WI: Napoleon united Italy and Germany as powerful client states so that he didn't have to keep fighting Prussia and Austria

Napoleon already made extensive usage of client states. But what if Napoleon was less fixated on expanding French territory directly and tried to create powerful allied states who could stand on their own, and would always be enemies of Prussia/Austria until Prussia/Austria are destroyed.

Italy and Germany are obvious candidates. Besides that, resurrecting the PLC, but it would have to be a limited campaign in the Baltic to avoid a failed Russian campaign.

Smaller ones could be Croatia, Catalonia, and maybe the Netherlands. Though, most likely he'd want to annex the Netherlands because they'd always be unhappy with the Rhine border.
 
To be fair, a large portion of northern and central Italy was carved out into the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, in personal union with the French Empire. Napoleon intended for his stepson, Eugène Beauharnais to succeed him as King of Italy iirc (assuming he didn't ever have a second son, of course).

The Netherlands was also a client kingdom for a short period, ruled by his brother Louis. Louis wasn't sufficiently pro-French and tried to act independently of his brother, hence the Dutch Kingdom was integrated into the French Empire.

It's likely in a world where Napoleon is victorious, some of the client states (such as Italy) benefit from this. I could see Italy divided between Naples in the south and the Kingdom of Italy in the north and center.
 
To be fair, a large portion of northern and central Italy was carved out into the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, in personal union with the French Empire. Napoleon intended for his stepson, Eugène Beauharnais to succeed him as King of Italy iirc (assuming he didn't ever have a second son, of course).

The Netherlands was also a client kingdom for a short period, ruled by his brother Louis. Louis wasn't sufficiently pro-French and tried to act independently of his brother, hence the Dutch Kingdom was integrated into the French Empire.

It's likely in a world where Napoleon is victorious, some of the client states (such as Italy) benefit from this. I could see Italy divided between Naples in the south and the Kingdom of Italy in the north and center.
Good points, thanks for mentioning. I also didn't mention the Confederation of the Rhine.

But what I meant for this scenario is a fully united Italy (including Naples) and a fully united Germany (east of the Rhine, mediatization continues and serious effort is put into making it a self-sufficient state). It probably does invite too many disputes over thrones, but that also means France would be less worried about the new nations turning on France.
 
Good points, thanks for mentioning. I also didn't mention the Confederation of the Rhine.

But what I meant for this scenario is a fully united Italy (including Naples) and a fully united Germany (east of the Rhine, mediatization continues and serious effort is put into making it a self-sufficient state). It probably does invite too many disputes over thrones, but that also means France would be less worried about the new nations turning on France.
Uniting Italy would probably be easy enough. Assuming Joseph stays in Naples (I really believe keeping France out of Spain is one of the best ways to keep Napoleon's empire going) he has no sons, so it would probably be easy enough to integrate Naples into Italy. Unfortunately Eugene's eldest son is way too old to marry either of Joseph's daughters, but I'm sure they could be compensated for the loss of those territories.

One reason however, that the French Empire might prefer a collection of tiny statelets over larger nations is the fact they'd be easier to manage and dominate. I don't think France would have any issues dominating Italy, but Germany would be a totally different question, though of course this could also be a way to lay the seeds for the French Empires demise down the lines, but considering the Confederation saw a wholesale reconfiguration of German territories to benefit the Bonaparte family (Westphalia) as well as Napoleon's allies in Bavaria and Wurtemburg, amongst others, there's no reason why the Confederation couldn't serve a vehicle to unite Germany (or pieces of it).

A Napoleonic unified Italy might still be missing certain parts, though: it's likely that Sicily remains under the Bourbons, and Sardinia under the House of Savoy, likely protected by the Royal Navy.
 
But what I meant for this scenario is a fully united Italy (including Naples)
the kingdom of Italy - as it was understood at the time - was only the northern half of the peninsula, not the "boot". The last time the pair had been united (as more than a PU like the Hohenstaufens) was with the Roman Empire. And OTL is a perfect example of why they're best kept separate
 
The Confederation of the Rhine and the Kingdom of Italy, really didnt have very much legitimacy, and this was not because of lack of territorial control, but because the support bases of these regimes were very narrow, mostly liberal intellectuals and the middle to upper middle class who saw French rule as preferable to local reactionary elites. The support bases narrowed once 1812 came around and the demands from the French grew.

Only Poland and Bavaria really had large degrees of indigenous buy-in to the French Imperial project, the former because it was the only real route to national sovereignty, and the latter because it was aggrandized to its stronger rivals detriment.

In any event, even if Napoleon had managed to avoid self-destructive actions like the Spanish and Russian campaigns, these states would have needed to have been propped up by French bayonets against Prussia and Austria long into the future. I think only in the case of a maximally enlarged and powerful Poland would this even be plausible, and this would require Russia to be cowed or placated in exchange.
 
In any event, even if Napoleon had managed to avoid self-destructive actions like the Spanish and Russian campaigns, these states would have needed to have been propped up by French bayonets against Prussia and Austria long into the future. I think only in the case of a maximally enlarged and powerful Poland would this even be plausible, and this would require Russia to be cowed or placated in exchange.
Do you think that if Napoleon gave the Russians large swaths of Prussian/Austrian Polish territory, it'd forestall a Russian breakaway from the French continental system?
 
Prussia/Austria until Prussia/Austria are destroyed.
I would say no, Prussia was a joke at the time and was constantly humiliated by the French. Austria was stronger, but with the marriage to the Austrian princess the matter was theoretically resolved. The problem was Russia, not the Germans.
resurrecting the PLC, but it would have to be a limited campaign in the Baltic to avoid a failed Russian campaign.
That or give prussian land to russia (east prussia) or or expand Poland, giving it Silesia among economically important regions
because they'd always be unhappy with the Rhine border.
i mean they already had the border on the river rhine. France was complete.
 
The problem with strong client states is that if they're strong enough not to need their overlord, they're going to look after their interests first and their overlords second. Weak client states are more reliable and dependable than ones that are strong.
 
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The problem with strong client states is that if they're strong enough not to need their overlord, they're going to look after their interests first and their overlords second. Weak client states are more reliable and dependable than ones that are strong.
Napoleon tried to fix this problem by having his relatives, some of whom were competent (Eugene for example, and to a lesser extent, Elisa) and some of whom were not (Jerome, and to some extent, Joseph), in spots of authority.

And they mostly rewarded him with treachery or failure when it came down to it.

I don't think the strong client/weak client problem really asserted itself until the very end when the Confederation of the Rhine mostly defected. Poland after all remained pretty loyal and was one of the stronger clients, because the alternative was extirpation. Naples was fairly weak, as was Saxony, and they defected anyways. Napoleon's client state loyalty issue was really a matter of the waxing and waning of his empire. When it was strong, even the Austrians came to heel. When it was weak, his own family members started looking to abandon him.
 
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Do you think that if Napoleon gave the Russians large swaths of Prussian/Austrian Polish territory, it'd forestall a Russian breakaway from the French continental system?
It's not clear on this - what would help is if Russia was engaged in a sustained war with the Ottomans. Alexander was by no means pro France but he also mistrusted the Coalition partners deeply, so it's possible.

What would have been the best case, honestly, for Napoleon, is to just have a benign neglect policy. Russia could not have succeeded in an offensive war against France prior to the 1812 invasion. But this is in hindsight, of course.

I think Napoleon's pursuit of Ottoman friendship was misguided, in the end. They were most useful as a distraction and sticking point for Russia and Austria, as well as Britain on the other side, than as a trade partner
 
as was Saxony, and they defected anyways
Saxony being the last of Nappy's allies to defect. And they paid the price for it
some of whom were not (Jerome,
while I don't doubt that Jérôme was certainly no genius of statecraft, Napoléon didn't make life any easier.

A regency had been established at cassel at the beginning of September [1807] whose main duty was to collect the revenues and pay over the money which Napoleon demanded for the upkeep of the French troops quartered in Westphalia. Four Frenchmen, Beugnot, Siméon, Jolivet and General Lagrange, formerly head of Kléber's staff in Egypt, with a German secretary, Mossdorf - since none of the others could speak German - composed this provisional government, which remained in office until the king's arrival
The curious thing is that from this time forward, by his conduct towards Westphalia, he [Napoleon] made it almost certain that Jerome should never again be solvent, even had he been anything else than the spendthrift he was.
The first sounds of the storm were very speedily heard. Jerome, as has been said, ordered that the funds in the State Treasury from 1 December should be held at his disposal. As soon as news of this command reached Daru, the Intendant-General of the Grand Army at Berlin, he refused to recognize it. His duty being to look after Westphalia's contribution, among others, to the maintenance of that army, he had written to the provisional government in September, claiming payment of 35.6 million francs, which he said, we still owing out of the 49 million francs due from Westphalia to France. He had secured, on account of this enormous sum, possession of all the revenues of the country during the period preceding Jerome's arrival, and had a sharp quarrel with Morio, who, on his mission from the king, had attempted to prevent the conversion to military ends of some small funds. Jerome, therefore, in December [1807] found nothing but bills in the Treasury, and on asking Daru to refund the moneys which he had extracted from the regency during the two preceding months, met with a positive refusal. That he had a suspicion he would find little in the chest at Cassel appears likely from the letter which he wrote to the emperor the day after his arrival at Wilhelmshohe [1].
[1] He might have remembered that when Joachim Murat entered Dusseldorf as Grand Duke of Berg in March 1806, he similarly hastened to the treasury to find it empty!
Daru lost no time in appealing to Napoleon, who was away on a visit in Italy, and, pending the arrival of an answer, steadfastly declined to allow the king to touch the money which he demanded. In the second article of the Westphalian constitution, which Napoleon had delivered to Jerome but a month before, it had been provided that half the "allodial" domains of Westphalia should be reserved to the emperor, to be used in rewards to the Grand Army officers for their services in the past war.
Napoléon backed Daru against his own brother:
...We must still recognize that Napoleon displayed injustice, if not actual bad faith, in putting out of his brother's reach all the ready money in the kingdom. Leaving aside the question of his claim, on behalf of the Grand Army, to half of the entire dominions of Westphalia, we can but suppose that he intended Jerome to keep up some state in his capital. Yet, knowing that he left Paris without any balance to his credit after paying his debts, but, on the contrary with a loan to repay, and having evidently allowed Jerome to think that there would be some ready money at least in the Treasury when he reached Cassel, Napoleon unhesitatingly supported Daru's absurd claims to the only available cash in the kingdom...
...He [Napoleon] recommended to him the strictest economy- and this was the right policy to pursue. But even the narrowest parsimony would not provide the money required at the commencement of the new reign...
"It would be a bad beginning for your reign," Napoleon wrote "and would suit your credit ill if you started off by not paying your debts." Jerome could not extract any comfort from this letter. He wrote to explain that he could not impose any fresh taxes without rendering himself unpopular in Westphalia. Two days later on the 25th [December] he wrote again, saying that on his arrival, he had found all payments ten months in arrears, and all funds against him. He was obliged, nevertheless, to spend money. He had counted on the October and November revenues, and he once more asked the Emperor for these. "Your Majesty knows that on my departure I was without money, and that I left in the assurance of finding resources here to repay your Majesty the sum advanced, and to provided for my government here." Jerome supported his case by procuring a report on the financial state of Westphalia from Siméon, Beugnot and Jollivet- all three Napoleon's appointees, not Jeromes- where in the ministers declared that there was a defecit of six million francs. To be added was a further eight million for the excess of actual over-estimated expenditure on the upkeep of the troops of the Grand Army in Westphalia. They could only advise that a loan should be raised to pay off this debt of 9 million francs
A deal was hammered out in February 1808 that set the "repayments" of the outstanding 35 million at an annual sum of 7 million francs. Unfortunately, Napoléon would not be mollified and asserted that the finance ministers had undervalued Westphalia's revenues by 4 million! In addition to demanding a repayment of the 1,8 million he had lent Jerome to go from Paris. When Jerome tried to raise a loan in Holland (some 20 million francs) to pay off his debts to his brother, Napoléon undercut him by requesting a loan from the same bankers of 30 million francs. When Jerome attempted to secure a second loan in Germany, his brother ordered him to "sell his furniture, his plate and his jewels" instead. Never mind the fact that Jerome's entire palace staff only numbered sixty (Murat's at Berg numbered five times that), that the upkeep of the wounded soldiers (and a further 3 million francs for the relief of the Westphalians) came out of Jerome's private purse.

It says something that, like Louis, Jerome went around the Continental System on behalf of his subjects. And in a manner similar to Louis, Jerome wrote in December 1809 requesting permission to abdicate, because he felt his whole position was a farce. His brother loved neither Germans nor Germany, he wrote, only the French. And he [Jerome] wrote: "I did desire, no doubt, to have a people to rule over. I should now prefer, I confess to your Majesty, to live as a private individual in your empire rather than be as I am: a sovereign with neither sovereignty nor nation". Napoleon responded in typical fashion, taking advantage of his brother's attendance at Compiègne around the festivities for his marriage to Maria Luise of Austria, he called him a "coward" to his face and ordering him to take off his military uniform "as a disgrace". Small wonder Louis just "silently quit" without informing Napoléon as to his intentions beforehand (AFAIK).

Things got worse when Westphalia was expanded by the addition of 300 000 thousand new oinhabitants and the strip of coastline between the Elbe and the Weser. Instead of getting a lighter load, Jerome found his kingdom simultaneously expanded and plunged another ten million francs into debt, with the money owed to Napoléon doubling to four million*.

*yup, Napoléon was that bastard. He didn't elevate his siblings or generals out of any love for them. He expected to be paid for the promotion. Usually around the tune of a cool 2 million francs for the original promotion, and then added on for each subsequent promotion. He made five million out of Murat from Berg to Naples and nearly double that out of Joseph when transferring him from Naples to Spain. Eugene had to pay for the privilege of being named as heir to Karl Theodor von Dahlberg, Grand Duke of Frankfurt and Prasident of the Rheinbund. Pauline's payments on being elevated to a mere spot like Guastalla were so severe she sold the principality back to the emperor. Elisa had to improve the Tuscan economy- and deal with that she wasn't allowed to have the final say to her ministers (like her brothers were)- in order to keep up with the payments.
 
The problem with strong client states is that if they're strong enough not to need their overlord, they're going to look after their interests first and their overlords second. Weak client states are more reliable and dependable than ones that are strong.
This, with the added caveat that their best interest is to reclaim land that said overlord is trying to gobble up, such as all the newly estabilished départments in Northern Italy and the Rhineland.
 
Saxony being the last of Nappy's allies to defect. And they paid the price for it

while I don't doubt that Jérôme was certainly no genius of statecraft, Napoléon didn't make life any easier.





Napoléon backed Daru against his own brother:



A deal was hammered out in February 1808 that set the "repayments" of the outstanding 35 million at an annual sum of 7 million francs. Unfortunately, Napoléon would not be mollified and asserted that the finance ministers had undervalued Westphalia's revenues by 4 million! In addition to demanding a repayment of the 1,8 million he had lent Jerome to go from Paris. When Jerome tried to raise a loan in Holland (some 20 million francs) to pay off his debts to his brother, Napoléon undercut him by requesting a loan from the same bankers of 30 million francs. When Jerome attempted to secure a second loan in Germany, his brother ordered him to "sell his furniture, his plate and his jewels" instead. Never mind the fact that Jerome's entire palace staff only numbered sixty (Murat's at Berg numbered five times that), that the upkeep of the wounded soldiers (and a further 3 million francs for the relief of the Westphalians) came out of Jerome's private purse.

It says something that, like Louis, Jerome went around the Continental System on behalf of his subjects. And in a manner similar to Louis, Jerome wrote in December 1809 requesting permission to abdicate, because he felt his whole position was a farce. His brother loved neither Germans nor Germany, he wrote, only the French. And he [Jerome] wrote: "I did desire, no doubt, to have a people to rule over. I should now prefer, I confess to your Majesty, to live as a private individual in your empire rather than be as I am: a sovereign with neither sovereignty nor nation". Napoleon responded in typical fashion, taking advantage of his brother's attendance at Compiègne around the festivities for his marriage to Maria Luise of Austria, he called him a "coward" to his face and ordering him to take off his military uniform "as a disgrace". Small wonder Louis just "silently quit" without informing Napoléon as to his intentions beforehand (AFAIK).

Things got worse when Westphalia was expanded by the addition of 300 000 thousand new oinhabitants and the strip of coastline between the Elbe and the Weser. Instead of getting a lighter load, Jerome found his kingdom simultaneously expanded and plunged another ten million francs into debt, with the money owed to Napoléon doubling to four million*.

*yup, Napoléon was that bastard. He didn't elevate his siblings or generals out of any love for them. He expected to be paid for the promotion. Usually around the tune of a cool 2 million francs for the original promotion, and then added on for each subsequent promotion. He made five million out of Murat from Berg to Naples and nearly double that out of Joseph when transferring him from Naples to Spain. Eugene had to pay for the privilege of being named as heir to Karl Theodor von Dahlberg, Grand Duke of Frankfurt and Prasident of the Rheinbund. Pauline's payments on being elevated to a mere spot like Guastalla were so severe she sold the principality back to the emperor. Elisa had to improve the Tuscan economy- and deal with that she wasn't allowed to have the final say to her ministers (like her brothers were)- in order to keep up with the payments.
Isn’t that the whole point of vassal states? Assuming these states held, it would have still been an extremely good deal for these relatives.
 
Isn’t that the whole point of vassal states? Assuming these states held, it would have still been an extremely good deal for these relatives.
Napoleon was indeed an imperious overlord who pushed his weight around on his clients. But frankly every single one of his clients should have realized what their role was ultimately going to be, that they were vassals of France that relied on French bayonets to preserve their thrones, and should have made the most of the situation accordingly. They did not have local legitimacy, and never would (especially if they were family of Napoleon) in their lifetimes, and the best that could be hoped for was a dominant Napoleonic hegemony that would allow their descendants to rule in a more comfortable manner once the constant state of war and mobilization that predominated during the era of the war of Coalitions had ended.

Now, for countries like Spain, Prussia, and Austria, this does not work, and the right course of action was indeed resistance and malicious compliance when necessary. But for, say, Westphalia, or Tuscany, or the Kingdom of Italy? Different story.
 
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