WI: The ROKA stopped the NKA in June 1950?

[stalkere]

Well, hell, just to keep some good discussion going - here's another one to think about.
When I was a Staff Officer in Korea, we, perforce had to study the Korean War, just in case the NKA decided to try coming South again. For reason of geography, there are only a few good invasion routes. There's nothing "artifiicial" about the DMZ - that area has been a natural border between the Northern and Southern Kingdoms of the Kor'yo Peninsula for over a Millennium.

Now, you study the history of June 1950, and it kind of jumps out that, despite the surprise, the ROKA was not exactly the bumbling idiots that they are often portrayed in American Histories. There was one division that crumbled in the Chorwon Valley that pretty much released the NKA into the ROKA rear. Had they held the line, had they been reinforced properly, had the valley been somehow blocked - the retreat to the Naktong might not have happened.

What happens to history if the ROKA holds the NKA back without a lot of US help? What if Task Force Smith doesn't get chopped to dogmeat and the US and UN forces come flooding in. No retreat to the Naktong, no Inchon, no march to the Yalu, no "Frozen Chosin".

Something maybe as simple as the 3.5 inch bazooka, or hell, an RPG or improved Panzerfaust in the hands of the ROKA in June of '50 might have stemmed the tide. Man-made avalanches to block the passes even for a short time, could have given the ROKA what they needed.

There are a lot of legends that I've been told but not found in official histories. Martin Caidin told of an unconfirmed story of close to a hundred P-38s that were supposed to go to the ROKAF in 1949 - but they were destroyed, since that might tempt the ROKAF to go North. A couple of squadrons of P-38s in the fighter-bomber role might have done some serious damage to the T-34s coming South.

But, what do you folks think of that scenario?
Ed

 

[General Mung Beans]

Well, hell, just to keep some good discussion going - here's another one to think about.
When I was a Staff Officer in Korea, we, perforce had to study the Korean War, just in case the NKA decided to try coming South again. For reason of geography, there are only a few good invasion routes. There's nothing "artifiicial" about the DMZ - that area has been a natural border between the Northern and Southern Kingdoms of the Kor'yo Peninsula for over a Millennium.

Now, you study the history of June 1950, and it kind of jumps out that, despite the surprise, the ROKA was not exactly the bumbling idiots that they are often portrayed in American Histories. There was one division that crumbled in the Chorwon Valley that pretty much released the NKA into the ROKA rear. Had they held the line, had they been reinforced properly, had the valley been somehow blocked - the retreat to the Naktong might not have happened.

What happens to history if the ROKA holds the NKA back without a lot of US help? What if Task Force Smith doesn't get chopped to dogmeat and the US and UN forces come flooding in. No retreat to the Naktong, no Inchon, no march to the Yalu, no "Frozen Chosin".

Something maybe as simple as the 3.5 inch bazooka, or hell, an RPG or improved Panzerfaust in the hands of the ROKA in June of '50 might have stemmed the tide. Man-made avalanches to block the passes even for a short time, could have given the ROKA what they needed.

There are a lot of legends that I've been told but not found in official histories. Martin Caidin told of an unconfirmed story of close to a hundred P-38s that were supposed to go to the ROKAF in 1949 - but they were destroyed, since that might tempt the ROKAF to go North. A couple of squadrons of P-38s in the fighter-bomber role might have done some serious damage to the T-34s coming South.

But, what do you folks think of that scenario?
Ed

That would have been very unlikely:

ROK had 100,000 troops while DPRK had 200,000 troops. North Korea had 250 tanks while ROK had none. So ROK would definatly need US troops for support.

 

[stalkere]

Not quite that simple....

That would have been very unlikely:

ROK had 100,000 troops while DPRK had 200,000 troops. North Korea had 250 tanks while ROK had none. So ROK would definatly need US troops for support.

-=-
This is a familiar arguement - a little familiarity with armor tactics and a little time spent along the DMZ brings this point home to roost. There are only four real routes that you can bring armor down into the South Korean Plains. Basically, Stop them north of Seoul and a relative few in those choke points can bottle up a lot of troops.
The Imjin, and Pukhan valleys especially in 1950, were pretty bad. The East coast route was pretty bad, basically, single file with the tanks in many places. The main route was the Chorwon Valley, but even that had many points that were only 100 feet wide.

The trouble was, once you got PAST those points, the armor can spread out and, once you get the howitzers south of Seoul, they can get some good range. At that point the ROK needs US help.

Nowadays, you have big concrete abutments along the roads and passes. When the situation gets critical, the ROKA pumps them full of ANFO Slurry and stands by with detonators. The plan is to tie up the NKA along the DMZ and create another "Highway of Death" - like the Basra Road in '91. Well, no, four "Highways of Death" - give the Mustangs, the Wolfpack, the Assam Dragons and their ROKAF buddies some target practice.

Now, the big thing in June 50, was that the ROKA managed to stop the NKA along three of the invasion routes. In the Chorwon, however, the charismatic General running IIRC Third Infantry Div came down with Malaria the first week of June. The guy running the show panicked after three days and bugged out, shortly followed by the rest of the division. The NKA poured through the gap, got into the rear of the rest of the ROKA, and rout ensued.

But, suppose General Lee doesn't get sick...better yet, 3rd Infantry has a bunch of RPGs, or 3.5 bazookas, or hell, even 30 105MM howitzers with good presets. I doubt if ANFO was available in 1950, but mining the border valleys roads might have made a huge difference in stopping the Armor and Artillery, all by itself.

Yeah, the NKA infantry can hike across the mountains, but I don't think a 2:1 superiority is all that decisive in this kind of war.

Like I said, a little material aid in 1948-9 might have paid big dividends.

But what happens to the world if there is a Korean Crisis in the Summer of '50, not a Korean War? More Logistical aid and advisors, but not many US troops, and no UN forces.

Does Uncle Joe try again in Summer of 51, or does he go somewhere else?

 

[Swordman]

Ed:

As it so happens, I was stationed with the 2ID from 1986-1987. I was assigned to the 2d Engr Bn at the time. When I got in country, I took the tour of the DMZ, and while I was there, my duties took me all over the area north of Seoul. Whereever we went, all those bridges you mention were pointed out and the remark was made that all of them had explosive charges already in place.
One way that the ROK could have done more damage to the DPRK's army is to have had a number of M-26 Pershings in country. The M-26 can pound the snot out of the T-34 any day of the week. Faiiling that, lots and lots of the 3.5" Super Bazookas, along with Thor's Lawn Mower (better known as the Quad Fifty).

Mike Garrity

 

[stalkere]

Ed:

As it so happens, I was stationed with the 2ID from 1986-1987. I was assigned to the 2d Engr Bn at the time. When I got in country, I took the tour of the DMZ, and while I was there, my duties took me all over the area north of Seoul. Whereever we went, all those bridges you mention were pointed out and the remark was made that all of them had explosive charges already in place.
One way that the ROK could have done more damage to the DPRK's army is to have had a number of M-26 Pershings in country. The M-26 can pound the snot out of the T-34 any day of the week. Faiiling that, lots and lots of the 3.5" Super Bazookas, along with Thor's Lawn Mower (better known as the Quad Fifty).

Mike Garrity

-=-
'Zactly! One of the newer touches I was reading, not sure how true it is - is that there are concrete walls above the passes with boulders piled behind them. Plan is, come the invasion, the walls will be hit with JDAMs, blocking the passes with tons of rock. Nice thing is, you don't have to maintain the explosives and check for age degradation.
Also, a lot of the buildings in major cities have bunkers and MG posts built into them. Basically, drop the facades, and you have multiple fortresses in the cities.
The War had an impact on the ROK that few Americans can appreciate. These folks have built a culture around the idea that the NODAKs are going to invade again. The more paranoid are afraid that, next time, the US will not be able to help.

But, much of the Truman military aid was toward an internal constabulary, mainly infantry force, with minimal anti-armor capability. They were afraid that the ROK might try to go North, and a lot of effort was expended to keep the ROK in check. Appears that the idea that the NKA might come south caught the US planners by surprise.

 

[Swordman]

Ed:

When I was participating in Team Spirit '86, we happened to pass over what looked like a rather small two-lane bridge over some forgettable little river. That small bridge was guarded by a pair of Quad Fifty's, a Hawk launcher and a pair of M-60 MBTs dug-in behind berms.
We also got to tour some of those underground hilltop bunkers that seem to be everywhere.
One aspect of the current ROK AT defense I was hugely impressed by were those enormous concrete-lined ditches. As I recall, they were 20' deep and more than 50' wide.

MIke Garrity

 

[rcmcciii]

Of course, why would we arm the ROKA better than our troops in Japan. Japan was the closest place to get reinforcements for Korea. The Divisions were organized as Constabulary for occupation duty. The Infantry 'Regiments' had only two battalions and they were understrength, all this for economic reasons. As Constabulary they lacked medium tanks, ie no M26s, Japanese bridges could only accomodate armored cars and light tanks, no AT assets. Why do Constabulary require heavy artillery or mortars? The troops were not WWII veterans, they were draftees. They did not get combat training after they arrived in Japan. They were expected to be used as Constabulary(police) not Infantry.

TF Smith was brought up to strength from the other battalion in the 'Regiment'. After that fiasco that 'Regiment' was not combat effective for months. There went 1/3 of that Division. The first units were deployed to Korea by plane. No heavy weapons.

I was a dependant in Korea in June 1950-October1952. I was mature enough to realize how tragic it was and studied it afterward.

End of rant. You just hit a hot button. I remember helping my mother at Haneda Airport. The day after notification of the sponsors death they were flown to CONUS so they did not hurt morale in Japan. It seemed that my Father flew the soldiers to Korea one day and three days later my mother and I were serving their dependants coffee and donuts, and mother was trying to comfort crying young wives and children, as they were shipped home.

Robert

 

[stalkere]

I agree

Robert
We're both talking about the same rant, it is just that I'm one step away. For me, it is simply that my father went to Korea in May of 1950 as an Airman in the Kunsan AB Crash Rescue. He wound up evacuating the base a week later, carrying a rifle over to the Naktong. Eventually, he wound up being evacuated to Japan, where he spent the rest of the war in Crash/Rescue.
But I've studied the war, and it just seems like Truman and Co used false economy - they saved money in 47-50, and spent it like water in 50 and onward.
A weeks worth of war expenditure in '51, spent in '47-50, might have made all the difference in June of '50.
I wish - WISH- that some form of alternate timeline viewer was available to politicians, so we can look at worlds where other versions of our world made other choices.
In terms of today, is the war in Iraq a mistake? Or have we stopped some greater evil from arising to bedevil the next decade? Maybe we killed a person that might be the Hitler of 2020. Or are we creating a reservoir of hate that will endanger the world of 2020?

The POD in this timeline is a little more savvy in 47-50. Actually, a relatively small expenditure - a couple of hundred 3.5 bazookas and say, 50,000 rounds might have turned the tide. Some surplus tanks and training might have been even better, and a a few squadrons of surplus Fighter bombers might have made this the Korean Non-event.

And what happens to the World if Stalin gets a bloody nose in Korea in '50? The Korea experience set the tone of the Cold War, and colored the experience and actions of almost all the major political players of the 50s and 60s.

Ed

 

[aktarian]

Wasn't Us reluctant to arm ROK army with heavy weapons because they feared they might invade the north and unify the country under their terms?

 

[rcmcciii]

Yes. Syngman Rhee was not considered the most stable and pacifistic person around.