WI: UK/France strike Nazi Germany in March 1939 after the takeover of Czechoslovakia

One of the most fascinating parts of the history of World War II was the run-up to the war. I always felt the UK and France had a strategic advantage against Germany if they decided the line that couldn't be crossed was Hitler taking over the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. If the UK and France had their hearts in it, they could have stopped Nazi Germany with a preemptive strike in the spring of 1939 before the Nazi war machine really ramped up.

I wonder what such a war plan would have looked like, as well. I know this question has probably been beaten to death here, but have at it. I'd like to know more about the comparative strength of each military (UK, France, Nazi Germany) in the spring of 1939 in a really detailed way, not just who was stronger and why...

Now for this to happen, the leadership has to be different in both countries. Chamberlain didn't want a war but Prime Minister Daladier was a little more keen on the idea. However, Daladier couldn't act unilaterally...
 
I don't really have the data at my fingertips, but I don't know if they would bear out the idea that the western powers would benefit by declaring war or attacking in March 1939, compared to their OTL timing.

I think their capabilities to attack in the Saar would be even less in the spring of '39 than in the autumn. The Germans, although perhaps less strong and trained, not having assimilated as much Czech loot, would also not be so combat engaged in the east since the Czech occupation was a walkover, not a campaign, in contrast to Poland.

Potential wildcards, and benefits, of an anti-Hitler stand include an excuse to hold on to Czech government financial reserves in London and Paris (which were handed over in OTL I believe), and possible, but not guaranteed, improvements in diplomatic situations, with countries to the east (Romania, USSR) being more willing to cooperate with the westerners.

I would think that if the west DoWs Germany in March 1939, that starts the economic war, and war at sea. But in terms of land war, at best, the French launch a Saar offensive, that like OTL stalls and gets broken off. Can't think of a reason for it to break through. Then we have the whole rest of spring, summer, fall, winter of 1939 for "phony war" unless and until Germany wants to start something.

What do you see happening?
 

Garrison

Donor
Nazi Germany may not be beaten overnight but they are in deep trouble if the war starts in March 1939. There's no M-R Pact, no transfer of Czech gold, and work on the Seigfreid Line is still ongoing. With the Germans and the Western powers at war Stalin has no need to offer Hitler any deal since has what he wanted without raising a finger.
 
Nazi Germany may not be beaten overnight but they are in deep trouble if the war starts in March 1939. There's no M-R Pact, no transfer of Czech gold, and work on the Seigfreid Line is still ongoing. With the Germans and the Western powers at war Stalin has no need to offer Hitler any deal since has what he wanted without raising a finger.

But it still takes more than a phony war to take advantage of Germany's vulnerabilities. And it takes further PoDs and changes in Allied thinking about what it takes to be "ready" and what acceptable sacrifices are in order for them to start and stay on a persistent offensive, instead of taking months/years of phony war to build up to be ready to fight sometime in the 1940s.

The Germans don't get Molotov-Ribbentropp, Czech gold/bank reserves in the west, but they still get, Czech arms in the field, Skoda works, Czech slave labor, Czech hard currency reserves at home, Czech home production.

And Poland can actually mobilize fully and intervene if it respects the pact with France.

When would Poland do this? It may want to take some time to consider how irrevocably committed to war and serious the French and British are to their declared war before mobilizing. If Poland mobilizes, the Germans can detect it and crush mobilizing Polish forces at pretty much any point in 1939.

Now this would not be risk free. But based on the Western Allies behaviors, it's not like the activation of an additional front in Poland would force the French to be more active/persistent pressing in the west if they don't think it will work.

The Poles can be expected to lose all the border forces and border battles, and will not have worked out any collaboration with the Soviets in advance. The risk for the Germans is that after getting the crap kicked out of them in west Poland, the Poles finally give in and accept Soviet help, which makes the eastern front open-ended.

The Germans could try to head that off by exploiting western inactivity and victories by offering the Soviets (who may not be enthusiastic about carrying the main weight of the anti-German war) the choice of Molotov Ribbentrop pact and partition of Poland and Eastern Europe, or eventual German occupation of all Poland, or having to fight Germany in Poland if they oppose Germany there and refuse a partition deal.
 

Garrison

Donor
But it still takes more than a phony war to take advantage of Germany's vulnerabilities. And it takes further PoDs and changes in Allied thinking about what it takes to be "ready" and what acceptable sacrifices are in order for them to start and stay on a persistent offensive, instead of taking months/years of phony war to build up to be ready to fight sometime in the 1940s.

The Germans don't get Molotov-Ribbentropp, Czech gold/bank reserves in the west, but they still get, Czech arms in the field, Skoda works, Czech slave labor, Czech hard currency reserves at home, Czech home production.
And that's going to take long time to come to fruition. The Germans have lost multiple advantages they would have had OTL and here Hitler's insistence on attacking France in Autumn 1939 probably proves irresistible, so they probably wind up attacking with far fewer Panzers and no Sickle Cut.
 
But it still takes more than a phony war to take advantage of Germany's vulnerabilities. And it takes further PoDs and changes in Allied thinking about what it takes to be "ready" and what acceptable sacrifices are in order for them to start and stay on a persistent offensive, instead of taking months/years of phony war to build up to be ready to fight sometime in the 1940s.

The Germans don't get Molotov-Ribbentropp, Czech gold/bank reserves in the west, but they still get, Czech arms in the field, Skoda works, Czech slave labor, Czech hard currency reserves at home, Czech home production.

Despite the urgency from September 1939 the integration of Czech arms and industry was still underway in May 1940. In the 1939 campaign in Poland, and in training exercises before and after there is a indication the Czech tanks had a significantly higher breakdown rate from less time to train the mechanics.

In the case of the the Czech artillery and infantry weapons the soldiers who were to use them were not available for mobilization in March or June 1939. They were still filling out formations equipped with German made weapons with new conscripts and freshly trained cadre. In May 1940 the formations with the Czech arms were not yet fully trained, but mostly Category IV suitable for limited defense operations and none of Category I with full offensive capability. Equipping newly formed formations in April/May 1939 with Czech arms is no different than giving them German arms, they are still not ready to fight in any fashion. You don't alter the number of Category I, II, or even III formations, you just expand the number of Category IV or worse, which in the German thinking of the time were a liability more than a asset.
 
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