Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[Saphroneth]

I can find no record of any of those ships on list being prepared for active service that I have bolded actually undertaking active service before being broken up. I can do a more thorough check later maybe, but I'm skeptical that it would turn anything up.

Being prepared for reserve means that the ships are being moved from one service category to another - they'd be broken up then if they were unserviceable. Instead they're moved to the service category in question.

The problem is one of geography. There is no safe place for these vessels to moor on Lake Erie, as I said earlier, they're not exiting the canal into a sheltered harbor, they're entering straight onto the Lake and possibly right into the middle of hostile fire. As the commissioners themselves mention, they don't have space at the exit of the canal and even worse, there's no fortified harbor for them to shelter in.

Any simple examination of the exits in question shows that the gunboats would be put in an unfavorable situation immediately upon their exit.

But if there's no place at all to moor on Lake Erie, then why would they be assigned there in the peacetime defence plan?

As for entering into hostile fire - I'm afraid I'm not seeing why this is a total dealbreaker. It's a risky situation, in which the boats are being put in harm's way as they enter the lake; it's not something that can completely prevent the attempt even being made. (Remember, OTL gunboats would sail right into enemy fortified harbours to complete their missions as they saw it.)

In any case, if the Union's gunboat flotilla is outside exit one (Colborne) it's not outside exit two - and if the Union gunboats are split between the two exits, then the British one can pick the weaker force and push enough boats through to overcome them.

Your statement doesn't track.

What do you mean? We have evidence that shows that, OTL, after issuing guns the Union had about 300,000 or so in reserve. Since this involved about a million guns being in Union hands at some point and the Union army was about 500,000 strong at the end of it, the Union's wastage of guns is such that they lost at least 200,000 guns through wastage.
Wastage is a factor of guns being used and then broken or lost. The more men you have with weapons, using them (instead of their being in an armoury) then the more chance you have for those weapons to be broken or lost.
As Cerebro notes:

Historically, damaged or lost weapons meant that fielding 501,663 men required 968,840 guns issued from the federal arsenals (plus all the state guns issued in 1861).

Here you're suggesting it would be possible to field 200,000 more men with 100,000 more guns issued. For that you have to assume that the Union suddenly stops breaking or losing guns, despite having greater opportunity than historically (for example, using more old guns since they can't get some of their OTL new gun purchases from Europe).

 

[cerebropetrologist]

Hmm seems worse than I originally thought. Everything in bold (with two exceptions) is probably unfit for overseas service.

That'd be surprising in the case of Jasper, which was sold to the Chinese in 1862 and later re-sold to Egypt in 1865.

I don't think you can assume a ship BU 1864 is automatically unserviceable

I can find no record of any of those ships on list being prepared for active service that I have bolded actually undertaking active service before being broken up.

I think that all we can conclude from the 1863-4 breaking up is that the Royal Navy didn't think it was worth keeping these ships on, not that they were necessarily unserviceable. Bear in mind that Gladstone was at the Treasury, there was a cost in both space and money to maintain the gunboat fleet, that the ironclad programme was costing money, that there was the prospect of moving away from the Armstrong gun, and that it was entirely plausible that they didn't need all the gunboats that they had on hand. In particular, the swathe cut through the Second Class Steam Reserve at Chatham and the Haslar gunboat sheds- ships from different builders, which are unlikely to have similar problems in construction- suggests to me that it was a cost-cutting measure rather than a systematic one based on seaworthiness.

That there was no real correlation between the amount of rot and their being broken up is suggested when you look at available information on their state. There are some contemporary observations in the 1860 select committee on gunboats:
Raven: 'in a very satisfactory state', 'small quantity of fungus on the heels of after cant timbers, inside, no decay in consequence'- BU 1864
Redbreast: 'in the same state'- BU 1864
Whiting: 'quite seaworthy'- BU 1881
Fervent: 'small quantity of fungus right aft under the deck, no decay in consequence'- BU 1879 [the Charger, which was in 'much about the same state', was converted in 1866 and sold in 1887]
Prompt: 'fore cant timbers damp and one of them sappy, no decay on consequence'- BU 1864
Earnest: 'In so good a state, compared with some of the others, that we considered it proper to make a remark in her favour' - Sold 1885

Look at the differing fates of the ships which were all observed to 'show a slight degree of dampness at fore and after extremities' at the same time:
Earnest: Sold 1885
Crocus: 'uncoppered, possibly rotten' in 1862, BU 1864
Skylark: 'uncoppered, possibly rotten' in 1862, sold 1906
Wolf: 'uncoppered, possibly rotten' in 1862, BU 1864
Albacore: 'uncoppered' in 1862, BU 1885
Gnat: 'uncoppered' in 1862, BU 1864

Brave: 'a very sound condition, apparently, and the timbers seem very clean and good and dry'; 'commencing planking' 1862, BU 1869
Peacock: 'has a few bad timbers in her'; timbering 1862, BU 1869
Beacon: 'also has a few'; timbering 1862, discarded 1864
Ready: 'a few decayed timbers'; 'planking, good shape' 1862, BU 1864
Thrush: 'a few decayed timbers'; planking 1862, BU 1864

More importantly, Richard Abethell, the master shipwright at Portsmouth Dockyard, was clear that even potentially faulty vessels did have a purpose:
'Do you consider that a gun-boat which is in a very defective state can be considered ready for service?- Yes; she may have many bad timbers in her, and yet be quite seaworthy for home service. If the Caroline had been sent to sea in the state she was, no doubt she would have swum very well, and might have done everything required for home service... there must be a sufficient number of timbers sufficiently sound to hold the planking, and then if the outside planking is good, the ship will hold together very well for duty off the coast.
'Even notwithstanding the concussion caused by the discharge of the guns?- It depends, of course, upon the degree of rottenness, and the number of timbers which are rotten; we should not send a ship like that to a foreign station.'

Rear Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker KCB commented 'there are many vessels now at sea which would otherwise be called unseaworthy. In my opinion these would be fit to go round the world. I have a higher opinion of these gun boats than many have.' He may well have been right: the ships which went on foreign service were sent without any formal inspection, and yet very few of them had to be broken up early. Either there were some exceptionally lucky picks, or the gunboats broken up in 1863-4 were not necessarily unserviceable.

Which means new builds

Not necessarily. You've got 18 ships you think are dubious, which (deducting Jasper which was actually fine, Fly at home, and Thistle in reserve) leaves 15 actually required for active service. The gunboats at home can go abroad, and the dubious gunboats can stay in home service. Alternatively, if they're too rotten even for that, there are 6 gunvessels spare in reserve, and 37 gunboats drawn up in the sheds at Haslar in varying states of readiness. And that's assuming that my allocation of 14 gunvessels and 17 gunboats for the American blockade isn't an overstatement.

What do you mean? We have evidence that shows that, OTL, after issuing guns the Union had about 300,000 or so in reserve. Since this involved about a million guns being in Union hands at some point and the Union army was about 500,000 strong at the end of it, the Union's wastage of guns is such that they lost at least 200,000 guns through wastage..

The 300k in storage is on top of the million issued, so technically they lost about half a million guns. However, the point being made was not that the Union could potentially raise another 200k troops, but that they could maintain their deployment levels as of December 1861 and might get 200k guns through the blockade to help them do this. I think the rephrase helps:

we arrive at 538,823 weapons imported/produced between the outbreak of war with the Confederacy and the outbreak of hostilities with Britain in TTL. That means, that the maintenance of the historic troop levels by the Union come January 1861, is plausible by any margin. When given wiggle room for weapons smuggling in the months where the blockade is weakest from March-May 1862 the number of weapons could very well rise to over 700,000[3].

Number of weapons, not number of troops.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Being prepared for reserve means that the ships are being moved from one service category to another - they'd be broken up then if they were unserviceable. Instead they're moved to the service category in question.

This is problematic then, as the ships I label as most likely to be scrapped or not available for service in the "Preparing for foreign or active service" category, do not appear as being in commission in the list of ships from the United Service Magazine 1862. That or I am misunderstanding how this category is being interpreted, in which case that would explain part of the problem on my end.

But if there's no place at all to moor on Lake Erie, then why would they be assigned there in the peacetime defence plan?

I fear there may be some miscommunication regarding the report we both seem to be referencing.

The Report of the Commissioners from 1862 is not actually a military plan, it is a series of recommendations on the strength of fortifications, number of such, necessary number of men for the defence of the Province, and resources currently available in the Province as of April 1862. The information therein is a set of recommendations about locations for permanent fortifications, suggestions for sites where military forces can entrench and offer battle to the enemy on favorable terms, and recommends things like whole new canals to transport vessels from the Ottawa River to Lake Huron.

It is acknowledged that there actually are no good ports on Lake Erie, but instead suggests that facilities be enlarged at Dunville (which is on the Grand River) to support a naval station. The chief problem is that a naval station on Lake Erie does not exist either at the time of the writing of that report, and certainly did not exist during the Trent affair historically. Without that no squadron on Lake Erie could sustain itself for major operations.

I'm merely following the opinions of both people who were writing at the time, and of the historians who are interpreting this data second hand. In that event I simply cannot say in good faith that the British felt it would be possible for their ships to contest Lake Erie.

If you have some information which says otherwise I would like to see it so I can perhaps adjust my own research.

As for entering into hostile fire - I'm afraid I'm not seeing why this is a total dealbreaker. It's a risky situation, in which the boats are being put in harm's way as they enter the lake; it's not something that can completely prevent the attempt even being made. (Remember, OTL gunboats would sail right into enemy fortified harbours to complete their missions as they saw it.)

On this I will have to ask for an example of such (without the aid of larger sloops, frigates, or battleships mind you, as that is what you are proposing). My understanding of the Crimean gunboats was that they were meant to act as patrol vessels and support ships to enforce the blockade in the Baltic and the Black Sea.

What do you mean? We have evidence that shows that, OTL, after issuing guns the Union had about 300,000 or so in reserve. Since this involved about a million guns being in Union hands at some point and the Union army was about 500,000 strong at the end of it, the Union's wastage of guns is such that they lost at least 200,000 guns through wastage.
Wastage is a factor of guns being used and then broken or lost. The more men you have with weapons, using them (instead of their being in an armoury) then the more chance you have for those weapons to be broken or lost.

Unfortunately, we will simply have to agree to disagree on methodologies. I believe my method of counting up from April 1861 takes more variables into account than the method of counting back from June 1862. I simply don't see the logic of counting backwards to arrive at a conclusion when our POD is behind it, it simply doesn't make sense to me.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

This is problematic then, as the ships I label as most likely to be scrapped or not available for service in the "Preparing for foreign or active service" category, do not appear as being in commission in the list of ships from the United Service Magazine 1862.

Unless I'm mistaken, the ships which you don't label as likely to be scrapped don't appear either. Those ships are the ones specifically said to be preparing for active service as a result of the Trent emergency, and were presumably stood down when the emergency ended. For instance:

‘The gunboats preparing at Plymouth for active service… Charon, Clinker, and Delight will have rifled Armstrong guns.’ (Times, 2 January 1862)
‘The gunboats Porpoise, Partridge, Gleaner, Ripple, Tilbury, Nightingale, and Trunculo, preparing at Plymouth for active service, are to be supplied with smooth-bored guns’ (Times, 2 January 1862)
‘The advanced gun-vessels belonging to the first-class steam reserve in the Medway, intended for the gunboat flotilla, have also been fully equipped from the Chatham stores, and, in addition to being furnished each with a 100-pounder and 40-pounder Armstrong, together with a quantity of shot and shell, each gunboat took on board a number of short sea rifles and sword bayonets, as well as a supply of small-arms.’ (Times, 30 December 1861)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

That'd be surprising in the case of Jasper, which was sold to the Chinese in 1862 and later re-sold to Egypt in 1865.

Ah, I put a question mark next to Jasper since I wasn't sure whether she was sold directly from Britain or sold in Asia, so whether or not she was actually at home.

I think that all we can conclude from the 1863-4 breaking up is that the Royal Navy didn't think it was worth keeping these ships on, not that they were necessarily unserviceable.

That's true absent more concrete information. The gaps in that information led me to assume that the 63-64 dates meant that these ships were unserviceable, and so could not be put to other purposes.

Not necessarily. You've got 18 ships you think are dubious, which (deducting Jasper which was actually fine, Fly at home, and Thistle in reserve) leaves 15 actually required for active service. The gunboats at home can go abroad, and the dubious gunboats can stay in home service. Alternatively, if they're too rotten even for that, there are 6 gunvessels spare in reserve, and 37 gunboats drawn up in the sheds at Haslar in varying states of readiness. And that's assuming that my allocation of 14 gunvessels and 17 gunboats for the American blockade isn't an overstatement.

I think the number of gunvessels and gunboats depends on losses suffered and if the Admiralty believes their efforts are succeeding or not. If losses are high or if they feel the need to tighten the blockade they would decide to deploy more, if that number is effective then it would remain the same.

The 300k in storage is on top of the million issued, so technically they lost about half a million guns. However, the point being made was not that the Union could potentially raise another 200k troops, but that they could maintain their deployment levels as of December 1861 and might get 200k guns through the blockade to help them do this. I think the rephrase helps:

Number of weapons, not number of troops.

The rephrase does help. That delivers my point better than I did. Thanks for that.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Unless I'm mistaken, the ships which you don't label as likely to be scrapped don't appear either. Those ships are the ones specifically said to be preparing for active service as a result of the Trent emergency, and were presumably stood down when the emergency ended. For instance:

‘The gunboats preparing at Plymouth for active service… Charon, Clinker, and Delight will have rifled Armstrong guns.’ (Times, 2 January 1862)
‘The gunboats Porpoise, Partridge, Gleaner, Ripple, Tilbury, Nightingale, and Trunculo, preparing at Plymouth for active service, are to be supplied with smooth-bored guns’ (Times, 2 January 1862)
‘The advanced gun-vessels belonging to the first-class steam reserve in the Medway, intended for the gunboat flotilla, have also been fully equipped from the Chatham stores, and, in addition to being furnished each with a 100-pounder and 40-pounder Armstrong, together with a quantity of shot and shell, each gunboat took on board a number of short sea rifles and sword bayonets, as well as a supply of small-arms.’ (Times, 30 December 1861)

This may then be the fault in my understanding. That explains the discrepancy quite nicely.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

Ah, I put a question mark next to Jasper since I wasn't sure whether she was sold directly from Britain or sold in Asia, so whether or not she was actually at home.

At Portsmouth:
‘The gunboats in the second-class reserve at Portsmouth are ordered to fit out immediately, to take the place of the boats in the first class, ordered for commission for foreign service.’ (Times, 21 December 1861)
‘the following boats are being hurried forward in the ship and steam basins of the dockyard from the second-class reserve:- The Jasper, 80-horse power, and the Earnest, Savage, Cracker, Foam, Swinger, and Pheasant, of 60-horse power each.’ (Times, 1 January 1862)
'the gunboat Jasper, of 89-horse power [sic], being brought forward as quickly as possible by the shipwright and factory departments' (Times, 9 January 1862)
‘fitting for commission in the steam-basin at Portsmouth… received her armament’ (Army and Navy Gazette, 22 February 1862)

Unfortunately, we will simply have to agree to disagree on methodologies. I believe my method of counting up from April 1861 takes more variables into account than the method of counting back from June 1862. I simply don't see the logic of counting backwards to arrive at a conclusion when our POD is behind it, it simply doesn't make sense to me.

The reason I don't like counting upwards from April 1861 is because there are actually more unknowns. How many weapons were in the state armouries when the war started? How many weapons were captured by the Confederates? How many regiments were armed by the states rather than the federal government? You also have nine months of fairly speculative figures for when weapons arrived, which- although they're the best we have- are still by no means certain.

With the mid-1862 point, however, you have a solid ground to work from. You know exactly how many troops there were present, how many weapons had been issued, and how many were in reserve. You have to assume that other factors like weapon wastage remain the same, but if you start from April 1861 you have no idea what those figures would be in the first place. The calculation is also much easier: work out your expected reduction in weapons and deduct it from the number of federal arsenal weapons as at June 1862.

When I plugged in your assumptions, it suggested the Union would have had c.150k weapons in the armouries as at June 1862. That suggests they can increase the size of their armed forces in the first six months, or replace some of the worse weapons. Alternatively, I can model my own assumptions- let's say no British weapons after December, 75% of continental weapons after January stopped by the blockade, 75% of domestic weapon production cut after January. Deduct that from the number of guns in store, and it gives us -23k weapons as at June 1862. That means that the Union have to do something different over the first six months, or they'll run out of guns. That could be raise 23k fewer troops (i.e. remain at the 477k levels of December 1861 instead of going to the 501k present of June 1862), replace 23k fewer old weapons, or take 23k weapons from the state arsenals.

Technically, you should get exactly the same result counting backwards or forwards. The fact that you can't is largely because we don't have enough information about the earlier period. It's always going to be a matter of preference, but I'd rather count backwards with a degree of certitude.

 

[Saphroneth]

On this I will have to ask for an example of such (without the aid of larger sloops, frigates, or battleships mind you, as that is what you are proposing). My understanding of the Crimean gunboats was that they were meant to act as patrol vessels and support ships to enforce the blockade in the Baltic and the Black Sea.

That's absolutely not what the gunboats were built for - they were designed directly to attack coastal fortifications and coastal towns.

I can commend Gunboat! (Perett) to you on the matter. The examples I'm thinking of are the Bulldog (six gun sloop, but close enough) fighting her way into the teeth of a fortified harbour and only being lost due to grounding; the attacks on the Peiho Forts where the gunboats were able to win through when facing dozens of Chinese guns (but lost out against hundreds); the Black Sea and Baltic attacks in the Crimean War... basically coast attack is what gunboats were for and that's why they've got such heavy guns and shallow draft.

They became patrol and support vessels because there were lots and lots of them knocking about spare, but they were originally built for pure fighting.



Even while operations were in progress to secure the straits, Lieutenant Henry McKillop, commanding the Snake, spotted a Russian warship of comparable size attempting to escape northwards. Ignoring the enemy fortifications, he promptly gave chase. No sooner had the two ships begun exchanging shots than two more Russian warships emerged to support their comrade, leaving Snake simultaneously engaged with three opponents. The gunboat, however, was extremely handy, and the Russians, no doubt expecting her to engage with conventionally mounted broadside guns, found themselves receiving fire from unexpected directions as the centrally mounted armament was heaved round to bear on each of them in turn.

Perrett, Bryan. Gunboat!: Small Ships At War (CASSELL MILITARY PAPERBACKS) (Kindle Locations 300-305). Orion. Kindle Edition.

Lyons’s ships proceeded to raise hell across the widest possible area. One was sent to cruise off the mouth of the Don, while two more were detached to Genichesk at the entrance to the Swash or Putrid Sea, a stretch of water separating the north-eastern coast of the Crimea from the Sea of Azov proper by a thin 70-mile-long spit of land known as the Tongue of Arabat. On 28 May the rest of the squadron bombarded Fort Arabat, situated at the mainland end of the Tongue. The engagement lasted some 90 minutes, at the end of which the defence works were wrecked by an internal explosion.

Perrett, Bryan. Gunboat!: Small Ships At War (CASSELL MILITARY PAPERBACKS) (Kindle Locations 317-321). Orion. Kindle Edition.



It was now apparent that the light squadron, and the new gunboats in particular, could go wherever they wanted and the Russians were powerless to stop them.

Perrett, Bryan. Gunboat!: Small Ships At War (CASSELL MILITARY PAPERBACKS) (Kindle Locations 343-344). Orion. Kindle Edition.


On the 16th the Allied squadron proceeded to Fort Petrovski, between Berdyansk and Mariupol. At 9.30 a.m., all arrangements having been made, the squadron took up their positions, the light-draught gunboats taking up stations east and west of the fort, and enfilading the works front and rear, whilst the heavier vessels formed a semicircle round the fort. The heavy nature of our ordnance soon not only forced the garrison to retire from the trenches, but also kept at a respectable distance the reserve force, consisting of three strong battalions of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry.

Perrett, Bryan. Gunboat!: Small Ships At War (CASSELL MILITARY PAPERBACKS) (Kindle Locations 350-354). Orion. Kindle Edition.

 

[Saphroneth]

Oh - sorry to barge into talking about ironclads again, but I found (or re-found) a fine example of extremely quick build ironclads.
http://www.shipscribe.com/marvap/630c.html

Tiny little 72x25x3 ironclads of 142 tons, armoured against field guns.

This class was ordered on 10.6.59 for use on the Po river, to be built with the utmost urgency. They were designed by Dupuy de Lôme to carry 2-24pdr BLR, but these were not ready and older 16cm (30pdr) rifles were used. The 2.0in armor was designed to be proof against Austrian 12pdr field guns (their largest). All were built by FCM La Seyne: the first one being delivered on 4.7.59 and the other four on 25.8.59.


Granted that the British builds for the Canals would be larger, but given that the build time of these five little ironclads was (ordering to delivery)
24 days
76 days
76 days
76 days
76 days



The no.6 class floating batteries were more substantial, at 285 tons with 88ft 7in x 29ft 6in x 5ft 7in, and the first was delivered two months from being ordered.


I think that it's at least feasible for the British to be delivering their first couple of little ironclads inside two months of ordering if they go for something about this size. That way they have about another month or two in order to work them up and transit them before throwing them into the battle, even though they could just as well have them make transit with un-worked-up crews in extremis (it's not as if the Virginia or Monitor needed working up).

 

[galveston bay]

Generally speaking gunboats are for power projection into littoral waters, and that would of course include attacking coastal defenses. Like all warships the key is balancing protection, speed, firepower and displacement, and in the case of anything designed for brown water, draft. Some gunboats are better at this than others. Also a factor of course is cost and cost effectiveness.

Their secondary mission is shooting at each other.

The RN in 1860 is roughly half gunboats (197 ships out of roughly 400) according to this, which tells you what its principal mission is.

http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862foreignnavies.htm
(source is originally from Mr. Lincoln's Navy and reprinted from Naval Institute Press, so reasonably authoritative)

However Paul Kennedy in "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" states that of that roughly 400 ships above for the RN, 129 are deployed on overseas stations (about half of those in Asia, Indian Ocean and East Asian waters)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Well I go away for a few days and I come back with a Turtledove nomination! Maybe I should try leaving more often

Many thanks to those who nominated me! Unfortunately the next chapter is not quite done yet, but should be up in a few days. Thank you all so much for reading and commenting and let's hope for no catastrophic computer failures this time around!

On with the war!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 21: Blood and Water​

Fort Wellington, Canada West, May 17th 1862

The sun shone fitfully behind a bank of white clouds, and the cool spring air bellied the heat which was surely approaching come summer. George Fulford, well Ensign George Fulford now he supposed, glanced across the river at the Yankee flag billowing proudly in the wind. The Union Jack of course flapped resolutely on the flag pole hanging above Fort Wellington, but the war wouldn’t be won with flags alone.

That was all the more apparent by both the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle he carried, and the large number of guns poking out from the parapets of the earthworks in front of the fort.

We’re not all here to love our neighbors. George thought ruefully of Christ’s most sacred commandment and what sacrilege it was to break it. Though I wonder how He would feel if His neighbor was trying to shoot him?

That was a question for a preacher on Sunday, today he had to worry about ensuring every man in his company was ready to move on the orders of Captain Burke. Burke stood nearby bawling orders to the men of the company of the 41st Battalion of Volunteer Infantry. They were readying to march; the Yankees had landed up river and were preparing to march on Prescott from the north so the news said. The camp was a flurry of activity as men gathered knapsacks and rifles, shakos and boots. The last four months had been nothing but constant drill and marching, the regular officers trying to get the men into shape come the spring when the real fighting would start. George hoped the feeling in the pit of his stomach was just his breakfast disagreeing with him.

“I don’t understand it.” William Fulford said sliding into place behind him in their section of the column.

“Understand what?” George asked his son, shifting his pack on.

“Why did the Yanks cross the river so far away? They can’t ride the train, they’ve cut it in a dozen places between here and Cornwall, why land so far away from us?”

“Our trenches and artillery are here, and we might bombard Ogdensburg in the fighting, they want to spare their own property as much as we want to spare ours I suspect. Besides, it would be foolish to attack where we’re strongest. Crossing up the river lets ‘em slip barges and boats across where we can’t shoot them full of holes either.”

“And why not?”

“Border’s too long and there’s not enough of us.” George said simply as the bugle sounded to move out.

The infantry moved in column, scouts from their cavalry companies in the lead, and the guns pulled by sturdy draft horses drafted into the army followed behind. Sunshine glinted fitfully off fixed bayonets, the muffled shouts and curses of men and drivers mingled with the whinnies of horses and the braying of mules. Officers rode mounted at the head of their units, and staff officers swarmed in and out of the head of the column like bees in a hive. The column, 3,000 strong was on the move.

They were off to see the elephant.

-x-x-x-x- ​

“…the decision to attack Prescott was an obvious one. It connected the only secure railroad from Ottawa with Kingston and was the first step to encircling that British possession, and it could be used to threaten the Rideau canal and so cut off Kingston completely, ensuring the forces there were unable to communicate with Montreal and Quebec. This was however, difficult from the American perspective.

Little more than basic infrastructure existed on the southern shore of the St. Lawrence, and the railroad along the northern bank was in Canadian hands, with the American railroads ending at Ogdensburgh. As the Chief Engineer of the United States Army Joseph Totten had observed back in December: “On that portion of the northern frontier that the Saint Lawrence abounds we have never had any defenses except a small weak redoubt at the mouth of the harbor of Ogdensburg. Every town and habitation upon either shore of this river may be said to lie at all times at the mercy of the shore opposite.” And the British ability to reinforce and supply their side of the frontier in the winter and spring of 1861-62 outstripped that of the Americans.

Small detachments of Volunteer militia under British officers had seized the important islands in the St. Lawrence and used the large quantity of guns in their possession to fortify these against approach. Though most of these guns were admittedly of small calibre, they were enough to deter anything but a determined assault on these island holdings.

Fort Wellington threatened the town of Ogdensburg across the river, and the Canadians had placed further guns, meaning that any assault would cost the town dearly. The American forces could not hope to cross at that point, and so were relegated to camps further inland. A crossing though, was a necessity, not just to be able to threaten Fort Wellington from a position of strength, but to cut the river route to Lake Ontario.

To do this 2nd Division of the Army of the Niagara had been assigned to that section of the front. The 2nd Division, under the command of Jacob Ammen, 56, was composed mainly of men transferred from the Army of Ohio, and as such consisted of men from William Nelson’s division. Ammen was a Virginian born loyalist who had joined the army in 1831 serving in the artillery and was stationed at Charleston Harbor during the Nullification Crisis. Though he had retired in 1837 for a career as a civil engineer when Fort Sumter was fired upon he rejoined the colors, seeing action at Cheat Mountain. Through both skill and determination he rapidly worked his way up the ranks from merely commanding a regiment, to commanding the whole of the Division by May.

His forces were organized as such:

2nd Division, I Corps, Department of the Lakes: (BG Jacob Ammen)

1st Brigade (Col. William Grose) 6th Ohio, 24th, Ohio, 36th Indiana
2nd Brigade (Col. William B. Hazen) 6th Kentucky, 9th Indiana, 41st Ohio
3rd Brigade (Col. Sanders D. Bruce) 1st Kentucky, 2nd Kentucky, 20th Kentucky

Cavalry: (Lt. Col. Edward M. McCook) 3rd Kentucky Cavalry

Artillery: (Capt. John. Mendenhall) Batteries I, H, and M, 4th US Artillery

On the morning of May 17th they crossed the St. Lawrence near Morrisburg and began marching inland towards Prescott.

At Prescott there was a force of approximately 3,000 militia under the command of George Jarvis. The 65 year old colonel had a respectable war record, serving in 1812 at most major battles including Queenston Heights and Lundy’s Lane, commanding a company at age 17. He had retired from the army in 1817, instead serving as a local judge and political figure but retaining an active role in the militia of Stormont County commanding a body of cavalry during the events of 1837-38. This had made him the obvious choice based on his service, career, and social standing to command.

This force was quartered at Fort Wellington, in a fortified camp well back from the river to protect the surrounding area.

His force was laid out as such:

Commander Col. George Jarvis

18th Battalion “Prescott” Infantry (Lt. Col John Hamilton), 41st “Brockville” Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col James Crawford), 42nd Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col Jacob D. Buell)

Prescott Volunteer Cavalry Company (Captain William D. Wood)1cos

Kingston Field Battery (Captain Thomas Drummond)

However, he also had 200 men of the 63rd Foot under Major Falkland Paterson. This caused some confusion in the chain of command, as although in the Volunteers Jarvis outranked Paterson, by the law he could not command a unit of regulars. On the morning of the invasion though, this was simplified by the dispatch of the remainder of the 63rd Foot from Kingston under Lt. Col. William F. Carter who carried the rank to command the engagement. He arrived with the 15th and 16th Battalions of Volunteers to stiffen the ranks. Carter had commanded the 63rd in the Russian War and had seen service in all the major battles, including the expedition against Kertch, and so was deferred to by Jarvis.

Marching east Carter, under advice from Jarvis, deployed his forces on the banks of Doran Creek just to the west of the village of Iroquois. Anchoring his right flank on the St. Lawrence and his left on Black Creek, he entrenched his militia on to the front of the American advance, taking advantage of a rise in the ground before the creek.

The two forces met the afternoon of the 20th. Ammen’s force was advancing up river, with McCook’s cavalry scouting ahead. They skirmished with the Canadian piquets before advancing towards the Anglo-Canadian positions. After two hours of skirmishing the 2nd Brigade under Col. Hazen who took to skirmishing with the Canadians. The slow progress of the remainder of Ammen’s division up the highway ensured that the first day’s fighting ended in stalemate as dark fell. Ammen arrived and established his headquarters at Parlow’s Farm, and reorganized his troops for the morning assault.

Carter realized that his forces would be outnumbered come the dawn, and with an unpleasant memory of Inkerman; decided to even the odds of the Canadians on the defence. He maneuvered the 63rd and the 15th Volunteers to a wooded lot in the north, setting up what many today would recognize as an L shaped ambush pattern along the American line of advance up the Queens Highway. From there he expected to engage the Americans on very uneven terms.

The two sides rested for the night, but shortly after 9am on May 21st 1862, the battle was joined again. As before Hazen’s men advanced up the highway, this time under the cover of Mendenhall’s artillery. As his men came closer to the Canadian positions though, the trap was sprung and a vicious fusillade of deadly accurate rifle fire poured into the unprepared flanks of the American column. The sudden rifle fire from in front and beside spooked the American column, which after ten minutes of fighting, broke and fled. In response, the 1st Brigade under Col. William Grose advanced into the heat of battle.

Grose, 49, had been born in 1812 and his father had fought in that war under William Henry Harrison, and his grandfather had been killed in the Revolution fighting against the British. His blood was up that day, and he led his brigade while mounted. Advancing methodically he moved his men hard, and despite having his horse shot out from under him he simply picked himself up and waved his sword hollering to his regiment: “Come on lads! Let us see how you deal with these militiamen!” Apocryphally he is said to be the only one to have made it over the Canadian entrenchments before being shot dead, but it is far more likely he, like the rest of his men, never made it past 100 yards. With Grose’s death the spirit of the 1st Brigade broke, and they too fled the field. Ammen, seeing further battle pointless, withdrew that evening. On his way south he sabotaged as much of the rail line as he could, and ordered his men to roll boulders into the Morrisburg Canal to impede any British traffic. Other than harassing him as he retreated, Carter did not have the strength to do more.

As the sun set on May 21st, the battle of Doran Creek had ended in a Canadian victory…”– For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

-x-x-x-x-​

May 21st 1862, Doran Creek, Canada West

Gun smoke hung in the air thick as fog. It stung George Fulford’s eyes and clung to his hands. Men stood in grim silence, faces stained black and blue like a troop of Christy Minstrels on tour. There was no music now though, just the grim shouting of the officers and the piteous cries of the wounded. He peered over the edge of the trench at the backs of the retreating Yankees. The occasional cannon shot still ploughed into the earth announcing they were not quite done yet, but they were leaving, that was clear.

Most of the gunfire had died out, though he still saw flashes and heard the occasional crack of a rifle in the distance, and thought he could make out flashes in the tree line. He tried very hard not to turn his eyes to the scene directly across the creek, but soon his eyes wandered.

Blue clad corpses lay in all manner of death pose. Men tumbled over in heaps, others laying down looking almost asleep. Others had gruesome wounds, missing arms, legs, and heads. Worse than that though was the moans that wafted in from the water with the gentle breeze. Horrific cries, some that seemed inhuman, others simply for water, and all too often, men weeping for their mothers.

Beside him, George knew there was another dead man. His face a perfect picture of perplexity, save for the hole in the top of his head. Flies were beginning to gather in numbers, and already he heard crows calling to one another.

He roused himself from his kneeling position and stood looking for his son. In the dim light under the smoke it was hard to distinguish one black faced red tuniced man from another, but soon someone pointed him in the right direction.

He found William sitting, mouthing prayers he hoped, staring wild eyed ahead of him. His rifle was gripped white knuckled in hands that shook too hard to give him much ease of aim. George took his canteen out from around his neck and proffered it to his son. Suddenly startled from his prayers William looked up with uncomprehending eyes. George poured a small dribble on his face and some of the powder residue began oozing off. Not seeming to notice William took the canteen and sucked greedily at it. George waited a moment before quietly pulling it back and taking a seat next to him.

They sat in silence for a time before William mumbled something. George looked over.

“What was that boy?”

“I’ve seen the elephant father.” William said grimly “And he’s an ugly beast.”

“Aye, that he is boy.” George said sitting back. He went to take a swig of his canteen and found it empty. He sighed. “An ugly beast indeed.”

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Well that's things wrapped up May-June in Canada West, next we will move on to Canada East, and after that, back to the Atlantic!

 

[RodentRevolution]

Well that's things wrapped up May-June in Canada West, next we will move on to Canada East, and after that, back to the Atlantic!

Well it all sounds interestingly ominous, well done so far.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Well it all sounds interestingly ominous, well done so far.

But ominous for whom eh?

Thank you though! These all have been relatively simple battles to write since they've involved only brigade or division sized forces. The battles coming up in the eastern theaters are going to be a bit more epic in size and scope!

 

[The Gunslinger]

We need to see more of George. He's so stereotypically Canadian that I adore his PoV.

Great section though! Both sides are probably a little less keen to try a stunt like that again on the St. Lawrence.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

We need to see more of George. He's so stereotypically Canadian that I adore his PoV.

Great section though! Both sides are probably a little less keen to try a stunt like that again on the St. Lawrence.

All he has to do is shoot someone and apologize and he will have all the stereotypes down pat!

Oh it will be a while before anyone has the strength to make another stab at this. The Canadians have a rather limited manpower pool, and the Union's resources are being pulled in multiple different directions. Canada West is probably the equivalent of the trans-Mississippi in some senses, not all but some.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Appendix: Orders of Battle for the Upper Canada Campaign May - June 1862​

Union Forces:

Army of the Niagara (I Corps, Department of the Lakes)

MG Charles F. Smith
Chief of the Staff: Col. John P. Cook
Asst. Adjutant General: Capt. Hiram Scofield


1st Division (BG John McArthur)
1st Brigade: (Col. Isaac C. Pugh) 9th, Illinois, 12th Illinois, 41st Illinois, 7th Illinois
2nd Brigade: (Col. Thomas W. Sweeney) 50th Illinois, 52nd Illinois, 12th Iowa, 52nd Indiana, 13th Missouri
3rd Brigade: (Col. Jacob G. Lauman) 2nd Iowa, 7th Iowa, 14th Iowa, Birge's Western Sharpshooters


2nd Division (BG Jacob Ammen)
1st Brigade (Col. William Grose) 6th Ohio, 24th, Ohio, 36th Indiana
2nd Brigade (Col. William B. Hazen) 6th Kentucky, 9th Indiana, 41st Ohio
3rd Brigade (Col. Sanders D. Bruce) 1st Kentucky, 2nd Kentucky, 20th Kentucky


3rd Division (BG Benjamin M. Prentiss)
1st Brigade (Col. Everett Peabody) 21st Missouri, 25th Missouri, 16th Wisconsin, 12th Michigan
2nd Brigade (Col. Madison Miller) 18th Missouri, 61st Illinois, 16th Iowa
3rd Brigade (Col. Ivan Turchin) 19th Illinois, 15th Iowa, 23rd Missouri, 18th Wisconsin


4th Division (BG John M. Palmer)
1st Brigade (Col. James R. Slack) 34th Indiana, 47th Indiana, 43rd Indiana
2nd Brigade (Col. Graham N. Fitch) 46th Indiana, 22nd Missouri, 64th Illinois “Yates Sharpshooters”

Cavalry Brigade (Col. John A. Bridgeland): 7th Illinois Cavalry, 2nd Indiana Cavalry, 11th Illinois Cavalry,

Anglo-Canadian Forces:

Upper Canada Field Force[1]: Lt. Gen. Sir, Henry Dundas

Staff:
Chief of the Staff: Col. Patrick MacDougall
ADC: Capt. John Weyland, RCR
ADC: Capt. Nathaniel Massey, 30th Foot
Asst. Quartermaster General: Lt. Col Garnet Wolseley
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj. Wimburn Laurie
Commanding Artillery: Lt. Col. Richard F. Mountain
Commanding Cavalry: Bvt. Lt. Col. Taylor Lambard Mayne

1st Division MG Randall Rumley[2]
1st Brigade (Col. James T. Mauleverer) 30th Regiment of Foot, 2nd Battalion of Volunteer Infantry “The Queens Own Rifles of Toronto”, 10th Battalion Volunteer Infantry, 12th Battalion Volunteer Infantry
2nd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Thomas Ross), 13th Battalion Volunteer Infantry, 19th “Lincoln and Welland” Battalion, 20th “Milton” Battalion Volunteer Infantry
3rd Brigade (Col. John De Courcy) 27th “Halton” Battalion of Infantry, 28th “Stratford” Battalion of Infantry, 30th “Wellington” Battalion of Infantry

1st Canadian Field Brigade (Lt. Col William Notman)

Support Troops: (Hamilton Garrison)(Col. Alfred Booker) 38th Battalion of Rifles, 39th Battalion of Rifles, 45th Battalion of Rifles

2nd Division MG George T. C. Napier
1st Brigade, (BG. Charles Fordyce) 2nd Royal Canadian Rifles, 22nd Battalion “Oxford Rifles”, 26th “Middlesex” Battalion Volunteer Rifles,
2nd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Edward Newdigate), 23rd “Essex” Battalion of Infantry, 24th “Kent Battalion of Infantry, 25th “Elgin” Battalion
3rd Brigade (Bvt. Col. Henry R. Brown), 31st “Grey” Battalion of Infantry, 32nd Battalion of Infantry, 33rd Battalion of Infantry

2nd Canadian Field Brigade (Maj. John Peters)

Support Troops: (London Garrison)(Col. James Shanley) 56th Battalion of Infantry

Cavalry Brigade: (Brevet Colonel Taylor L. Mayne)
1st Canadian Volunteer Dragoons (Lt. Col. D’Arcy E Boulton) 10cos, 3rd Canadian Volunteer Dragoons (Maj. Norman T. Macleod, transfers from 2nd York Troop) 5cos,


Garrison Troops:

Toronto Garrison: Col. George Denison
Upper Canada Colored Corps (5cos 474 men)(Maj. Charles C. Grange)
5th and 10th District militia cos.

Kingston Garrison: Col. Hugh Bouchier
63rd Regiment of Foot (right and center wings)
14th Battalion Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Col David Shaw)
15th Battalion Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Col Archibald Ponton)
16th Battalion Volunteer Infantry (Lt. Col Walter Ross)
Kingston Volunteer Cavalry (Major James Wood)3cos

Prescott (Fort Wellington Garrison): Col. George Jarvis
18th Battalion “Prescott” Infantry (Lt. Col John Hamilton)
41st “Brockville” Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col James Crawford)
42nd Battalion of Infantry (Lt. Col Jacob D. Buell)
Prescott Volunteer Cavalry Company (Captain William D. Wood)
Kingston Field Battery (Captain Thomas Drummond)

-----

1] All troops are existing militia formations or those created in the mobilization of 1861-62 unless specified otherwise.

2] Seems I made a mistake in the narrative where I referred to Rumley as Russell. Going to go back and fix this.

Well there you have it. For ease of reading a complete order of battle for the forces involved in the Upper Canada Campaign thus far! I'll probably do another like this for Canada East once I power my way through that chapter. Hope it helps!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I do have an update ready, and will be posting it tomorrow, but I sincerely wish to thank everyone who nominated this TL for a Turtledove and those who have read and commented thus far! I hope you all continue to enjoy this piece and that it can keep going

Until tomorrow then some hints as to the progress of TTL:

Chapter 22: The Lion and the Bull

Chapter 23: To Change Her Masters

Chapter 24: Celerity

 

[Mre64]

Chapter 22: The Lion and the Bull

Spanish involvement, given they retained slavery for years after the ACW OTL they might be supporting the CSA, at the very least we'll see the British trying to get something out of them, but other than support for their Co-belligerents (really don't think the Brits would like being called Allies of Slaveholders) the British don't really need much, although maybe being allowed to dock and resupply at Havana might be helpful if there are some union ships still causing problems in the Gulf

Chapter 23: To Change Her Masters

Maybe Canadians joining invading Union forces, or a debate between parliamentary factions in the Two Canadas over possibly joining the Union (unlikely to get far, from what I can tell both have a relatively decent Pro-Britain majority)

Chapter 24: Celerity

noun: celerity

1. swiftness of movement.

Could mean any number of things. Fast raids by light forces west of the Great Lakes, Union Commerce raiders on the high seas, a rapid redeployment of troops catching an enemy by surprise, all could happen, and there are probably plenty more options I haven't thought of.