Even in the best of circumstances, the Germans still won't be able to beat back the D-Day invasion. Of course it would be more deadly and costly for the Allies if the Nazi's find out beforehand where and when D-Day will happen, but even in that scenario the situation for Germany is hopeless.
But then again, I doubt the D-Day landings will actually happen if the Allies find out that the plans have been leaked. Let's say someone like Walter Bedell Smith falls for a honey trap and spills the beans to an attractive female Nazi spy. If a week or so before the landings, the Allies learn through observations (massive German troop movement to Normandy) and the cracked German communications through Enigma, that the Nazi's know that they're coming, will Eisenhower call off the invasion and let the massive amount of preparation go to waste? Or can the D-Day plans be adjusted to land in Belgium if the Allies know that the Nazi's are waiting for them in Normandy?
Personally I think the Allies will call off D-Day completely, especially before finding out how the plans were leaked. Eisenhower wasn't a gambler when it came to these things.
But then again, I doubt the D-Day landings will actually happen if the Allies find out that the plans have been leaked. Let's say someone like Walter Bedell Smith falls for a honey trap and spills the beans to an attractive female Nazi spy. If a week or so before the landings, the Allies learn through observations (massive German troop movement to Normandy) and the cracked German communications through Enigma, that the Nazi's know that they're coming, will Eisenhower call off the invasion and let the massive amount of preparation go to waste? Or can the D-Day plans be adjusted to land in Belgium if the Allies know that the Nazi's are waiting for them in Normandy?
Personally I think the Allies will call off D-Day completely, especially before finding out how the plans were leaked. Eisenhower wasn't a gambler when it came to these things.
The temptation to postpone because of the iffy weather forecast would certainly have been strong...
One option is to restore uncertainty by executing a few specific deception ops in the remaining time.
A second is to take advantage of the new concentration of enemy and step up air attacks on them. This could be extended by doing the mine sweeping several days early and sending in the Naval bombardment forces early. Thus instead of a one or two hour preparatory air and naval attack on the beach defense there would be a series of destructive attacks running up the defenders losses.
Altering the post landing plan: Instead of expecting to roll inland quickly 21 AG acts much more methodically and concentrates more air bombardment before each days attacks. A higher priority is given to getting artillery and ammunition ashore, and the post landing naval gun fire support is kept up.
A second is to take advantage of the new concentration of enemy and step up air attacks on them. This could be extended by doing the mine sweeping several days early and sending in the Naval bombardment forces early. Thus instead of a one or two hour preparatory air and naval attack on the beach defense there would be a series of destructive attacks running up the defenders losses.
Altering the post landing plan: Instead of expecting to roll inland quickly 21 AG acts much more methodically and concentrates more air bombardment before each days attacks. A higher priority is given to getting artillery and ammunition ashore, and the post landing naval gun fire support is kept up.
If the defense is overcommitted to defending Normandy & weakend elsewhere then it may be possible to execute one of the Rankin plans. Those were operations designed in 1943 for hastily capturing a weakly defended port with a combination of airborne and commandos. With the port captured intact follow on forces could be landed administratively & a lodgement built up before the defense can reorganize & send a counter attack force.
The result is a portion of the defense further exposes itself rushing off to the new emergency.
The result is a portion of the defense further exposes itself rushing off to the new emergency.
Look More Closely Later
Gone Fishin'
You mean what if Operation Mincemeat and the like fail, and the Germans (and Italians) are expecting the Allies to make their main onslaught in 1943 as Sicily-Southern Italy? (Don't look at me like that; (edit) too many people seem to forget that Italy is (and was at the time) actually a part of Europe, and the British, Americans, and Allies headed there after North Africa, a year before the Normandy landings in France.)
If it's really obvious that the Germans and Italians are pouring troops into Sicily, wouldn't the Allies go for Sardinia-Corsica (and gain option for landing in a wide range of places in Italy or Southern France after that) or maybe Greece instead?
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Look More Closely Later
Gone Fishin'
Or, if we're talking about France in 1944, this, as Carl suggests. Part of the fun of seaborne landings if you have air and naval supremacy is that (even if it messes with the main plans you might have had for air-support) the ships moving your stuff can relatively easily be diverted to a new area appropriate for amphibious operations if you get sufficient notice from enemy troops movements, spies/local resistance, what's going on and that your initial target area is now going to be too hotly contested for your liking...
Deleted member 96212
I think answering this question depends on just WHAT the Germans know and WHEN they know it. Is this a week, a fortnight, or six months before the invasion?
The longer it is, the more Rommel will shift to building up fixed fortifications in Normandy - his strategy was to beat the invasion on the water's edge, so he has no choice. Of course, the Allies will notice every pillbox and antitank obstacle he puts in place, so it will cause some pressure to reconsider the landing zone.
The longer it is, the more Rommel will shift to building up fixed fortifications in Normandy - his strategy was to beat the invasion on the water's edge, so he has no choice. Of course, the Allies will notice every pillbox and antitank obstacle he puts in place, so it will cause some pressure to reconsider the landing zone.
Look More Closely Later
Gone Fishin'
You said 'Invasion of Europe', and as far as I'm concerned that started (from a Western Allied point of view) in the summer of 1943*. One of my grandfathers was with the Allies on an anti-aircraft battery in first Sicily and then (later) Italy. If you mean the Normandy landings, then in future please qualify it as 'Northern Europe' and do not do a disservice to the memories of those who were fighting and dying (and incidentally drawing off Axis forces away from France) in the Italian peninsula months before Overlord came ashore.You know very well what I mean; don't play games.
Fortunately my grandfather came back from Italy alive and in one piece. Thousands of others weren't as fortunate.
And I made a further post, having made my initial point about Italy, agreeing pretty much with Carl's post of #6 in this thread.
* Obviously the Soviets were in action in the east, too, from mid-1941.
Deleted member 96212
Sorry I snapped at you. I haven't been doing so well lately.
The short version is that it really doesn't matter.
By mid 1944 the Reich couldn't defend the entire Channel coast in depth. It had to use a thin crust of troops backed up by strong mobile formations. Hitler was fixated on Calais, so that was the hub of the defenses and the mobile formations were closest to that point, something that the deception with First U.S. Army Group & Patton encouraged. If Berlin decides that the threat is certainly in Normandy and the Cherbourg Peninsula then the defenses elsewhere have been weakened. The WAllies can land as far north as Bruges with minimal changes to the overall plan (the main effort would be shuffling of aircraft to more northerly airfields). If anything the WAllies are helped by any move by the Heer to the south since they can now mainly avoid a head on run into the hedgerow country.
A move fairly close to the planned landings (originally in early May) would almost be a gift. All those columns moving in daylight, after the naval gun line had gathered in the Channel ports, and with the available air power, would allow for a slaughter of epic proportions.
By mid 1944 the Reich couldn't defend the entire Channel coast in depth. It had to use a thin crust of troops backed up by strong mobile formations. Hitler was fixated on Calais, so that was the hub of the defenses and the mobile formations were closest to that point, something that the deception with First U.S. Army Group & Patton encouraged. If Berlin decides that the threat is certainly in Normandy and the Cherbourg Peninsula then the defenses elsewhere have been weakened. The WAllies can land as far north as Bruges with minimal changes to the overall plan (the main effort would be shuffling of aircraft to more northerly airfields). If anything the WAllies are helped by any move by the Heer to the south since they can now mainly avoid a head on run into the hedgerow country.
A move fairly close to the planned landings (originally in early May) would almost be a gift. All those columns moving in daylight, after the naval gun line had gathered in the Channel ports, and with the available air power, would allow for a slaughter of epic proportions.
Well to some extent they did know it was going to be there but by that stage of the war Hitler only allowed his intelligence officers to tell him what he wanted to be told and would reject anything that disagreed with his own ideas. So they Nazis find out where and when the D-Day landings will happen but Hitler says its fake intelligence and they ignore it.
I'm of the school of thought that, as with the Panzers being released earlier, all it wold have done is provided more targets. As soon as they come within naval bombardment range, shells would fall like rain. And that's before air support gets involved.
I wonder if that would have shortened the war at all?
I wonder if that would have shortened the war at all?
IIRC, they *were* told that the 'Patton & Calais' thing was a hoax and that the invasion would arrive in Normandy.
However, that source was a 'turned' agent in UK with a long history of getting *everything* wrong.
Second, open beaches do not a logistics port make. The 'Mulberry' stuff was a very, very nasty surprise. Literally, a game-changer. That enough facilities to supply the break-out survived the first storm was proof the Allies had logistics in truly terrifying depth...
And had the weather cancelled the op ? South of France, Italy etc get the troops.
If their advance was stalled long enough ? A mushroom cloud might arise over some vital nexus of Reich...
However, that source was a 'turned' agent in UK with a long history of getting *everything* wrong.
Second, open beaches do not a logistics port make. The 'Mulberry' stuff was a very, very nasty surprise. Literally, a game-changer. That enough facilities to supply the break-out survived the first storm was proof the Allies had logistics in truly terrifying depth...
And had the weather cancelled the op ? South of France, Italy etc get the troops.
If their advance was stalled long enough ? A mushroom cloud might arise over some vital nexus of Reich...