Yamamoto Rejected, Pearl Harbor is Turned Down

[OneUp]

I know this has probably been explored before, but search totally failed my computer.

Anyway, what would happen? I expect the Southern Strike should go as planned. Does America jump in right away? If they do, what will America likely commit to the attack? What was American strategy at the time? If Japan does happen to fight them off successfully, or semi-successfully for the next year or two, what will we see on the American homefront?

 

[Gridley]

The Philippines, Wake, etc. were already on the Japanese list, so the US would still be in from the beginning. I doubt the attacks on the Philippines would have the same cultural effect on the US home front as Pearl Harbor did, but it would still be enough for a declaration of war.

The various southern offensives will go a little better due to the added strike capability Kido Butai can bring to bear on Day 1. The US and ABDA won't be able to do much, if anything, more than OTL - the logistic support to bring the battleline and its screen forward from Pearl to the western Pacific just didn't exist in 1941.

I think this would be an interesting variant for a timeline, and AFAIK it has been explored only in "what ifs" to date.

A little recent discussion here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=3644968#post3644968

 

[mrmandias]

Might there be a possibility of a negotiated peace in this TL? That would be pretty interesting variant.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Once Japan starts the war the prospects for a negotiated peace are nil.


Gridley, the US will certainly be able to surge forward a number of cruisers and destroyers to reinforce ABDA with some battleships to Australia as a threat. Given the limited size of most of the IJN naval forces conducting landings in the Dutch East Indies the threat of a single battleship arriving could cause serious consternation and some delays.

 

[Markus]

Once Japan starts the war the prospects for a negotiated peace are nil.


Gridley, the US will certainly be able to surge forward a number of cruisers and destroyers to reinforce ABDA with some battleships to Australia as a threat. Given the limited size of most of the IJN naval forces conducting landings in the Dutch East Indies the threat of a single battleship arriving could cause serious consternation and some delays.

But the Japanese can to that too. They have six fleet carriers that are not going to PH. What do they do with them?


Wake, Wake, Wake!

The two carriers that were key to the success of the 2nd landing came from PH. Fletcher was just ~24hrs behind. Looks like Wake could be held as the IJN will hardly assign two CV right away. I say could because Japan is edit: 200nm closer to Wake than PH.

Map.

 

[Gridley]

Gridley, the US will certainly be able to surge forward a number of cruisers and destroyers to reinforce ABDA with some battleships to Australia as a threat. Given the limited size of most of the IJN naval forces conducting landings in the Dutch East Indies the threat of a single battleship arriving could cause serious consternation and some delays.

The US didn't lose any cruisers at Pearl, and only a few were damaged, yet none were sent to help ABDA except those already in the Asiatic Fleet. Only two destroyers were lost, but again, none were sent from Pearl.

What base in Australia could support eight or nine battleships and their screen for an extended period in 1941/early 1942? If you're suggesting only sending a few, that's just inviting defeat in detail.

To conduct operations in the DEI from Pearl would require sailing past or through the Mandates, thus exposing the force doing so to attritional air, surface, and submarine attacks both ways. Assuming that Force Z suffers the same fate ITTL as IOTL, no one is going to be anxious to send out BB's without carrier cover, and the US just doesn't have the fleet oilers to send the entire fleet that far forward. Heck, IOTL several battleships were left behind for the battle of Coral Sea due to lack of tanker support!

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Gridley, the US did have the cruisers and destroyers of the Asiatic fleet OTL in harm's way but nothing more following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

If the US still has eight battleships and hundreds of aircraft available a few cruisers and destroyers suddenly become a much more reasonable means of delaying the IJN advance. Not to mention a battleship or two being sent via a loop avoiding the Pacific islands until it reaches Australia. The likelihood of Japan sending a fleet to Melbourne or Sydney is extremely low but the threat of even a single battleship arriving in support of ABDA forces against a large number of IJN landings lacking more than destroyers or cruisers in support is one that the IJN will have to consider.

 

[Gridley]

If the US still has eight battleships and hundreds of aircraft available a few cruisers and destroyers suddenly become a much more reasonable means of delaying the IJN advance.

Except those CA/CL/DD are needed to screen the battleships. I'm trying to think of a time the US built a battlegroup around nothing heavier than a cruiser for a major operation and I'm not coming up with anything.

Not to mention a battleship or two being sent via a loop avoiding the Pacific islands until it reaches Australia. The likelihood of Japan sending a fleet to Melbourne or Sydney is extremely low but the threat of even a single battleship arriving in support of ABDA forces against a large number of IJN landings lacking more than destroyers or cruisers in support is one that the IJN will have to consider.

Yeah, I bet the Brits were REALLY glad they had Force Z out there... you realize you're describing a force almost exactly like that, right?

The US has a choice. I can send some, all, or none of the fleet.

It doesn't have the logistical capability to send it all.
If it sends some, it exposes that force to the entire IJN - remember that the USN can't be certain that its one battleship won't encounter three IJN BB's - and thus risks defeat in detail. For what benefit? Why stick some of your forces out on a limb to delay the conquest of secondary objectives? Especially when you expect to need them in short order? Remember that the IJN was actually larger than the US Pacific Fleet in almost every way. The other Allied forces in the Pacific don't change that fact, though they help.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Except Force Z was vastly closer to the Japanese than a battleship or two in Sydney would have been and what was ABDA if not a force of cruisers and destroyers?

The battleship doesn't have to enter Dutch East Indies waters or even visit Darwin but the mere possibility leaves the IJN with the choice of a long series of operations whose escorts are no match for a battleship or by making sure at least some of the operations have an escort which can confront a battleship at the expense of delaying others.

The likelihood of three IJN battleships sailing all the way down to Sydney alone are exceedingly small and if the IJN is forced to send an entire balanced fleet of battleships, carriers, etc. then the question is which operations are those ships unable to carry out?


Gridley, your entire argument is disproven by the fact the US did not withdraw the contingent of cruisers and destroyers from ABDA and, having left those ships, why should a stronger US Pacific fleet not send a few more cruisers and destroyers or even have a battleship lurking closer to the DEI than Pearl Harbor? Not to mention all the aircraft at Pearl Harbor which might now be redeployed, perhaps to Darwin?

 

[HMS Warspite]

When for some unlogical reason Japan was going to war against the USA, by simply attacking the possessions of that state (Philippines, Guam and possibly Wake as well, the main problem for the short term would not be the US Pacific Fleet, but the British Force Z, as this unit was much closer in striking range to the Japanese field of operations, than any US Pacfic Fleet unit of any importance, while these US Forces were painfully unballanced in nature to start with, as they were slow and lacking supporting units of replenishing ships, as these were on shot order still. The only troublesome US Units would be the two operational carriers on the loose somewhere in the vastness of the Pacifc, but these were numerically opposed by six heavy and two light Japanese units. (USS Saratoga was too far away refitting in the USA, so is discounted in the start.)

So the Japanese would still have a relatively free hand in the early months of war, mostly doing what they did in the OTL, with the exception of not attacking Pearl Harbor, less angering the US People a bit, as they would now lack the psychological effect of that attack. This would in the end bea possible reason why the USA might not want to fight that hard as it did in the OTL, possible seeking a less costly sollution in terms of human lives in this war. (possibly even in Europe as well, as the US were not that happy in getting involved there to start with, were it not for FDR.)

 

[Gridley]

Except Force Z was vastly closer to the Japanese than a battleship or two in Sydney would have been and what was ABDA if not a force of cruisers and destroyers?

(Snip)

Gridley, your entire argument is disproven by the fact the US did not withdraw the contingent of cruisers and destroyers from ABDA and, having left those ships, why should a stronger US Pacific fleet not send a few more cruisers and destroyers or even have a battleship lurking closer to the DEI than Pearl Harbor? Not to mention all the aircraft at Pearl Harbor which might now be redeployed, perhaps to Darwin?

ABDA was a force thrown together from what was on hand, with disastrous consequences. Have you looked at ABDA's kill/loss ratio?

How, exactly, would the Asiatic Fleet ships have made it back to Pearl? They had no choice but to fight their way SW and hope.

Let's take a look at the mighty Asiatic Fleet's surface combatants on December 7th, shall we?

One 'modern' Heavy Cruiser: USS Houston. Fate: Sunk on March 1st.
One obsolete Light Cruiser: USS Marblehead - already in the DEI. Fate: badly damaged in February, retired to South Africa via Ceylon.
13 obsolete Destroyers, all Clemson-class, nine already in the DEI. Fate: five sunk in February/March, including three of the four still in the PI.
There were also a dozen or so patrol boats.
The service train included exactly two oilers; USS Pecos, sunk in March, and USS Trinity, which spent most of the early years in the Indian Ocean.

Have you taken out a map lately and looked at just how far the DEI are from Pearl Harbor, and what's in between?

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Gridley, why are you so frantically trying to disprove a possible retreat of ABDA's American ships to Pearl Harbor which I never suggested it in the first place?

The American, British, Australian and Dutch ships could have been withdrawn to Australia but were not so, having taken the decision to leave those ships in harm's way, including two additional US light cruisers which spent time in theater beyond Houston and Marblehead, why couldn't a few more have been considered? For that matter why couldn't a battleship been deployed as a potential menace to Sydney in the hopes that the IJN would waste time and resources just in case that ship showed up? If they don't, nothing is lost and if they do then the Allies benefit just from moving one ship.

 

[Markus]

Except those CA/CL/DD are needed to screen the battleships.

All of them?

With regard to battleships there is one thing speaking against deployment. The target of the Japanese offensive is Malaya and the DEI. Logically some of the six CV would be send south right away. PoW and Repulse arrived in Singapore on the 2nd. I think Singapore might have been the target of a four carrier raid at the start of the war and the Asiatic Fleet would have been in trouble sooner.

 

[HMS Warspite]

All of them?

With regard to battleships there is one thing speaking against deployment. The target of the Japanese offensive is Malaya and the DEI. Logically some of the six CV would be send south right away. PoW and Repulse arrived in Singapore on the 2nd. I think Singapore might have been the target of a four carrier raid at the start of the war and the Asiatic Fleet would have been in trouble sooner.

More likely the Kido Butai would not be involved in the operations in the SE Asia theater, simply since there still was a numerically strong US Fleet in the Pacific, which dispite being far away and of poor composition, could not be ignored. Japanese strategical thinking had simply forbidden the deployement of the First Fleet (Classical Battlefleet) outside Japanese Homewaters, as well as its strongest supporting Interdictionforce, the First Striking (Aircraft Carrier) Group. These two strategical units were therefore allocated to the homedefense only, sometimes interpreted as preemtive strike force as well, leaving the operations in the SE Asia region to the 3rd Fleet units of cruisers and destroyers mainly, supported by a single section of the 3rd Battlesquadron (Kongo and Haruna), leaving their two remainign sisters with the 1st Strikingforce.

Beside that, the landbased Naval Airfroces in the region of SE Asia already outclassed anything the Allies could throw up, so no need to send in carriers in confined, submarine invested waters.

 

[1940LaSalle]

I don't see Pearl Harbor as not being part of the bargain: going back into the late 1920s, the senior class at the Japanese naval academy was routinely asked as part of a final exam how an individual cadet would plan and execute a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor. Thus, the thinking was embedded long before the actual event.

Also, while I don't have my copy handy, I believe that it was something also of an article of faith for war against Japan as noted in War Plan Orange.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

A good point by 1940LaSalle. NOT attacking Pearl Harbor leaves the US stronger by whatever ships and aircraft would have been destroyed. As we know that meant eight battleships, a few smaller craft and 300-400 aircraft but in the IJN's mind this might have included carriers, the oil tank farms, repair facilities and more.

Once reinforced from the Atlantic fleet this leaves a US Pacific fleet of five carriers(leave Ranger at home), and ten or more battleships which is more than a match for anything short of the entire IJN and Japan's plans for several months after Pearl Harbor meant it was impossible for the IJN battle fleet to stay in one unit or even in supporting distance, running the risk of the US devouring much of the IJN in isolated units.

Then there were the fighters and other aircraft lost on December 7...they can be redeployed or newly built aircraft instead to northern Australia or even parts of the Dutch East Indies. If the Allies just have additional land based fighter coverage comparable to what several carriers can deploy at Coral Sea...

 

[HMS Warspite]

A good point by 1940LaSalle. NOT attacking Pearl Harbor leaves the US stronger by whatever ships and aircraft would have been destroyed. As we know that meant eight battleships, a few smaller craft and 300-400 aircraft but in the IJN's mind this might have included carriers, the oil tank farms, repair facilities and more.

Once reinforced from the Atlantic fleet this leaves a US Pacific fleet of five carriers(leave Ranger at home), and ten or more battleships which is more than a match for anything short of the entire IJN and Japan's plans for several months after Pearl Harbor meant it was impossible for the IJN battle fleet to stay in one unit or even in supporting distance, running the risk of the US devouring much of the IJN in isolated units.

Then there were the fighters and other aircraft lost on December 7...they can be redeployed or newly built aircraft instead to northern Australia or even parts of the Dutch East Indies. If the Allies just have additional land based fighter coverage comparable to what several carriers can deploy at Coral Sea...

The IJN was not particualry concerned about the USN battleships, as these were not particuary well designed and relatively slow at only just 20 knots, the speed of the slowest units in the line, compared to the much faster IJN medium and light forces of cruisers and destroyers, which were the primary assailants of this slow moving force. The USN carriers however were of a far bigger concern, as these were all fast and possessed a relatively large airgroup each (in late 1941 mostly still of obsolete design) and the large number of fast cruisers likely to operate with the carriers. The IJN battleships would not engage in battle untill the later phases of the fighting, so they are not that bad after all in the theoretically weaker numbers, as they only had to theoretically much weakened USN left overs of the battlefleet.

Japanese doctrine about the decisive battle was to cause attricion on the US Pacific Fleet by continual attacks day and night by air, light surface and submarine forces, while the battlefleet of the Japanese stayed away, waiting untill the numbers were more favourating the Japanese. In night attacks the large and fast cruisers and destroyers would harrash the USN Fleet with torpedoes, possibly supported by the fast 3rd Battleship Squadron of the four reconstructed Kongo's and cause as much chaos as possible.

Technically, the IJN in late 1941 was far more advanced to the USN in terms of weaponry and training, while also possessing the tools needed for modern warfare, whoofully lacking in the still peacetime compossition of the US Pacific Fleet. Technically the US Pacific Fleet was only capable of fighting a classical naval war in a time when more advanced weapons were available to the enemy. The USA simply were not prepared yet and had to wait two years untill rebuilding and reequipping their fleet to modern standards.

 

[Gridley]

Gridley, why are you so frantically trying to disprove a possible retreat of ABDA's American ships to Pearl Harbor which I never suggested it in the first place?

You want to send cruisers and destroyers forward from Pearl to the DEI and you don't think the inability of the ships there to even escape is relevant? You said that the US didn't pull out the Asiatic Fleet 'proved' I was wrong that the US wouldn't send screening units forward.

For that matter why couldn't a battleship been deployed as a potential menace to Sydney in the hopes that the IJN would waste time and resources just in case that ship showed up? If they don't, nothing is lost and if they do then the Allies benefit just from moving one ship.

Because if the Japanese sink it the US is down a capital ship? Because you can't just send the ship, you also need to send fuel oil, shells, spare parts, barrel liners, etc. if you actually intend for it to do any good there? Because Taranto and Force Z have demonstrated that small forces of battleships are at risk from air attack?

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Gridley, you're managing to ignore every point I've made lately.

1) You can give up this claim that any ships assigned to the Asiatic fleet or ABDA could not escape. The USN chose not to withdraw them but they would have escaped if the government had given them the order to do so.

2) The US did send additional ships, few though they were, to ABDA. If the US has hundreds of aircraft and eight battleships pushing a few destroyers more and a cruiser or two to buy time becomes much more plausible.

3) SE Australia does have something in the way of air defenses, the IJN does not have such a surplus of forces that a month or two planning and deploying a carrier or two plus any escorts as far as Sydney will be well received, and you seem to be under the impression that the USN should only worry about possible losses while the IJN will be oblivious to any such possibilities.

If a battleship doing nothing but sitting in Sydney harbor forces the IJN to slow down the rate of advance, to provide stronger escorts to each landing, then the deployment has worked to the advantage of the USN. If the IJN has to take a battleship or two from all other operations for guard duty then so much the better. And if the IJN actually has to commit a carrier or two for an operation as far as Sydney, besides the fact that the attack might not succeed, what other operations are reduced or cancelled instead?

 

[Gridley]

Gridley, you're managing to ignore every point I've made lately.

And you're managing to ignore logistics, strategy, and operational considerations. I guess we're done here.