France does not actually need to mobilise as such - the threat of her Mobilising while all of Germany's enemies also mobilise - in 1938 is too great for Germany.
I cannot recall the exact size of the German Military but it was significantly smaller in 1938 than it was in late 39 (which was again significantly smaller than what it was in 1940!)
There is absolutely no basis for this belief. In 1938 British and French military leaders were shrilly informing their political masters that a war with Germany would be a slaughter as the endless Tuetonic hordes overran the ill prepared armies of the democracies. This was an exaggeration, but the best information the politicians had from their military experts at the time was that if it came to war France and Britain would lose, and lose badly.
The reality was quite a bit different, but not necessarily in the WAllies favor. Germany may not have been as powerful in 1938 as she would be in 1940, but then, neither were the Allies. While contemporary fears were overblown, in many ways the military balance was still more favorable for Germany in 1938 since she was well into her own mobilization while her enemies were just starting their own. Certainly Czechoslovakia would have been doomed. German military studies of her defences after the occupation found them ill equipped and positioned in ways that left them vulnerable to German artillery, while the historical Czech deployments would have played into German hands and likely seen most of their army destroyed near the border. Arguments that postulate the heroic Czechs repulsing the Germans in a bloody slaughter are based on rosy pre-war assessments by military officers who looked favourably on rows of Czech fixed fortresses, and had no concept of the kind of fighting WWII would bring.
So France and Britain could easily have found themselves in a conflict almost as terrible as the historical one. We might then be lamenting how a horrible war ravaged Europe only a generation after WWI because European leaders still hadn't learned to get together and talk out their differences.
Isolated and significantly outnumbered I don't think that it would even come to war.
Hitler would bottle it and who knows maybe the 'great' National Socialist dream would be stillborn by 1939?
Might Hitler have been overthrown, by German Generals who don't think they ready for war.
The Oster Conspiracy was probably a pipe dream.
"For its part, the army tried to use its control of personnel assignments to affect the balance of power. Fritsch and Beck believed they could torpedo the War Ministtry's ambitions [for war with Czechoslovakia, which they had been ordered to start planning in 1935] by filling key positions with officers who would defend the army's point of view. For example, in the late summer of 1935 Beck went to the chief of the Army Personnel Office, Lieutenant General Viktor von Schwedler, and said he needed an officer to be Reichenau's replacement as head of the Armed Forces Office. The officer should be a good administrator, Beck added, but not too bright, and someone who would not sell the army out. Schwedler said he could only think of one man: Brigadier General Wilhelm Keitel. Beck took the suggestion to Fritsch, who nominated Keitel to Blomberg. Blomberg accepted, and Keitel took up his post on October 1. However Keitel soon demonstrated that he believed just as firmly in the principle of centralized Wehrmacht command as Reichenau had, and he outdid Reichenau in loyalty to Hitler."
-Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Inside Hitler's High Command," p.34
And to show how serious a miscalculation this was:
"[Keitel] quickly became convinced of Hitler's genius as a political and military leader. 'At the bottom of my heart I was a loyal shield-bearer for Adolf Hitler,' he told Allied interrogators after the war, 'my personal convictions would have been National Socialist.' Moreover he fell completely under the spell of Hitler's personality, and his way of avoiding conflict was to agree loudly with everything the Fuhrer suggested."
-Megargee, p.41
Following the purge of Blomberg and Fritsch on trumped up scandals, Keitel became Hitler's right hand man. As a replacement for Fritsch, Keitel nominated Walther von Brauchitsch.
"Brauchitsch's character was hardly suited for his new position. He did not have the force of personality to stand up to Hitler on those occasions when the two men disagreed. . .Hitler found his bearing infuriating, but the Fuhrer rarely had any trouble cowing him."
-Megargee, p.42
Hitler then took personal leadership of the Wehrmacht in Blomberg's place, a move that shocked Beck, who had not anticipated such a move and undid many of his machinations to move the army out from under Hitler's thumb. Hitler rapidly consolidated his control. There was some danger that the Army might rally behind Fritsch, who had been falsely accuse of homosexuality. Hitler used the occupation of Austria to distract the army leadership, and with Anschluss was able to pull of another foreign policy coup that silenced most of his doubters. Fritsch's trial ultimately found him innocent, but by then Hitler had made his position unassailable.
Beck was now increasingly isolated. His picked man had become Hitler's fervent lackey; Fritsch had been replaced by Brauchitsch who had no stomach for confronting Hitler, even if he had been willing to do so on Beck's behalf (which he was not, Brauchitsch and Beck did not like each other); and worst of all, Hitler had taken Blomberg's position for himself, to general acclaim by the Wehrmacht leadership. Throughout July and August Beck attempted to convince the other Generals to join him in opposing Hitler's plan, but was met with stony silence. Braunchitsch would not back him up, and he convinced no one.
"At the end of July, Manstien, then a division commander [and formerly Beck's assistant - Beck recognized Manstien's brilliance and had deep respect for him], provided Back with some unsolicited - and illuminating - advice. In his view, the problems Beck was experiencing were the result of a faulty command organization. 'It seems completely unavoidable to me, that the fact that the Fuhrer is receiving advice on military questions from two sides must in the end shake his confidence in that advice,' he wrote. 'Also diverging views or the entrance also of lesser figures from OKW could be used to discredit the military leadership.' He went on to suggest that in wartime, Hitler should have command of both the armed forces
and the army; that would eliminate the internal conflicts (which the army had been losing) and place great power in the hands of the Chief of the General Staff. As far as the attack on Czechoslovakia was concerned, Manstein considered this a political decision that Hitler should make, and for which he would have to accept responsibility. Finally, Manstein argued that if only the commander in chief of the army and the chief of the General Staff could forge a closer bond with Hitler, they could win his trust and overcome the bad advice coming from the OKW.
"Manstein's letter underscores the futility of Beck's efforts to inspire resistance against Hitler's plans. In fact, Manstein managed to encapsulate, in just a few pages, the main problem with officers of the high command: their inclination to deal with operational and organizational details instead of broader issues of "politics"; their unwillingness to let go of personal power for the sake of unified leadership; and their complete obliviousness to the dangers of Germany's strategic position."
Megargee, pp.50-51
On August 18th, having failed to sway Hitler, Beck resigned as Chief of the General Staff, penning the prophetic words, "I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible." Beck had hoped his resignation might be followed by mass resignations among the other Generals. Not a single one of them followed him. Hitler even managed to get Beck not to publicize his resignation for "national security reasons," which removed any effect the act might have had on the wider German population.
In 11th hour before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, with the prior removal of Hitler's other opponents, Beck's voice was the sole voice in the wilderness, and the rest of the German generals marched happily into annihilation behind their Fuhrer.
Franz Halder was Beck's replacement. He shared Beck's concerns over Hitler's foreign policy (Halder had in fact been pushing Beck on from the shadows), but was not open in his opposition, instead choosing various forms of obstructionist behaviour. Ultimately this proved counterproductive, because Hitler quickly cottoned on, and had the power to circumvent Halder himself, which he did. Halder laid plans for a coup, to be triggered on the outbreak of war over Czechoslovakia, but the problem was that as Chief of the General Staff he didn't actually command any troops himself and relied on other Generals to execute the plan.
Halder actually had little faith that his coup attempt would succeed, since he was sure it would be opposed by most of the rank and file, but he felt it was necessary to at least try so as to avert disaster. Some historians have portrayed it as a sure thing, but it was really a crazy roll of the dice, and all the odds were against its success,
particularly if war had just been declared, an act that would rally the soldiers more closely behind Hitler. Halder quickly cancelled the attempt once the Munich agreement was announced, but had he proceeded his chances of success were, by his own estimation, low.
Given how Halder flinched from further coups and attempts on Hitler, I find it likely that even had the Allies gone to war in 1938, he'd have flinched then as well. We have to remember that Halder wrote most of those histories, so we get a rather more favorable view of him than we would otherwise.
) There was one more shoot out between Czechoslovak troops in Tatra region when Czechoslovaks refused to retreat from village Zdiar. Polish Major Stefan Rago was killed and polish NCO Oleksinski wounded. No casualties on Czechoslovak side were reported. Czechoslovaks were under command of colonel Duda.