WI: No Market Garden, Allies Forcus On Clearing The Scheldt To Get Antwerp Working As A Port?
- Thread starter AbeLincoln1865
- Start date
Agreed there. From at best October you get more supplies to the Allies. November isn't the greatest time to advance in Western Europe, and it doesn't get much better until spring.
Mind, something like the Bulge would be far easier to smash down with extra easy supplies, and starting up in spring can go faster and easier.
The problem is that Antwerp as a port is pretty far inland and even today ships must take on a pilot at Vlisingen and then take half a day slowly creeping up the Schelde estuaria zig-zagging around the latest shallows and regularly stopping to let outbound ships pass first. As a result Antwerp today is a port for fabricated goods mostly while bulk and containers are mainly shipped via Rotterdam.
To make things worse, most of the Schelde estuaria downstream from Antwerp is on Dutch territory.
So in 1944, Antwerp could have easily become a main logistic hub for allied reinforcements about 1/2 a year earlier then OTL, but it would require the allies to liberate half of the Netherlands first to secure the passageways. Otl, this actually was the one thing operation Market Garden, intended or not, DID achieve.
To make things worse, most of the Schelde estuaria downstream from Antwerp is on Dutch territory.
So in 1944, Antwerp could have easily become a main logistic hub for allied reinforcements about 1/2 a year earlier then OTL, but it would require the allies to liberate half of the Netherlands first to secure the passageways. Otl, this actually was the one thing operation Market Garden, intended or not, DID achieve.
Antwerp was captured with the docks intact, on 4 September. Actually the Belgians had run the Germans out of the port on the 2d & 3rd before the Brit XXX Corps arrived. Only one crane was damaged and some bridges over the canals leading inland demolished. When the Scheldt was finally opened the discharge rapidly ran up to well over 15,000 tons daily, near 20,000 some days. The first convoy docked 22 Nov & started discharge imeadiatly.
The sticker was Antwerp had evolved into a 'through port'. It lacked large scale storage. In the 1930s cargo went straight from rail cars and barges to the cargo ships or the reverse. In December 1944 the Belgian canals and railways were still damaged they had to scale back discharge in order to clear the docks and few warehouses.
Still, if the port is open anytime in October a urge of 15,000 or 19,000 tons daily to 21 & 12 AG is not trivial. It reduces the artillery ammunition shortage 12 AG was experiencing, makes the distribution of winter equipment easier, and takes some of the stress off the French transport system.
The sticker was Antwerp had evolved into a 'through port'. It lacked large scale storage. In the 1930s cargo went straight from rail cars and barges to the cargo ships or the reverse. In December 1944 the Belgian canals and railways were still damaged they had to scale back discharge in order to clear the docks and few warehouses.
Still, if the port is open anytime in October a urge of 15,000 or 19,000 tons daily to 21 & 12 AG is not trivial. It reduces the artillery ammunition shortage 12 AG was experiencing, makes the distribution of winter equipment easier, and takes some of the stress off the French transport system.
First look at a map - to use Antwerp at all the Allies have to clear up to the line of the Maas/Meuse; Market Garden (up to Nijmegen) was a very effective way of doing this quickly, as noted above.
Next, look at Walcheren Island. It is an Atlantic Wall fortress with a permanent garrison, and heavy guns covering minefields which block the Scheldt. There is no quick or easy way to capture this, as it needs a full scale assault landing. The vessels for this are tied up at Le Havre, and need refurbishment and units need retraining and so are unlikely to be available before October. Even after clearing Walcheren (and similar defences on the southern shore), it will take several weeks of minesweeping to open Antwerp, and even then it is unlikely to be used for personnel and ammunition due to bombardment by V2s.
Short version - it will not make any difference to the supply situation before November at the earliest.
One alternative to Market Garden is using US airborne divisions to help breach the Siegfried Line, but given how badly Hodges performed at Aachen and The Huertgen Forest, it might make little difference.
Yes this - also the assault units used for Walcheren Island had only been pulled out of the line in Normandy in late Aug and needed time to rest refit and reorganise - and then train for this new op with their replacements - the follow on unit to the Royal Marines and Army Commandos = the 52nd lowland Division was trained as an air mobile unit (ie all of its equipment was air transportable) and was switched over as a marine division very late in the plan (I seem to recall that they had been slated to 'fly in' to Arnhem airport after its capture.
Actually there may have been early September 1944. The bulk of the 15th Army was still retreating across Flanders & the garrisons of the region appear to have been stripped. The defense works were manned by a few weapons crews and caretakers. There dont appear to be any infantry regiments to man the secondary defense or constitute reserves for counter attacking intrusions. This seems to be the case on the south bank of the Scheldt as well. If in the first week of September the retreat of the 15th Army can be blocked and the neck to Beveland blocked it leaves the Germans with a few residual regiments of their 1st Army in the Netherlands to try to reach Walchern & Beveland by barge or ferry from the north.
It is correct Bereton thought a airbourne operations vs Walchern island in late September or October impractical. However Beretons tactical judgement is suspect and is based on a different situation than existed a few weeks earlier. Looking at the ground on both banks of the Scheldt it does not look impractical to seize the ferry crossings. Or the town of Flushing.
IIRC the pre September defense works on Walcheren Island and along the Flanders coast from Breskins faced the North sea & were not much oriented for attack from inland.
It is correct Bereton thought a airbourne operations vs Walchern island in late September or October impractical. However Beretons tactical judgement is suspect and is based on a different situation than existed a few weeks earlier. Looking at the ground on both banks of the Scheldt it does not look impractical to seize the ferry crossings. Or the town of Flushing.
IIRC the pre September defense works on Walcheren Island and along the Flanders coast from Breskins faced the North sea & were not much oriented for attack from inland.
At the start of September there was a division on Walcheren, but there followed quite a bit of shuffling about of units, first southwards to hold Breskens and the ferry crossings open, and then northwards as the remnants of 15th Army came through. There might be a gap when the defences of Walcheren were weaker, but you need to plan for it being occupied by a division. The best case is where Montgomery and Bradley don't adjust their boundary, so that Brussels is a 12th Army Group objective. Then the British can send one armoured division to block Beveland, and another to Breskens, so trapping the 15th Army and isolating Antwerp and Walcheren, as a prelude to capturing both.
Airborne operations would be difficult due to the amount of water, and also AA - there was significant amounts along the Dutch coast e.g. 7 batteries at Flushing according to Moulton's Battle for Antwerp.
The defence works included 6in batteries at Flushing and Breskens facing each other across the Scheldt, plus some of the supporting batteries (plus AA) were in open emplacements and so could be used against the landward approaches - which IIRC was a narrow 1km+ causeway, flanked on tidal marshes.
Walcheren is not impregnable, it's just very difficult to see how it could be taken quickly or cheaply.