WI: Valens and the Romans win at Adrianople?

[Tom Colton]

The forces at Adrianople were apparently more or less equal, the battle was mostly decided by infantry action, and the PoD is as simple as preventing the reckless Roman charge that ruined everything.

Despite how even the setup was, the results were so disastrous for the Roman Empire, given how many senior commanders died, that Adrianople has frequently been cited as the beginning of the end of the WRE, especially in making Rome resort to recuriting foederati. Not even Theodosius could save it for long enough to prevent Arcadius and Honorius from ruining the joint, after all. Valens surviving would also have major implications on Roman religious doctrine, given that he nominally was an Arian Christian, and it took Theodosius to entrench Nicene Christinaity as the state religion.

So, assuming the Roman win a decisive victory at Adrianople, what other consequences would there be? How much longer could the WRE survive with a PoD as late as 378 AD?

 

[Avrorrange]

The real beginning of the end for the WRE was the Battle of Frigidus River,not Adrianople.Andrianople didn't sap the manpower of the WRE.Most of the Roman troops that participated the battle was part of the Eastern Army,not the Western one.In fact,a few months later,the Western Army actually arrived and helped suppress the Goths.What really was the problem was that for barbarian groups were now able to settle into the empire with few supervision under their own chiefs and kings.This is the most problematic part as it allowed independent polities to remain and try to conquer Roman lands whenever the empire shows weakness.It also meant that the empire couldn't assimilate the tribesmen and have them become loyal citizens given they couldn't be dispersed into smaller groups.The Battle of the Frigidus River was the battle that really sapped the manpower of the WRE as it is the battle where the Western army was practically wiped out.I have read claims however that said the Eastern Army never became as powerful it was qualitatively after the battle.It said that because of the amount of troops killed in battle,a lot of training practices and recruiting requirements were abandoned in order to re-train an army as soon as possible.Personally,I'm extremely skeptic about the claim.Assuming the entire army was indeed annihilated,that constituted only around 10-15% of the entire Eastern Army only,less than 10% of the entire Roman Army.

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

I would disagree with the above statement. Adrianople was decisive; perhaps not on manpower grounds but almost certainly on moral grounds and on Rome's ability to stop barbarian settlers. The situation by 375 BC was much more stable than the 3rd century crisis-the empire was more united, coinage wasn't being devalued like mad, barbarian raids were less frequent. Both Gratian (west) and Valens were competent and broadly worked together. There is absolutely no reason why the empire should have fallen-no inevitable decline nor noticeable decline in troop quality.
After Adrianople however, we do see a clear downward trajectory. It really was a turning point, if only symbolically. There are many reasons for this; field army sizes had already massively shrunk by this period (WRE barely cobbled together 10-15,000 men to help Valens) largley due to financial but also reasons of maneuverability.
If the large roman armies of the republic were comparable to conscript armies of America in WW2 as they fought other massive armies, then 4th century Roman forces were today's US military with it's counter terror approach-designed to meet the smaller but faster raiding forces of the Goths or steppe nomads.
Problem is however, these armies really did have to keep winning, and they couldn't cover every front. Once one force gets through the net, the entire defense setup falters. That was Adranople; while the east was more able to recoup losses, the poor west now a very large and increasingly sophisticated force behind it's lines. It was now easier to raid roman lands, harder to get rid of due to smaller roman army sizes, so the obvious solution was to pay them off with land and gold. Needless to say, this last strategy was what killed the western empire, as all it' most valuable land (and tax revenues) was lost to barbarian settlers, who would raid more land, forcing Rome (with less forces to beat them off militarily) to pay them off with more land. And so the fatal cycle continued.
The loss of manpower at Frigidaus was serious, but it was a mere symptom of the then wider problem that followed Adrianople-notice how at Frigidaus a large percentage of the army was already Gothic mercenaries/levies, who post battle demanded more land and rampaged around Italy to get it-and nobody had the forces to stop them.

TLDR Prior to Adrianople both ERE and WRE had a broadly coordinated front and a clear strategic setup. Adrianople, and the settlement of barbarian forces within imperial borders, utterly undermined this grand strategic plan. The more populous East could recoup losses, and could force Goths to go west so it was no longer there problem. The West could not do the opposite. Really, Adrianople was the end of the united Roman empire-Theodosius reunification in 395 could not fix this increasing disunity and differing strategic visions.

 

[Avrorrange]

What's your evidence for the destructiveness of the Frigidus (and by 'evidence' I mean either a reliably primary source, of which there aren't too many on that battle, or a carefully argued modern study)? Certainly I remember no such claims from Alan Cameron's chapter on the battle, though his focus is more on deconstructing the religious rhetoric of later sources than it really is on the military aspects, I'll admit. The great long-term problem of Adrianople, as I have always understood it, is less the destruction of the East Roman field army, as devastating as that was (usually figured at about a third of the force, not the 10-15% you state, though perhaps that is meant to include static garrisons?), but the fact that the Tervingi and Greuthungi were left to roam about unchecked, and eventually allowed to develop a quasi-autonomous existence (as 'Goths') within the Empire.

About 10-15% of the army,it's widely known that the Diocletian expanded the Roman army from 400,000 to 450,000.The Western army probably wouldn't be able to maintain 200,000,but the eastern one mostly likely can.And why are you asking me evidence of the destructiveness of the Battle of the Frigidus River?I don't remember the name of every book I've read.

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

What's your evidence for the destructiveness of the Frigidus (and by 'evidence' I mean either a reliably primary source, of which there aren't too many on that battle, or a carefully argued modern study)? Certainly I remember no such claims from Alan Cameron's chapter on the battle, though his focus is more on deconstructing the religious rhetoric of later sources than it really is on the military aspects, I'll admit. The great long-term problem of Adrianople, as I have always understood it, is less the destruction of the East Roman field army, as devastating as that was (usually figured at about a third of the force, not the 10-15% you state, though perhaps that is meant to include static garrisons?), but the fact that the Tervingi and Greuthungi were left to roam about unchecked, and eventually allowed to develop a quasi-autonomous existence (as 'Goths') within the Empire.

Exactly. If anything, Frigidaus was a good thing the empire, as it temporarily restored a united front against further barbarian expansion. The west by itself simply lacked manpower to stop the goths (and later Vandals, franks and Suaves) once they settled within their borders.

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

About 10-15% of the army,it's widely known that the Diocletian expanded the Roman army from 400,000 to 450,000.The Western army probably wouldn't be able to maintain 200,000,but the eastern one mostly likely can.And why are you asking me evidence of the destructiveness of the Battle of the Frigidus River?I don't remember the name of every book I've read.

He asks because He (and I) have never ever heard Fridaus river of all battles given as the turning point. Many of the losses were Gothic mercenaries anyway.
If you want to give an alternative turning point to Adrianople, than Stilicho's execution and Romes sacking would be it (though even Stilicho lacked the manpower to wipe out Aleric's Goths decisively.)

 

[Avrorrange]

Exactly. If anything, Frigidaus was a good thing the empire, as it temporarily restored a united front against further barbarian expansion. The west by itself simply lacked manpower to stop the goths (and later Vandals, franks and Suaves) once they settled within their borders.

Hardly.Theodosius only ruled the full empire for less than three years.After he died,the relationship between the two halves of the empire broke down rapidly.Stilicho almost went to war with the Eastern Empire a couple of times trying to get the entirety of Illyricum in order to get more manpower.The Battle of Frigidus River meant that the army Stilicho had was constantly understaffed and he couldn't win the decisive victories required.

He asks because He (and I) have never ever heard Fridaus river of all battles given as the turning point. Many of the losses were Gothic mercenaries anyway.
If you want to give an alternative turning point to Adrianople, than Stilicho's execution and Romes sacking would be it (though even Stilicho lacked the manpower to wipe out Aleric's Goths decisively.)

Most of the Gothic casualties were the ones on the Eastern side.Theodosius was the one who employed the Goths.Most of the western casualties were part of the regular Roman army.

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

Hardly.Theodosius only ruled the full empire for less than three years.After he died,the relationship between the two halves of the empire broke down rapidly.Stilicho almost went to war with the Eastern Empire a couple of times trying to get the entirety of Illyricum in order to get more manpower.The Battle of Frigidus River meant that the army Stilicho had was constantly understaffed and he couldn't win the decisive victories required.


Most of the Gothic casualties were the ones on the Eastern side.Most of the western casualties were part of the regular Roman army.

That's actually the point I was making actually. Frigidaus was only bad because of Theodosious death and division soon after. I would argue that the reason relations broke down so quickly was in a large part down to the loss of strategic vision due to Adrianople, with the East letting the West soak up most the invasions.
Also, arguing that Frigdaus was the reason Stilicho lacked manpower (while a factor) is taking it to far. WRE manpower was in decline long since Constantine's day, with Gratians field army only 15,000. Again, this and other garrisons could hold the frontier (so long as all other fronts were covered) but once the Tervingi and friends were inside the empire this manpower was woefully inadequate.

 

[Avrorrange]

Again, such debates are positively useless without sources--and without citation of studies from those who do know them. There is no scholarly consensus on what exactly even happened politically at the Frigidus, let alone on what caused the collapse of the Western Empire. What's the point of making assertions back and forth in ignorance?

And point still stands: we need to look at more than just raw military numbers (which represent speculation piled on speculation). We also need to look at things like morale and especially the long-term political implications of the Roman defeat at Adrianople, which might have been confirmed by the battle at the Frigidus (though why Stilicho could not raise more men over the course of the next decade-and-a-half I don't know, so I very much doubt that claim), but hardly began with it.

The argument that the Battle of Frigidus River did lasting damage to the Western Roman Empire was The Late Roman Army by Pat Southern and Karen Ramsay Dixon.The authors argued that Frigidus was the equivalent of Adrianople for the Western Empire except the damage was far more lethal given the Western Empire's weaker.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

I see Adrianople not as a turning point in and of itself, but disastrous because it brought Theodosius to power. Avoid that, and you avoid the two disastrous losses the Western Roman Empire suffered at the hands of Theodosius in two civil wars, which decimated their armies. That's what allowed the incredibly unlucky chain of events that led to the west's collapse in the 5th century to even be possible.

EDIT: Also, as for evidence, here's an excerpt from Ian Hughes's book on Stilicho about those 2 civil wars:

"Both sides had heavy losses, but for the west it was a disaster. It is likely that the losses suffered during the three battles of Siscia, Poetovio and Frigidus were greater than those suffered by the Eastern Empire at Adrianople. The need to rebuild the army in the following years would prove to be too great a strain for the Western Empire to bear." (pg. 26, Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome)

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

I see Adrianople not as a turning point in and of itself, but disastrous because it brought Theodosius to power. Avoid that, and you avoid the two disastrous losses the Western Roman Empire suffered at the hands of Theodosius in two civil wars, which decimated their armies. That's what allowed the incredibly unlucky chain of events that led to the west's collapse in the 5th century to even be possible.

EDIT: Also, as for evidence, here's an excerpt from Ian Hughes's book on Stilicho about those 2 civil wars:

"Both sides had heavy losses, but for the west it was a disaster. It is likely that the losses suffered during the three battles of Siscia, Poetovio and Frigidus were greater than those suffered by the Eastern Empire at Adrianople. The need to rebuild the army in the following years would prove to be too great a strain for the Western Empire to bear." (pg. 26, Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome)

That is a very good argument Desertfox, and you're right to point out just how unlucky the WRE was to have such a spectacularly bad chain of events. The Wests fall was not inevitable in the 5th century. HOWEVER..

I really do think that Adrianople was the turning point, for the reasons i've listed extensively above. Even before the losses suffered in the civil wars, the West's army were till relatively small. Once a large barbarian force was settled and entrenched within and behind imperial defensive line, it would have been difficult for the wests army to decisively defeat even at full strength. Both Roman and Gothic armies were around the same size, which in the past wouldn't have mattered for the disciplined Romans except that by any losses incurred in defeating this force would be horrific and irreplaceable. Thus, Barbarian armies were now an infestation that could not be purged, and combined with sudden increased pressure from Vandals on Rhine and Franks the pressure was just too much.

 

[Avrorrange]

That is a very good argument Desertfox, and you're right to point out just how unlucky the WRE was to have such a spectacularly bad chain of events. The Wests fall was not inevitable in the 5th century. HOWEVER..

I really do think that Adrianople was the turning point, for the reasons i've listed extensively above. Even before the losses suffered in the civil wars, the West's army were till relatively small. Once a large barbarian force was settled and entrenched within and behind imperial defensive line, it would have been difficult for the wests army to decisively defeat even at full strength. Both Roman and Gothic armies were around the same size, which in the past wouldn't have mattered for the disciplined Romans except that by any losses incurred in defeating this force would be horrific and irreplaceable. Thus, Barbarian armies were now an infestation that could not be purged, and combined with sudden increased pressure from Vandals on Rhine and Franks the pressure was just too much.

I don't see how the army lost at Frigidus was extremely small.The Visigothic army at the battle alone numbered 20,000.The Western Roman army was able to fight the combined Visigothic army and the Eastern Roman army to a standstill for a quite a while,and perhaps even won if not for bad luck,this means that the army which fought a Frigidus must have been fairly large. If such an army wasn't lost,the Romans most likely wouldn't have as much trouble handling the barbarians.By all means until Stilicho was killed and the Germanic elements of the army defected over to Alaric,the Romans were able to defeat Alaric a good number of times,probably even destroy him for good if Stilicho's relationship with the ERE wasn't as toxic.At one point in time Stilicho was on the verge of eradicating the Visigoths but was stopped by the ERE.Importantly,the WRE only really started losing lands after 406.If such a large Roman army wasn't lost,most likely the West Romans can destroy the Visigoths on their own.

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

My argument rests largely on my reading from Peter Heather, one of the main historians on this period (with his book literally focusing on the hundred years between Adrianople and the deposition of Augusteles.) He makes it very clear why Adrianople was decisive. You are utterly right that short term the effects of Adrianople were not that major, armies were still raised, losses replaced.
But the main effect of Adrianople is that NEVER before had such a large amount of armed, organised and worst of all semi-autonomous group of barbarians (i'll use that name as nothing better comes to mind) settled within imperial borders. If barbarians were allowed to settle, it was after being defeated and disunited. The Tevingi Goths and allies really did change the political landscape, and it was their first stepping stone to power as they became larger and made increasingly larger parts of imperial armies. Theodosius was able to halt the Goths after Adrianople; but he could not destroy them. Worst, they became a political too of the east (can't beat them, use them) against the west. Hence why Stilcho could not score a knock out even when e assembled a pretty major western army.
And of course, in being forced to assemble everything to face these increasingly large and organised Goths, Stilicho left the Rhine, Gaul and Spain ultimatly exposed to the sudden influx of Vandals. And I think we can both agree that the Vandals were the most damaging group to the West and responsible more than any other group for destroying the west.
So, short term Adrianople has been overblown. Short term, yes, Frigidaus was probably much more damaging in terms of manpower. But long term, Adrianople is a stepping stone to the increasing political and military power of various Barbarian groups, and the undermining of the Wests ability to protect all it's borders.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

That is a very good argument Desertfox, and you're right to point out just how unlucky the WRE was to have such a spectacularly bad chain of events. The Wests fall was not inevitable in the 5th century. HOWEVER..

I really do think that Adrianople was the turning point, for the reasons i've listed extensively above. Even before the losses suffered in the civil wars, the West's army were till relatively small. Once a large barbarian force was settled and entrenched within and behind imperial defensive line, it would have been difficult for the wests army to decisively defeat even at full strength. Both Roman and Gothic armies were around the same size, which in the past wouldn't have mattered for the disciplined Romans except that by any losses incurred in defeating this force would be horrific and irreplaceable. Thus, Barbarian armies were now an infestation that could not be purged, and combined with sudden increased pressure from Vandals on Rhine and Franks the pressure was just too much.

You're not wrong. But the weakening of the western roman army was crucial in the years prior to the 5th century. To highlight this, the Eastern Roman Army was not adverse to seeking decisive battle prior to Adrianople. After Adrianople however, Theodosius began a campaign of containment, unable to bring the Goths completely to heel and unwilling to risk forces in any decisive battle that he would likely come out on top of. This was due to immediate manpower concerns following the loss. You can see a similar development post-civil wars in the west. In the previous years, western roman leaders were perfectly willing to risk battle and incur losses. Julian, Valentinian, and Gratian all did so. Yet this changes decisively with Stilicho, who despite being in positions where he could potentially eliminate his enemy in one great battle, against Alaric in Greece (and again when Alaric invaded Italy), and against Radagaisus in northern Italy, instead chose to avoid battle whenever at all possible. This would suggest that the west dealt with the same manpower problems following the civil wars. In addition to this, Stilicho was required to strip forces from the Rhine frontier in order to beef up the central field army in Italy during and after Radagaisus's invasion. Finally, he had designs on the Prefecture of Illyricum prior to things unravelling in 406-the most important asset of the prefecture was its large pool of manpower and wealth.

My argument rests largely on my reading from Peter Heather, one of the main historians on this period (with his book literally focusing on the hundred years between Adrianople and the deposition of Augusteles.) He makes it very clear why Adrianople was decisive. You are utterly right that short term the effects of Adrianople were not that major, armies were still raised, losses replaced.
But the main effect of Adrianople is that NEVER before had such a large amount of armed, organised and worst of all semi-autonomous group of barbarians (i'll use that name as nothing better comes to mind) settled within imperial borders. If barbarians were allowed to settle, it was after being defeated and disunited. The Tevingi Goths and allies really did change the political landscape, and it was their first stepping stone to power as they became larger and made increasingly larger parts of imperial armies. Theodosius was able to halt the Goths after Adrianople; but he could not destroy them. Worst, they became a political too of the east (can't beat them, use them) against the west. Hence why Stilcho could not score a knock out even when e assembled a pretty major western army.
And of course, in being forced to assemble everything to face these increasingly large and organised Goths, Stilicho left the Rhine, Gaul and Spain ultimatly exposed to the sudden influx of Vandals. And I think we can both agree that the Vandals were the most damaging group to the West and responsible more than any other group for destroying the west.
So, short term Adrianople has been overblown. Short term, yes, Frigidaus was probably much more damaging in terms of manpower. But long term, Adrianople is a stepping stone to the increasing political and military power of various Barbarian groups, and the undermining of the Wests ability to protect all it's borders.

I too, am a big fan of Peter Heather, but I think we are, at the same time, understating the impact the civil wars had on the west's ability to deal with multiple crises all at once. Many of the forces defeated in the civil wars would have been from Gaul and Britain (at least, in Magnus Maximus's defeat), the areas that would be under the most strain in the early 5th century.

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

You're not wrong. But the weakening of the western roman army was crucial in the years prior to the 5th century. To highlight this, the Eastern Roman Army was not adverse to seeking decisive battle prior to Adrianople. After Adrianople however, Theodosius began a campaign of containment, unable to bring the Goths completely to heel and unwilling to risk forces in any decisive battle that he would likely come out on top of. This was due to immediate manpower concerns following the loss. You can see a similar development post-civil wars in the west. In the previous years, western roman leaders were perfectly willing to risk battle and incur losses. Julian, Valentinian, and Gratian all did so. Yet this changes decisively with Stilicho, who despite being in positions where he could potentially eliminate his enemy in one great battle, against Alaric in Greece (and again when Alaric invaded Italy), and against Radagaisus in northern Italy, instead chose to avoid battle whenever at all possible. This would suggest that the west dealt with the same manpower problems following the civil wars. In addition to this, Stilicho was required to strip forces from the Rhine frontier in order to beef up the central field army in Italy during and after Radagaisus's invasion. Finally, he had designs on the Prefecture of Illyricum prior to things unravelling in 406-the most important asset of the prefecture was its large pool of manpower and wealth.



I too, am a big fan of Peter Heather, but I think we are, at the same time, understating the impact the civil wars had on the west's ability to deal with multiple crises all at once. Many of the forces defeated in the civil wars would have been from Gaul and Britain (at least, in Maximus's defeat), the areas that would be under the most strain in the early 5th century.

Having read up on some Adrian goldsworthy, I too am rapidly coming to a similar conclusion actually. If Adrianople is indeed the long term turning point, the short term was Constantius and Magnus Maximus revolt. Structurally West and Eat were similar (though East could raise more money) yet the East just had more luck. It had no major civil wars during this period; in just 10 years the West had at least 2 major ones. Worse, Honorious (or Stilicho) majorly prioritized defeating pretenders over invaders, allowing the raiders to run wild and entrench.

Indeed, reading the accounts it's almost as if the West has no troops at all. Vandals seemingly ran unopposed through Spain and had to be defeated by Visigoths. Just 4,000 Eastern troops in Ravenna was enough to turn the tide of the war in Honorious' favor, and the fighting between Maximus, Constantius and loyalist troops is tiny in scale. According to some official accounts the garrison of Britannia was 20,000-but archeological and historical evidence says barely 12,000, and it's unknown how much of this was brought with Constantius. I'll admit I have no idea just how the West suddenly had so little solders.

 

[SlyDessertFox]

Having read up on some Adrian goldsworthy, I too am rapidly coming to a similar conclusion actually. If Adrianople is indeed the long term turning point, the short term was Constantius and Magnus Maximus revolt. Structurally West and Eat were similar (though East could raise more money) yet the East just had more luck. It had no major civil wars during this period; in just 10 years the West had at least 2 major ones. Worse, Honorious (or Stilicho) majorly prioritized defeating pretenders over invaders, allowing the raiders to run wild and entrench.

Indeed, reading the accounts it's almost as if the West has no troops at all. Vandals seemingly ran unopposed through Spain and had to be defeated by Visigoths. Just 4,000 Eastern troops in Ravenna was enough to turn the tide of the war in Honorious' favor, and the fighting between Maximus, Constantius and loyalist troops is tiny in scale. According to some official accounts the garrison of Britannia was 20,000-but archeological and historical evidence says barely 12,000, and it's unknown how much of this was brought with Constantius. I'll admit I have no idea just how the West suddenly had so little solders.

It is indeed remarkable. Constantine III's revolt in particular could not have come at a worse time. It prevented Stilicho from dealing with the invasions in Gaul, and simultaneously provided an opportunity for his political opponents in Italy to strike, causing even more domestic unrest. Cosntantine of course saw the invaders as political chess pieces rather than enemies to be destroyed, allowing them to enter Spain in order to crush the uprising of Gerontius there against him. Which had knock on effects of its own.

 

[calvin1417]

So does this mean there's a chance for the empire to survive under classical borders even if divide?

 

[Archon of Thessaly]

So does this mean there's a chance for the empire to survive under classical borders even if divide?

Absolutely. The west just got extremely poor luck, it was not that structurally or militarily different from the East. No Adrianople, then likely no war between east and west, more stability within the West itself, less major barbarian invasions. There is thus a very good case that the West can at least survive until 500 AD with current borders intact. After that, well butterflies really makes it difficult to speculate.

 

[calvin1417]

Absolutely. The west just got extremely poor luck, it was not that structurally or militarily different from the East. No Adrianople, then likely no war between east and west, more stability within the West itself, less major barbarian invasions. There is thus a very good case that the West can at least survive until 500 AD with current borders intact. After that, well butterflies really makes it difficult to speculate.

Awesome someone would make a timeline based on this

 

[calvin1417]

Has there ever been a time line based on this scenario?