of Terra Australis, they would exact a fearsome execution on the damaged aircraft encountered of the disorganized returning strike. It would later be assessed that this group destroyed an estimated 31 aircraft of the returning force for the loss of two further aircraft before the air engagement finally concluded.

    Concurrently, TF44 was preparing to receive the Japanese strike. With radar warning, all 32 defending fighters airborne and intercepted the approaching raid some 20 miles outside the screening vessels. Despite being able to disrupt much of the organization of the attacking force, faced with over 120 inbound aircraft the defense was swamped as the attack developed. To some respect, the disorganized arrival of the strike, spaced out as it was over nearly 20 minutes, would aid the Japanese. The final group of 18 aircraft from the Chiyoda, enjoyed a virtual free run on their approach, with the defending fighters already dispersed and combating the preceding arrivals. Those aircraft that successfully broke through the defending fighters still had to face the defensive fire of the surface vessels.

    When the final Japanese aircraft departed around 1345, they left behind a force in disarray with all three RNN carriers visibly on fire and seemingly incapable of further combat operations. Australia had been the nearest to the incoming vector of the strike and bore the brunt of the initial assault. Torpedoed three times on the port side and struck by five bombs she would roll over and sink around 1450 taking over 500 of her crew down with her. The Pacifica in the center of the formation received two torpedoes close together on the port bow which blew a large hole over twenty feet wide below the waterline. This benefited her, in that the resultant sudden loss of way resulted in the two bombs that struck her did so well forward. This left her badly on fire forward but under power and barely able to make way until her forward bulkheads were reinforced. Lastly, the Terra Australis took a single torpedo midships and received four bomb hits. It also was hit by a damaged Kate that deliberately flew into the rear of the island after releasing its weapon and strewing burning fuel across the deck. At a distance, the damage appeared far more significant than was the case, and the radar fitted to the island remained operational. Unlike the other two, the Terra Australis armored design enables it to remain under power and still capable of reaching 24 knots. Of the four bomb hits, two hits penetrated the armored flight deck before detonating on the armor of the hangar deck below. Here the carrier benefited from the fact that all the bombs carried by the Japanese strike were limited to 500-lbs, due to the distance of the strike. This and the fact that the hangers were empty of aircraft and combustibles, resulted in the fires being rapidly contained. With the application of repairs, the Terra Australis was able to commence recovery operations shortly after 1420. Despite the damage suffered the Terra Australis remained combat capable, much to the amazement of the embarked USN observers. In addition to the carriers, the cruiser screen also suffered losses with the Emerald and Concord both left powerless and subsequently to sink before evening. Manchester and the Launceston took damage forcing them to withdraw. The Japanese strike lost some 50 aircraft and the defending fighters lost21.

    The remainder of the afternoon was required for TF44 to reorganize and complete the process of recovering aircraft and picking up survivors. By 1530 Grace finished recovering the surviving aircraft on his sole remaining carrier and was left with 31 operational aircraft of the mornings 116. Of these, 27 were Dragonflies and just two each of Spearfish and Swordfish remained operational. Around 1615 as Grace prepared to separate his damaged ships to return to Hawaii, he received notification from observing aircraft that the Japanese appeared to be launching a small strike. With this, he elected to remain with the damaged vessels and prepared to receive the attack.

    At this time Ozawa too was assessing the results of the action. Like Grace he too was left with just one fully functional carrier, with the slightly damaged Oiyo restricted to only launching the lighter Zero. The loss of his two light carriers was disturbing along with the demonstrated effectiveness of the Dragonfly aircraft. Not only as a fighter against the Zero, but its effectiveness in the dive bomber role had come as an unpleasant surprise. His worry deepened as the remnants of his strike slowly dribbled in. By the time the last of the 39 survivors was recovered he had to accept that nearly 70% of the aircraft committed had failed to return and was left with barely 60 available aircraft, and only one fully operational flight deck. The reports of three burning carriers were promising, but the ability of his group to conduct offensive operations was compromised by his losses. Nevertheless, he determined to attack and sink any damaged vessels of the opposing force whilst the opportunity existed. He launched a small force of 21 aircraft composing 9 Val, 6 Kate, and 6 Zeros which represented virtually the sum of his remaining offensive capability shortly after 1600.

    He was unaware that his force remained under observation by a spotter launched earlier and using the persisting bad weather to the south as cover, it was able to report the launch of this strike. With this advance notice and the advantage of radar direction, Grace was able to deploy the remaining Dragonflies to ambush the approaching strike some 25 miles short of TF44. This was brutally effective and proceeded to down 17 of the strike for the loss of 2 fighters without any of the Japanese force reaching visual distance of TF44. Recovering just four aircraft as dusk fell, Ozawa was faced with the fact that well over three-quarters of his air assets were lost and his force was no longer capable of conducting offensive operations. When the size of the ambush was reported, and still unable to determine how large a force opposed him, Ozawa elected to preserve his remaining force and used the fall of darkness to break contact and head east to marry up with the approaching invasion group. The ships of the 5th Air Fleet would play no further combat role in the Midway operation.

    With the success of the aerial ambush Grace too recovered his aircraft before dusk and proceeded to split his command. He released the Pacifica and the two damaged light cruisers along with 5 escorts to withdraw towards Hawaii. Grace used the cover of darkness to move his remaining operational ships, Terra Australis, three light cruisers, and six destroyers, and rendezvous with TF58 shortly after dawn. For the remainder of the Midway operation, the two groups operated as a single unit under the command of Vice-Admiral Lyster of TF58, Terra Australis acting as the fourth carrier with the other three RN vessels.

    The final exchange of the day was late in the afternoon with the Yamaguchi launching the remaining aircraft of the Kido Butai against TF58. Having received Ozawa’s initial report of three burning carriers and aware that Yamamoto had closed and would rendezvous that night, he elected to make one maximum effort against the as yet undamaged group of enemy carriers. Retaining just 30 fighters for defense meant that the final strike numbered over 180 aircraft. Radar gave TF58 plenty of warning and all its fighters were airborne as the strike approached. By this time TF58 was within 10 miles of the battered remains of TF 16 and 17 and 20 of the defending fighters were tasked to cover them, leaving some 50 available defenders. With warning the CAP was at height and ready as they engaged the strike some 15 miles out. The 65 escorts somewhat outnumbered the defenders and a savage melee developed which allowed the 120 attackers to close on the TF. Here two factors played a key role in helping the defense. As already proven each carrier was closely supported by an allied battleship, contributing considerably to the defensive fire. Secondly, the strike consisted of the surviving aircraft from eight carriers and lacked the coordination of earlier strikes. Regardless, the attack was pressed home with great vigor and with sufficient numbers to penetrate the screen. All the carriers were hit by torpedoes, the Audacious twice, and dive bombers succeeded in hitting all three carrier’s multiple times. The Bulwark was hit by three bombs, and the other two carriers twice, but here the armored nature of the British designs proved their worth. All three ships remained under power and command and with combustibles secured and empty hangars, the resultant fires were largely contained before dusk. All proved capable of recovering their aircraft that evening and with emergency repairs would remain combat capable the next day, though Audacious, hit twice and with extensive underwater damage, was restricted to a top speed of 20 knots, barely sufficient to operate aircraft. The other ships to receive damage were the battleship Richelieu, hit by a bomb and a torpedo, and King George V struck by two bombs, but both remained operational, albeit at a reduced speed. This was achieved at a cost of some 70 aircraft from the strike, with the British CAP losing over half its numbers.
     
    10
  • Part 10

    Taking Stock

    With the fall of night, both opponents were left to assess the results of the days' conflict. During the darkness, both moved to consolidate their remaining vessels into a single force, whilst trying to save damaged ships and recover survivors. The sheer size and scope of the engagement, along with the severity of the losses, deeply shocked both sets of leadership. Each had been confronted and disturbed by an opponent far larger than had originally been expected and the major losses in aircraft both had experienced hamstrung the possible options available to both sides.

    That evening Admiral Lyster as the senior surviving allied commander caucused with Admirals Spruance, Kincaid, and Grace on options and rapidly agreed that offensive operations seemed no longer viable. The option of the Allied carriers conducting a night strike on the Japanese was briefly tabled and discarded. Even with the Terra Australis joining, there were simply too few remaining aircraft available to mount a strike of sufficient strength to significantly damage the opposing force. Attempting such a feat simply seemed to risk exposing the allied forces to greater losses next day, without the prospect of commensurate gain. Of the original twelve carriers, five were sunk and two badly damaged, and whilst the remaining carriers were operational, all had been damaged to some degree. Of more importance there remained barely 200 available aircraft to be deployed from them. With many of the ships afloat already damaged to varying degrees, it would be all that they could do to shepherd the stragglers back to Hawaii without further loss. It would be fair to say that the command element was fairly traumatized by events, not just by the losses, but also by the sheer scope and intensity of the air combat and the level of forces involved, far beyond those originally anticipated. With the consensus of this group, he informed Nimitz back in Hawaii of his intentions to discontinue the action and advised Midway to evacuate all remaining aircraft and as many personnel as possible on them.

    Even whilst this was occurring the Japanese were also taking stock of their own situation. Post-war analysis and interviews revealed a startlingly similar mindset on both sides in the wake of the battle. With barely 250 available aircraft and three of their largest carriers sunk Yamamoto was faced with an equally daunting prospect for the next day. It was only the proximity of reinforcements in the form of the closing Invasion Group that enabled the plan to take Midway to proceed. As it was the size and totally unexpected inclusion of the six allied carriers and what they represented in the long term deeply disturbed Yamamoto. He was later to remark that it was at this point of the war he realized that it was not only could they not win, but how badly would Japan eventually lose. During the night the priority was to concentrate his forces to enable the occupation of Midway to proceed, but otherwise, adopt a defensive posture till reconnaissance the next day revealed the true state of his opposition.

    In terms of the conflict as an aerial battle, nothing on this scale had ever occurred or even been realistically considered in naval warfare before. In terms of losses, both sides through either combat or the sinking of carriers had lost over 500 aircraft each, a figure previously inconceivable, and representing a crippling blow on the professional capabilities for naval aviation of both navies. That its legacy was to be both galvanizing and enduring was to be crucial in subsequent developments in the Pacific.

    Dawn next day revealed the combined allied fleet with seemingly five operational carriers withdrawing east and obvious signs that Midway’s aircraft were being evacuated. The Japanese force was also identified with five carriers, but the presence of two further carriers and the battleships of the Invasion Group confirmed the allied decision to end the engagement. In what seemed to be a result of mutual exhaustion, both groups proceeded to break contact with the opponent’s main force and concentrate on saving the damaged vessels of both sides.

    Midway Losses 1.jpg


    Withdrawal.

    The final phase of the battle was telling in its way. The actual assault and occupation of Midway itself, whilst fiercely contested was a foregone result. Support by direct fire from battleships resistance barely lasted a day and, whilst suffering over 500 casualties, the Japanese troops completed occupation and accepted the surrender of some 280 survivors of the garrison on the morning of June 21. Emergency repairs enabled a portion of the Oiyo’s air group to immediately occupy the airfield as an interim measure, but Yamamoto would insist that Japanese Army aviation assets assume this role as rapidly as possible to restore his carrier arm numbers. By the end of June elements of the 17th Army, originally tasked for the Coral Sea Operation, occupied the island. The aerial defense of the island would rest with the army as IJN assets aside from seaplanes were withdrawn to Japan.

    The final stage of the naval conflict incorporated the significant submarine assets both sides had deployed to the conflict. The USN assets had been deployed to cover the north-western approaches and were poorly placed initially to intercept the withdrawing Japanese forces. Nevertheless, eventually six of those were able to intercept some of the slowly withdrawing damaged vessels and mount attacks. The failure of the US torpedoes was again to be damning. At least three Japanese warships, including the badly damaged carrier Akagi, were struck by weapons that failed to detonate. The sole success was the sinking of the heavy cruiser Mikuma by the USS Skipjack and a single strike on the battleship Haruna that failed to sink her. In a tragic coincidence one of the few successes struck and sank the merchant vessel Isi Maru carrying over two-thirds of the embarked POWs from Midway, killing most of them. Less than 90 of the garrison would reach Japan and just thirteen survivors were eventually repatriated back to the US at the end of the war. Despite the best efforts of the escorts only a single submarine, S-29 of the attacking submarines were sunk.

    The Japanese navy was able to concentrate nine submarines on the approaches to Hawaii and unlike the US efforts were able to sink the damaged heavy cruiser Chester and score hits on the slowly moving HMNS Pacifica and USS San Juan. But for the proximity of Pearl Harbor and the availability of salvage tugs, both would probably have sunk. As it is both would not return to service till 1943 and joined a long list of vessels requiring urgent dockyard attention. These attacks were not prosecuted without loss and four of the nine Japanese submarines would be sunk by the escorts before the final damaged units reached safety.

    This spasm of violence would mark the final operational phase of the battle. The occupation of the Alaskan islands of Kiska and Attu would go ahead as planned unopposed and the Japanese priority for the next period switched to fortifying these conquests. The strategic impact over the long term was just beginning and its impact and the resultant flow-on effects had yet to be assessed.
     
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    11 - Aftermath
  • Part Eleven

    Aftermath​

    The Battle of Midway has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific". It was the latest and perhaps greatest naval victory achieved by the Japanese to that point in the war. Superficially Yamamoto had achieved all the aims stated for the initial plan, the capture of Midway Island with the destruction of the US carrier forces in the central Pacific and the occupation of the Aleutian objective. Yet for all that Japanese news announced a great victory and it was perceived as a resounding defeat in the US, it came to represent the watershed moment in the conduct of the war for the IJN. It marked the point at which the expansion phase of operational planning concluded and future operations would be in the context of adopting the ‘barrier’ strategy to form a defensive perimeter. Offensive plans such as Operation FS (to invade and occupy Fiji and Samoa) or attacks against Australia, Alaska, and Ceylon; or even Hawaii and the west coast of the USA including Panama were no longer considered viable. From this point on the strategic initiative would steadily swing in the USA's favor as the IJN operational tempo changed from aggression to an emphasis on prolonged attrition to achieve an acceptable outcome to the war.

    For the US the impact of the defeat would be far-reaching, politically as well as militarily, especially as the total casualty figure would far exceed that suffered at Pearl Harbor. It would initially cost President Roosevelt a great deal of political capital to sustain the ‘Germany first’ priority of his war plans and subsequently delay its implementation, with strident demands for action in the Pacific in response to the loss. Conversely, the significant role of the allied navies in the battle would eventually prove far more beneficial once that role became well known. The USN CNO Admiral Ernest J King would also be dismissed in the aftermath and replaced by his deputy, Admiral Frederick J Horne, as a result of his response to the RN/RNN unit’s involvement in the battle. Already under scrutiny for his abrasive personality and questions regarding his actions to the German East-coast U-boat offense on American shipping, his tactless response to the allied involvement in the loss highlighted his Anglophobia and led to his dismissal. His barely concealed disdain and scapegoating of others for facilitating allied involvement as being responsible for the loss, combined with the prioritizing of USN repairs in preference to more damaged allied units, were the final straw to his appointment. President Roosevelt was said to have bluntly told him that any officer who is incapable of maintaining civil relations with an ally who has shed blood for the US was a liability the nation could not afford, particularly in a time of war. Conversely, it was those very attempts to blame Admiral Nimitz amongst others for the results, that enabled that officer to remain as C in C of the Pacific Theatre to the end of the war. His replacement Admiral Horne would prove both able and far more suited to the requirements of maintaining an effective alliance in the role of CNO.

    Another significant flag officer dismissal was Rear Admiral Ralph Christie. Prominent in the development of the Mark 14 torpedo between the wars he had proved resistant to reports that the exploder of the warhead was faulty. Despite a relentless stream of operational reports to the contrary, as late as May 25 he had still formalized a response stating that the failure issues were largely a result of poor maintenance or crew errors rather than a fundamental issue with the torpedo design. The numerous detailed failures during the battle, which could have significantly damaged or sunk numerous enemy units, contributed significantly to the defeat. Within the USN he was widely attributed as being responsible for the failure to address those issues before the battle, despite ample opportunities. He was posted to command the 9th (Great Lakes) District on 1 July 1942 and subsequently receive no further professional appointments before his retirement in 1945. The surviving USN Flag Rank officers Spruance, Kincaid and subsequently Mitscher, would all be highly successful operational commanders later in the war, but were strongly influenced by the battle. All would later admit that subsequently they never felt as free to risk aggressive action and thereafter were more considered and conservative in the offensive outlook they took.

    The other long-term significant legacy of the battle was the loss of confidence in cryptology information from US code-breaking services by the USN. For long periods during both 1943 and 1944, the USN was once again receiving good operational insights and timely intelligence into the plans of the IJN. However, as a result of the battle much of this was distrusted and on several occasions disregarding this intelligence or failure to act promptly would cost US forces severely.

    USN Impact

    The effect of the battle was to have a profound and lasting effect on the design of US carriers. The contrast between the fate of the relatively unarmored Ranger and Wasp and the armored allied designs which had all suffered multiple bomb and torpedo hits, yet remained operational was striking. That the pre-war American designs could be rendered combat incapable due to the unarmored flight deck whilst even the smaller and more lightly armored HMNS Terra Australis had endured four bomb hits, two penetrating the deck armor, yet remained capable of recovering and operating aircraft, was profound to USN observers. The level of damage suffered by all four of the armored allied designs was considered sufficient to have probably sunk any pre-war design USN carrier, yet not only had they survived but all had remained to some limited degree combat capable in their role. The first three vessels of the new Essex-class vessels were too far progressed to be changed, but the design of all subsequent ships was revisited to incorporate an armored flight deck in light of the battle experience. The losses and need for new carriers lead to the prioritization of the conversion of nine of the Cleveland-class light cruisers to become light carriers (the Independence-class CVLs), as well as accelerated development of the smaller CVEs.

    The role of the battleship to act as a ‘flak-castle’ in close protection to the carrier was highlighted, with its effectiveness for the Japanese also noted, along with the inadequacy of the existing quadruple 1.1-inch gun. This would lead to the massive proliferation of the 40-mm Bofors mount being employed along with the 20-mm Oerlikon gun. This, along with the impressive contribution of the Atlanta and San Juan emphasized the importance of the screen in air defense highlighted the increased role of the AA cruiser as well.

    Major changes would also result in the aircraft being operated by the USN. The catastrophic losses suffered by the Devastator TBD resulted in its immediate withdrawal from all front-line duties to be replaced by the Grumman TBF Avenger. Whilst recognizing its robustness, the inability of the F4F Wildcat to hold its own in a turning dog fight with the Zero lead the USN to seek an urgent replacement. This would ultimately result in the F6F Hellcat becoming the standard fighter deployed on fleet carriers by mid-1943, but at the same time, the outstanding performance of the RNN/RN Dragonfly in the dual-purpose role of fighter and dive bomber was recognized. Despite partisan and at times almost rabid opposition from aviation industry lobby groups in the US, the USN insisted on and got an American version produced under license that would begin to appear for frontline service late in 1942. This would serve on light and escort carriers as well as marine aviation units for the rest of the war, where its ability to fulfill both fighter and bomber roles offered greater flexibility necessary for smaller air groups. The USN had seized the Brewster Aeronautical Corporation in the US in April 1942 after numerous industrial and management failings. Already familiar with the Dragonfly due to service of the Brewster Buffalo alongside the Dragonfly in the NEI it proved straightforward to produce the aircraft under license. The American version would be armed with Browning.50-caliber machine-gun and fitted with folding wings for the first time, and eventually over 850 would be produced and served with distinction with the USN and USMC, the only non-US design fighter aircraft to undergo large scale production in the US during the war.

    Significant changes were made to the operational doctrine and employment of fighters in air defense. In terms of operations, the size of the fighter components in carrier air groups would be greatly increased in proportion to allow sufficient numbers for both escort and defense missions. Also, tactical training would be changed with the employment of methods like the ‘Thatch Weave’ and better interception and control methods for fighter operations to address issues revealed during the battle. Both the United States and Japan accelerated the training of aircrew, but eventually, the United States would have a more effective pilot rotation system, which meant that more veterans survived and went on to training or command appointments, where they were able to pass on lessons they had learned in combat to trainees, instead of remaining in combat, where errors were more likely to be fatal.
     
    12 - Conclusion
  • Part Twelve

    Japanese Response

    That the Japanese would undertake equally sweeping, if not greater changes than the USN despite winning the battle, indicates how significant an impact the result of this battle made. Japan won the battle to conquer Midway Island, but the presence of an equal number of RN and RNN carriers, in the wake of the earlier NEI operations, bought home the strategic imbalance of forces facing Japan in the longer term. That the Allies were now in a position to release significant forces from operations in the European theatre would only increase the level of force imbalance facing the IJN in the Pacific. With no sign that the U.S. would seek peace in the wake of the battle as Yamamoto hoped, his country faced a daunting prospect in the longer term.

    Although the Japanese would continue to secure more territory, with operations in the SW Pacific and securing Nauru, it would only be a matter of time before the U.S. would move to a state of naval parity and eventually supremacy which would only be exacerbated by allied support. The Battle of Midway redefined the central importance of air superiority for the IJN. Without any form of air superiority, the Japanese would never again be in a position to launch a major offensive in the Pacific or conduct effective defensive operations.

    After the battle, with the Tosa still undergoing repairs following the Coral Sea Operation, and soon to be joined in dock by Akagi and Hiryu. This left the Shōkaku and Zuikaku as the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still operational. Of Japan's other fleet carriers, the two improved Shokaku-class, (Watatsumi and Kuroakami laid down in 1940) where working up but striking the same issues Ozawa highlighted regarding the impact of fuel restrictions on aircrew training. With the Taihō, which would not be commissioned until early 1943, represented the only fleet carriers available with Shōkaku and Zuikaku; until the arrival of the first of the Unryu-class vessels currently under construction in 12 months. The three vessels of the Junyo-class would all be available to supplement these shortly and, although technically classified as fleet carriers, were smaller civilian conversions offering less effectiveness in that role. For the foreseeable future, much of the naval aviation capabilities would rely on the increasing number of light carrier conversions just becoming operational. In the time it would take Japan to replace carriers, the U.S. Navy had more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers building thanks to the shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act of 1938.

    The heavy losses in carriers had a similar flow-on effect on personnel. Not only had the loss of veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weaken the Imperial Japanese Navy. These heavy losses in veteran aircrew (perhaps over 50% of the aircrew embarked on the carriers) were not permanently crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrews at the start of the Pacific war. But the loss of over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers, with the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews, were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet and would take time to replace. The prospect of constant attrition of veterans during further operations would be the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.

    Awareness of these prospects made the IJN almost immediately set in place steps to address the issues. Plans to accelerate the training of aircrew were prioritized. Analysis by Admiral Ozawa on the relative skills of the pilots of the 5th Air Fleet emphasized the requirement for increased training and greatly increased fuel allocation required to produce effective air groups. This would become the highest priority to the IJN to maintain a viable air asset by 1943, and much of the operational tempo of the carrier force would be cut back whilst its personnel and aviation assets were rebuilt. The securing of the NEI oil fields helped but a crash program to develop and expand the existing Sakhalin Island fields was prioritized. In many ways, this would be fortuitous as by 1945 these, and their proximity to the Japanese home islands, would represent the only oil resource available to Japan in face of the otherwise overwhelming US naval blockade.

    Further measures were introduced to preserve aviation personnel. Evacuation of air group personnel from damaged or sinking vessels was prioritized. Measures such as the greatly increased deployment of seaplanes and submarines to recover downed aircrew included in future operations along with directives to aircrew to seek recovery reiterated. As a result of the battle, new procedures were adopted whereby more aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck, rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines was adopted, along with a review of damage control training measures. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment, with more carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques.

    In terms of aircraft, it was forced to be recognized that allied aircraft were rapidly improving and that soon would exceed the performance of current operational models of the IJN. Ozawa in particular was at the forefront of the introduction of change and improved models after the battle. His emphasis accelerated the development and acceptance of the Shiden. Though very large for a carrier aircraft and a handful for all but the most experienced of pilots, two or three chutai of this aircraft would eventually be deployed aboard each large fleet carrier of the IJN as standard from 1943 on, to act as a counter to the newer American designs. Rapidly recognized as the equal to the best allied fighters by both sides, its reputation was enhanced by using the cream of the IJN to fly them and generally known as honchos in their hands. Also accelerated was the development of the successor to the Zero, the smaller A7M Reppu, which would start to appear in some numbers by 1944 and be deployable on all carriers. Both would prove superior fighters and help maintain to a degree parity of performance with the USN, though not in numbers required as the war progressed. In addition, plans to greatly increase production rates were introduced to some effect, but never in sufficient quantity to match the overwhelming production might of the US.

    Ozawa, strongly backed by Yamaguchi, was also strident about lapses in the specific employment of fighters as a result of the 5th Air Fleets experience. He emphasized the need to acquire radar urgently, highlighting the effectiveness of RNN attacks on returning aircraft and his second strike, even to the extent of seeking urgent assistance from Germany. The lack of adequate warning hampered the effective employment of the CAP. As a result of the battle, it became IJN doctrine to deploy a ‘bubble’ of scout planes from the screen out 50-70 miles down a threat access as Yamaguchi had done, to provide adequate warning in the absence of radar. He also advocated better aerial management of defensive fighters to prevent over-commitment of the CAP too soon. Though never matching the capabilities of the allied air controllers these changes would significantly improve the defensive performance in later battles.

    Major improvements were instituted in anti-aircraft armament aboard ships. Employment of the excellent 100-mm Type 98 and lighter 80mm Type 98 guns were accelerated. Perhaps the most significant change was to accelerate the replacement of the Type 96 25-mm gun with the Type 00 40-mm version to supplement the lighter gun as the standard close-range gun of the IJN. Already under limited production, it would become the crash priority to fit on all surface vessels in mass numbers. Though lacking a high-velocity shell and thus the range of its allied 40-mm equivalents, it nevertheless was significantly more damaging than the type 96 it replaced, and become the feature of the towering ‘flak-castles’ of Japanese ships later in the war. A flow on of this would be the re-armament of most of the older Japanese light cruisers with a variety of 127, 100, and 80mm weapons for employment in the anti-aircraft role. Secondly it became the tactical model to employ these vessels as intimate close support to carriers in fleet operations. They would prove far more effective later in the war in this employment, rather than their original destroyer-leader role.

    All these represented a major sea-change in policy to the IJN, and there would also be further changes involving the aviation support industries that would flow on from this. It was noticeable how little real opposition was expressed by the previously strong ‘battleship’ lobby of the IJN to these changes. In some way, this lies with the recognition and contribution of the RN involvement in the battle. In many ways, the RN remained the institutional founder of the modern IJN, with much of its professionalism and ethos drawn from those beginning. The involvement of significant RN forces helped to shatter the institutional blinkers of the battleship lobby and their preoccupation with the ‘decisive battle’ concept solely with the USN. The ‘decisive battle’ had been won with aviation assets and yet still there existed major surface forces beyond those of the USN to contend with.

    Most historians now acknowledge that these changes represented the start to the middle or ‘attritional’ phase of the Pacific Theatre, which, while achieving some notable tactical successes, would ultimately prove to be a strategic failure for Japan in the faces of the allied and in particular US logistical might. Whilst failing to counter the eventual outcome of the war the new strategies and doctrine adopted would inflict far more on the allies in terms of eventual casualties and losses in subsequent battles before victory was achieved.

    Longer-Term Operational and Strategic Implications.

    It would not be until November, with the arrival of the last two of the Yorktown-class carriers Bon-Homme Richard and Ticonderoga, both still in work-up phase in the Atlantic post-commissioning, that the allied carriers would begin to be released from the Central Pacific. Both the Lexington and Pacifica required extensive emergency repairs before being able to proceed to the US to be fully repaired (indeed it was Admirals King’s irrational direction that the lightly damaged Hornet be docked first that nearly resulted in Pacifica sinking in Pearl Harbor, and ultimately lead to his dismissal). The result of this was that the balance of the battles in the SW Pacific for the next six months would be largely fought by the smaller carriers of both sides and the higher importance of land-based assets in this upcoming campaign.

    The long deployment greatly improved the inter-operability of the allied forces and the USN, developing both familiarity, trust and procedures which would be the basis of aviation operations between the allies for the remainder of the war. The presence of the Dragonfly aircraft in Hawaii greatly assisted the USN in developing aerial tactics to cope with the highly maneuverable Zero. Acting as ‘enemy’ during this period the RN/RNN component helped polish tactics like the Thatch Weave and improved the effectiveness of USN fighter tactics, and greatly helped the inexperienced air groups of the new carriers, along with improving the standard of air control of these forces. Both Terra Australis and Bulwark would undergo urgent repairs when space became available in Pearl Harbor before being released for operations in the SW Pacific in late October. They would be followed by Audacious and Illustrious from late November. By this time the repaired Saratoga would return to join the other three fleet carriers to form the basis of US Carrier forces for operations in the Central Pacific for 1943.

    For Japan, the occupation of Midway for all its cost failed to generate any real long-term strategic benefit, except to perhaps deny a closer USN submarine base to Japanese waters. Initially, Japan was able to repair and operate an airbase there, but it was never large enough to be employed as a springboard for operations against the Hawaiian chain. The US in November began a relentless night area bombing campaign, Operation Woodpecker, by the Hawaiian-based B-17 force. By April 1943 the repeated bombing of the tiny island area had rendered it inoperable as an airbase except for a few seaplanes operating from the atoll lagoon. The constant attritional cost of attempting to keep it supplied was a logistic failure and after the 2nd Battle of Midway in 1943 what forces remained were largely withdrawn before its recapture later that year.

    Thus, Midway was the first of the great carrier vs. carrier battles of the Pacific Campaign and resulted in a hiatus in the central Pacific for the second half of 1942, with attention switched to SW Pacific. Both sides used this period to recover and analyze the battle, in preparation for a renewal of the wider conflict in 1943. The sheer size and intensity of the aviation forces involved was unprecedented in any naval operation conducted in the war up to that point. Aside from stunning the leadership of both sides with the losses involved, it also bought to prominence and confirmed the vital importance that naval aviation and air supremacy would have in all subsequent naval operations for the remainder of the war.

    END OF MIDWAY DIKKI.

    OK everyone, that concludes the end of my Midway Battle Chapter and I hope you bear in mind that it is part of an increasingly difficerent AU here from the events IOTL. The sheer force levels involved should make that clear, but I have included it because even if I sound defensive, believe it I do appreciate the critiques and value the feedback and have already included a couple of things raised to change my draft. Please feel free to respond and ask if you want to elaborate on the rationales or changes presented, and I welcome others perspective but remember that IMO we are sailing in new waters and events IOTL are providing context and not necessarily rigidly fixed here. I hope you have enjoyed this and have found it interesting a I look forward to what you come up with. Regards T. (PS. I will in due course run the second half of the personal interlude up the flagpole shortly for your enjoyment.)
     
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