Yom Kippur War - Suez Canal Crossing Fails

[lucaswillen05]

October 18 1973 Headquarters IDF Southern Command

On October 115 1973 the IDF mounted Operation Stouthearts, the crossing of the Suez Canal By October 18, after more than sixty hours fighting of the bloodiest fighting of the Yom Kippur War. it was clear that the operation was a disaster. Magor General Ariel Sharon was dead, killed in action in the vicinity of Chinese Farm. Major General "Bren" Adan was wounded but still in command. Sharon's 143rd Division had effectively been destroyed as a combat unit and Adan#s 162nd was likwise badly damaged. The burning hulks of Egyptian and Israeli tanks littered the desert between the Sapir Road and the Great Bitter Lake. The critical Israeli bridging equipment had been destroyed when it was destroyed by Egyptian tanks during a counter attack

A small Isreali force had mad it over the Suez Canal but was under heavy and continuous counter attacks by far superior Egyptian forces The only real bright spot for IDF's Southern Command was the destruction of Egypt's 25th Armoured Brigade on 17 October along the shores of the Great Bitter Lake by elements of Bren Adan's division.

In his headquarters General Bar Lev pondered the results of the IDF offensive which, if anything, had field even more disastrously than the October 8 counter attack. There was a third bridge available, the "Austerity" Bridge but the Egyptians must now know the intended canal crossing site location. Would Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Defense Minister Moshe Dayan decide to relieve him of command at Southern Command. Bar Lv could only hop things were going better at Northern Command

 

[The Machine]

It's possible individual Israelis, such as Sharon, may have been killed in the battle, but the likelihood the Egyptians would be able to react to and defeat the Israeli attack is bordering on ludicrous.

One of the many weaknesses of the Egyptian/Syrian/Arab armies was their strict adherence to "The Plan." When things didn't go according to "The Plan," they generally hunkered down and waited for orders from above. They also had the problem that junior and field officers reported what was supposed to have happened, not what actually happened, leading the senior officers to have an inaccurate picture of the situation.

Unlike the Arab Armies, the IDF was capable of improvisation and it's officers correctly reported the situation in the field, which is why they were able to win despite taking heavy casualties during "The Plan" at the beginning of the war.

If you want the Egyptians to win, there will need to be a huge shift in the Egyptian leadership and culture, which I'm not sure is even possible.

Please note I am putting the Arab armies in the same basket here due to amazingly-similar weaknesses displayed by the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Libyans from 1948-1991.

 

[lucaswillen05]

October 18 1973 Golda Meier's Office 9AM

The Israeli Prime Minister was furious Why, she demanded of the Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had the IDF failed to pull off the Suez Canal crossing which, had been so meticulously planned and war gamed by Israel's high command for several years prior to the war.Dayan blamed the commander of the now decimated 162nd Division, Arial Sharon who, from 1969 to August 1973 had been the commanding general at Southern Command. He had been responsible for working out the plans for the canal crossing and it was his division that had been tasked with implementing the plan. Sharon of course was conveniently dead, killed the previous afternoon while organizing yet another failed attack attack. Nobody was quite sure of the circumstances but reports indicated hat Sharon was killed when his forward Headquarters was hit by an Egyptian artillery barrage or an Egyptian air strike. Soon after the area was overrun by an Egyptian counter attack Their was one report that Sharon died when his command vehicle was destroyed by an Egyptian T-55.

Bar Lev also held a large portion of responsibility owing to his failure to co-ordinate Adan's and Sharon's Divisions which were the key components of the entire Israeli plan Consequently both had been decimated in ill conceived and ill coordinated attacks much like the failed counter attack of October 8

Having explained the reasons for the disaster Dayan offered his resignation.

Meier however refused. Israel was in the middle of a desperate war war. Although the IDF had driven deep into Syria the situation on that front was also critical. Over the last few days . over October 15 and 16 there had been large scale attacks by Syrian, Iraqi,Jordanian and Saudi units along the southern face of the Israeli penetration. Although thes attacks had been repelled fighting had been intense. Although the Northern Front was now quiet this was only temporary. Al the indicators showed that the Arabs planned to launch a massive renewed push against the Southern flank of the IDF salient in Syria. Mount Hermon of course was sill firmly under Syrian control. There was also the matter of what the Egyptian army would do to exploit their victory on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. With the destruction of Israel's 162nd Division and the fact that Adan's Division was combat ineffective for most likely the next few days Southern Command was incapable of offensive operations. Should the Egyptians mount a renewed offensive in the Sinal Southern Command would b hard pressed. Indeed.Golda Meir might have to reconsider the use of Israel's nuclear option, the use of which had been briefly considered and rejected during the darkest hours of Syria's opening offensive on the Golan Heights.

"Now" sad Golda Meier after several minutes careful consideration "is not the time for Israel to change her Defense Minister. I do not accept your offer to resign".

Nevertheless, someone had to be held accountable for the disaster. Following a few moments discussion Meier picked up the telephone to Southern Command. Bar Lev was relieved of command and, by noon Bren Adan was the new commander of Israeli Southern Command His orders were to suspend offensive operations for at least the next few days until Israeli forces had regrouped. IDF forces n th West Bank bridgehead were to be withdrawn and IDF forces were to pull back to more defensible positions

In Syria IDF forces were ordered to continue defensive operations in the salient they had driven into Syria. Any thoughts of a possible IDF drive towards Damascus would have to b abandoned at leas for the time being. All efforts would focus on the defense against Arab offensives on both fronts pending a possible political solution. A solution that would be unlikely to favour Israel

 

[lucaswillen05]

It's possible individual Israelis, such as Sharon, may have been killed in the battle, but the likelihood the Egyptians would be able to react to and defeat the Israeli attack is bordering on ludicrous.

One of the many weaknesses of the Egyptian/Syrian/Arab armies was their strict adherence to "The Plan." When things didn't go according to "The Plan," they generally hunkered down and waited for orders from above. They also had the problem that junior and field officers reported what was supposed to have happened, not what actually happened, leading the senior officers to have an inaccurate picture of the situation.

Unlike the Arab Armies, the IDF was capable of improvisation and it's officers correctly reported the situation in the field, which is why they were able to win despite taking heavy casualties during "The Plan" at the beginning of the war.

If you want the Egyptians to win, there will need to be a huge shift in the Egyptian leadership and culture, which I'm not sure is even possible.

Please note I am putting the Arab armies in the same basket here due to amazingly-similar weaknesses displayed by the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Libyans from 1948-1991.

The Suez Canal crossing could very easily have failed. Read Crossing:Suez 1973 by Amiram Ezov. The battle to cross the canal was in fact a very close run affair. Historically the IDF took considerable losses. In this scenario the Israeli operation was at least as open to SNAFUs as OTL due to poor co-ordination of Sharon and Adan by Bar Lev. Sharon got obsessed with taking Chinese Farm and failed to pay sufficient attention to his real mission, the canal crossing. Finally the Israeli canal bridging train got caught and destroyed in a local Egyptian counter attack.

The Egyptians did not so much win the battle. More accurately the IDF lost it, in large part thanks to Sharon.

To what extent the Egyptians will be able to exploit their victory in the next few days is open to question. The iDF will pull back to the defensive positions they held on October 14 where, despite their losses they can likely hold. However the IAF has suffered heavy losses and, without the historical Suez Canal crossing the Egyptian SAM sites cannot now b taken out by ground forces.

The situation in Sinai is now virtually a stalemate at least for now. The Egyptians have some limited offensive chances. The new Israeli commander at Southern Command, Bren Adan, still has one bridge immediately available but his forces have been significantly weakened. Another attempt at crossing the canal with wakened IDF forces will be very risky.Politically Sadat has achieved his objective of gaining a major bridgehead across the Suez Canal.

Before I move on to consider military developments in Syria and political developments in Washington and Moscow I will be examining the position from the Egyptian side with particular reference to issues between Sadat, Shazli, Ishmail and Kosygin Even though the Suez Canal crossing has been a disaster for the IDF it is unlikely that Israel's survival is threatened. However there is still a distinct possibility of the historical nuclear confrontation between the Soviets and the US, Golda Meier could yet decide to use Israel's nuclear option should the need arise.

Assuming however that a ceasefire is imposed Egypt at last will have done sufficient to extract significant concessions from Israel getting at last a significant part of Sinai back very quickly. In this case Israel will be viewed as suffering a limited defeat lmn Syria meanwhile there is the question of th Arab counter attacks to deal with.

Another possibility is a Soviet military intervention. Soviet airborne divisions were put on alert for deployment to Syria and, iTTL this could actually happen widening th conflict into a possible WW3 and a nuclear exchange

 

[lucaswillen05]

Egyptian Headquarters 18 October 1973

Egyptian Chief of Staff General Shazli and Egypt's Commander in Chief General Ishmail were engaged in yet another shouting match The two generals had hated each other and had done so for years, ever since 1960 when Shazli and been given preferment for command over the UN paece keeping contingent in the Congo. The tension between the two men had worsened considerably during th 1967 6 Day War

This time the issue was how best to exploit the victory at Chinese Farm and the failure of the IDF Canal Crossing, The stolid General Ishmail wanted to consolidate the Egyptian Second and Third Field Armies particularly in the area of Chinese Farm where the IDF attack of the last few days had been concentrated. This would allow the SAM batteries to protect Egyptian ground forces from the IaF while the Egyptian army fought the defensive battle it was best suited for fighting. It was this same strategy that had proven so successful. y again, during the intensive battles of the last few days. General Shazli on th other hand, a handsome, aggressive and dashing officer (a former paratrooper) although. like the late Arial Sharon, something of a prima donna advocated a far more aggressive approach. Despite the heavy losses incurred in the most recent battles, the exhaustion of many units and the failure of the October 14 offensive Shazli wanted to mount a similar offensive to take advantage of IDF disarray and lower morale following their recent failure Like the October 14 offensive Shazli planned a broad front push towards the"Lattoral Road" and to capture the Giddi and Mitla Passes. If this went well it would take the pressure off the Syrians and even force the Israelis to transfer forces from the Northern Command in order to shore up their positions in the Sinai. There might even be an opportunity to recapture more of the Sinai.

General Ishmail however stubbornly refused to countenance even the less ambitious idea of an advance to the "Lattoral Road". This would leave advancing Egyptian forces outside of the SAM Umbrella and vulnerable to mobile counter attacks by the far more nimble IDF. With their high command at loggerheads the Egyptian army took no action throughout the 18th, merely regrouping and recovering losses The IDF did much the same while preparing a withdrawal towards the defensive positions it had held on October 14

 

[Livius wannabe]

Operation Nickel Grass is still ongoing. Shouldn't that make up for the lost materiel
and give the Israelis a chance to restart pushing?

Of course the Soviets might start a major resupply operation of their own (larger than
the one in OTL), but as I understand their capabilities weren't on par with USAF and
it would have to be done more slowly by sea.

 

[lucaswillen05]

18 October nwar Sadat's PresidntialbOfficc Cairo

Operation Nickel Grass is still ongoing. Shouldn't that make up for the lost materiel
and give the Israelis a chance to restart pushing?

Of course the Soviets might start a major resupply operation of their own (larger than
the one in OTL), but as I understand their capabilities weren't on par with USAF and
it would have to be done more slowly by sea.

They may very well do so lading to a far mor serious confrontation with US 6th Fleet. It is also possible TTL might see the Soviets deploying airborne divisions to Syra in tat event and putting hr forces in Eastern Europe on alert

For the moment though Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin is in Egypt meeting with Sadat. This meeting could well be a critical event. Ibn the repulse of the Suez crossing Egypt has suffered heavy material losses. There is also the political situation in Washington and th military situation in Syria to consider as th situation develops over the next few days. Nixon will b distracted by the Watergate Scandal and Kissinger is busy with diplomacy but the US may well step up supply shipments to Israel but without wanting to be drawn into th war or into a global conflict for hat mattr. Neither the Soviet Union or the US want to start WW3 and will want to take steps to avoid that

 

[Livius wannabe]

They may very well do so lading to a far mor serious confrontation with US 6th Fleet. It is also possible TTL might see the Soviets deploying airborne divisions to Syra in tat event and putting hr forces in Eastern Europe on alert

For the moment though Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin is in Egypt meeting with Sadat. This meeting could well be a critical event. Ibn the repulse of the Suez crossing Egypt has suffered heavy material losses. There is also the political situation in Washington and th military situation in Syria to consider as th situation develops over the next few days. Nixon will b distracted by the Watergate Scandal and Kissinger is busy with diplomacy but the US may well step up supply shipments to Israel but without wanting to be drawn into th war or into a global conflict for hat mattr. Neither the Soviet Union or the US want to start WW3 and will want to take steps to avoid that

I don't know. Back in 1956 the less-than-composed Khrushchev didn't actually want to go to war: do you see Brezhnev doing so?
The simpler option for the Soviets would be to keep resupplying Syria to hold pressure on the Israelis and make sure that if they have to win, it's going to be a costly victory.

Regarding Egypt I'm undecided. OTL they ditched the cooperation with USSR after having vindicated the 6 days catastrophe. In this case perhaps they would reach more of a stalemate and it would be Israel's pride to be injured.
So, what do Meir and Dayan do? Israel can afford a war of attrition far less than Egypt. Do they see the situation on the ground and decide to make peace all the same?

 

[starman]

The Suez Canal crossing could very easily have failed. Read Crossing:Suez 1973 by Amiram Ezov. The battle to cross the canal was in fact a very close run affair.

Agreed. It was tough to open the Tirtur road.

Historically the IDF took considerable losses.

Right and it would've been worse had the Egyptians been more alert October 15-16. I'm under the impression they anticipated an Israeli attack on the southern flank of 16th Infantry and made some preparations, but may have thought no attack would come til dawn so failed to stop the first tank battalion.

Sharon got obsessed with taking Chinese Farm and failed to pay sufficient attention to his real mission, the canal crossing.

No OTL it was the other way around. He was eager to cross with his forces, despite the Tirtur issue, and certainly opposed the Missouri operation.

Finally the Israeli canal bridging train got caught and destroyed in a local Egyptian counter attack.

I don't think the 1st armored could've reached it but artillery might've wrecked it had there been observers nearby.

To what extent the Egyptians will be able to exploit their victory in the next few days is open to question. The iDF will pull back to the defensive positions they held on October 14 where, despite their losses they can likely hold.

Agreed.

However the IAF has suffered heavy losses and, without the historical Suez Canal crossing the Egyptian SAM sites cannot now b taken out by ground forces.

Right.

The situation in Sinai is now virtually a stalemate at least for now. The Egyptians have some limited offensive chances.

They wouldn't risk a repeat of October 14.

Even though the Suez Canal crossing has been a disaster for the IDF it is unlikely that Israel's survival is threatened.

Of course not.

However there is still a distinct possibility of the historical nuclear confrontation between the Soviets and the US, Golda Meier could yet decide to use Israel's nuclear option should the need arise.

Which is unlikely in this scenario. As long as Egypt and Israel are stalemated, the USSR won't feel a need to intervene as it threatened to do OTL when 3rd Army got trapped.

Assuming however that a ceasefire is imposed Egypt at last will have done sufficient to extract significant concessions from Israel getting at last a significant part of Sinai back very quickly.

Likely, especially if Egypt's bag of prisoners is significantly bigger than it was OTL.

In this case Israel will be viewed as suffering a limited defeat lmn Syria meanwhile there is the question of th Arab counter attacks to deal with.

Not sure they would've happened.

Another possibility is a Soviet military intervention. Soviet airborne divisions were put on alert for deployment to Syria and, iTTL this could actually happen widening th conflict into a possible WW3 and a nuclear exchange

The Soviet alert was due to the desperate plight of 3rd Army.

 

[starman]

Despite the heavy losses incurred in the most recent battles, the exhaustion of many units and the failure of the October 14 offensive Shazli wanted to mount a similar offensive to take advantage of IDF disarray and lower morale following their recent failure Like the October 14 offensive Shazli planned a broad front push towards the"Lattoral Road" and to capture the Giddi and Mitla Passes.

Did you ever read what Shazli himself wrote, in The Crossing of the Suez? He hotly denied favoring the October 14 attack. That was Sadat's blunder--and far from the only one that month...

General Ishmail however stubbornly refused to countenance even the less ambitious idea of an advance to the "Lattoral Road"

For the most part the Egyptians hadn't even reached the Artillery road let alone the Lateral road.

 

[lucaswillen05]

Agreed. It was tough to open the Tirtur road.



Right and it would've been worse had the Egyptians been more alert October 15-16. I'm under the impression they anticipated an Israeli attack on the southern flank of 16th Infantry and made some preparations, but may have thought no attack would come til dawn so failed to stop the first tank battalion.



No OTL it was the other way around. He was eager to cross with his forces, despite the Tirtur issue, and certainly opposed the Missouri operation.



I don't think the 1st armored could've reached it but artillery might've wrecked it had there been observers nearby.



Agreed.



Right.



They wouldn't risk a repeat of October 14.





Of course not.



Which is unlikely in this scenario. As long as Egypt and Israel are stalemated, the USSR won't feel a need to intervene as it threatened to do OTL when 3rd Army got trapped.



Likely, especially if Egypt's bag of prisoners is significantly bigger than it was OTL.



Not sure they would've happened.



The Soviet alert was due to the desperate plight of 3rd Army.

Ishmail woud not have risked a renewed offensive. Shazli on the other hand might. Historically it was Shazli who was dismissed. In TTL it might be Ishmail who gets fired Sadat might decide to throw his weight behind a limited offensive. Another driver and departure from OT might be Soviet agreement to increase the supply of arms to Egypt and Syria. This does not require the Soviets to intervene but it might heighten the possibilities of a US attempt to blockade Egypt and Syria heightening the risk of an Eastern Mediterranean confrontation. This may or may not result in a hot war depending on how matters are handled. At some point, if the situation really heats up it is also possible the Soviets might deploy the airborne divisions alerted IOTL

Regarding the idea of a limited Israeli defeat, in the Sinai area the IDF failed to cross the Suez Canal which means that there will be no bridgehead on the West Bank of th Suez and Egyptian Third Army will not be surrounded. Egypt will have a secure lodgement on the East Bank of the canal. Although the IDF will have a salient in Syria the situation would be much easier to portray as an Arab victory even though the military situation s actually likely to be a stalemate particularly given the destruction of Sharon's Division and the battering inflicted on Adan's division during TTL fighting of 15 - 17 October. Tactically it will be hard for Adan, now the new Southern Front commander to attempt another attempt at crossing the canal

 

[starman]

Ishmail woud not have risked a renewed offensive. Shazli on the other hand might.

Shazly strongly opposed the October 14 attack, and would've opposed another.

Historically it was Shazli who was dismissed.

But that had nothing to do with 10/14. He was dismissed because he was sometimes at odds with Sadat, for example on October 15 when "Sadat turned nasty" threatening to court martial Shazly for suggesting some units be pulled back to the west bank.

In TTL it might be Ishmail who gets fired Sadat might decide to throw his weight behind a limited offensive

I don't think even Ismail wanted the 10/14 operation. "It's a political order" he told the reluctant generals. "We must develop our attack by tomorrow morning."

 

[lucaswillen05]

Did you ever read what Shazli himself wrote, in The Crossing of the Suez? He hotly denied favoring the October 14 attack. That was Sadat's blunder--and far from the only one that month...



For the most part the Egyptians hadn't even reached the Artillery road let alone the Lateral road.

Th situation has changed markedly from Octobr 14 though and Sadat might decide he wants the attack for political reasons end thus follow Shazli's plan in TTL. Whether it works any better than October 14 remains to be seen. ITTL the situation will b different though given the destruction of Sharon's Division and the battered stat of Adan's old division There might be some Egyptian hops for capturing the Giddi and Mitla passes for instanc. This would be a more interesting situation than just having the Egyptians and IDF sit there for the rest of the war. Also. if the Egyptians attack again and fail as they did on Octobwr 14 this might create a situation where the IDF has another shot at crossing the canal. They still have have the Austerity Bridge available.

On the downside the Egyptian units in the Chinese Farm area have also suffered heavily Egypt also lost the T-62s of 25th Armoured Brigade

 

[starman]

Th situation has changed markedly from Octobr 14 though and Sadat might decide he wants the attack for political reasons end thus follow Shazli's plan in TTL. Whether it works any better than October 14 remains to be seen.

I doubt the Egyptians would launch another attack after the experience that day, not even after bloodying the IDF. After all, they had initially bested the IDF on October 6-8, yet failed miserably in offensive operations afterwards.

ITTL the situation will b different though given the destruction of Sharon's Division and the battered stat of Adan's old division There might be some Egyptian hops for capturing the Giddi and Mitla passes for instanc.

The situation on the ground was far from the only consideration. It wasn't feasible to advance beyond SAM coverage. The Egyptians had already learned that the hard way, around the 9th and again at the wadi Mab'uk.

This would be a more interesting situation than just having the Egyptians and IDF sit there for the rest of the war. Also. if the Egyptians attack again and fail as they did on Octobwr 14 this might create a situation where the IDF has another shot at crossing the canal. They still have have the Austerity Bridge available.

Another reason to avoid launching a risky attack. Btw by this time the IDF was getting plenty of replacement armor from the US.

On the downside the Egyptian units in the Chinese Farm area have also suffered heavily Egypt also lost the T-62s of 25th Armoured Brigade

I don't know if the OP's scenario works if the 1st and 25th are wrecked as occurred historically. The best chance for it to happen IMO would be for the Egyptians to use 21st armored to bolster the static defenses in the Chinese Farm i.e. have the tanks hull down in ambush positions (maybe in ditches) to repel and crush the IDF attacks beginning with that of Reshef October 15-16.

 

[Ak-84]

It's possible individual Israelis, such as Sharon, may have been killed in the battle, but the likelihood the Egyptians would be able to react to and defeat the Israeli attack is bordering on ludicrous.

One of the many weaknesses of the Egyptian/Syrian/Arab armies was their strict adherence to "The Plan." When things didn't go according to "The Plan," they generally hunkered down and waited for orders from above. They also had the problem that junior and field officers reported what was supposed to have happened, not what actually happened, leading the senior officers to have an inaccurate picture of the situation.

Unlike the Arab Armies, the IDF was capable of improvisation and it's officers correctly reported the situation in the field, which is why they were able to win despite taking heavy casualties during "The Plan" at the beginning of the war.

If you want the Egyptians to win, there will need to be a huge shift in the Egyptian leadership and culture, which I'm not sure is even possible.

Please note I am putting the Arab armies in the same basket here due to amazingly-similar weaknesses displayed by the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Libyans from 1948-1991.

That is palpable bullshit. Explain the OTL Ismailia and Port Said battles then? Which were basically improvisation at all levels. Or Sultan Yacub in 1982?

I am not picking on you as such, that is the popular narrative in the West. Arab armies have many problems. However there is a tendency amongst Western analysts to pontificate at lengthy on failures, while ignoring successes, declaring extreme examples as standard procedure, and perferring to rely on preconceived notions rather than a sober analysis of the facts.

From my experience, IDF personnel don't make those mistakes.

 

[Ak-84]

Some other points to consider.
1) In OTL Dayan (who has opposed the crossing mission) planned with withdraw to the East Bank if the ceasefire did not hold. If the failure in counter crossing occurs, he is going to do that early.
2) Further to the above, Dayan's opposition to the crossing was due to the risk of finding themselves trapped between reserves coming up from Cairo, and the Canal. This nearly happened in OTL, actually would have happened if the war had continued.
3) Third Army's actual position was not as bad as was feared by the Soviets and the HQ in Cairo. In actuality, they increased the amount of area they took in the East bank. They also beat back Israeli attempts to take Suez, and until the Israeli took Suez the Third Army was still able to fight (and threaten the Israeli supply line into Africa, which they IOTL attempted to disrupt). David Elazar concluded post war that the Third Army was far from destroyed.

 

[starman]

That is palpable bullshit. Explain the OTL Ismailia and Port Said battles then?

Port Said? Didn't you mean Suez?

Or Sultan Yacub in 1982?

That was a relatively minor affair. It's interesting, though, that while Katz gave the impression of being strongly "slanted" toward Israel, his account of the '82 battles appears quite objective.
Btw I'm not sure what to make of the allegedly successful employment of T-72s by Syria at Rashaya.

 

[starman]

Some other points to consider.
1) In OTL Dayan (who has opposed the crossing mission) planned with withdraw to the East Bank if the ceasefire did not hold.

The Israelis pulled out much armor in November in preparation for an attack on 3rd Army if the cease fire broke down.

2) Further to the above, Dayan's opposition to the crossing was due to the risk of finding themselves trapped between reserves coming up from Cairo, and the Canal. This nearly happened in OTL, actually would have happened if the war had continued.

How? By October 24, the Egyptian reserves had been shot. Kabil would've attacked if ordered but was obviously not confident of success.

3) Third Army's actual position was not as bad as was feared by the Soviets and the HQ in Cairo. In actuality, they increased the amount of area they took in the East bank.

Well, Badawy was a good officer and a little territorial gain wouldn't be surprising if the bulk of IDF armor including Magen's forces, formerly confronting the 3rd in Sinai, were sent west of the canal.

They also beat back Israeli attempts to take Suez, and until the Israeli took Suez the Third Army was still able to fight (and threaten the Israeli supply line into Africa,

How could the Third Army due that?? The 25th was wrecked, and the 3rd and 22nd pulled back west. Furthermore the Third was farther from the main Israeli crossing point near Deversoir than the Second (not that the latter was able to do much either....)..

David Elazar concluded post war that the Third Army was far from destroyed.

Of course not. But it was in a pretty precarious situation.

 

[Ak-84]

Yup, Suez. '82 is an interesting read. You have IDF claiming massive wins in the air and yet Syrians aircraft still took a major toll on Israeli Armour.

 

[Ak-84]

The Israelis pulled out much armor in November in preparation for an attack on 3rd Army if the cease fire broke down.

The Egyptians had also moved significant forces

How? By October 24, the Egyptian reserves had been shot. Kabil would've attacked if ordered but was obviously not confident of success.



Well, Badawy was a good officer and a little territorial gain wouldn't be surprising if the bulk of IDF armor including Magen's forces, formerly confronting the 3rd in Sinai, were sent west of the canal.

Egypt had by Dayan's own estimate over 1500 tanks on the West Bank and over a 100 SAM batteries. Furthermore, they had nearly a 1000 tanks uncommitted, detailed to defend Cairo. Presuming that Third Army would surrender tends to presume that the Egyptian would not commit at least some of these forces to break out their trapped forces. In OTL, they had already begun to move to the front. The Israelis would have faced fresh troops coming from the West with as yet undefeated ones on the banks, exactly the senario Elazar and Dayan had feared.

How could the Third Army due that?? The 25th was wrecked, and the 3rd and 22nd pulled back west. Furthermore the Third was farther from the main Israeli crossing point near Deversoir than the Second (not that the latter was able to do much either....)..




Of course not. But it was in a pretty precarious situation.

Until Suez was taken Third Army could fight on. It had plenty of supplies and it also had a sea channel open for food and water, one which was never shut historically. Trevor Dupay, probably the most level headed writers makes a very good point that the situation was not as bad as the Egyptian HQ feared and the Israelis hoped.