True, which is why US presidents no longer bother to, dont they?
But back then they still had to pretend, so they prodded, pushed and bullied the other guy into making a mistake so they could get into the war.
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Zimmerman denies the telegram
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True, which is why US presidents no longer bother to, dont they?
But back then they still had to pretend, so they prodded, pushed and bullied the other guy into making a mistake so they could get into the war.
IIRC:
The German agreement with the US was that all messages would be sent in clear. Then the Germans somehow persuaded the US to let them send the ZT in cipher. The British were monitoring the US line at the relay station at Land's End in Cornwall. However, to cover that operation, they told the US that they stole the ciphertext of the ZT in Mexico. (That story got out, and triggered something of a witch-hunt in the German embassy there.)
The victory reinforces the extreme authoritarian tendencies of the Kaiser and generals like Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The end of the war causes economic and social disruption, leading to unrest which the regime suppresses violently. The Socialists are destroyed, the Communists go underground. The regime becomes a quasi-fascist corporatist state, with open political opposition banned. The well-organized Communist underground becomes the central node of underground opposition, which includes ethnic minorities (Poles, Jews, Francophones in Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig Danes), Catholics, labor activists, liberals.
Like nearly all authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, Imperial Germany becomes increasingly sclerotic and corrupt. Nobody wants to hear bad news, so the country's problems are denied rather than addressed. The state-controlled economy systematically fails, due to cronyism and decisions made arbitrarily by bureaucrats who necessarily lack sufficient information and are insulated from the consequences of failure.
Eventually the regime collapses in a revolution led by the Communists.
The Socialists will be discredited, leaving the Communists as the only Left party. The Army will be discredited by losing the war; likewise the Right, which was the big support of the Army.
Consider what happened after WW II:
- Britain: Churchill and the conservatives lost in a landslide.
- US: Republicans took both houses of Congress from the Democrats in 1946.
- China: Communists defeated the KMT in the civil war.
- France: De Gaulle was pushed aside in the set-up of the Fourth Republic.
Or in 1920, when the Democrats lost in a landslide.
The German leadership was quite aware that they would need to throw the poeple a bone after the war or risk turmoil, they were already considering widening the right to vote (Germans already had a higher % of voter enfranchisement than the UK) and other measures, unless Ludendorff makes a very unlikely coup de etat, Germany would have been more democratic.
For the French, it would have been the French Revolution 3.0 with a communist twist.
Well...
If no USW and therefore no US entry into the war.
1917
March - Tsar deposed
April - Nivelle offensive, the French army mutinies, only this time there is no US Army coming to pick up the slack. With the Russians undergoing a revolution, the poilus have no hope, nothing to look forward to but for the other half of the German army to return from Russia.
This would have ended the war right there, but if not, there is more.
May - 10th Battle of the Isonzo River, the Italians suffer yet another bloody repulsion.
June - Messines Ridge - The brits score a point... buuuuut the Russians launch the Kerensky offensive, which quickly turns into a rout and yet more revolution. The Russian army is done and everyone can see it now.
July - Third Battle of Ypres begins... well... someone has to keep appearances.
August - 11th Battle of the Isonzo. The Italians score a minor success, enough to remind people they were still in the war, which leads to:
October - Battle of Caporetto. The Italians are crushed, lost a third of its infantry, half its artillery. There are no French troops available to shore them up as IOTL, so a few brits show up just to see the Italians run past them. The Italians sue for peace.
November - ...which is followed by the rest of the now, bankrupt, Entente. The Germans sign a status quo ante bellum with the UK, impose heavy war indemnities on the French plus a little land and some colonies... and have their way with Eastern Europe.
The fun part is... what do they do with Austria? They were already aware of the Sixtus Affair so... oh, and they were already shooting at the Ottomans.
Good times.
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Ah, it’s one of these kind of threads. Alright, I’ll get back to that in a minute. First:
The story of the Zimmermann telegram is perhaps more fragmented than I realized since there is a vital piece missing here.
The British didn’t tell the US that they were reading their codes. That was what the delay was about. Finding a way to alert the US to the German communication without telling them that that was where it had come from. So, they got a copy from the Mexican side of the line. They sent an agent to bribe an employee of the (commercial) telegraph office to steal the copy of the cypher text that they knew was there. This then gave them a legitimate reason to have the telegram. They could then send it to the Americans along with the German diplomatic codes (which they had broken) so the US could read it for itself from their own telegraph transcripts.
Each person it was shown to in the American government first thought it was a forgery. They were convinced, not by Zimmermann’s confirmation but by the records of the text in the USN telegraph office. Thus even prior to Zimmermann’s confirmation the American government was well aware of the authenticity of the telegram. Zimmermann’s confirmation certainly made it easier to convince the public, without revealing that the British had broken German diplomatic code. But it did not change the stance of the American leadership.
It should also be reiterated what has been said by others. Zimmermann is unlikely to not confirm. The diplomatic calculus behind the ZT was to create a deterrent that might keep the US out of the war when the Germans did the thing that the US had already threatened War over (USW). Denying it would only have eliminated any chance of that deterrent working now that they were already determined to push past the US’s red line. Now it was a ridiculous deterrent that was never going to work but if Zimmermann had realized that he likely never would have sent the note in the first place. German foreign diplomacy was notably bad in this era, and the power struggle between the various factions in government and military hadn’t helped it.
In March 1917? How do you figure?
Not really no. Even the much misunderstood French Mutinies weren’t until End of April. And they were only really about being sent into hopeless offensives.
If you ever study Ireland in WW1 you will notice that even at the height of the anti-conscription era no major Irish leader, even those in the IRA, recommended leaving WW1. Continuing participation in the war remained the consensus even while participation under Britain became a political poison pill.
I mean, must might be a bit of an overstatement . It is very possible. Maybe even likely. But it would depend a bit on the Germans. Even with France gone, the British are not in a position that would allow the Germans to name any price.
How do you figure?
Don’t think so. If USW doesn’t go ahead the Germans still need to knock the Russians out (which didn’t happen IOTL until after the October Revolution) and then have enough left in the tank to defeat the French and British in the field. Something they were basically incapable of doing. It would make it even worse if the lack of American entry leads to the Russians going on the defensive. That could slow things down and raise the cost higher for the Germans.
Wilson didn’t want war. What he wanted was for America (with him at the helm) to be the arbiter of the peace. Originally, the plan was to do this once all the silly, barbaric imperialists realized the futility of their war effort. When the Germans seemed to be willing to entertain him he hoped to pressure the British economically to force them to the table. When that fell apart and the relationship with the Germans began to break down in November 1916, Wilson generally worked to slow the breakdown and hoped to recover the situation. When it became clear that dream was unsalvageable he began to fear that the Entente would win unassisted and cut the US out of the peace process entirely. Between this and the already ample provocation, he determined to enter the war in such a way as to be a primary determiner of the peace.
After the Kerensky offensive against AH collapsed and the Russian army melted under the rather small German counterattack, the Germans had more pressing matters to consider, the Italians almost succeeded at the 11th battle of the Isonzo, so they went there to deal with them.
The you had Passchendaelle and the winter... plus there was no need to fight the Russians anymore, there was no one to fight anymore and no point in invading Russia either... but the Soviets were playing for time, until the Germans lost their patience and renewed the advance, the result was Brest-Litovsk.
The Kerensky offensive was the last major battle in the Eastern Front.
The Germans had no need to beat the French and British on the field, the French were already mutinous and the only thing that kept them in the fight, and in a passive manner, was the expectation of a new and large army coming to relieve them, take that away from them and what you have is the German army after the Kaiserschlacht.
I would agree with your view on WIlson if it were not for the fact that he never was a true neutral, always favored the ENtente and he was the one dishing the provocations.
... and every evil has a german first name ...
I would like to mind that Kaiser Bill ordered his prussian minister of the interior in autumn 1914 (after the Marne desaster) to push the reform of prussian electorial laws and constitution which was in a way in the works since it 1850.
He was already then well aware that he can't and would not 'deny his homecomming heros their share on participation of co-shaping the fatherlands ways in peacetime as well'.
Only the arch-conservative Loebell did his best by dilatory acting upon said order and delay and at times even trying to revert reformist thoughts within the ministry well 'building' upon Kaiser Bills rather ... imrovable span of attention for single topics. ... seems he quit the job not at least due to opposites with his King on this topic
Therewith when it actually counted in 1917 the german and prussian goverment had near to nothing in their offerings. Only Loebell successor 'Bill' Drews - already priorly known as a rather 'liberal' and modern thinking civil servant he proved to be also post-war - then rushed kinda proposal.
Thanks for the clarification and new info, for me at least. But my post was more for a hook for a TL were Germany acts a bit more inteligently in this and plans for a possible leak and has a story in hand for why it send the message. What ever follows was not mentioned by me.
If as positioned the USA do not enter, we do not know, how the French could / would handle the Mutinies. Could they do better? I doubt it... but worse is certainly possible. So again, we are in the midst of a process started earlier and going on. As such the OTL happenstance is a guideline but not, I think, the only way it could happen. For OTL I agree that the Mutinies are not the be all end all they sometimes are made up to be. But in a discussion of no USA entry I have doubts that it could not be worse.
Again, I think here is a mixing of different changes at work. If no Zimmermann, as per initial post, and no USW I have doubts that the USA enters. They may or not but generally I tend to think they would not. So yeah...
Regardless, Russian troubles did not start in October but with the February Revolution. And as I understand it, the Russians were kept in the War by prommises of US Dollars... So we may see an earlier Russian Exit... maybe depending on the actual cercumstances and possible TL telling. But I regard it as a possibility.
If that should happen and the French have some of the same problems of OTL and we add the uncomfortable decicions for the British regarding the worsening financial situation and I think we could come to an Peace of Exhaustion in the West with some German gains in the East. Maybe... depends... you know the spiel.
And no, I do not think the British finacial situation was good. Not in the way they would colapse outright but in the sense they would have to make uncomfortable choices. That in return could influence the situation on the ground with worse results for the Entente. How much? Again depends on the actual TL and personal reading of the situation. But I am of the oppinion that the Entente would have to cut somewhere and that it would impact the war effort negatively. How much I am more then happy to keep open as I do not know it.
While I generaly agree with this, I think you are painting Wilson in a bit to positive light. In that I mean that he was clearly Pro-Entente in his actions. As he was very different in the tone of his messages. Because as I understand it, they were rather negative against the CP but much less so for the Entente. In that, I think, he in part created the atmosphere where the Germans we not seeing the USA as neutral. With all that followed from that. So if Wilson truely wanted to negotiate, I think he would have had to take a stronger position against the Entente when they misbehaved... But again, that is my opinion and open to discussion.
And messiah Lenin takes over the world ?
Communists failed even in OTL when Germany was far more politically unstable and economically collapsing. They have no Chance TTL
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Wasn't Ludendorff the de facto dictator at this point. Why would he give up his power.
Because as far as I know it was all legal. Maybe an overreach but still within the law. And as soon as the war would be over... poof goes the power. And also very important, Hindenburg and Ludendorf did not depower the Reichstag and the other institutions. So the moment they had the possibility to take back control, Imo, they would.
And regardless of what some may have thought. I have massive doubts that the Army would have backed them, as in the Militarist Duo.
No he wasn't. His dictatorship is a myth. Wilhelm II was the absolute ruler and he exercised his power through the military. When he wanted to get rid of Ludendorff effortlessly. This was the German law that in the event of war the military led by the Emperor in the event of war is given absolute power over the country.
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Yeah, Wilson was clearly biased and was never neutral, which led to a clash with the Germans.
It would be interesting to explore what would have happened with a "generic" US president, one that would actually defend US interests against anyone during the war.
The POD for a delay in USW, which was the contention I was responding to, is 1 February 1917 at the latest. Or the day before when the Kaiser signed the order. More likely it is 9 January when the meeting at Schloss Pless is held and the Military leaders urge the Kaiser to do so. Possibly it is even 22 December when Holtzendorff composed his memo.
All of these are prior to the Keresky Offensive, prior even to the April Crisis which brought Kerensky in as Minister of War. Meaning there is considerable scope for things to change on the Russian side as well.
Had the Russians gone with the more limited offensive through Romania against Bulgaria, as Stavka had originally desired, or had the continual slip of the start of the offensive (originally planned for all parties in February, then slipped to April with the Russians following in May, then slipped to June, and not even being ready then) had caused the Entente to rethink their strategy and allow for a more defensive or limited stance on Russia’s part, then the Kerensky offensive may not go forward. And the Germans would instead have to chew through the, still effective and now better armed (though more poorly disciplined) Russian Army if they want to knock Russia out. And the offensive was basically always more costly than the defensive in WW1.
Now, does the lack of a commitment to USW guarantee that the Russians don’t commit to the offensive? No, not at all. The Western Entente was keen on Russia supporting them (and they had considerable economic leverage on Russia) while Stavka and Kerensky were keen on meeting pre-existing agreements to unite Russian opinion and gain diplomatic capital to negotiate peace on their new terms (self-determination for all in Kerensky’s case, though I am not sure if he would have applied that within the Empires borders). But the point stands, that changes have to be considered for the effect on both sides.
Additionally, it should be noted that the decision to resume USW was one of desperation. The Germans were losing. And they knew it. Slowly, but it was happening. They were outnumbered and had been hammered hard in 1916. So if they don’t decide to resume USW, it’s worth considering what they do instead?
This assumes that the entry of the Americans was a strong stabilizing influence on the French Army that kept the mutinies from getting worse. Ironically the opposite is actually true. At least initially.
The French Army had some features that turned out to be liabilities in 1917. Most importantly, they did not have a well functioning rotation system, allowing troops at the front to rest and receive leave. Additionally, the French officer class didn’t have the same Paternalistic outlook that was common in the British Army, as an example. British Officers expected deference and obedience but in return were expected to be preoccupied with the welfare and morale of their men. This was drilled into them pretty strongly all the way through. French officer culture had a much less marked emphasis on this, which could lead to soldiers feeling less connection to their officers and vise versa.
And, most importantly, the French Army had taken a lot of casualties in the early years of the war. For most nations their worst losses came nearer the end of the war. For France its worst year was 1914 and 1915 and 1916 were not light either. This all made the French Army reluctant to attack.
And then came Robert Nivelle. Nivelle promised that he would gain victory in 48 hours. And that if he didn’t he would halt the offensive. He convinced the political establishment (Lloyd George in particular) and he raised optimism in the French soldiery to a fever pitch. And then, having massively over promised he proceeded to under deliver. He did not break German lines in 48 hours and refused to end the offensive once he did not.
In 1915 Second Aisne would have been considered a draw at worst, a small success at best. The attack exhausted German reserves and gained a small amount of strategically valuable territory. But, with the above mentioned issues and the disappointment of the let down, the soldiers began to consider the offensive suicidal. This was made worse, not better, by the expectations of American entry. With optimism so high, when the US declared war the French soldiers unrealistically expected them to be there almost immediately. And when they did not magically appear en mass the disappointment only added to the malaise.
This caused units to start to refuse to attack. It should be noted that only 9 divisions had problems with discipline at the formation level. Many others had individual issues but in most cases it was not organized. And in all cases the troops did not refuse to fight, to defend their own trenches and they did not harm or attack their officers. They just refused to attack and sent delegations asking for the offensive to be called off and better conditions for the men. Once the offensive stopped, Nivelle was relieved, and Petain began talking to the men and addressing their concerns, order was restored quickly. The arrests of mutineers were done largely with the cooperation and acceptance of both the local officers and the rank and file. And of the thousands arrested and the hundreds of death sentences handed out, less than 4 dozen were carried out.
After this Petain began the same process that Montgomery would have to complete with Eighth Army in WW2. Rebuilding their confidence with defensive and limited offensive work. It’s here that the lack of US involvement might make a difference. IOTL Petain and Clemenceau could openly wait for the arrival of Tanks and American forces. Here that option isn’t there and offensive action may need to be contemplated sometime in the future. However, that does not mean the other option is a complete collapse. Most likely Petain does much the same as OTL, and puts the French army on the defensive with the intention to wait for more tanks in 1918 or 1919.
And that would likely be enough for the soldiery. None of them were recommending regime change. Few even mentioned an enforced end to the war. And absolutely no one was ok with the idea of letting the Germans take more of France. A collapse of the Army was never a realistic danger.
Neutrals are not required to be neutral in thought. Or even to not lean one way or the other. And Wilson was, if forced to look at it, more pro-Entente than pro-CP. but he should be. America was more pro-Entente than pro-CP. How could they not be? They are economically closer to the Entente (British and French trade with the US making German and Austrian trade look like a rounding error and Germany actually being more rival than partner in many markets), ideologically closer to the Entente (Germany was seen as the aggressor and the Rape of Belgium being a strong talking point), politically closer to the Entente (the French Republic and British Westminster system being more comfortable to a Republic which absorbed large amounts from the Westminster system), culturally closer to the Entente, and diplomatically closer to the Entente (the three nations diplomatic corps having strong contacts with each other and a lot of experience dealing with each other). For the US not to favour the Entente would have required a monumental screw up on the part of the Entente combined with some truly inspired work by the German diplomatic service (which, as mentioned, wasn’t the Reich’s strongest department).
The Entente had every advantage in this popularity contest. It’s like expecting the home crowd of a professional team to favour the armature out of towners. The only real advantage the CP had in this arena was Wilson’s ambitions, but neither side actually had a good enough understanding of the other to make this work.
I am not sure what provocations Wilson was supposedly giving to the Germans though.
That’s fair. Yours was mostly added because it mentioned the Mexican side of the story. So it seemed to fit. But my response was less aimed at your post anyway.
As mentioned above, the US entry was not critical to settling the mutiny. It actually initially made things worse (though by no fault of the US). So settling the mutiny is unlikely to go any different than OTL. Addressing the soldiers concerns and stopping the offensive.
What would have to change is the French strategy going forward. They would still have to wait and build up confidence in the Army. And they would probably do that by precluding major offensives in 1917 and stating that they are waiting for tanks and new tactics to be ready. But at some point they will need to consider that they will eventually need to once again go on the offensive.
Materially, this doesn’t actually change anything. The French only went on the offensive again in summer 1918, and by then they had rebuilt their confidence and planned an offensive that they were sure they could accomplish. American presence didn’t actually add much material strength to that attack.
Morale wise though, French High Command is going to have to be careful about when and how they eventually announce the idea of new offensives. They will likely need to do some smaller limited ones before attempting something like the OTL Meuse-Argonne. They may also need to consider the long term objective if they feel that British and French strength alone needs to carry them all the way to Berlin.
But, I will reiterate, French collapse is not likely in 1917 even without American DOW.
POD’s have got mixed around. The OP called for everything to be basically the same until 3 March when Zimmermann denies the telegram rather than confirms it. At that point I doubt you stop American entry. Wilson and his government are already aware of the authenticity of the ZT and USW has already been declared. The only difference then is that Wilson’s government still has the dilemma of how to convince the public of their authenticity without revealing that the British had broken the German diplomatic code.
The ZT was transmitted using diplomatic code 13040, which had been in use for years. The newer code 3512 was already in existence as an update and the British had already broken it too. What’s more with the US against them there weren’t really many places the Germans can talk to diplomatically anyway. So if nothing else can be found to explain it Wilson will probably just get the go ahead to reveal that the British cracked the German codes and that allowed thé US to confirm the message in their own system. It could, at worst case, cause the Germans to review all their codes and possibly cause the British to lose access to them for a while. This would be a serious loss, but would likely be considered worth it to bring the US on board. And it’s likely the loss is not so serious anyway.
If, however, we are talking about the delay of the return to USW than we have butterflied or delayed r the ZT anyway. The ZT was an attempt to soften or avoid the consequences of USW that the Germans had accepted were likely to occur. So, no USW, no ZT.
It’s true that Russian instability had already shown itself with the February Revolution. However, this did not make an anti-war posture the standard. The Provisional government was made up almost entirely of those who believed that Russia must continue the war. Stavka counselled Nicholas II to abdicate only after determining that the new government would be in favour of continuing the fight. And even the more radical soldier Soviets at the front were, though often not in favour of offensives, on board with a continued war in a defensive stance. And were talked around to supporting the offensive in many cases. Even the Petrograd Soviet was not exactly anti-war. It was divided on the issue and did not lay out an official anti-war stance until after the Kerensky offensive was already going badly. Previous to that they had said that they wanted a peace without annexations or reparations but had also said that the revolution should not retreat in the face of foreign conquest.
So, yeah, the Russian commitment to the war was definitely shaken by the February Revolution. But anti-war did no become the obvious winning strategy to Russian populists until the Kerensky offensive started going badly.
An actual peace of exhaustion, at least one that lasts more than a couple years, is really hard to get in WW1 (or any war really). It’s a very small needle to thread. Everyone might be sick of war and want peace but they have to be in a position that they will accept what the other side is offering. But each side only hardens their positions as the costs pile up. The Entente was winning. They have more troops, more material and more money. As long as that is the case they have little incentive to accept anything but the most generous of German terms. The CP, having got into this war, needed to get something out of it and be assured that they would not be more vulnerable after it than before. And that incentivized them to keep trusting that the next thrust would change things and that the Entente was less committed to the war than they were. For a peace of mutual exhaustion you need everyone to have a collapse of morale at the exact same time. Otherwise the one in less bad shape rally’s as they see their enemy flagging and continues on to enforce their own peace.
The British financial weakness was not a lack of money. The domestic financial environment was quite healthy. What they lacked was a currency acceptable to the US for purchases there. In a worse case scenario when the ability to purchase in the US was cut off entirely (unlikely in itself) , ability of the Entente to continue as they have done would be compromised. But the British and French would still be some way from the internal cannibalization of their economy that Germany had been forced into since 1914. If they kept the will to do so, they could still very much outlast the Germans.
You know, that might be the first time I have ever been accused of going easy on Wilson. Usually it’s the other way around.
Just to restore some balance let’s try saying what I think a little more clearly. Wilson was a moralistic blowhard of the Gladstonian school. Surpassed or equaled as a moralistic blowhard only by Gladstone himself. And Wilson was possibly even more hypocritical in it than was Gladstone. Wilson’s naive, over idealistic and under informed policy possibly extended the war, and almost certainly contributed to much chaos and heartbreak after it. I would go so far as to say he had a stronger hand than most of his day in bringing about WW2.
So, that’s out of the way. I often come across the idea that Wilson was pro-Entente but generally don’t get specifics. Sometimes it seems to come from the idea that if a nation is neutral it must not have an opinion. Occasionally it seems to come from the belief that since the US did not use its fleet to force through trade to Germany (an act that would be against its own interests and would have been seen to be a direct support of Germany against the Entente by the American population of the day) it was not neutral.
Could you give me some specifics on how Wilson was not neutral? Cause his designs on dictating the peace and the world which would emerge from it seem to have harmed whoever stood between him and them, regardless of allegiance.
Who said anything about Lenin or the world?
Just like Castro failed abjectly in 1953, and therefore had no gaining of seizing power in 1959.
And just like Hitler failed abjectly in 1923, and therefore had no chance of gaining power in 1933.
At the time of Lenin the presumption was that the USSR would just annex any communist country.
The other idea was that the leader of the USSR is basically the pope of Communism but that wouldn't arrive until the Stalin era when they accepted the existence of other socialist states. Even then that is disputed by China.