Would There Still Be An American Revolution If France Still Held Parts of Canada?

I wondered if gaining Guadalupe would mean less need for new taxes? Not saying no new taxes at all, but less punitive ones perhaps?
 
This is funny because I always thought it was the french and the indians that had the feeling that the inhabitants of the british colonies were breathing round their necks, given the reality of demographics, given the identity of those who tried to take territories from the others and who took initiative for it.

It was quite an exacerbated and exceptional sense of insecurity, the kind of which thinks that any foreign presence is a threat.


It may well have been, but it was no less real for that.

Just look at the reaction to the Quebec Act of 1774, which put the French settlements beyond the Alleghenies into Canada, and recognised the rights of the Catholic Church there. Quite a few New Englanders seemed to think that an American version of the St Bartholomew's Day massacre was imminent.
 

jahenders

Banned
I can see how the "foreign" (French) threat might have kept the colonies in line with Britain to some degree. However, if those issues settled somewhat and the colonies still had their complaints, it could enable the Revolution. So, if France still has its holdings in Canada in 1776, Britain is hindered in its ability to use Canada as a base. Then, if the colonies convince France to get involved, you could have a hot French-British war in Canada, leaving fewer British men and resources to deal with the colonies. Basically, it would make it easier for the French and colonists to be mutually supportive and would likely lead to an earlier peace.
 
No. Choiseul was not a strong reformer.
That's a big affirmation, in regard of the post-SYW reorganisation of french army and its reorganisation of french foreign policies. That he was not a great financial reformer is true, though (admittedly, he never recieved the charge of surintendent des finances, which prevented him to really have a say on these matters).

But then again, no one of his successors selected more on factional preference than for skills, were.

Louis XV did not fire ChoiseulChoisel because he was a reformer but because he discovered Choiseul was secretly negotiating with Spain France's intervention in a war against Britain over the Falklands. Which was basically high treason.
Problem is that Choiseul's diplomacy was a secret one since quite a time : it was with Poland and it was with Austria for exemple. Louis XV never really minded (being more about official acceptance of work than actually doing it) but the agglomeration of disregard for Louis XV's opinion, being too liberal for its own sake, overly ambitious, Louis XV being ruled by his mistress, and the Malouines' affair was the proverbian last drop.

That said, I never said he was sacked because he was a reformer. I said that he was because he was too incline to concede with absolutists features, as in having ministers working directly on matters at hand without having the king having every last word.

The true reformers were Machaut and then Maupeou 20 years later.
I disagree when it come to Maupeou : his main reform was to break Parlements and to remove venality of charges in favour of a more important royal power. Would have this reform made one century earlier, it would have been a decisive one, but in 1770's strengthening absolutism in France was awfully short-sighted and pissing more provincial notiblity and upper bourgeoisie for the sake of this.

As for d'Arnouville, I'd agree more on the financial reform, but he was really short-sighted when it came to foreign and colonial policy.

Were the french a threat to the british colonies in north America ?
I don't think so. The french just prevented further expansion for the settlers. But they did not prevent them from having a prosperous and peaceful life.

So I don't think a strong french presence continuing in America would necessary butterfly away an american revolution.

It's less they were a threat than were they percieved as such.

Our colonies are most vulnerable et without any defensive possibilities. French colonies are protected trough a great ammount of forts and fortifications. Our population widespread trough far provinces. Canadians are concentrated whithin towns and garrisons. Our people are nothing but planters and farmers, really knowing how to use only axe or hoe. Canadians are not only well trained and disciplined, , but are furthermore, used to, since their young age, to use weapons against Indians.
Their valor is equal, if not superior to any veteran force present in this part of the world. Our people is so divised among much governements, opinions and diverging interests that it is unable, that it doesn't even want go againt the ennemy...They, at the contrary, are under one command and are ordered as soldiers are. We think only to out trade and production. And French are allied to Indians, we are not. They are troops fighting without pay, able to survive in forests, without supply, advance without charge, don't need supply posts while these things are for us an heavy burden. Some Indians are more dangerous that five or siw times our men, and French have almost all the Indians of this continent for them.

A lot of fantazied feature, no doubts. But what counts is that it was believed, and not only by Northern Americans.

P.Kalm (1748) said:
It's a great advantage for English crown that its north american colonies are so close to french holdings. I heard from Englishmen that english colonies of North America will be ablee to form an independent state in 30 to 50 years (around 1780 or 1800). But as the land is expanding along a defenseless coast and is exposed, from inland side, to French raids, this dangerous' neighbours existance is, in war, enough to abort any tentative of separation between colonies and the motherland. The British government have, therefore, enough reasons to believe the french presence as the best political way to maintain the thirteen colonies in old England's obedience.

I certainly not dispute the fiscal reasons or the post-war North American inner policies, I just point out that it was geopolitically important enough to be considered by French rulers and applied so.

Because France's support for the American rebels was for them damage control after losing their NA colonies. They did not lose in Canada as part of some cunning grand strategy. Come on, dj!
And still, we have sources about how, if they had to loose territories, Canada would be the first to go because it was considered as mostly useless, and would impact the North American policies enough to wreck British North America.

It's shown trough sources and it's shown trough preferrence of Carrbiean Islands rather than Canada.

Did my riposte really warrant a "why"?
Nah, you're way too cool for warranting yourself.
Giving sources, however...

France would rather have a big empire than wreck someone else's, even a rival like Britain's.
Who said the contrary? It's just that, loosing a war and willing to limit the damages, giving Canada away was considered the best choice.
 
Who said the contrary? It's just that, loosing a war and willing to limit the damages, giving Canada away was considered the best choice.


And was it ever up to the French?

As I understand it, there were some in London who would have taken Guadeloupe in preference to Canada (in 1763 both were in British hands) but the planters on the British sugar islands lobbied against it because Guadeloupe's sugar production would drive down the price of their own crop. The decision was made in Britain not in France.
 
The decision was made in Britain not in France.

Not exactly : we're talking of the SYW there, not WW1 or WW2. Meaning the peace was negotiated rather than imposed (as almost all peace treaties of the XVIIIth century) with both sides extenuated by the conflict, negotiations that began since 1761.

It's even more clear with the choice France had to choose between Caribbeans and Canada. Literally, the decision was made by French rulers on this regard. And this choice was partially lead by the aforementioned geopolitical considerations, partially by Canada being seen as empty and useless, partially because Caribbeans were far more important economically and strategically.

Furthermore, the lobby you describe is far from being the only one at work and you had as much of a Canada's annexation movement in Britain.
 
well, the fall of Canada did indeed seem to spark the ARW (and it was famously predicted by Count Vergennes), so I'd imagine it could delay the revolution, depending on the state of relations between Britain and France. The intermittent hostility between them led to a series of vicious raids/counter-raids by both sides (usually with allied natives) on each others' citizens. Fear of these attacks kept the colonists on Britain's side throughout. OTOH, Britain's previous failures against Canada also rankled the colonists; troops promised and then sent elsewhere, etc. So while the revolution would be delayed, hard feelings towards the old country will grow the longer Canada stays French....
 

It's

Banned
That actually doesn't conflict with

France gave up in Canada because they estimated it would foment discontent in the British colonies? Estimation sounds like a tool of grand strategy to me.:confused:
But, each to their own interpretation.
 
France gave up in Canada because they estimated it would foment discontent in the British colonies? Estimation sounds like a tool of grand strategy to me.:confused:
Oh, that was certainly not without flaws, hence the second Choiseul' quote I posted, where he estimated it would brutally weaken Britain which not only definitely not happened even with American independence, but hugely backfired in France as well.

But basically, yes. As they had to give up a territory, they gave up the one they think was most useless for them, and would bring more dissent in British NA.

But, each to their own interpretation.
I would point that it's not interpretation, but sourced contemporary quotes.
 
.... Just like the poster of the original comments, n'cest pas?;)

I think that it's the best indicator on how you simply not read the thread closely enough.
1) I'm the original poster
2) I posted several quotes to advance my first post.

Either you're calling me liar, or either you point how these mentions aren't good enough, but I expect a bit more than snarky (or borderline insulting) answers.
 
That depends on how much the french keep.

But there is one thing that you can't scratch from the picture : whatever the different result of the seven years war you choose, the british government is going to want to have the american settlers to pay new taxes because it badly needs to find new resources to repay part of the huge debt it contracted during the war.

And you still have the fact that, after 150 years of neglegt, the american settlers don't want to be ruled by a small bunch of aristocrats and bankers in the far-distant metropolis.

So of course, thinking long terme they have an interest in wiping out any foreign presence blocking westward immigration. But before adressing long term issues, they have to swallow paying taxes for a distant very small oligarchy.
And you know that the famous "read my lips : no new taxes !" had many forebears.

Were the french a threat to the british colonies in north America ?
I don't think so. The french just prevented further expansion for the settlers. But they did not prevent them from having a prosperous and peaceful life.

So I don't think a strong french presence continuing in America would necessary butterfly away an american revolution.

Let's say the french win the battle of the plains of Abraham and all the following battles and that they're able to retain all their territories. If they show peaceful intentions towards british colonies, you still could have a revolt against Britain's demanding taxes.

Things might be different if the french win some kind of unprobable crushing victory and, for example, take Maine, Vermont, the norther part of New Hampshire and western parts of the States of New-York and Pennsylvania, and force the british settlers to leave those lost territories.
In this case, it seems quite sure that the colonies would be afraid enough to stick to the metropolis.

French Canada wasn't really populated. And even if the French kept it they wouldn't be as able to support their native allies because of their losses. A more populated Quebec could still reduce chances, but get the Natives out of the 13 colonies' way and that would still open some opportunities for the revolution.
 
Could the American Revolution still be pulled off even if France still held places in Canada (French America above the Ohio Country; basically French Canada still borders OTL U.S.-Canada borders and has lands like Ontario and west of that)? Or would the colonists rather suck it up to prevent the French from taking advantage of them?

This has been debated by two historians, John M. Murrin and Lawrence H. Gipson. Gary J. Kornblith summarized the debate as follows in "Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise" in the June 2003 *Journal of American History* http://www.oah.org/site/assets/documents/02_JAH_2003_kornblith.pdf

***

"For guidance in this task, I turn to John M. Murrin's provocative essay
'The French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the
Counterfactual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John
Shy.' Noting that 'Gipson was one of few American historians to erect
counterfactual arguments into explicit research tools,' Murrin accepted
Gipson's methodology but questioned his conclusions. Whereas Gipson
posited that 'had Canada remained French after 1763, ... 'Americans
[would] have continued to feel the need as in the past to rely for their
safety'' on the mother country and would not have rebelled, Murrin argued
almost the opposite. By his account, the 'Gallic Peril' had never produced
Anglo-American harmony, and after the Canadian cession the mainland
colonists were more, not less, vulnerable to military pressure from the
north if they wished to secede from the British Empire. Thus the French
departure from Canada was not the necessary and sufficient cause of the
American War of Independence.

"Murrin acknowledged, however, that "important links can indeed be
established between [Gipson's] 'Great War for the Empire' and the American
Revolution." With wry delight, Murrin portrayed those connections as more
ironic than ironclad. He traced how British policy makers in the 1760s
overlooked the successes of the later years of the French and Indian War
to address problems from the early years that no longer required
solutions. 'The war provided a catalyst for all kinds of change,' he
concluded, 'but evidently it could not alter the habitual way that
politicians looked at old problems.... Britain may actually have lost her
colonies because, in the last analysis, the English simply did not know
how to think triumphantly.'"

***

Murrin's article can be found at http://www.erusd.org/Teaching_American_History/tah_last_year/03-15-11 The French and Indian War.pdf

Gipson's argument in "The American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, 1754-1763," Political Science Quarterly 65 (1950) is reprinted at https://books.google.com/books?id=-w_xPy-S3aEC&pg=PA101
 
It is also because Britain came out of the war with a huge debt and wanted the american settlers to take a share in the debt burden. After all, India was a huge source of money.

And from a certain and quite logical point of view, there can be no military defence without taxation. That was the pre-requisite on the "no taxation without representation".

That's also why finally accepting the independance of the 13 colonies was certainly a good bargain for Britain. "The 13 colonies don't want to contribute : let them pay for their own defence and just trade with them."
 
It is also because Britain came out of the war with a huge debt and wanted the american settlers to take a share in the debt burden. After all, India was a huge source of money.

And from a certain and quite logical point of view, there can be no military defence without taxation. That was the pre-requisite on the "no taxation without representation".

That's also why finally accepting the independance of the 13 colonies was certainly a good bargain for Britain. "The 13 colonies don't want to contribute : let them pay for their own defence and just trade with them."

The 13 colonies were quite happy to contribute. They just wanted to put their own militias on the frontier, rather than pay for British regulars that abused the locals and stopped them from settling West of the Appalachians.
 
That's a big difference and by itself a big point of disagreement.

And there were other point of disagreement that put the american colonies and Britain on a collision course : freedom of trade and of production that was a major issue. Britain just wanted to retain for itself monopoly of trade on some products that were important to the american colonies.

So basically, the point is that the colonies wanted Britain to resume its benign neglegt policy or wanted a deal on which termes there probably could be agreement with Britain.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The whole settling-west-of-the-Appalachians thing is actually quite bizarre to look at, from 21-Century eyes. Because it doesn't really fit our preconceptions - wait, what? The oppressive British were restricting the abilities of the colonists to steal land from the Indian tribes?
It's one of those reminders that progressive people are not always progressive in all ways, I guess.
 

jahenders

Banned
That, of course, depends on one's definition of "progressive."

Always best to avoid putting the mores and mindset of today on people 150-250 years ago.

The whole settling-west-of-the-Appalachians thing is actually quite bizarre to look at, from 21-Century eyes. Because it doesn't really fit our preconceptions - wait, what? The oppressive British were restricting the abilities of the colonists to steal land from the Indian tribes?
It's one of those reminders that progressive people are not always progressive in all ways, I guess.
 
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