WI Wallies Stalingrad

[elkarlo]

Ok, so we've had discussions here like what if the Germans had garrisoned the Pacific islands during the Pacific war?
Well instead of having the Wallies in Stalingrad, let's change the scenario a bit. Let's say Stalin begs and threatens the Wallies that unless they open a main theater in France/Lowlands in 42.
So the Wallies land, find success in Normandy, take Paris, and push towards Germany. But like in 44, the Wallies get a surprises in winter. The Axis had little in France in summer 42 when the landings occurred. So they ended up scrapping Case Blue, falling back to defensive lines in the East. Send forces tot he West, and slowly slow the Wallies down.
Until that Winter, the US forces don't fight a decisive battle, and don't absorb any counter attacks of note. So they are still un Kasserine passed. When the Axis counter attack occurs, the Wallies are overstretched supply and support wise. They are also disorganized.
What ends up, is that 250k Allied soldiers are pocketed in and Paris, for arguments sake. The lead up doesn't matter as much, as I want to talk about how and if the Wallies in 42/43 could support this. In the pocket are a lot of tired and hungry troops, with low supplies, and little ammo, and little gas for their armor. They do have several airfields in the pocket.
The first week or so, the Parisgrad pocket is only 10 miles behind Axis lines.

Paris is largely evacuated tot he same pop level as Stalingrad during the siege. Maybe 100K at most. Just don't want them to factor in airlift cap.
After 2 months Parisgrad is over 60 miles behind Axis lines. Relief attempts have failed, and have failed badly. The Wallied forces can't sustain an operation of that size until new troops and equipment are brought in
Wallied command decides to air lift as much as possible and hope that a spring offensive can relieve the trapped troops.

Could the Wallies sustain a pocket around 250K troops? Would their airfields in Normandy and maybe the UK be able to supply that many troops for 3-4 months until a relief attempt is possible?
How many planes could they use to lift? B-17s and other heavy and med bombers could also airlift.
Given similar air attrition rates as Stalingrad, or maybe even higher due to better Luftwaffe capabilities. Could the Wallies sustain airplane and pilot loses?

Also curious as to what the Wallies would do if put in this situation. Given that IOTL the Wallies were conservative and really only attacked when odds were heavily in their favor. Would they go for a Hail Mary relief attempt, or try and grind their way there?

 

[cladglas]

what did the allies have available for such an operation in summer of '42?

 

[alexmilman]

what did the allies have available for such an operation in summer of '42?

None?

 

[Look More Closely Later]

...So the Wallies land, find success in Normandy, take Paris, and ...

Umm, how do the British and Americans get as far as Paris in 1942?
From what I've read, they'll be lucky (no Mulberrys or built up amphibious fleet remember to help with logistics) if they manage to take Cherbourg with desperate and costly fighting and get pinned in in the Cotentin Peninsula.

 

[elkarlo]

Umm, how do the British and Americans get as far as Paris in 1942?
From what I've read, they'll be lucky (no Mulberrys or built up amphibious fleet remember to help with logistics) if they manage to take Cherbourg with desperate and costly fighting and get pinned in in the Cotentin Peninsula.

That's not the point. The point is giving the Wallies a Stalingrad like situation in late 42.

 

[cladglas]

not a stalingrad, but a 'dieppe' writ large.

 

[cladglas]

That's not the point. The point is giving the Wallies a Stalingrad like situation in late 42.

but, there should be some reasonable expectation that they could position themselves to get into that situation.

 

[cladglas]

None?

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/USA-E-XChannel-1.html

The British Joint Planners had come to the same conclusion as the U.S. War Department-that the approaching summer campaign of 1942 in Russia was likely to be critical and might require support by diversions in the west if Russia was to be kept in the war. On the other hand, the British were much more pessimistic about what could be done. The maximum feasible operation, they thought, would be a limited-objective attack-something like a large-scale raid-the main purpose of which would be to tempt the German Air Force into a battle of destruction with the Royal Air Force under conditions favorable to the latter.31 For that concept, Prime Minister Churchill coined the code name SLEDGEHAMMER, and the Combined Commanders were directed to study and report on it. They found at once that the name was far more aggressive than the plan could be. They faced a tactical paradox. They were asked to strike where RAF fighters could engage the Luftwaffe on favorable terms. There was only one such area, since effective fighter cover from British bases extended at that time only over the beaches between Dunkerque and the Somme. This area, called

the Pas-de-Calais,32 had the strongest German defenses of any portion of the French coast. It also had flat beaches unsuitable for British landing craft. The beaches furthermore had too few exits to pass the required number of vehicles inland to maintain the forces landed. Finally the ports in the area were too small to supply a force large enough to hold a bridgehead against the probable scale of German counterattack. In short, the one area where the RAF could supply fighter support and achieve the main purpose of defeating the Luftwaffe was precisely the one area which, from every other point of view, was unsuitable for assault.33
The problem seemed insoluble and the planners first concluded that no cross-Channel operation was possible in 1942 unless the Germans showed signs of collapse. This conclusion, however, was modified by a second report submitted by the Combined Commanders early in April. Assuming then that they might disregard requirements for the security of the British Isles and that "the maintenance problem"34 could be "successfully overcome," they calculated that an invasion of the Pas-de-Calais could be carried out. But, they added, if the Germans countered in force, the beachhead probably could not be held and, if lost, it was doubtful whether the bulk of the men and equipment could be evacuated. The British Chiefs of Staff did not wholly endorse this analysis, but they did tacitly accept the conclusion that establishment of a permanent bridgehead on the Continent would probably be impossible in 1942.35

 

[Look More Closely Later]

That's not the point. The point is giving the Wallies a Stalingrad like situation in late 42.

Probably need to look at where the western allies were then, in the original timeline in late 1942, and see if you can find something that might happen in Northwest Africa.

Edit:
Don't know if that will get you close to what you seem to be looking for, mind you.

Further Edit:
If you're not too picky about who it's against, it might be able to come up with something in the far east, with the Allies versus the Imperial Japanese at Singapore which drags on and on...

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/USA-E-XChannel-1.html

The British Joint Planners had come to the same conclusion as the U.S. War Department-that the approaching summer campaign of 1942 in Russia was likely to be critical and might require support by diversions in the west if Russia was to be kept in the war. ...

..." they calculated that an invasion of the Pas-de-Calais could be carried out. But, they added, if the Germans countered in force, the beachhead probably could not be held and, if lost, it was doubtful whether the bulk of the men and equipment could be evacuated. The British Chiefs of Staff did not wholly endorse this analysis, but they did tacitly accept the conclusion that establishment of a permanent bridgehead on the Continent would probably be impossible in 1942.35

Oddly enough the best developed Brit plan I've seen from 1942 proposed a landing on the east coast of the Cotientin, near the village of Madeline. What we know of as UTAH Beach. The plan proposed landing there, setting a blocking force to the south & then attacking north to secure the port of Cherbourg. In about a month the lodgment would be built up to eleven infantry and armored divisions, mostly British. The description of this plan did not extend beyond this lodgment in the Cotientin.

Search for Michael Giumarras essay on Op Sledgehammer in PDF format

'D-Day 1942, D-Day 1944: A Comparative Analysis of Operations SLEDGEHAMMER and OVERLORD'

 

[Raferty]

A Stalingrad situation, for the Western Allies, is impossible in 1942 in that they didn't have the manpower in the field to replicate the situation you are discussing. The Battle of Stalingrad saw at the time of the decisive counterattack over a million men on each side. The Soviets lost 1 million men in the span of a little over 4-5 months. The quantities of resources were needed for such a thing were not available for the Western Allies until 1944.

Now, if you are talking about a second front in France in 1942, well, it would be difficult. The US Army, which provided the kind of logistical and manpower resources needed to open up that front, was neither doctrinally or operationally ready for combat on the mainland of Europe. Keep in mind that the US Army in 1941 was smaller than I believe Bulgaria's. Despite the Europe first guarantee of Roosevelt, the first National Guard division mobilized for combat (and done so haphazardly and inadequately, it must be mentioned) was sent to New Guinea.

The Germans had around 25-30 divisions in Western Europe during this period, and would outnumber the Allies. As to the quality of these units, I'm not exactly sure, but there was an armoured reserve, and I think the Allies would find their beachhead penetrated and the invading force either destroyed outright or forced into a hasty evacuation.

 

[Agra]

Maybe instead of a WAllies Stalingrad, a WAllies El Alamein.

 

[Saint_007]

Maybe instead of a WAllies Stalingrad, a WAllies El Alamein.

Which runs into the problem that the only Axis forces at El-Alamein was Rommel's Afrika Korps and whatever auxiliaries he could scrounge up. He was low on supplies and fuel, far from any friendly base, and he was sorely overextended. Montegomery just dug in and let Rommel come to him, winding up attritioning Rommel enough to force him to leave - not that it took much. And the British forces had much closer, well-stocked supply bases.

Plus, Rommel was never really one for grinding assaults. The D-Day Normandy beaches defense was him working with what he had.

EDIT: Okay, so I remember that was the second Battle of El-Alamein. Still doesn't remove the fact that the Italian command was incompetent and their troops undertrained and underequipped (so they're not exactly going to pull a massive assault successfully - they couldn't manage one the first time around), and Rommel's forces were working on half a shoestring budget, so they don't exactly have men to spare.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Maybe instead of a WAllies Stalingrad, a WAllies El Alamein.

Which runs into the problem that the only Axis forces at El-Alamein was Rommel's Afrika Korps and whatever auxiliaries he could scrounge up. He was low on supplies and fuel, far from any friendly base, and he was sorely overextended. Montegomery just dug in and let Rommel come to him, winding up attritioning Rommel enough to force him to leave - not that it took much. And the British forces had much closer, well-stocked supply bases.

Plus, Rommel was never really one for grinding assaults. The D-Day Normandy beaches defense was him working with what he had.

EDIT: Okay, so I remember that was the second Battle of El-Alamein. Still doesn't remove the fact that the Italian command was incompetent and their troops undertrained and underequipped (so they're not exactly going to pull a massive assault successfully - they couldn't manage one the first time around), and Rommel's forces were working on half a shoestring budget, so they don't exactly have men to spare.

Hm... If you're just looking for a trapped urban force with the basic structure and timing, rather than scale, of Stalingrad might it be possible (Albeit unlikely) to get a miniaturized version in day Cairo following a more successful Italian offensive? Say the British get driven back from the coast, the civilians have been evacuated down the Nile, they're trying to hold the city to keep the Italians tied down and away from Suez or putting enough pressure on Sudan to disrupt the pacifying of East Africa, ect?

 

[Asp]

That's not the point. The point is giving the Wallies a Stalingrad like situation in late 42.

This scenario is impossible. The one thing that OTL decisively proves in between the Dieppe Raid, Operation Torch, and Kasserine Pass is that the WAllies were not capable of landing France in 1942. They wouldn’t even have managed to get a pocket along the coast.

 

[bernardz]

Until the uboats were defeated in 1943, an invasion in France is not possible.

 

[Saint_007]

There's only a couple of real point where a potential urban meatgrinder would occur for the WAllies, but by then you'd be past Stalingrad. By then, the Axis manpower and initiative was on a definite decline, and the massive battles of Stalingrad and Kursk would not be repeated, not without Germany spontaneously collapsing.

The first is Cherbourg, or basically the first few days after the success of D-Day, where the Allies have a beachhead but need to work their way inland.

The second is the final Allied assault on Tunisia, assuming Hitler manages to get Rommel his supplies a little earlier and in more abundance. The problem there would lie that the Axis lines of supply were shit; the Med by that point would basically be a British pool, as the Italians prove all but useless against the RN, and the German submarines completely impractical for the job of carrying supplies.

Until the uboats were defeated in 1943, an invasion in France is not possible.

Well, partly, yes, but it took the Dieppe Raid for the WAllies to understand that amphibious assaults are massive investments and tricky to do logistics-wise. I doubt they had the capacity until 1944 to do it properly.

 

[Lusitania]

In addition to lack of U-boats the German Air Force by 1944 had been forvmodt part destroyed and what units it had were few and far apart. In 1942 during Dieppe the German airforce was a force to be reckoned with and its strength was a factor in the failure of Dieppe.

 

[GDIS Pathe]

Hm... If you're just looking for a trapped urban force with the basic structure and timing, rather than scale, of Stalingrad might it be possible (Albeit unlikely) to get a miniaturized version in day Cairo following a more successful Italian offensive? Say the British get driven back from the coast, the civilians have been evacuated down the Nile, they're trying to hold the city to keep the Italians tied down and away from Suez or putting enough pressure on Sudan to disrupt the pacifying of East Africa, ect?

Than that’s less than 40,000 men making a stand not Stalingrad

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Than that’s less than 40,000 men making a stand not Stalingrad

I fully agree it's pathetically tiny compared to Stalingrad, but it's also the only scenario I can think of for the WAllies where a city under seige behind enemy lines is possible. Singapore can't work due to the issue ofg geography preventing the existence of the resupply airfields, and no other real urban centers were under threat post FOF