Without WWII happening, Germany beating France, and 'wounding' the USSR by invading it, the USSR would have been naturally set to rule over Europe

[raharris1973]

Every now and then I've seen a theory on alternate history or historical discussion boards that can be distilled this way, "without WWII happening, Germany beating France, and 'wounding' the USSR by invading it, the USSR would have been naturally set to rule over Europe, in time."

Is this theory:

The most logical extrapolation of geopolitical capabilities and intentions over the mid-20th century in a no-Nazis or less successful Nazis TL

A very unlikely extrapolation of of geopolitical capabilities and intentions over the mmid-20th century in a no-Nazis or less successful Nazis TL

Likelihood is impossible to estimate, but it is one of many logical possible outcomes of the mid-20th century in a no-Nazis or less successful Nazis TL

Likelihood is impossible to estimate, it could happen, but it mostly reveals the political biases or obsessions of the person proposing it

 

[cloistered scholar]

Without WW2 who develops nuclear weapons first could be the Soviet Union

 

[rfmcdonald]

Without a world war that leaves the great powers of Europe basically intact—a list, I would argue, that might have been coming to including an increasingly substantial Poland—I see no reason to think the Soviet Union would conquer Europe. Ideology aside, the Soviet Union might have been large but it also lagged economically and even militarily as the Winter War showed dramatically.

 

[Fries]

I doubt it. The USSR had no desire to invade vast swathes of Europe. The USSR was fine with helping socialist movements in Spain, Yugoslavia, Italy, &c.. It still had an internationalist foreign policy but never had the desire (nor, arguably, the means) to control the entire European continent.

The USA was still the most likely to hold political power over Europe in the 20th century. It had the power projection, industry, and national fraternity with the important countries (France, the UK, and to an extent Italy). Outside of the US, I could maybe see Britain and France getting together in some sort of proto-NATO/EU or maybe Italy creating an economic and/or military pact with countries like Francoist Spain, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, and maybe Yugoslavia.

 

[David T]

Germany is going to re-arm, Hitler or no Hitler. The Allies had already agreed to the principle of military equality for Germany before Hitler came to power. Just what that meant was not entirely clear, but Schleicher was already planning to move toward universal conscription by creating a compulsory militia. The restrictions on the militarization of the Rhineland could also have been overcome without taking even the minimal risk of war Hitler took in OTL; see my post at https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-rhineland-is-prevented.425476/#post-15570216

The idea that without Hitler Stalin would be facing a helpless Germany is nonsense. Of course a non-Nazi regime might not rearm at quite the pace of a Nazi one but OTOH it might have the advantage of good relations with France and the UK as well as the US (the US would be unlikely to resist a Soviet invasion of Europe with troops but could certainly provide a great deal of financial support).

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Yeah. Certainly without getting mauled the Soviet Union would be more powerful, but it wouldn't be so much more powerful that it could rule over all of Europe. It's absolute power would be stronger, but there is a powerful argument that it's relative power would probably be a fair bit weaker.

 

[Jürgen]

Dominance are not about your strength but others weaknesses. If the Weimar Republic had survived , Germany would have served as a counter to USSR while Western Europe had weaken in the late half of the 20th century [1].

[1] which was unavoidable as the de colonial inaction would happen and it would have economic consequences for the colonial powers.

 

[Ambusher11]

Germany is going to re-arm, Hitler or no Hitler. The Allies had already agreed to the principle of military equality for Germany before Hitler came to power. Just what that meant was not entirely clear, but Schleicher was already planning to move toward universal conscription by creating a compulsory militia. The restrictions on the militarization of the Rhineland could also have been overcome without taking even the minimal risk of war Hitler took in OTL; see my post at https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-rhineland-is-prevented.425476/#post-15570216

Actually, while I do agree that the remilitarization of the Rhineland is unlikely to cause a war with France, the method you said that Hitler could've used (declaring the Landespolizei in the Rhineland part of the Wehrmacht) for the remilitarization of the Rhineland would still be just as risky as marching troops into the Rhineland. The French in addition to considering the possibility of Germany carrying out remilitarization by openly marching its troops into the Rhineland were also considering other possibilities such as the army being brought in the Rhineland to suppress a revolt and staying even after the revolt is suppressed (In fact, after Germany sent the Reichswehr into the Ruhr in 1920 to suppress a communist revolt, the French occupied Frankfurt to get the Germans to withdraw the Reichswehr from the Ruhr). Any incorporation of the Landespolizei in the Rhineland into the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht would likely be viewed by France as a major breach of Versailles and Locarno. Here's some French documents (translated with Google Translate) from August 1932 describing France's attitude towards the various scenarios of remilitarization of the Rhineland:

M. PAUL-BONCOUR, MINISTER FOR WAR,
TO M. HERRIOT, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

D. No. 1100 SAE 2/11. Secret. Paris, August 13, 1932.

I have had the honor on several occasions to draw your attention to the numerous abuses committed by Germany in the application of the agreements relating to the entry of elements of the Reichswehr into the demilitarized zone.

The German Government has never taken account of the observations made to it on this subject. Moreover, its attitude in this matter seems to prove that it is determined to gradually resume its freedom of military action in the demilitarized zone, in order to fully establish its territorial sovereignty there.

It is therefore logical to think that, either that it exploits possible internal incidents that the political situation in Germany makes it possible to envisage in the Rhine area, or even that it does not have recourse to this pretext, the Reich will, in in the more or less near future, to enter the demilitarized zone with armed personnel other than those which it has been authorized since 1926 to maintain there (4).

What are the provisions of the diplomatic texts relating to a possible entry of German armed forces into the demilitarized zone?

The Treaty of Versailles (arts. 42 and 43) clearly prohibits any presence, permanent or temporary, of armed forces in the zone.

The Rhineland Pact guarantees compliance with the provisions of these articles and recognizes our right of self-defence. But it restricts our full freedom of action in the sense that the finding of a contravention of Articles 42 and 43 must be brought before the Council of the League of Nations.

CDA letter no. 121 of November 8, 1929 takes note of the German government's declaration of September 13, 1929 "not to allow Reichswehr units to enter the delimited zone without having, according to the precedents already in existence, put in touch with the governments concerned”.

It therefore admits the principle of the possible entry of Reichswehr units.

The Paris agreements of January 10, 1930 admit that exceptional circumstances may make it necessary to send temporary police reinforcements to the area. This dispatch must be immediately notified to the governments concerned if it involves exceeding by at least two hundred men the maximum strength provided for the police in the demilitarized zone.

By what methods could the Reich introduce additional armed forces into the demilitarized zone?

The German government, if it wishes to respect the agreements concluded, can await the event of disturbances in the zone before introducing reinforcements of the police or Reichswehr units under the conditions provided for by the said agreements.

It can also act clandestinely by reinforcing its police force in the large centres.

Finally he can, one day, openly resume, of his own free will, his entire freedom of action and introduce into the zone new armed, police or Reichswehr forces to the extent corresponding to his designs.

The introduction, even temporarily, of additional armed forces into the demilitarized zone would entail certain dangers for our security.

a. In the first case: disturbances in the area; the state of siege being declared, the zone would pass under the orders of the military authority. The latter could thus, openly, take on the spot a whole series of measures falling within the “material mobilization facilities”, measures which are formally prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles and which can only be taken, in normal times, clandestinely.

On the other hand, one can be certain that the Reich would subsequently employ all possible means to maintain in the demilitarized zone the additional forces which would have entered it. It suffices, to be convinced of this, to recall the precedent of the Ruhr (April 1920). Under the pretext of repressing communist troubles in this region, and although it had already been exceptionally authorized to leave 17,000 soldiers there for the maintenance of order, the German government introduced there, in spite of the allies, new troops of the Reichswehr. After a very rapid repression, he claimed to maintain these reinforcements in the Ruhr. To compel him to withdraw them, it took the seizure by the allies of new territorial pledges and their unanimous agreement at the conference of San Remo.

We can be sure that at the present time the German government would demand the maintenance of such reinforcements with much more energy and tenacity than at a time when the allies occupied the whole left bank of the Rhine.

b. In the event of a clandestine reinforcement of the police in the large centres, the determination of the numbers thus introduced will be practically very difficult, if not impossible.

c. Finally, in the event that the Reich resumed its full and entire freedom of action, and openly introduced units of the Reichswehr into the zone, the dangers previously reported would have a character of much more immediate and marked seriousness, even if this reinforcement had to be done in the form of weak garrisons far from each other (battalion, battery, isolated squadron), so as not to constitute a "gathering" nor a threat of "aggression".

What would be, in the various eventualities envisaged, our possibilities of making the Reich respect the demilitarized character of the Rhine region?

Whether it is the introduction of unauthorized forces into certain areas of the zone, the maintenance of additional forces beyond the expected time limits, or the general re-establishment of Reichswehr garrisons throughout the zone, recourse to the Council of the League of Nations seems to be the obligatory preliminary procedure for enforcing the treaties and agreements in force, if however these facts are not considered as an "unprovoked act of aggression", making it possible to bring into play the "legitimate defence" provided for in article 2 of the Locarno agreements.

This procedure can only be long and delicate. It will likely raise the issue of equal rights again.

During the negotiations, and whatever their subsequent outcome, the dangers mentioned above will remain and are likely to aggravate the situation.

Under these conditions, what could our attitude be? Would this attitude be different depending on whether it was a question of the introduction into the demilitarized zone of elements from Schupo or, on the contrary, from the Reichswehr? And according to whether the arrival of these elements would be consecutive to disorders or that it would be the fact of a clandestine reinforcement, or finally that it would be the result of a premeditated decision of Reich to take again its complete freedom? What military repercussions would the events referred to above be likely to have in the various cases?

Because of the importance of the problems which may thus arise, perhaps quickly, I have the honor to ask you to kindly let me know your point of view in the event that events of this order should occur, in order to allow me to study the possible repercussions that their solution could cause in the military field.

M. HERRIOT, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
TO M. PAUL-BONCOUR, MINISTER OF WAR.

D. No. 1142. Paris, August 24, 1932.

You were good enough, by letter of August 13 (No. 1100 SAE 2/11), to draw my attention to the offenses that the German government could be led to commit against the provisions of the articles of the Treaty of Versailles which set the status of the demilitarized zone, and you have expressed the desire to know my point of view on the military repercussions which these events might entail.

In particular, you have considered the following possibilities:

1° Introduction of reinforcements of police intended to repress disturbances in the Rhineland. Maintaining these police forces in the Rhineland beyond the time necessary to carry out their mission.

2. Clandestine reinforcement of the police in the large centres.

3. Cantonment of units of the Reichswehr in the form of weak garrisons far from each other, so as not to constitute either assembly or “threat of aggression”.

4. The Reich regains its full and entire freedom of action in the Rhineland.

As soon as the hypothesis of "unprovoked acts of aggression" or gatherings of armed forces is ruled out, a hypothesis in which we can exercise our right of self-defence under the terms of Article 2 of the Treaty of Locarno, it should be noted that any breach by Germany of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles may be subject to protest to the Reich government. Difficulties arising in this regard may be brought before the Franco-German conciliation commission, as provided for in the Hague agreement of August 30, 1929. This procedure is not, however, compulsory and the French government may, in any case cause, refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, which is expressly recognized in the aforementioned agreement, in accordance with Article 4 of the Locarno Agreements.

As for the specific questions you have raised, they call for the following reflections:

1. The introduction of police reinforcements into the Rhineland was regulated by an exchange of letters of January 18th and 19th, 1930, between the German Embassy in Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors. The temporary dispatch of police reinforcements must be immediately notified through the diplomatic channel to the governments concerned, if it results in an overrun of at least two hundred men of the maximum manpower provided for the police for the whole of the demilitarized zone. . The withdrawal of these reinforcements must also be brought to the attention of the Governments concerned without delay.

This modus vivendi left open the legal question of the interpretation of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles: do the German police forces constitute “armed forces” within the meaning of this article or not? The question remained open.

The maintenance of these forces in the Rhine area, if prolonged beyond the time necessary for the execution of their mission, would therefore constitute, in our view, an infringement of the Treaty.

2. Clandestine reinforcement of the police in the large centres. This question raises the same observations as No. 1.

3. Cantonment of units of the Reichswehr in the demilitarized zone, but in such a way as to constitute neither "assembly" nor "threat of aggression".

If it is true, as your dispatch shows, that in its letter of November 8, 1929, the Conference of Ambassadors admitted that units of the Reichswehr could, under certain conditions, enter the demilitarized zone, it the fact remains that the "maintenance"... "on a permanent basis" of such units in the Rhineland would constitute a marked and undeniable breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

4. With all the more reason it would be the same if the Reich resumed in the demilitarized zone its full and entire freedom of action from the military point of view.

As regards the procedure to be followed, it would depend, in each specific case, on the nature and gravity of the infringement. Before any action, the question would arise whether it would not be appropriate to consult beforehand with the other signatory powers of the Rhine pact.

As for the repercussions of a military order which the measures taken by the Reich should have for France, only the government would have the capacity to decide according to the circumstances.

It goes without saying that, in the mind of my Department, the French Government, attentive to the objections as well as to the rights which derive for it from the Covenant of the League of Nations, cannot envisage that a violation of the treaties does not entail first, on our part, immediate recourse to the peaceful procedures provided for, until the resources provided by them have been exhausted.

As for the main question ITT, I do believe it's unlikely that the Soviet Union in the absence of WWII could eventually rule Europe.

 

[Garrison]

Overall a Germany that was prepared to play along with the efforts to revive the European economy in the latter half of the 1930s and that kept its military spending to a more sensible level it would be possible for it to rebuild to a pretty decent military and economic position by the late 1940s and the wariness of the British establishment about Communism might well make some sort of anti-communist military pact possible. So no, preventing WWII does not strengthen the position of the USSR, indeed without the transfer of resources and technology it received during the war the USSR might actually be weaker.

 

[David T]

Actually, while I do agree that the remilitarization of the Rhineland is unlikely to cause a war with France, the method you said that Hitler could've used (declaring the Landespolizei in the Rhineland part of the Wehrmacht) for the remilitarization of the Rhineland would still be just as risky as marching troops into the Rhineland.

1932 was a long way from 1936.

 

[Ambusher11]

1932 was a long way from 1936.

Yes, but you said that there would be virtually no risk (as opposed to the minimal risk you said Hitler faced when he sent troops to the Rhineland) of a war with France if the Landespolizei in the Rhineland were incorporated into the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht instead, to which I pointed out that the French had been considering the multiple possible ways that the Germans could use to remilitarize the Rhineland (either secretly or openly). If the French were willing to use military force against Germany to reverse the remilitarization in the first place (and yes, I'm well aware of the reasons why France didn't do so OTL), I don't think they would've considered it a less major breach of Versailles and Locarno and acted any differently if it was just "merely" the Landespolizei in the Rhineland being incorporated into the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht instead of a couple thousand troops being sent to the Rhineland.

 

[AltoRegnant]

To be honest, I see a Russian-German war as inevitable in this period. Russia would naturally want to rebuild its empire, and as teeth get cut and the industry grows (which I see no reason why it wouldn't continue to in absence of a war,) its power becomes a threat to germany, especially after 1941. And wouldn't you know it, both of them have claims in poland. Stalin might not be as radical an expansionist as hitler, but if given a chance or a reason beyond "we used to own it" he would take it. Which, germany, as a moderate/conservative state now on the border of an opportunistic communist power, cannot abide.

The question is: how does that war go? I don't know enough to really comment. If russia wins, they're definitely in a great position in europe

 

[Teutoberg Forest]

In this scenario the Soviets could rule over Europe economically, assuming they are able to grow their economy like they did after WWII without having most of it destroyed beforehand. If the standard of living for the average Soviet citizen were to overtake that of the Western European powers, countries like France or Germany with historically strong Communist parties could end up shifting away from capitalism and towards communism. The Soviets would never be able to take over all of Europe by military force, but a well-run state with the resources of a full continent (especially if the Sino-Soviet split is avoided) could play detente enough with the capitalist powers to foster an economic dependence on said resources, and history has shown that France and Germany won't hesitate to jump into bed with a friendly Russia for cheap gas.

TLDR: The Russians could rule over Europe in the same way the US did OTL, by the power of a vastly larger economy and with the help of intelligence plots like Operation Gladio

 

[thenextgui]

Dominance are not about your strength but others weaknesses. If the Weimar Republic had survived , Germany would have served as a counter to USSR while Western Europe had weaken in the late half of the 20th century [1].

[1] which was unavoidable as the de colonial inaction would happen and it would have economic consequences for the colonial powers.

Historically the Weimar Republic actually had good relations with the USSR.

 

[Moby Dick]

Historically the Weimar Republic actually had good relations with the USSR.

But only because both were revisionist powers.

 

[kham_coc]

But only because both were revisionist powers.

Both of whoms revisionism wasn't mutually contradictory. Ideology mandated the eastern front. Absent that, the Russians didn't want Poland back, and Germany didn't care about anything else. A MR pact would have been perfectly stable (absent ideology).

 

[Sam R.]

I’d ask Spanish independent communists, syndicalists and the finally republicans about help.

 

[skarosianlifeform]

Probably not.
Stalin was very cautious about avoiding direct conflict with capitalist great powers, and feared a wide anti-Soviet coalition. So he would never engage in an invasion of Europe, or even in a war against Poland / Finland / Romania if those countries are backed by undistracted Western Europeans.

Once Stalin dies, nukes will likely be there, which also precludes a war if conquest.

 

[Cymraeg]

Without WW2 who develops nuclear weapons first could be the Soviet Union

God, no. The early theoretical work was done mostly in the UK by a UK-Canadian team in the early days of the War (the Tube Alloys project). Without the war itself and the motivation and funding that came from the British Government (Churchill took a close interest in this) then Tube Alloys will be very different and perhaps would not even have existed. In Germany the leading theoretical expert was Heisenberg and there's still a great deal of debate over whether or not he deliberately screwed up his calculations over how much pure U-235 was needed to make a working nuclear weapon.
No war means the work is purely theoretical, not really state-funded, the USSR never gets to hear about it, the security-compromised Manhattan Project never happens, everything is different.

 

[Thoresby]

Highly unlikely but I voted for the last option because post 1921 (and the creation of the Soviet Union) the geopolitical map of Europe is fundamentally unstable and while the precise OTL Second World War was totally contingent on a series of relatively low probability events some sort of second war is quite likely imho and the Soviet Union is well placed to benefit from that. If the scenario is "No WWII, instead continued peace in Central Europe" then there is zero chance that the Soviet Union be in a position to rule over Europe.