WI: No Sino-Soviet Split - Two Scenarios

No split happens, does Communism eventually fall as mainstream like OTL?

Second scenario, No split, Cold War goes hot with Soviet Union/China alliance against NATO... western victory or no?

Please reply with thoughts.
 
No split happens, does Communism eventually fall as mainstream like OTL?
The reasons for the collapse of the USSR are in no way healed without the Sino-Soviet split.
The reason why it collapsed OTL is because their economy was extremely inefficient and then Gorbachev came and destroyed the entire system, this is in no way prevented by China.
The real change from OTL is that China doesn't begin its process of liberalization of the economy changing OTL a lot.
Second scenario, No split, Cold War goes hot with Soviet Union/China alliance against NATO... western victory or no?
I don't think it would happen but if an escalation happened the slight technological deficit of the USSR is covered by population and by the fact that NATO isn't ready for war while the Warsaw Pact was preparing for this for decades. I would give an advantage to the Soviets but in the end I think they'll just nuke each other into oblivion sooner or later
 
The reasons for the collapse of the USSR are in no way healed without the Sino-Soviet split.
There can be useful amelioration.

The USSR can be less panicked into as much military overspending, overinvestment as OTL.

Additionally, it could be less antsy about the state of Cold War competition in general, even as investment inputs not used for military forces are used inefficiently, and signs emerge that microelectronics and sensing systems are making western weapons systems better.

In the later Cold War it can feel a bit stagnation-y and like its falling behind, but with the margin of security of a calm Chinese flank, Moscow can be more complacent and not desperately jump into reforms that go into destabilizing directions and spirals.
 
There can be useful amelioration.

The USSR can be less panicked into as much military overspending, overinvestment as OTL.

Additionally, it could be less antsy about the state of Cold War competition in general, even as investment inputs not used for military forces are used inefficiently, and signs emerge that microelectronics and sensing systems are making western weapons systems better.

In the later Cold War it can feel a bit stagnation-y and like its falling behind, but with the margin of security of a calm Chinese flank, Moscow can be more complacent and not desperately jump into reforms that go into destabilizing directions and spirals.
Absolutely not, the Soviets will still have the same policies as OTL with or without China: they still will compete with the US for global hegemony and they still will have an extremely inefficient economy. Andropov still tells the party that reforms are needed and Gorbachev still comes to power and still makes the USSR collapse
 
Absolutely not, the Soviets will still have the same policies as OTL with or without China: they still will compete with the US for global hegemony and they still will have an extremely inefficient economy. Andropov still tells the party that reforms are needed and Gorbachev still comes to power and still makes the USSR collapse
If you're going to be this deterministic, why even be interested in alternate history?

If you have the same leadership in charge, sure, but there are definitely ways that the particular leadership of the USSR could have been different, which would mean very different development outcomes and economic priorities. A Beria-led post-Stalin USSR that manages to come to a compromise with the West would look very different than say a post-Khrushchev Podgorny-led USSR.
 
If there is a friendly China, then it will help the USSR if the starts to collapse. If scenario 1 was true, by the 2020s the USSR would have stabilized because of Chinese aid, most likely. And the Great Leap Forward would have just been the "Great Importation of Soviet Economic Advisors and Heavy Machinery".
 
Depends on the conditions of the split and when it happens. Staying friends through the death of Stalin would be different from - say - Mao tripping over a rock in 1951z which would be different from the split getting patched up in the early 60s upon Mao getting fully forced out and Khrushchev replaced.

Regardless of everything else, as China overcomes its early 20th-century issues and moves towards industrialization it's going to be extremely hungry for the kinds of heavy industrial/capital goods the USSR was able to produce en masse. What starts for the USSR as the continuation of 40s-50s industrial aid programs probably ends up as a significant export sector for them. China is also a strong market for Soviet energy, especially as it develops.

At the same time, China not being in a condition of total encirclement and economic isolation means that desperate shock tactics like the GLF and collectivization are less likely to be carried out. This is especially true given the power of internal factions turned off by Soviet shock industrialization and heavy industry fetishism who consistently called for a better-adjusted, more "even" approach. China likely develops in a far more consistent, pragmatic, and "orthodox" developmental direction - less Maoism and no Dengism, but probably way more Chen Yun and Li Shaoqi. Still planned, but more in keeping with both the party's general preference for an even approach which includes the countryside (a source of many of Mao's more "clever" ideas) and the pragmatic faction's attachment to planning as a moderating and rationalizing tool rather than a way to produce radical breaks. This also probably means far less famine and more grain available for export.

The USSR basically halves its hostile frontiers, allowing more military concentration in Europe and the Middle East or less spending, and has a far freer hand on the international stage. It also means that the US can't play China off against the USSR to triangulate pursue detente, so you probably get a more militant posture from both. However, I also suspect it leaves India more clearly in the Western camp. The Communist world is also likely going to be less thoroughly Soviet-dominated, possibly opening up more spaces for independent alternatives.

It's hard to say and depends on the exact details, but a Sink-Soviet friendship persisting, at least in terms of economic cooperation and basic military/diplomatic amity, has immense advantages for both through the span of the Cold War.
 
Because the Chinese would be unable to contribute to a large ground campaign except in Korea, they would be unlikely to create a significant change to the correlation of ground forces, globally speaking. NATO would still concentrate the vast majority of their forces for operations in Europe. US forces in the Pacific like III MEF, 2ID, and 25ID were already tasked with the Korea contingency, because a NATO-Soviet war might have been a good chance for Kim to invade. Considering the size of the front, the density of UNC forces, and the likely competency of North Korean and Chinese troops, it would take a massive Chinese intervention to create a significant difference on the battlefield there. The Chinese would be able to significantly increase the area that the Communist naval threat could cover in the Pacific, but Pacific Fleet was already so far ahead of the Soviets that the ancient Chinese fleet would not make much of a difference there, except in the first few days, and after that probably only with mines.
 
If you're going to be this deterministic, why even be interested in alternate history?

If you have the same leadership in charge, sure, but there are definitely ways that the particular leadership of the USSR could have been different, which would mean very different development outcomes and economic priorities. A Beria-led post-Stalin USSR that manages to come to a compromise with the West would look very different than say a post-Khrushchev Podgorny-led USSR.
It's not that I don't consider other outcomes it's that the Soviet leadership (Brezhnev and Andropov) is sort of already decided from 1964, Brezhnev will still oversee a stagnating USSR and Andropov will still begin reforms, Gorbachev doesn't necessarily come to power but the addition of China doesn't really prevent him from doing so.
If there is a friendly China, then it will help the USSR if the starts to collapse. If scenario 1 was true, by the 2020s the USSR would have stabilized because of Chinese aid, most likely. And the Great Leap Forward would have just been the "Great Importation of Soviet Economic Advisors and Heavy Machinery".
China wouldn't be able to prevent the Collapse of the USSR, what you really need is someone more competent than Gorbachev.
 
If you're going to be this deterministic, why even be interested in alternate history?

If you have the same leadership in charge, sure, but there are definitely ways that the particular leadership of the USSR could have been different, which would mean very different development outcomes and economic priorities. A Beria-led post-Stalin USSR that manages to come to a compromise with the West would look very different than say a post-Khrushchev Podgorny-led USSR.
Exactly
Some people on this site think that USSR Collapse was as inevitable as Nazi defeat in WW2
When actually it can be saved (barely surviving, not suddenly becoming efficient) even after Gorbachev took power had some things taken different ways
 
Here is a pretty interesting timeline on the same subject, I didn’t write/create this but I’ll put it up anyway:

This is a world where the USSR is the dominant empire. The divergence point between OTL and the Cold War World occurred in the 1950's when the US lost the Korean War allowing the Sino-Soviet Empire to sweep thorugh Europe, then Indo-China, then South America, until the US was economically isolated from the rest of the globe. The USSR's assets and technology grew, while US assets and technology shrank and finally collapsed leaving the USSR in control. By 1995, the only part of regular America still in existence lives on in an underground rebellion. Due to the political influence in the culture, contemporary rap music preaches service to the state and the evils of individualism, PBS is far more aggressive and intimidating about their funding, "The People's Court" is a televised criminal court instead of a televised small claims court, AT&T is PT&T, and a statue of Lenin stands in the park where a Lincoln statue stands on OTL. And more the one dollar bill are red not green, this is not USA just SSA (The socialist states of america) and instead the face of George Washington, this is a portrait of Nikita Khrouchtchev.
 
Exactly
Some people on this site think that USSR Collapse was as inevitable as Nazi defeat in WW2
When actually it can be saved (barely surviving, not suddenly becoming efficient) even after Gorbachev took power had some things taken different ways
I don't think the USSR would inevitably collapse, I think that the Soviets would inevitably collapse once Gorbachev comes to power and China being Soviet friendly doesn't prevent Gorbachev from coming to power.
 
The USSR can be less panicked into as much military overspending, overinvestment as OTL.
Look at the USSR before the Sino-Soviet split, does it seem like it's not going to spend a lot on the military? Does it seem like they're not going to fight the US for global hegemony?
Additionally, it could be less antsy about the state of Cold War competition in general, even as investment inputs not used for military forces are used inefficiently, and signs emerge that microelectronics and sensing systems are making western weapons systems better.
Why exactly? The Soviets weren't antsy IOTL either.
In the later Cold War it can feel a bit stagnation-y and like its falling behind, but with the margin of security of a calm Chinese flank, Moscow can be more complacent and not desperately jump into reforms that go into destabilizing directions and spirals.
Gorbachev did not do it because he was panicking, he did what he thought was best for the Soviet Union. If he comes to power, he'll do what he did IOTL.
If you have the same leadership in charge, sure, but there are definitely ways that the particular leadership of the USSR could have been different, which would mean very different development outcomes and economic priorities.
Okay, who takes over and prevents Mao from being overambitious?
A Beria-led post-Stalin USSR that manages to come to a compromise with the West would look very different
Beria had something like 0.00000001% chance of getting in power, and why would Beria out of all people make compromises with the West?
than say a post-Khrushchev Podgorny-led USSR.
How does Podgorny outmaneuver Brezhnev and Kosygin?
If there is a friendly China, then it will help the USSR if the starts to collapse. If scenario 1 was true, by the 2020s the USSR would have stabilized because of Chinese aid, most likely. And the Great Leap Forward would have just been the "Great Importation of Soviet Economic Advisors and Heavy Machinery".
China won't manage to help the Soviets, they don't have the capabilities of saving the Soviets economically and cannot influence Soviet internal politics.
Exactly
Some people on this site think that USSR Collapse was as inevitable as Nazi defeat in WW2
I never said that, I said that the succession of events that led to its collapse IOTL aren't removed ITTL.
When actually it can be saved (barely surviving, not suddenly becoming efficient) even after Gorbachev took power had some things taken different ways
OTL Gorbachev will make the USSR collapse, you need someone else to run the Soviet Union and everything is fine.
 
Look at the USSR before the Sino-Soviet split, does it seem like it's not going to spend a lot on the military? Does it seem like they're not going to fight the US for global hegemony?

Why exactly? The Soviets weren't antsy IOTL either.

Gorbachev did not do it because he was panicking, he did what he thought was best for the Soviet Union. If he comes to power, he'll do what he did IOTL.

Okay, who takes over and prevents Mao from being overambitious?

Beria had something like 0.00000001% chance of getting in power, and why would Beria out of all people make compromises with the West?

How does Podgorny outmaneuver Brezhnev and Kosygin?

China won't manage to help the Soviets, they don't have the capabilities of saving the Soviets economically and cannot influence Soviet internal politics.

I never said that, I said that the succession of events that led to its collapse IOTL aren't removed ITTL.

OTL Gorbachev will make the USSR collapse, you need someone else to run the Soviet Union and everything is fine.
how about Romanov?
 
The reasons for the collapse of the USSR are in no way healed without the Sino-Soviet split.
The reason why it collapsed OTL is because their economy was extremely inefficient and then Gorbachev came and destroyed the entire system, this is in no way prevented by China.
The real change from OTL is that China doesn't begin its process of liberalization of the economy changing OTL a lot.
I agree with this the most. I'd say no Sino-Soviet split leads to the above and then it leads to a longer Cold War. USSR collapses and then China becomes the "remaining Red giant".
 
I agree with this the most. I'd say no Sino-Soviet split leads to the above and then it leads to a longer Cold War. USSR collapses and then China becomes the "remaining Red giant".
Interesting, however the USSR would bring about the fall of all of Eastern Europe, so it would be an alliance of Vietnam, China, Mongolia (saved by Chinese soldiers), North Korea, Laos and China with other states depending on specific conditions.
However China would be significantly stronger since they constantly got Soviet technological and financial help, so yeah I could see them trying to do that, it would be interesting to see how the former USSR will be handled by the remaining Communist bloc.
I have to say it would be a very interesting TL.
 
Has anyone considered the possibility of a China-friendly USSR taking a page out of Deng's playbook in order to ensure its survival well past the 1990s?
 
Top