WI Prussian West Indies
- Thread starter Uruk
- Start date
They wouldn't. Schleswig is far too important as a territory of Prussia/German Empire.
They might yield Northern Schleswig - it's only a patch of cow pasture.
Assuming they do get the DWI, my guess is that at some point it is ceded to England (who already owns the other half of the Virgin Is) in exchange for Heligoland. This may have the butterfly that Germany keeps more of East Africa than OTL.
Assuming they do get the DWI, my guess is that at some point it is ceded to England (who already owns the other half of the Virgin Is) in exchange for Heligoland. This may have the butterfly that Germany keeps more of East Africa than OTL.
katchen
Banned
That would mean trouble with the United States. The Monroe Doctrine clearly stated that European nations could neither create new colonies in the New World nor transfer colonies from one European power to another. The US would have at the very least the first right to either acquire the Danish Virgin Islands or insist on their independence.
Prussia would have a much better chance of trading Northern Schleshwig for, say, Greenland, which despite it's inhospitable climate, turns out to be rich in mineral wealth, including in some places, gold.
Prussia would have a much better chance of trading Northern Schleshwig for, say, Greenland, which despite it's inhospitable climate, turns out to be rich in mineral wealth, including in some places, gold.
Actualy I believe that was not part of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine only spoke about European nations interfering in already independent former colonies in the America's, not about transfering one colony to another colonial power.
According to wikipedia:
wikipedia said:
That said, I doubt Prussia would want the Danish West Indies. Ok, I might be able to see them trading the danish West Indies for Heligoland. That would make sense, but that means Britain getting directly involved in the peace treaty and I don't think they would want to.
That would mean trouble with the United States. The Monroe Doctrine clearly stated that European nations could neither create new colonies in the New World nor transfer colonies from one European power to another. The US would have at the very least the first right to either acquire the Danish Virgin Islands or insist on their independence.
Prussia would have a much better chance of trading Northern Schleshwig for, say, Greenland, which despite it's inhospitable climate, turns out to be rich in mineral wealth, including in some places, gold.
Swedish Saint-Barthélemy was sold without much trouble. Though, it was fairly minuscule compared to Danish Virgin Islands.
The Monroe Doctrine would be immaterial here (not because it couldn't be interpreted that way if need be, but because in the 1860s, the USA isn't really in a position to object if Britain accedes). The main issue would be that Prussia really needs a colony like it needs a hole in the head.
Bismarck turned down the offer of Indochina in return for forgoing Alsace-Lorraine, which, given he didn't actually want to annex Alsace-Lorraine, should tell you how little he though of the idea. That said, I really love the image of Prussian Virgin Islands. The cultural melange would be absolutely fascinating.
Bismarck turned down the offer of Indochina in return for forgoing Alsace-Lorraine, which, given he didn't actually want to annex Alsace-Lorraine, should tell you how little he though of the idea. That said, I really love the image of Prussian Virgin Islands. The cultural melange would be absolutely fascinating.
American reactions could go either way --
Monroe Doctrine is not quite immaterial here. The US had a non-trivial navy, especially compared to Prussia, in 1864-1865. The US reaction to the French adventure in Mexico offers hints that an American reaction could have been anywhere on a scale of 1 to 10.
Outline of History, Volume II
“But in April, 1865, the civil war in the United States was brought to an end, and the little group of eager Europeans in possession of Mexico found themselves faced by the victorious United States government in a thoroughly grim mood, with a large, dangerous-looking army in hand. The French imperialists were bluntly given the alternative of war with the United States or clearing out of America. In effect, this was an instruction to go. This was the entanglement which prevented Napoleon III from interference between Prussia and Austria in 1866, and this was the reason why Bismarck precipitated the struggle with Austria.”
Based on this, one could surmise there would be American hostility to Prussia’s move into the West Indies (and even Greenland)
So, Prussia opts to exchange northern Schleswig for the Virgin Islands and Greenland in October 1864 (the historic end of the Danish War) as a sop, primarily to assuage the feelings of the Russians, historic friends of Denmark. To a degree this may assuage the feelings of historically pro-Danish Britain also, and France‘s favor of the national principle.
An alternative time for the Prussians to work out the exchange is August-September 1865 after the Convention of Gastein gives undisputed Prussia sovereignty over Schleswig.
Domestically, Bismarck Wilhelm accedes to all this most of all to stay on a good footing with Russia and secondarily as a sop to Prince Adalbert, an advocate of colonialism and navalism.
(I checked wiki and the Danes had given up on all their African or Indian Ocean colonies at this time by 1850.)
A) More likely (if the already unlikely colonial acquisition happened) is that the United States decides to take little official notice, based on the “one war at a time” principle.
The U.S. avoids conflict with Prussia because first it is fighting a war, secondly because even after the war it is war weary, and thirdly it is concerned about alarming or provoking a European coalition between Prussia and more dangerous powers like England, France or Spain..
Also, the Virgin Islands are more distant than Mexico and therefore less important to clear of European influence than Mexico. Even in OTL, although the US strongly opposed the French involvement in Mexico, Washington resorted to intimidation and proxy war by supporting Juaristas, not direct war. It also did not make an ultimatum for instant withdrawal, rather it gave the French about two years to retreat from Mexico. Getting on Prussia’s bad side, on the other hand, may strengthen the French position and stubbornness over Mexico.
Assuming the US lets the territorial transfer stand,the French might seize the Virgin Islands in 1870, and then be forced to return them in the peace treaty. Or the French might hesitate and the US might voice displeasure at the prospect.
German possession of the Virgin Islands only becomes a sore point after some period of time, not till the late 1870s. At that time, there is even less America can do about it than in the mid 1860s.
As Mike Stone suggests, the Germans may exchange the Virgin Islands to Britain for Heligoland, and retain a greater stake in East Africa (especially in Witu on the southern coast of Kenya). If they agree to this, it does violate the presumed non-transfer principle, but since it is to Britain, America would/could not contest it.
Another possible exchange would be the granting of all the Virgin Islands to the US in 1889, or 1899, in exchange for yielding all American claims over Samoa to Germany, so all of Samoa ends up as a German or New Zealand dependency over the long run.
If the Germans instead retain the Virgin Islands up to the beginning of the Tirpitz era, they would become a disturbing (to America) naval base, giving Germany more options in the Caribbean.
B) The alternative is the United States making a big protest over transfer of the Virgin Islands (and possibly Greenland), perhaps to the point of fighting.
If the U.S. takes this line, either in late 1864*, or in 1865, it would be because Seward demands it and Lincoln or Johnson agree, they feel victory is in the bag in the Civil War, believe confrontation with Prussia can be a unifying force and feel that Prussia is so negligible a naval factor it cannot threaten the U.S., aid the Confederacy, or even defend the Virgin islands should it come to a fight. The U.S. in this case calculates it can intimidate the Prussians into withdrawing, and that this will encourage the French and Spanish to be cautious and withdraw from American republics as well. It is safer to threaten the Prussians than the more formidable French or Spanish.
This calculation could work out, or not.
*what was the timeframe of the 13th amendment debate? Lincoln, nor Seward, want to endanger that or distract from it. The Democrats may be the ones to play up the Prussian menace.
Monroe Doctrine is not quite immaterial here. The US had a non-trivial navy, especially compared to Prussia, in 1864-1865. The US reaction to the French adventure in Mexico offers hints that an American reaction could have been anywhere on a scale of 1 to 10.
Outline of History, Volume II
“But in April, 1865, the civil war in the United States was brought to an end, and the little group of eager Europeans in possession of Mexico found themselves faced by the victorious United States government in a thoroughly grim mood, with a large, dangerous-looking army in hand. The French imperialists were bluntly given the alternative of war with the United States or clearing out of America. In effect, this was an instruction to go. This was the entanglement which prevented Napoleon III from interference between Prussia and Austria in 1866, and this was the reason why Bismarck precipitated the struggle with Austria.”
Based on this, one could surmise there would be American hostility to Prussia’s move into the West Indies (and even Greenland)
So, Prussia opts to exchange northern Schleswig for the Virgin Islands and Greenland in October 1864 (the historic end of the Danish War) as a sop, primarily to assuage the feelings of the Russians, historic friends of Denmark. To a degree this may assuage the feelings of historically pro-Danish Britain also, and France‘s favor of the national principle.
An alternative time for the Prussians to work out the exchange is August-September 1865 after the Convention of Gastein gives undisputed Prussia sovereignty over Schleswig.
Domestically, Bismarck Wilhelm accedes to all this most of all to stay on a good footing with Russia and secondarily as a sop to Prince Adalbert, an advocate of colonialism and navalism.
(I checked wiki and the Danes had given up on all their African or Indian Ocean colonies at this time by 1850.)
A) More likely (if the already unlikely colonial acquisition happened) is that the United States decides to take little official notice, based on the “one war at a time” principle.
The U.S. avoids conflict with Prussia because first it is fighting a war, secondly because even after the war it is war weary, and thirdly it is concerned about alarming or provoking a European coalition between Prussia and more dangerous powers like England, France or Spain..
Also, the Virgin Islands are more distant than Mexico and therefore less important to clear of European influence than Mexico. Even in OTL, although the US strongly opposed the French involvement in Mexico, Washington resorted to intimidation and proxy war by supporting Juaristas, not direct war. It also did not make an ultimatum for instant withdrawal, rather it gave the French about two years to retreat from Mexico. Getting on Prussia’s bad side, on the other hand, may strengthen the French position and stubbornness over Mexico.
Assuming the US lets the territorial transfer stand,the French might seize the Virgin Islands in 1870, and then be forced to return them in the peace treaty. Or the French might hesitate and the US might voice displeasure at the prospect.
German possession of the Virgin Islands only becomes a sore point after some period of time, not till the late 1870s. At that time, there is even less America can do about it than in the mid 1860s.
As Mike Stone suggests, the Germans may exchange the Virgin Islands to Britain for Heligoland, and retain a greater stake in East Africa (especially in Witu on the southern coast of Kenya). If they agree to this, it does violate the presumed non-transfer principle, but since it is to Britain, America would/could not contest it.
Another possible exchange would be the granting of all the Virgin Islands to the US in 1889, or 1899, in exchange for yielding all American claims over Samoa to Germany, so all of Samoa ends up as a German or New Zealand dependency over the long run.
If the Germans instead retain the Virgin Islands up to the beginning of the Tirpitz era, they would become a disturbing (to America) naval base, giving Germany more options in the Caribbean.
B) The alternative is the United States making a big protest over transfer of the Virgin Islands (and possibly Greenland), perhaps to the point of fighting.
If the U.S. takes this line, either in late 1864*, or in 1865, it would be because Seward demands it and Lincoln or Johnson agree, they feel victory is in the bag in the Civil War, believe confrontation with Prussia can be a unifying force and feel that Prussia is so negligible a naval factor it cannot threaten the U.S., aid the Confederacy, or even defend the Virgin islands should it come to a fight. The U.S. in this case calculates it can intimidate the Prussians into withdrawing, and that this will encourage the French and Spanish to be cautious and withdraw from American republics as well. It is safer to threaten the Prussians than the more formidable French or Spanish.
This calculation could work out, or not.
*what was the timeframe of the 13th amendment debate? Lincoln, nor Seward, want to endanger that or distract from it. The Democrats may be the ones to play up the Prussian menace.
What Prussian menace? In 1864 Prussia's navy was much weaker than Denmark's, so Prussia would have been less of a concern than Denmark, not more.