WI: President Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas elected in 1988

[Kermode]

The 1988 Mexican presidential election was the closest-fought election the country had seen to that point. The incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party— which had ruled Mexico for nearly six decades— faced a surprisingly strong challenge from Cuahtémoc Cárdenas, running as the candidate of the National Democratic Front (precursor to the Party of the Democratic Revolution). In fact, Cárdenas was leading in the early results… but then the computer system tabulating the votes mysteriously crashed, and in the intervening time— before any final count— the PRI declared itself the victor. The official results were:

Carlos Salinas, Institutional Revolutionary Party — 50.7%
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, National Democratic Front — 31.1%
Manuel Clouthier, National Action Party — 16.8%

… with a turnout of 51.6%, down nearly 25pp from the previous election.

Years later, the president at the time of the election, Miguel de la Madrid, admitted that the election was indeed rigged to secure Salinas' succession.

Let's say that the election isn't rigged. Maybe Cárdenas' victory is even wider, so much that rigging it would be too unbelievable; maybe de la Madrid and/or Salinas have a change of heart, and decide to let history take its course; maybe Cárdenas declares victory first, giving the opposition the momentum and forcing the PRI to back down. Whatever the case, for the purpose of this thread, let's assume that Cárdenas is sworn into office as part of a reasonably peaceful transfer of power (ie: not through controversy sparking a popular revolution).

What happens next?

Here's some questions to kick things off (you don't have to answer each one, I'm just trying to spur discussion):

• How does Cárdenas fare in office?
• How does the PRI's stranglehold being broken 12 years ahead of schedule, and by the PRD instead of the PAN, affect the development of Mexican democracy?
• Do the Zapatistas still appear, and if so, how do they affect Cárdenas and the PRD; does their existence spur a rally-round-the-flag effect, or just make them look weak and unprepared for higher office?
• What's the PRD like going into the 1994 election; can they repeat their success? Who is their candidate?
• How does the PRI fare, following their defeat? Do they bounce back (as IOTL 2012), or do they fade away?
• Where's the PAN in all of this? Do they have a similar rise, portraying themselves as opposition to the PRD instead, or does the PRD suck all the "opposition" air out of the room and confine them to "also-ran" status?
• Basically: what sort of party system does Mexico develop?

 

[Herman Gigglethorpe]

Is this the "se cayó el sistema" election? I don't know a lot about modern Mexican politics, but I have heard of this in one of my introductory history books.

I wonder what could keep the PRI from rigging the election. Even if he received a greater amount of votes, couldn't the PRI lie about it anyway?

 

[thatsbunkers]

I think that Cardenas could break the PRI. The PRI survived PAN because PAN didn't go after the power structures and corruption that allow the PRI to thrive. What happens with the Zapatistas depends on NAFTA. Cardenas might get different terms out of NAFTA to protect indigenous people

 

[Roberto El Rey]

Is this the "se cayó el sistema" election? I don't know a lot about modern Mexican politics, but I have heard of this in one of my introductory history books.

I wonder what could keep the PRI from rigging the election. Even if he received a greater amount of votes, couldn't the PRI lie about it anyway?

That's the one. The corruption was so brazen and obvious to basically all opposition groups that de la Madrid's admittance that it was rigged was no shocking revelation, it was a concession of the obvious truth. The PRI used its majority on every vote-tabulating and election-overseeing council to bury complaints, riling up many within the opposition groups but ultimately making them powerless to do anything about it as Salinas took office.

 

[Roberto El Rey]

What happens next?

Here's some questions to kick things off (you don't have to answer each one, I'm just trying to spur discussion):

• How does Cárdenas fare in office?

Cárdenas likely fares less than great in office. He didn't have the charisma or speaking skills that were generally expected and required of PRI-era Presidents, nor would he have had much interest in constantly playing up the traditional rhetoric that assured Mexicans that they were on the road of revolution (Cárdenas would still try and claim the heritage of the Mexican Revolution, of course—his father was the first stable post-revolutionary President—but he would probably do so in a way devoid of the flamboyant and aggressive speechery that made the President such an adored figure).

This would only deepen his unpopularity among PRI stalwarts and apparatchiks, and his agenda (expand the size of Mexico's already-bloated bureaucracy and undo some of the budget cuts that Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid had made) would likely have been unpopular among the middle class, which would have had to continually contend with an inefficient government bureaucracy to do anything from getting phone service to getting large and inconvenient piles of toxic waste cleaned up. I imagine he would also try to break the stranglehold that the PRI had over the labor unions, possibly by going after corrupt union bosses like Salinas did during his time in office, but more likely by prosecuting corporations who had set up one-sided labor deals with shady union representatives with PRI permission. Cárdenas's most staunch areas of support were the rural regions, but surely he would be able to unlock an additionally reliable support base by democratizing some of the unions and allowing the blue-collar workers (always a fan of left-wing politics) some more participation and influence.

As for the impoverished rural regions (Cárdenas's most reliable base of support, in 1988 at least) I imagine Cárdenas would try and claim the legacy of his father by re-redistributing land. Lazaro Cárdenas's redistribution program in the late 1930s was just about the first and last major policy the PRI pushed to better the rural poor, and since then rural farmers had languished on ejido plots of land they didn't really own and in which nobody wanted to invest. I can't imagine Cárdenas going through a term in office without trying some program to reform this situation.

But one very important thing to remember is that Cárdenas would have been met with fierce resistance from all levels of government at every step of the way. The Congress, which was still controlled by a PRI majority, would have almost certainly gone out in force to oppose all of his proposed measures, the tradition of complete obedience to the head of state squandered in the face of a non-PRI, uncharismatic President. Local village caciques and PRI governors of rural states would have stood firmly against any attempts to reorganize society and the individual level, probably sending in payrolled police officers or just regular thugs with guns to resist any changes.

 

[Kermode]

I think that Cardenas could break the PRI. The PRI survived PAN because PAN didn't go after the power structures and corruption that allow the PRI to thrive. What happens with the Zapatistas depends on NAFTA. Cardenas might get different terms out of NAFTA to protect indigenous people

Is it likely that Mexico develops into a PRD/PAN duopoly, with the PRI regulated to the sidelines if not entirely wiped out?

Good point about the Zapatistas. If a Cárdenas presidency is able to avert the uprising entirely, that has its share of butterflies.

(Cárdenas would still try and claim the heritage of the Mexican Revolution, of course—his father was the first stable post-revolutionary President—but he would probably do so in a way devoid of the flamboyant and aggressive speechery that made the President such an adored figure)

The name "Party of the Democratic Revolution" seems, to me, like a way of tying their party and movement to the Revolution— the PRI was the vanguard of the Mexican revolution, we're the vanguard of this new democratic revolution— but I don't know if Cárdenas was involved in that name, or if it'll even come about ITTL (though I think it very well might, since it's a better name than "National Democratic Front").

But one very important thing to remember is that Cárdenas would have been met with fierce resistance from all levels of government at every step of the way. The Congress, which was still controlled by a PRI majority, would have almost certainly gone out in force to oppose all of his proposed measures, the tradition of complete obedience to the head of state squandered in the face of a non-PRI, uncharismatic President. Local village caciques and PRI governors of rural states would have stood firmly against any attempts to reorganize society and the individual level, probably sending in payrolled police officers or just regular thugs with guns to resist any changes.

So we're looking at a presidency that finds most of its ambitions stalled and watered down by Congress, with its biggest accomplishments made in cracking down on corruption. Makes sense. So perhaps seeing their agenda frustrated would lead to ramping up their organization and infrastructure at other levels of government, and try for a bigger victory in '94?

 

[samcster94]

Is it likely that Mexico develops into a PRD/PAN duopoly, with the PRI regulated to the sidelines if not entirely wiped out?

Good point about the Zapatistas. If a Cárdenas presidency is able to avert the uprising entirely, that has its share of butterflies.


The name "Party of the Democratic Revolution" seems, to me, like a way of tying their party and movement to the Revolution— the PRI was the vanguard of the Mexican revolution, we're the vanguard of this new democratic revolution— but I don't know if Cárdenas was involved in that name, or if it'll even come about ITTL (though I think it very well might, since it's a better name than "National Democratic Front").



So we're looking at a presidency that finds most of its ambitions stalled and watered down by Congress, with its biggest accomplishments made in cracking down on corruption. Makes sense. So perhaps seeing their agenda frustrated would lead to ramping up their organization and infrastructure at other levels of government, and try for a bigger victory in '94?

A two party Mexico evolving in the 90's could be interesting.

 

[raharris1973]

I think that Cardenas could break the PRI. The PRI survived PAN because PAN didn't go after the power structures and corruption that allow the PRI to thrive. What happens with the Zapatistas depends on NAFTA. Cardenas might get different terms out of NAFTA to protect indigenous people

I question whether there would be a NAFTA in this TL.

 

[Roberto El Rey]

I question whether there would be a NAFTA in this TL.

Definitely not, at least not during Cárdenas's term. President Salinas (who would obviously not become President in this scenario) was the driving force behind NAFTA. In OTL, Salinas started to push for a free trade deal with the U.S. because, after he started to advance his free-market, neoliberal agenda by unraveling the mess of protectionist laws and restrictions that had for decades closed Mexico off to foreign investment, he found that European countries simply weren't particularly interested in investing in Mexico, even despite the fact that the country had a strong, professional, educated middle class as well as a large working class and bounteous natural resources. But, he realized, if Mexico could offer unrestrictive commercial regulations, an ample working population and exclusive trade privileges with the United States, the foreign capital would start pouring in. And it did.

But Cárdenas would never do anything like this. For one thing, he is essentially a socialist, so he would not free up the markets. But for another (and arguably more important) thing, he is a nationalist, and not just any nationalist—he is an subscriber to the old, defensive, uniquely Mexican strain of nationalism that aggressively rejects foreign influence and trade of all kinds (particularly involving the United States) out of fear that it will lead to imperialist domination of Mexico. President Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas would never try to court investment from Europe or any other first world country, and you can bet your bottom dollar he would never open up free trade with the United States. That would be like if Kim Jong-Un suddenly recognized the legitimacy and sovereignty of South Korea, or if Nelson Mandela voiced support for racial segregation—not only would it be antithetical to the man's values, it would contradict the very founding principles of the Revolution to which he considers himself an heir.

 

[History Learner]

Major question that comes to mind is how will he effect the Peso Crisis, should it still occur? Particularly if, as @Roberto El Rey suggests, Cárdenas takes an Anti-American tact; the Peso Crisis was largely resolved via President Clinton managing to get a $50 Billion relief package through Congress.

 

[Roberto El Rey]

Major question that comes to mind is how will he effect the Peso Crisis, should it still occur? Particularly if, as @Roberto El Rey suggests, Cárdenas takes an Anti-American tact; the Peso Crisis was largely resolved via President Clinton managing to get a $50 Billion relief package through Congress.

It wouldn’t occur. The 1994 peso crisis occurred IOTL when the administrations of Presidents Salinas and Zedillo (mostly Salinas) badly mishandled a peso devaluation; and the reason the peso needed to be devalued was because a significant trade deficit had developed between Mexico and the United States, and foreign capital was flying out of the country for separate reasons, mostly due to foreign perceptions of political instability after some very high-profile assassinations and the Chiapas uprising. With Cárdenas as President, no trade deficit would develop with the U.S. because there would be no trade of consumer goods with the U.S., and foreign capital wouldn’t start flooding out of the country because there would be no substantial foreign capital in the country.

That’s not to say that no crisis of any kind would have occurred during a Cárdenas presidency—they were frequent occurrences in 20th century Mexico, and if Cárdenas went about shoveling more money into the vast federal bureaucracies and increasing Mexico’s autarkic dependence on state-owned industries, the likelihood of one happening would only increase—but if it did occur, the government would probably deal with it in the conventional way: devalue, suffer, and recover (eventually).

 

[raharris1973]

uniquely Mexican strain of nationalism that aggressively rejects foreign influence and trade of all kinds

I would dispute the "uniquely Mexican" preface here. A lot of nationalisms had this as a feature.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

One thing to add is that in a universe where de la Madrid and the PRI allow Cardenas to become President is a universe where they decide to go back on the entire neoliberal project, possibly because the actual election results show that it would be too unpopular. This might be a universe where Cardenas, not Salinas, is the PRI candidate, a nomination which would be more in line with the historical PRI method of operating and which would have kept their power more securely intact.

 

[Roberto El Rey]

I would dispute the "uniquely Mexican" preface here. A lot of nationalisms had this as a feature.

Fair enough, but I would argue that at least the application and results of this kind of nationalism were unique in Mexico. In Mexico, the result of this type of nationalist current was to create a strong incentive for the country to modernize, develop and advance itself through its own endeavors and accomplishments; whereas in other societies, this sort of nationalism has often contributed to 1) virulent xenophobia (occasionally), 2) intense levels of repression (in order to root out foreign spies, real and perceived), 3) the institutions of government becoming dominated by the military (as a means of safeguarding the state from foreign usurpers), and, sometimes, 4) opposition to capitalism, which is hated as a tool of foreign economic imperialism. See: North Korea (1, 2, 3, 4); Argentina (2, 3, 4); Libya (2, 3, and kind of 4), etc.

Thus, while rest of Latin America fell to military juntas, civil wars, and brutal dictatorships throughout the 20th century, Mexico was industrializing and improving its physical infrastructure, fostering an educated middle class of skilled white-collar workers, constructing sophisticated administrations to provide healthcare, housing and recreation for the laboring classes, and—perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this discussion—attracting intellectuals from all over South America and building a reputation as an enlightened nation in the developing world. I think that this was due at least in part to an unique application of defensively nationalistic impulses.

 

[Plumber]

You avoid the Maseca cartel, with good consequences for tortilla lovers everywhere.