WI Soviet East Austria ?

[Rattenfänger von Memphis]

Growing up during the Cold War, I always heard that communism never relinquished any territory that it had acquired yet I found that that was not true in the case of Austria in 1955.

Exactly like Germany and its capital Berlin, Austria and its capital Vienna were divided into 4 military zones (British, American, French and Russian) when World War II ended.

But, after 10 years, the Russians agreed to withdraw their troops from Austria which became permanently neutralized. Stalin, who had died in 1953, and Molotov, who died in 1986, had not wanted to give Austria up.

These excerpts (below in quotes), from a fairly lengthy article found at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-24-beer-en.html , explain that a Soviet East Austria was too small to be anything other than an economic and strategic liability.

But, what if the Russians, as Stalin and Molotov wished, had held onto a Soviet East Austria with its capital East Vienna, how would history have been affected? Would it have made much difference?

In the spring of 1946, the Soviets must have realized that Austria was not as attractive ideologically as it was economically. This change of policy was already hinted at by the personal assessment of an eastern European diplomat who in 1946 intimated that "when the Russian economic needs are satisfied, the Red army will leave the country.”…..

Austria was Europe's third largest oil producer (after the Soviet Union and Romania) and the Soviets had taken hold of these oil fields in April 1945. Initially, the Soviet holding company USIA accounted for about 30 per cent of the industrial output of the zone, at the peak of its operations controlling about 10 per cent of the Austrian workforce, altogether some 50 000 employees.

At this time (August 1946) the Soviet Military Bank (SMB) was created, which was to handle all the financial transactions of the USIA. By 1953, the value of these USIA firms had dropped dramatically due to lack of investment and general neglect. By then, most of the USIA enterprises had proven unable to compete with similar firms in western Austria; the USIA system was no longer an incentive for the Soviets to remain in Austria. By 1955, the majority of the companies was close to bankruptcy or heavily indebted to the Soviet Military Bank.

In 1946, and more determinedly in 1947, leading functionaries of the KPÖ tried to convince their Soviet comrades that a separation of Soviet-controlled eastern Austria from the rest of the country would be beneficial to Soviet interests in Austria. They seem to have been supported by their Yugoslav counterparts, then still in line with Moscow.

By February 1948 – curiously at the time of the Communist takeover in Prague – Moscow made it absolutely clear to the KPÖ leadership that the separation of Austria was against Soviet interests and therefore to be avoided; such a small territory in eastern Austria would prove to be a liability rather than an asset, economically and strategically…..

The question as to why the Soviets finally decided to abandon their military presence in eastern Austria in the spring of 1955 and to agree to a negotiated withdrawal has preoccupied historians ever since. Clearly, the Kremlin leaders had ideological, geo-strategic, and economic reasons. They had long since recognised that Austria was not to be incorporated into the Soviet postwar empire, not even by gradual means.

Khrushchev chose Austria as a showcase for his new, more flexible policy of "peaceful coexistence", thereby forcing President Eisenhower to adjust his strategy and agree to meet the new Kremlin master for summit diplomacy in Geneva. The neutralisation of Austria also stopped the latent impetus for Austrian integration into western Europe and at the same time drove a wedge between the northern and Mediterranean flanks of NATO.

The German question had for years hindered and blocked progress in the Austrian question. Now the former opened the way for the latter. But Adenauer made sure it was not to become a model for Germany.

Economically and financially, the value of Austrian reparations had by then diminished dramatically. USIA was facing bankruptcy and the cost of occupation to the tune of 36 million Austrian shillings annually since 1953 may have made the leaving easier.

In the words of one analyst, "the Soviets had become not only disinterested in Austria, but eager to leave." Not so Molotov, who shortly before his death in 1986 still bewailed Moscow's withdrawal from Austria and Soviet inability to "democratize" Austria.

 

[Onkel Willie]

Maybe West Austria is incorporated into West Germany as a response and the USSR does the same to East Austria (as an exclave) and East Germany as a response since west and east Austria are to weak to mean anything by themselves

 

[tallwingedgoat]

There's really no reason for this. Letting Austria exist as a neutral was beneficial to all. What was the Red Army going to do, invade Germany through the mountains of Austria?

 

[MerryPrankster]

There's really no reason for this. Letting Austria exist as a neutral was beneficial to all. What was the Red Army going to do, invade Germany through the mountains of Austria?

Could be useful as a site for aircraft and missile launches or to threaten Italy via the Alpine passes.

 

[tallwingedgoat]

Could be useful as a site for aircraft and missile launches or to threaten Italy via the Alpine passes.

They could hit any part of Europe with missiles fired from Russia.

The logic of the Cold War was the Soviets were afraid of being invaded through the plains of northern Europe, as NATO was afraid of the WP pulling the same. That's why both had to maintain massive troop numbers in the two Germanys. There was little prospect of invasion through the Alps. Neither side would use Austria, or Italy for that matter to threaten each other.

So long as Austria was neutral, everybody wins because there would be no army poised to strike from Austria. If one side moved an army into Austria, it would be a slow and difficult process with ample time for the other side to mobilize.

If you have Austria divided and full of opposing troops, it does nothing to enhance anyone's security since the mountainous terrain itself does the job well enough. OTOH a face off in Austria increases the chance of an unwanted conflict. The risks outweigh the rewards. Therefore everyone was happy with a neutral Austria.

 

[MerryPrankster]

They could hit any part of Europe with missiles fired from Russia.

Why did they deploy missiles in the Warsaw Pact countries, some of which weren't taken out until after the USSR fell?

 

[tallwingedgoat]

Why did they deploy missiles in the Warsaw Pact countries, some of which weren't taken out until after the USSR fell?

Because they were afraid their conventional forces were not enough against NATO armies in Northern Europe. Why should the Soviets be afraid of the Italian army? What were they going to do, invade Yugoslavia? That's Tito's problem.

 

[MerryPrankster]

Because they were afraid their conventional forces were not enough against NATO armies in Northern Europe. Why should the Soviets be afraid of the Italian army? What were they going to do, invade Yugoslavia? That's Tito's problem.

But if they can hit anywhere in Europe from launchers in the USSR, why deploy nukes in the Warsaw Pact countries where it would be easier for NATO to attack them?

And since Italy was in NATO, Italy would be an enemy of the USSR during wartime. Threatening Italy would force NATO to commit troops there, weakening their forces in Germany.

(The Soviets had a deeper manpower pool than NATO, so it wouldn't hurt their German position as much)

 

[tallwingedgoat]

But if they can hit anywhere in Europe from launchers in the USSR, why deploy nukes in the Warsaw Pact countries where it would be easier for NATO to attack them?

Short range missiles are always cheaper than long range missiles and could be had in greater number. If there was an unstoppable army on the move, you rather have more nukes to shoot at them than less.

And since Italy was in NATO, Italy would be an enemy of the USSR during wartime. Threatening Italy would force NATO to commit troops there, weakening their forces in Germany.

Strategically Italy was just not as threatening as Germany, period. There was not going to be a million man NATO army storming over the Alps that had to be stopped with large quantities of nukes. Neither would the WP need to invade Italy and require the tactical nuclear support.

(The Soviets had a deeper manpower pool than NATO, so it wouldn't hurt their German position as much)

Yes the Soviets could've threaten Italy more than it did and increase the risk of nuclear war, but that would've have been foolish of them. They would have enough missiles pointed at Italy for their needs. Austrian missile sites were unnecessary.

 

[Peter]

If Stalin abandoned the quite un-communistic idea that every socialist state should be essentially autarkic and instead had gone for economics of scale and a continential division of labour (that is, coplanning of the area from Pyonyang to Tirana), then there's no economic reason why a socialist Austria wouldn't be plausible.

 

[Peter]

In fact, that would an interesting POD. Stalin establishes a Continental Socialist Planning in 1945. It would definatly benefit economic development. Instead of every country building their own lousy Trabant: Skodas for everyone. Instead of Albania trying to build gigantic steel mills, import from those in Magnitorsk, while Eastern Germany with it's tech-skills can become the Silicon valley of Socialism, and so on. If this is policy is established from the start, then there's no need for a ten year rape of Eastern and Central Europe ("reparations"), which in my opinion retarded those countries severely and ruined any hope of some popular support for the new order.