Not exactly. Polk was explicitly ordered NOT to move into Kentucky, but went and did it. Hood was implicitly ordered to attack, and as much and as soon as possible. As mentioned elsewhere, his attacks at Atlanta were good in conception, just not quite strong enough (and the victims of bad luck and Thomas' heroics). At Nashville......yeah, that was bad, but by this point the Confederates were trying anything. He again had the approval and good wishes of Jefferson Davis, and was outnumbered. I doubt that by this point even a Lee-Jackson combination in the west could have reversed the tide in the 'farther west' before Sherman could complete his various marches.
Furthermore, I neglected to include some of Polk's 'oversights' at Vicksburg. While Pemberton, Johnston, and Grant were still in the maneuvring stages, Polk had 2 opportunities to take his wing of 18,000 troops and crush down upon Union detachments of 10,000 troops, by surprise, and destroy one of Grant's wings. He neglected to do so, despite being explicitly ordered one of the times. Furthermore, in battle the day after that, without orders, he just off and took his wing away from the still-raging battle and retreated to the east, never coming to Pemberton's aid and leaving said gaping hole. Arguable he also mismanaged his wing at Chickamauga.
Hood, again by contrast, esentially single-handedly stopped the might of the Union XIIth, and half of the the Ist and IInd corps at Antietam/Sharpsburg, was the spearhead in the attack at 2nd Manassas/Bull Run, and at Gettysburg recognized before it happend the disaster waiting to happen in Devil's Den and related, appealed to Longstreet and Lee, was rebuked, and still went forward with determination and destroyed the left of the IIIrd corps, part of the arriving Vth corps, and damn near captured Little Round Top. (This without an arm and a leg.
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