I'd describe it as more like making a necessary exception to the overall strategy. Pretty much everyone who was anyone in the Soviet military high command saw the danger at Kiev and recommended the forces there fall back to Stalin. Even his toadies begged him to fallback at several points. That doesn't mean they weren't still committed to the constant pattern of tactical/operational counter-strokes the Soviets were trying throughout the summer-autumn of 1941.
WI: Stalin dies on June 22, 1941
- Thread starter Whiteshore
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I'd describe it as more like making a necessary exception to the overall strategy. Pretty much everyone who was anyone in the Soviet military high command saw the danger at Kiev and recommended the forces there fall back to Stalin. Even his toadies begged him to fallback at several points. That doesn't mean they weren't still committed to the constant pattern of tactical/operational counter-strokes the Soviets were trying throughout the summer-autumn of 1941.
Huh. Now that's a twist I hadn't considered before.
So whatever troika calls the shots might follow a strategy much the same as that followed by Stalin in OTL, but be more willing to endorse exceptions where their generals recommend they be made?
I wonder how that flexibility would vary with the political strength of the clique. For example, if the politicians are flexible due to political weakness, do they, later in the war start to be more assertive when they feel their power is greater?
fasquardon
No matter what the Soviets do, between the initial assault and the weaknesses of the Red Army in 1941, the Germans are going to end up at least close to where they did by the end of the summer. More troops may be saved, but equipment losses are unlikely to be significantly different. The key is the relocation of Soviet industry to the east which allowed them to rebuild the gear they needed to equip the manpower they had even after the losses OTL. In several areas LL was important, I will not get in to exactly what and how important debate. In 1941 many of the Ukrainians and others were welcoming the Germans with bread and salt, the atrocities and excesses against the locals came later and the locals were, in many cases, more than happy to assist the Germans in "dealing" with the Jews. Given how the local population in some areas were ambivalent about the outcome of USSR vs Germany or even pro-"liberation" could the Soviets have moved the factories as quickly and completely as they did OTL without Stalin?
Yes the NKVD/KGB is still there, but if Beria has been eliminated which is possible, what is their morale and command & control like? For many young Soviets, Stalin was the face of the USSR and communism - those under 25 or so had only known Stalin at the top, they were too young to really remember Lenin or the shuffle after his death. Every factory that does not get transported, every specialized set of machinery that does not make it on to a train is that much less "stuff" the Soviets make. manpower is all very well and good, but no matter what the Soviet solution is throw lots of men and equipment at the enemy, hopefully with smart tactics but overwhelm them. If they don't have the numbers they are screwed, and it is the displaced factories that carry all the load until LL kicks in.
Yes the NKVD/KGB is still there, but if Beria has been eliminated which is possible, what is their morale and command & control like? For many young Soviets, Stalin was the face of the USSR and communism - those under 25 or so had only known Stalin at the top, they were too young to really remember Lenin or the shuffle after his death. Every factory that does not get transported, every specialized set of machinery that does not make it on to a train is that much less "stuff" the Soviets make. manpower is all very well and good, but no matter what the Soviet solution is throw lots of men and equipment at the enemy, hopefully with smart tactics but overwhelm them. If they don't have the numbers they are screwed, and it is the displaced factories that carry all the load until LL kicks in.
Anchises
Banned
At this point in time Stalin had effectively monopolized decision making in the SU. If he suddenly dies during this critical time we would at least see the same passive period that we saw IOTL. I don't think it is possible that a triumvirate immediately steps up and starts giving effective orders. Realistically the top dogs will need a while to "discuss" who is in charge simply because everyone has different opinions on what is the right way to deal with the crisis. And during this atmosphere the disastrous results of the border battles are pouring in. Eventually someone will be in charge but then we have to consider that trading space might be a bad strategy. I could easily see that the new guy can't just say: Hey, fuck Kiev retreat! The new guy won't have the degree of control that Stalin had and losing valuable territory is a risky move, especially if the vultures are already waiting at the next session of the politbureau...
Deleted member 1487
What was the Soviet capacity to actually fall back in good order at that time? Depending on when they started the process it might actually speed up the collapse of Southwest Front given their historical inability to coordinate and competently command their forces in or out of combat.
thorr97
Banned
With the "Man of Steel" dead at the war's outset I can't see anyone letting Beria live any longer than it takes to securely kill him off. He's too much of a threat to all the other players. He knows their secrets and has the ability to extract more secrets about them as time passes. No, he'd be off'd as soon as possible and his replacement would be someone the new troika both agreed upon and knew they could thoroughly keep under control. They all didn't just survive the insanity of Stalin's Terror to sit idly by while some new monster inflicted his own version of it upon them.
I agree that Molotov would have to be part of the new ruling gang. But he never struck me as being a power hungry type. He'd ably serve whoever was in charge but he wasn't after the rulership of the Soviet Union himself. For stability's sake he'd have to have a very visible role in whatever bunch did come to power. He'd be foreign face of the USSR, still. He'd have a significant say within that ruling council but he'd not be the guy sitting in the Big Chair and nor would he want to be so.
Would Zhukov be on such a leadership assembly? Or would that mix the Red Army and politics too much for both the Army's preference and that of all the civilians? Plus, Zhukov has a war to fight and doing power game battles in Moscow is thus a distraction from that. Then again, the Red Army, as an institution, doesn't want to be gutted yet again by some idiot schemes the idiot politicians cook up. So perhaps there'd have to be some Army type at that table.
I agree that Molotov would have to be part of the new ruling gang. But he never struck me as being a power hungry type. He'd ably serve whoever was in charge but he wasn't after the rulership of the Soviet Union himself. For stability's sake he'd have to have a very visible role in whatever bunch did come to power. He'd be foreign face of the USSR, still. He'd have a significant say within that ruling council but he'd not be the guy sitting in the Big Chair and nor would he want to be so.
Would Zhukov be on such a leadership assembly? Or would that mix the Red Army and politics too much for both the Army's preference and that of all the civilians? Plus, Zhukov has a war to fight and doing power game battles in Moscow is thus a distraction from that. Then again, the Red Army, as an institution, doesn't want to be gutted yet again by some idiot schemes the idiot politicians cook up. So perhaps there'd have to be some Army type at that table.
marathag
Banned
If you got a directive from Stalin, would you ignore it because it had no signature at the bottom on the 24th of June?
marathag
Banned
A disorganized retreat beats being 100% destroyed in a pocket from 'Not one step back' orders
Deleted member 1487
Not necessarily; being destroyed in a route can be worse as resistance breaks down sooner during the stampede to the 'golden bridge'. Kiev might be wrapped up sooner, which then could mean Typhoon starts earlier in better condition.
The opportunity to withdraw was definitely there. The Southwestern Front had already managed to conduct a fighting retreat too Kiev, so it had already demonstrated the ability to do that. Other Soviet formations also managed to conduct fighting retreats both before and after Kiev. That said, a botched withdrawal does still become a distinct possibility if the Soviets leave it too late (which would be some point after Guderian managed to breakthrough the Briansk Front on September 2nd, but that was more then a month after recommendations to withdraw had begun) but even then the Soviets would have salvaged at least some of the forces falling back, which is a superior result to compared to IOTL. Stubbornly holding onto a fortress in a salient forming between the jaws of two Panzer groups was clearly madness but the Soviets missed the chance offered by the enforced halt of Army Group Center to extricate Southwestern Front from so obvious a trap.
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Deleted member 1487
Thing is, Guderian pretty much never stopped moving South from August on, so if the Soviets were to pull back in phases at some point they'd weaken their lines so much that the Germans would penetrate and overrun retreating units. Any units the Soviets extract are going to have to stay in the south or they would experience the OTL collapse that lost them most of East Ukraine; the Donbas is no less critical to hold than IOTL, so any forces extracted are likely to just fall straight back and prevent a say the Rostov overextension of AG-South. It's not clear that any Soviet forces pulled out would really matter much to Moscow other than preventing Guderian from getting overextended on the flank.
Semi-Correct: Guderians advance throughout August was stuttering and halting. It wasn't until September 2nd that he managed to finally breakthrough the Briansk Front and seriously penetrate into Soviet rear areas. Before this time, the Southwestern Front could have withdrawn at it's leisure.
Given the slowness of the German advance throughout August against even pitiful resistance, this is unlikely.
They would matter quite a bit, albeit indirectly. Without the elimination of the Southwestern Front, the Soviet winter counter-offensive and many of the forces that historically went into first forming the picket line and then the Rostov counter-offensive would be available for use elsewhere. Soviet logistics would also be greatly enhanced both through the preservation of industry and more directly by not losing all the vehicles in the Southwestern Front. German logistics would also be correspondingly harmed, as they impressed many of the captured Southwestern Front trucks as replacements to their own motor vehicle losses. Finally, without the securing of Eastern Ukraine, AGC's right flank would be much more exposed during it's attempted advance on Moscow.
Deleted member 1487
Other than the pressure all along the length of the front. Where is the halt line for their withdrawal in your opinion and a timeline of the pull back?
It was serious resistance given the disparity in numbers. Guderian was outnumbered the entire time and facing heavy flank attacks from Reserve and Bryansk Fronts.
Such as attacking AG-South in East Ukraine, just further west than their historical position.
AG-South's logistics would have been hurt, but at the same time by not advancing as far could have experienced at least a wash or better. Of course who is to say Southwest Front would be able to withdraw with most of their equipment and with what they do pull out in good condition?
Where do you see the line in Ukraine stopping?
Beria's former mansion was eventually converted to be the Tunisian Embassy. The workmen found bones - lots of bones.
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Guderian was not facing pressure along the southern part of the front until very late in August.
Probably a line running aproximately north-south around Sumy-Poltava. The timelines more iffy, given that the pace of Southwestern Front's pull-back is going to invariably be influenced by how late in the day the order comes. They would be aided by the fact that not only could Guderian not seriously move against them until the 2nd, but the southern pincer in AGS was unable to start moving until even later.
Guderian's Panzer Group contained some ~200,000 men plus another ~80,000 in the 2nd Army up against the 244,000 men of the Briansk Front. During the advance to Kiev, he did not face the Reserve Front. In any case, the Southwestern Front's withdrawal would not change the pressure he faces in August until a very late stage, at which point the Southwestern Front would have largely been out of the exposed zone area.
Not likely, given the big inviting target that would be AGC's southern flank and Soviet ambitions on that axis. The Soviets are in fact more likely to take some of Southwestern Front's remaining maneuver elements and send them against AGC's southern flank.
2nd Panzer's logistics would also have been hurt, as Guderian also captured large numbers of trucks which he kept for himself. His requisition teams even got into shoot outs with other formations troops over the issue. He also benefitted from the capture of Soviet fuel stockpiles at Romy, which was treated in time for Typhoon. IATL that stockpiles is liable to be moved or destroyed. And while AGS would obviously not advance as far and likely would have a relatively quiet winter (at least compared to AGC), their very much a secondary force compared to AGC. And Southwestern Front had already been able to withdraw to Kiev with most of the equipment they had left after the border battles in good condition, a distance more then double what they would have to do here, so they could obviously manage the feat of pulling out from Kiev with most of their equipment in good condition.
Approximately a line running north-south around Sumy-Poltava. The Psel and/or Vorskla Rivers would probably constitute the Southwestern Front's new... well, front.
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Probably make up something about working himself to death.
Blaming the Nazis might backfire. Since they are at war with them and all that, it might end up less as Nazis getting the blame and more as Nazis getting the credit. Overestimating the enemy can be as dangerous as underestimating them. And if Nazi agents somehow managed to murder The Great Stalin, then that makes them look very capable indeed.
takerma
Banned
I think people heavily underestimate the totality of fear that Stalin achieved by this point. It is this total fear and obedience that allowed USSR to survive shock defeats of 1941 and not disintegrate and surrender as any other state would. Beria himself or Troyka or anyone else present at the time can not hope to stem the collapse. They just don't have time to re-establish the chain of total control, they might not be able to do it at all even if they had more time. Problem is that Stalin also purged anyone who could many levels down the chain, Beria is a monster he is not a master like Stalin.
Army collapses some time after Brody or similar counter attack is crushed. With Vozd dead house of cards falls.
Army collapses some time after Brody or similar counter attack is crushed. With Vozd dead house of cards falls.
I am not convinced that this fear was only a positive for the Soviets at this point and I think people underestimate the degree to which the Soviet people and especially the red army really believed in Bolshevism and were willing to fight for their revolution (and to ensure something good came out of the sacrifices they, their friends and their families had made). And that's not even getting to pure nationalism which was probably stronger than Stalin and Communism put together.
So I grant you that people were bloody terrified in June of 1941. But my disagreement is in how they'd react to the death of the top man.
(And in any case, for most people in the Soviet Union they genuinely believed that the warm papa Stalin would be horrified if he knew what his overzealous underlings did - so arguably it was only the people at the very top who will be less afraid once Stalin is dead, the rest might actually be more afraid since the warm and loving Stalin wouldn't be there to hold back his psychopathic minions any more... Talk about black comedy huh?)
fasquardon
Deleted member 1487
There was no one type of Soviet soldier, many opted to surrender, desert, or defect. Many more chose to fight, with a variety of reasons for doing so. Fear certainly was a major factor as the NKVD was not shy about executing people, nor was Stalin shy about executing generals:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Pavlov_(general)
https://www.historyireland.com/20th...ns-victory-the-soviet-union-and-world-war-ii/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrier_troops
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shtrafbat
For sure. I didn't mean to imply that there weren't red army soldiers who were apolitical or who didn't outright hate the Communists. My point was only that the Red Army was as a whole pretty red, and loyal to Communism.
Kind of like how it was with the Wehrmacht, the army of the Soviet state wasn't some bastion of pragmatism like it sometimes gets portrayed as.
fasquardon