World War III breaks out in 1948-Stalin expels the Western Allies from mainland Europe, and then offers peace negotiations from a position of strength

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Ojserkis touches on them a bit in "Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the US Arms Build-Up". Most of the professional troops were overseas fighting guerrilla wars in the colonies, most notably French Southeast Asia. Most of the troops left back home were lightly armed conscripts who were regarded as undertrained and poorly motivated. The lone armored division in the French occupation zone in West Germany was reasonably equipped and trained by all accounts, but it's just one division. Little surprise that the French governments own assessment of their defenses at the start of the Berlin Crisis was "We are virtually defenseless." It's a similar story for the Low Countries

Undoubtedly, the French government would have retreated to the colonies in North Africa and continued the fight from there as a government-in-exile. Also undoubtedly, the Soviets would have attempted to set the French PCF up as a puppet government, although this government would likely enjoy even less legitimacy than Vichy did. Talk of the Western European civilian population providing a significant impediment to the initial Soviet assault is total persiflage: nobody in Western Europe was considering organizing a civilian militia to attempt to take onto Soviet armored spearheads and for good reason. One merely has to look what happened to the one-sided butchery the Soviets inflicted on Volkssturm units to see how that would turn out. Later resistance organization in the vein of the WW2 French and Low Countries is more than plausible, but as in WW2 their main contributions would be low-level sabotage and reconnaissance on the behalf of their Anglo-American patrons, with armed uprisings being totally infeasible until the Anglo-Americans can fight their way back onto the continent... again, as was the case with the Germans.

Discussed here.

Well, it's not totally impossible if Stalin offers a generous enough peace deal (not an entirely Soviet-aligned Germany, but an expanded East Germany maybe), but ultimately it does not strike me as very likely. And that's the ultimate problem for the Soviets: whatever they can manage to do in the initial months of the war, it just isn't enough to prevent the WAllies from buckling down for a multi-year war. And it's in a multi-year war that the Soviets are truly screwed.
Thanks for the information and examination of a possible Spanish holdout!
 
@ObssesedNuker A rough draft of the French tank force says we got 656 Shermans through lend-lease and some 300-ish to replace losses as the war went on, and we got some tanks from post-war dumps. Minus losses, I don't expect more than 700 Shermans in service postwar and that's a stretch. 76 Shermans were very rare.
Worse, many of the tanks had worn-out engines and the Transformé rework with radial engines only started in the 1950's, so the number of tanks actually available is probably lower.

This is well below what they could sustain after mobilisation if it was required, and indeed over 1000 Shermans were sent as MDAP help from 1950-on.

Evidently, a pseudo-MDAP program could have been started as early as 1946 to reequip Europe (and redistribute the best equipment that the US couldn't use alone) and maintain sufficient material reserves to sustain troops in case of mobilisation, and initial losses. If the political will had been there.

Do you have a link to your source for the US tank and SPG inventory? I would like the name if not. There's probably more info in it.
 
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Yeah in the context of this thread, some form of rushed into service radar equipped night fighter seems within the relm of the possible for the Soviets. If the performance was on par with top of the line contemporary day fighters such an aircraft would likely complicate the use of B29's. IOTL the US and Canada both put a lot of effort into such projects to counter Tu4's. I'm not saying this would be easy or even likely for the Soviets to do.
OTL - History of Air Defence 1945-55
In 1948, a requirement for an all-weather interceptor resulted in development of three different two-engine, radar-equipped prototypes—the Su-15, the La 200A, and the MiG-310. These were awkward designs which attempted to incorporate two centrifugal flow engines and a radar in the same fuselage. They were dropped in favor of a radar modification of the MiG-15—a short-range interim expedient. It was not until 1951, with the development of the Mikhulin AM-5 small, efficient, axial-flow engine that a long-range, all-weather interceptor became technically convenient. Such an engine made practical an alternate aircraft configuration which would accommodate the large radome associated with Soviet air intercept radars of that era. There is sufficient evidence to believe that the aircraft which would eventually accommodate the “requirement” for an all-weather area interceptor, the YAK-25, arose outside of the normal process of Soviet research and development decision-making. The YAK-25 appears to have been the result of an initiative of the designer taken up directly with Stalin. Thus, the aircraft that was wanted concurrently with the formation of PVO in 1948 was not available until 1954.
Soviet Union WW2 nightfighter was the Pe- 3
The Gneiss-2 airborne radar was evaluated in the Pe-3 beginning in July 1942 and it was sent to both Moscow and Stalingrad for combat trials in late 1942. Another round of trials was conducted by aircraft of the 2nd Guards Fighter Corps of the PVO in Leningrad between February and May 1943 and it was approved for service the next month. Very few appear to have been deployed as only fifteen were fitted on Pe-3s
So it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could deploy an effective nightfighter force in 1948.
 
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ferdi254

Banned
So no nightfighter force, no really working radar coverage (with maybe the exception of Moscow) so within two weeks of the fight (assuming the USA has not a single day of prewarning) Leningrad, Baku, Ploesti and Maikop are gone.

Then the USSR has to decide: Produce fertilizers and fuel for tractors/ harvesters and the like and still starve millions of people due to a lack of manpower in harvesting, processing and distributing food,

or produce aviation fuel and fuel for tanks and trucks supplying the Red Army. Meaning Generalplan Ost sort of gets implemented.

So 1949 they will have to ask for terms. And that is with the USA still being able to produce how many bombs? 30,40…

The USSR was in absolutely no shape to fight a war against the west. It may have had the soldiers, tanks, arty and trucks to make it to Bordeaux but their citizens had been on 6 years of starving rations in a row, the transport system was still not up to the task, housing and clothing was an utter desaster and no one wanted a war with the USA.

So replace Stalin with a gung ho idiot as a POD to start this.
 
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I proceed to quote an extensive section, showing that the force had already transitioned to a mostly-combat ready group amd you run off to with the non-sequitor “b-but three of four mechanized armies were cadred 2 years earlier!” I’ll take that concession.
For clarity: you used a quote from a source showing that part of a force (a Mechanised Army) was transitioning to a more combat ready status. I used the same page of that source to show the context that this was not a huge change.

As to the Soviet mobilisation plans, the US estimate you quote:
the Soviets could initially send 50 divisions against Western Europe followed by at least 50 more. This would enable them to conquer
Europe to the Pyrenees within two months. At the same time, the Soviets would have enough divisions left over to conquer Italy, Scandinavia, the Balkans, and much of the rest of Eurasia, although not all simultaneously.


The British view (as you know) was different:
the British chiefs of staff accepted it with some reservations. They were willing to go along with the estimate as a basis for further planning, they said, but they insisted that “the scale and rate of progress of the various campaigns is probably an over-estimate. ”While “little purpose would be served in re-examining them,” they wanted it “made quite clear to all concerned in the use of the Appreciation that it does not take any account of Allied counteraction and represents the maximum possible physical capabilities of the Soviet Union.”
 
@ObssesedNuker A rough draft of the French tank force says we got 656 Shermans through lend-lease and some 300-ish to replace losses as the war went on, and we got some tanks from post-war dumps. Minus losses, I don't expect more than 700 Shermans in service postwar and that's a stretch. 76 Shermans were very rare.
Worse, many of the tanks had worn-out engines and the Transformé rework with radial engines only started in the 1950's, so the number of tanks actually available is probably lower.

This is well below what they could sustain after mobilisation if it was required, and indeed over 1000 Shermans were sent as MDAP help from 1950-on.

Evidently, a pseudo-MDAP program could have been started as early as 1946 to reequip Europe (and redistribute the best equipment that the US couldn't use alone) and maintain sufficient material reserves to sustain troops in case of mobilisation, and initial losses. If the political will had been there.

Do you have a link to your source for the US tank and SPG inventory? I would like the name if not. There's probably more info in it.
Reportedly the French also operated Panther tanks post WW2 although they were likely out of service by 1948. Maybe some of them could at least have been used as static pill boxes in this time line :)
 
Reportedly the French also operated Panther tanks post WW2 although they were likely out of service by 1948. Maybe some of them could at least have been used as static pill boxes in this time line :)
I guess, and maybe they manage to somehow make the ARL 44s work ahead of schedule since they were built in 46-47...
 

marathag

Banned
So no nightfighter force, no really working radar coverage (with maybe the exception of Moscow) so within two weeks of the fight (assuming the USA has not a single day of prewarning) Leningrad, Baku, Ploesti and Maikop are gone.
Leningrad was still pretty well wrecked from the siege, butwould have had active defenses as well as what they had available for Radar in 1948
Problem with Baku, is no real good choices for basing B-29/B-50s in the Mideast
Yes, the B-50 had range to reach Baku from SE England, but best not to fly over so much contested airspace to go there, and back again
Ploesti still hadn't recovered from the war damage, either
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I guess, and maybe they manage to somehow make the ARL 44s work ahead of schedule since they were built in 46-47...
Yeah but I doubt any of it would make much difference overall, although having 75mm L/70 guns to shoot at T34's might be handy.
So no nightfighter force, no really working radar coverage (with maybe the exception of Moscow) so within two weeks of the fight (assuming the USA has not a single day of prewarning) Leningrad, Baku, Ploesti and Maikop are gone.

Then the USSR has to decide: Produce fertilizers and fuel for tractors/ harvesters and the like and still starve millions of people due to a lack of manpower in harvesting, processing and distributing food,

or produce aviation fuel and fuel for tanks and trucks supplying the Red Army. Meaning Generalplan Ost sort of gets implemented.

So 1949 they will have to ask for terms. And that is with the USA still being able to produce how many bombs? 30,40…

The USSR was in absolutely no shape to fight a war against the west. It may have had the soldiers, tanks, arty and trucks to make it to Bordeaux but their citizens had been on 6 years of starving rations in a row, the transport system was still not up to the task, housing and clothing was an utter desaster and no one wanted a war with the USA.

So replace Stalin with a gung ho idiot as a POD to start this.
The lack of night fighters does seem to be a major issue to me. I'll avoid rehashing related stuff that has been covered in multiple prior threads on this topic.
 

ferdi254

Banned
Marathg how long does it take to actually build a 4 km long 50 m wide strip of tarmac in the desert of Syria if one really sets its mind to it?
4 months? 6?

And your figures just confirm my point. The USSR economy was running on fumes. Any significant damage and they are toast.
 
I see Ferdi’s still peddling argument by assertion and blatantly ignoring already provided evidence that contradicts it. Not much worth in addressing him until he stops that. At least Aber tries to engage with the source material.
For clarity: you used a quote from a source showing that part of a force (a Mechanised Army) was transitioning to a more combat ready status. I used the same page of that source to show the context that this was not a huge change.
Bzzt. Wrong. The quote discusses the return of the mechanized army to active status as being among one of the many signs that the occupation command was transitioning to a combat one. And yes, it was a huge change, given that at the time, the 2nd Guards Mechanized was the only army in the GSFG left at cadre status (the other two cadred mechanized armies from 1946 had been withdrawn into the interior by 1948, while the two combined arms armies - 3rd Shock and 8th Guards - had always been maintained at Cat-A status). As usual, you can’t honestly engage with the source material.
The British view (as you know) was different:
Quote basically says the British went “Yeah, we agree the Soviets can do this if they went all out (maximum physical capabilities). We just don’t think they’ll go all-out unless a major war has already broken out.” So the British had no fundamental disagreement.
 
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CalBear

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I see Ferdi’s still peddling argument by assertion and blatantly ignoring already provided evidence that contradicts it. Not much worth in addressing him until he stops that. At least Aber tries to engage with the source material.

Bzzt. Wrong. The quote discusses the return of the mechanized army to active status as being among one of the many signs that the occupation command was transitioning to a combat one. And yes, it was a huge change, given that at the time, the 2nd Guards Mechanized was the only army in the GSFG left at cadre status (the other two cadred mechanized armies from 1946 had been withdrawn into the interior by 1948, while the two combined arms armies - 3rd Shock and 8th Guards - had always been maintained at Cat-A status). As usual, you can’t honestly engage with the source material.

Quote basically says the British went “Yeah, we agree the Soviets can do this if they went all out (maximum physical capabilities). We just don’t think they’ll go all-out unless a major war has already broken out.” So the British had no fundamental disagreement.
Play the ball.
 

CalBear

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Okay.

Serious reminder here folks:

DO NOT go after other members. Full Stop.

I am going to have to stop taking part in this thread because I've had to wave my Mod hat twice already. That upsets me since I was rather enjoying this debate.

Just imagine how much more unhappy I will be if anyone ignores this post.

Just sayin'...
 
Play the ball.
I am. I cite sources. I cited a source that states “Early-warning radars were first deployed to cover the approaches from the Baltic and Eastern Europe; by 1950 the radar net had been extended to the Pacific Ocean, and to the Caspian and Black Seas.” and another which says “the Soviets had established an effective and integrated command and control system that operated 24 hours per day. Soviet ground radar operators were capable of vectoring interceptor aircraft to within two to five miles of the incoming SAC bombers. Additionally, Soviet radars were capable of conducting this operation from ranges up to 70 miles”. This clearly demonstrates that the Soviets at least had adequate radar coverage on the most available route for the WAllies (that is, flying out of Britain) and the GCI ability to mount intercepts. I also observe the historical use of Soviet night-fighter “Wild Boar” tactics in Korea, which like when they were used by the Germans were noted as being effective enough. And how does Ferdi reply?

So no nightfighter force, no really working radar coverage
Basically totally ignores it. I’m sure you can imagine how frustrating that behavior is.

I’m playing the ball. He isn’t.
 
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CalBear

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I am. I cite sources. I cited a source that states “Early-warning radars were first deployed to cover the approaches from the Baltic and Eastern Europe; by 1950 the radar net had been extended to the Pacific Ocean, and to the Caspian and Black Seas.” and another which says “the Soviets had established an effective and integrated command and control system that operated 24 hours per day. Soviet ground radar operators were capable of vectoring interceptor aircraft to within two to five miles of the incoming SAC bombers. Additionally, Soviet radars were capable of conducting this operation from ranges up to 70 miles”. This clearly demonstrates that the Soviets at least had adequate radar coverage on the most available route for the WAllies (that is, flying out of Britain) and the GCI ability to mount intercepts. I also observe the historical use of Soviet night-fighter “Wild Boar” tactics in Korea, which like when they were used by the Germans were noted as being effective enough. And how does Ferdi reply?


Basically totally ignores it. I’m sure you can imagine how frustrating that behavior is.

I’m playing the ball. He isn’t.
Great. Restate the facts. DO NOT "@UserName", especially in the 3rd person. That by definition is playing the man.
 
Quote basically says the British went “Yeah, we agree the Soviets can do this if they went all out (maximum physical capabilities). We just don’t think they’ll go all-out unless a major war has already broken out.” So the British had no fundamental disagreement.
You don't seem to understand British understatement. :)

In particular the quote says: made quite clear to all concerned in the use of the Appreciation that it does not take any account of Allied counteraction and represents the maximum possible physical capabilities of the Soviet Union.

ie if there were no Western armed forces; with an unspoken large BUT
 
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I am. I cite sources. I cited a source that states “Early-warning radars were first deployed to cover the approaches from the Baltic and Eastern Europe; by 1950 the radar net had been extended to the Pacific Ocean, and to the Caspian and Black Seas.” and another which says “the Soviets had established an effective and integrated command and control system that operated 24 hours per day. Soviet ground radar operators were capable of vectoring interceptor aircraft to within two to five miles of the incoming SAC bombers. Additionally, Soviet radars were capable of conducting this operation from ranges up to 70 miles”. This clearly demonstrates that the Soviets at least had adequate radar coverage on the most available route for the WAllies (that is, flying out of Britain) and the GCI ability to mount intercepts. I also observe the historical use of Soviet night-fighter “Wild Boar” tactics in Korea, which like when they were used by the Germans were noted as being effective enough. And how does Ferdi reply?


Basically totally ignores it. I’m sure you can imagine how frustrating that behavior is.

I’m playing the ball. He isn’t.
IMHO radar equipped night fighters are not the same as "Wild Boar tactics." While some of us (including my self) could be perhaps be a bit more clear on definitions, I don't believe it is un reasonable to say that the Soviets didn't have night fighters when looking at this from a typical post WW2 western point of view. (I believe I typically use the phrase "radar equipped night fighter", or in some prior threads the phrase "jet powered radar equipped night fighter", but I seem to have slipped up this time round. Sorry about that..)
 
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