I think if you win a battle suffering twelve thousand dead while killing seventy thousand plus of the enemy, that's an overwhelming victory going purely by the grim arithmetic of war.Yes they were not perfect...
I think if you win a battle suffering twelve thousand dead while killing seventy thousand plus of the enemy, that's an overwhelming victory going purely by the grim arithmetic of war.Yes they were not perfect...
There were three different Japanese individual in Switzerland each belonging to three different government agencies, that being Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministry, desperately reaching out to communicate and negotiate with the Western Allies in three separate cases, none of them were in official capacity to negotiate anything. Those people with pipedreams always exist, and to my knowledge Western historians don't call Himmler's offer to sue for peace an official proposal. Although in Japan's case it's mixed with the good old pre-war Japanese working modus operandi, that is, initiating operation without waiting for instruction from his superiors in Tōkyō let alone seeking for their consultation beforehand
The matter of fact is that Tōkyō was not interested in talking through Switzerland, at all, from the beginning to the end; all its attention was paid to Moscow and Stalin, and the few people who advocated to work with the Western Allies rather than Soviet Union were arrested and removed of influence in the Yoshida Anti-War Group case
But depending the butterflies they might be different scenariosso you'd have more people alive from those two cities. Some of them may become prominent figures in post-war Japanese politics
My personal experience with the Japanese is nothing was official until it was a done deal. Until then senior leaders made opaque remarks and second tier staffers, drew on that to direct third or fourth level under secretaries of mangers to work on seeming disjointed details, until abruptly consensus was reached and the top man signed off on whatever it was they were putting together. Most of the Japanese army officers or civilian managers I worked with were equally baffled by American management methods. The one Japanese I was able to communicate with at a reasonable level was fairly open with me. He told me the Japanese regarded American management as insane, a PoV I've run across with others.
In any case, official or not, the concept, or proposals, or conditions for a peace contained in the Swiss and the Soviet initiatives were far from anything the Allies might have agreed to.
I agree, In some sectors of Asian business you see a similar thing. Each side enters a meeting and the senior person on each side says bas nothing, until the deal is more or less worked out or it implodes. Then the senior member says something that either concludes the deal or has everyone depart.
I have never figured out exactly why it often works like this as in my cultural background the senior members do the negotiations and the juniou members just provide support or details when called on.
I suspect it is a matter of face saving in that the senior members can be seen to kower themselves to negotiate and they don’t want to risk losing face if the negotiations don’t work out. So they lets lower level staff handle everything until it is more or less worked out.
So it is entirely possible that the negotiations was being handled by lower level staff but that does not necessarily mean that they were going against the wishes of those higher up. It is all a matter of plausi Deniability and saying face.
And WW2 was hell on earth in a way that is hard to comprehend today as was any major war before that. So while we today would be appalled at 12000 Kia in a war much less a single battle the reality is that in an all out war between peers you will get a lot higher casualties then we have seen in the past 80 years So yes in a battle that requires you to kill 70 + THOUSAND enemies, losing ”only” 12 thousand is a victory. Assuming you end up in control of the island or whatever you were fighting over afterwards. Yes the casualties are horrendous but… war is horrendous. It is just that we have not fought a major war in generations. And no even as significant as Vietnam and Korea were compared to major wars they were more of a side show. Horrible for those involved but not of a scale to compare with say the World wars, or the Civil war, or the Napoleonic wars or what have you.
I was reading a debate about the necessity of dropping the nuclear bombs to get Japan to surrender. One side brought up the prospect of invasion being far bloodier than the nukes, while the other side countered that forcing Japan to surrender was not necessary in the first place and it wasn't worth nuking, invading, or blockading Japan just to get their unconditional capitulation.
In short, the anti-nuke, anti-invasion advocate was suggesting that Japan be simply allowed to burn itself out, without the US trying to occupy it or effect regime change. Eventually the war would end and the participants would come to terms.
Now I didn't add "blockade" to the question in the thread title because I think it would have been rather impossible to keep Japan functionally defeated without some form of blockade, but the intensity of such operations could be dialed up or down obviously.
I know that the US not seeking unconditional surrender is probably not politically plausible, but let's say that for whatever reason, the Americans didn't care about getting an unconditional surrender from the Japanese and were willing to vastly reduce the scale of Japan-focused operations in the Pacific War following the capture of Okinawa, precluding a complete blockade and disruption of civilian shipping in Japan.
-- Would this have been militarily feasible? Or would the Japanese retain enough warmaking capacity to continue fighting the US forces indefinitely, even with their territory being eventually reduced to just the home islands?
-- Would the Japanese have eventually sued for peace (i.e. conditional surrender)? How long would this take?
-- What would Japan look like after 1945?
-- What would the effects on the rest of Asia and the postwar world be?
Yes, but the allies wouldn’t accept the Japanese would demand.
By that point the US had built a lot more atomic bomb, during the Korean war the US had a few hundred bombs while the USSR had something like 20.But without the atomic bombs being used on Japan, it makes me think the U.S. would use it on the Red Army if the 1948 Berlin Crisis went hot or even in Korea in 1950-1951.
Yeah. While America's ability to use atomics in '48 was pretty poor, had war broken out in 1948 they still probably would've done their best to fix those problems as quickly as they could and try to use them ASAP. American post-war military strategy documents were extremely explicit in it's reliance on atomic weaponry from 1947 onward and even extremely implicit in 1946...I am confused.. what makes you think thatvis Berlin had turned hot IOTL that the US would have Not Used the Atomic bombs?
I am pretty convinced that if the USSR forces a war over Berlin that Atomics WOULD have been used.
You seemed to imply that the bombs used on Japan were the only ones the US had or one of the few it had.I am confused.. what makes you think thatvis Berlin had turned hot IOTL that the US would have Not Used the Atomic bombs?
I am pretty convinced that if the USSR forces a war over Berlin that Atomics WOULD have been used.
The ones just got from the presses,mass production was coming, the bombs were Japan easy exit otlYou seemed to imply that the bombs used on Japan were the only ones the US had or one of the few it had.
I was told the reason why the U.S. did not want to use nukes in 1948 because everyone saw the devastating power of the bomb in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki and nuclear radiation was understood. Remember in most Operation Downfall scenarios, many mentioned that the U.S. would have used nuclear weapons to clear beachhead while landing troops where the bomb was used. That would mean all those marines or soldiers would be fighting in a irradiated landscape without means for protection since there were not much NBC suits in 1945-46.I am confused.. what makes you think thatvis Berlin had turned hot IOTL that the US would have Not Used the Atomic bombs?
I am pretty convinced that if the USSR forces a war over Berlin that Atomics WOULD have been used.
I also read that the early USAF only had a handful of nuclear-capable B-29s and B-36s in 1948. Of course, that would mean there will be modifications made into those existing B-29s and B-36s to start carrying nuclear weapons.Yeah. While America's ability to use atomics in '48 was pretty poor, had war broken out in 1948 they still probably would've done their best to fix those problems as quickly as they could and try to use them ASAP. American post-war military strategy documents were extremely explicit in it's reliance on atomic weaponry from 1947 onward and even extremely implicit in 1946...