WI Napoléon II: Bourbon Hostage?
- Thread starter Kellan Sullivan
- Start date
given that he remarked- OTL- that he would rather see his son dead than raised as an Austrian archduke- he might regard this (his son at least staying in France, for now) as "oddly preferable" to being effectively exiled. Especially given the fact that the Bourbons are currently without an heir. He might genuinely be deluding himself into thinking that he can still pull a rabbit out of the hat (the man was delusional enough to think the Bourbons would accept him as an acceptable regent for the comte de Chambord, so definitely capable of such "idiocy")
Makes one wonder if he'll bolt from Elba earlier or be more willing to bide his time here?
thank you
True.
And hope Nappy gets the memo and doesnt ruin what his son has going for him
Bolting from Elba came in part because Napoleon got wind of plans to send him to St. Helena (with or without leaving the island), because of a lack of money on the island, and because he thought it was the only way to secure anything for his son.
With his son in the Bourbon court and possibly in line for a position of some importance...he might not risk it at all.
I no longer know what adjectives to use to describe your works, Kellan, you're seriously putting me in difficulty this time, because to say that you've outdone yourself once again seems reductive, otherwise Napy Sr's reactions to the letters and news are really funny coming from his extended family, the part about Lucien who tries to become a great friend of the Pope made me laugh a lot (considering how much Pius VII shared the feeling of contempt towards him, after the treatment suffered by the good Napy, I can imagine what all Lucien he is hearing in Rome regarding his brother) for the rest it will be interesting to see what our emperor of Elba will do, given that in Otl the Elbians immediately loved him
^^^^ this sums up my feelings exactly ☺️ fantastic as always, well thought out, realistic - pick a positive adjective, my friend, and it's yours ❤️
seemingly it was "ruminating" as early as September 1814, when Murat was forced to withdraw his representative to Elba or face retaliation. The same month, Metternich informed Elisa that she wasn't going to be allowed to keep even Lucca. Combined with the king of Württemberg's refusal to allow Jérôme and Katharina to settle in Stuttgart- as they'd hoped- this led to a realization that the Allies weren't planning to keep their word and leave the Bonapartes alone
Indeed. The question this puts to the Emperor, then--does he give enough of a shit about himself and the rest of his family to put his son's fortunes at risk?
I really do think Napoleon would let all his siblings, except maybe Pauline, rot for his son's sake (and, from what I've read about them, rightly so). And as for himself, going willingly into exile in St. Helena for his son's sake allows him to do basically the same drama-queen stuff he did IOTL (paint the allies as oathbreakers and backstabbers, himself as a heroic father sacrificing himself for his son). (EDIT: or he might flee himself elsewhere--if not to America, then somewhere else in the Mediterranean...Napoleon Pasha, anyone?)
will admit that I'm unfamiliar with what he actually did while on Elba. Most biographies give it- at best- a few lines, with no descriptions of how or what he did there/what they thought of him etc.
maybe he can fulfil his longstanding ambition and go to Greece?
The main problem is financial. Napoleon is acting as a ruler on Elba, albeit in a scaled down way, but Elba cannot support it financially. It requires the subsidies that the Bourbon kings promised to pay being paid, which they weren't OTL.
Something is still likely to happen unless somehow the Bourbons have a flash of insight and decide its safer and cheaper to let him play ruler on Elba.
Nice chapters Kellan! I love Artois and Madame Royale ganging up on Louis XVIII.
IOTL, he worked pretty closely with his Controller-General, Baron Louis to get things under control. This meant slashing army expenditures (which to be fair, were bloated for peace time: in 1814, military costs had consumed 55% of the total budget). Slashing the army budget is necessary, but it also means releasing many soldiers from service who may or may not be able to find peacetime jobs. These financial issues also meant that Louis XVIII maintained unpopular taxes on tobacco, wine and salt that he'd promised to abolish. Apparently riots even broke out in Bordeaux over this, one of the first cities in 1814 to host demonstrations of support for the Bourbons. France also entered an economic slump in 1814: primarily because of cheap British imports, which effected many workers.
The other main issue IMO is that Louis XVIII's initial popularity and goodwill from Frenchmen who were tired of war and wanted peace blew away pretty quick. Part of it may have been because of symbolic choices that Louis XVIII made, though they likely only irked a small segment of the population: like the adoption of the white flag, Louis XVIII taking his regnal number as a successor to Louis XVII, taking back the old title as King of France and not King of the French, and monarchy recognizing the anniversaries of the deaths of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette. I do not think any of these things truly effected Louis XVIII's popularity—perhaps it irritated certain political segments such as the Republicans or perhaps the Bonapartists, but I do not think the average Frenchmen was profoundly impacted by any of these decisions. IIRC, there were concerns about the role that the Comte d'Artois might play in the king's government, too. Louis XVIII allowed both Artois and Angoulême to join the re-established royal council in 1814 headed by Talleyrand, though this wasn't a wild idea, since during the ancien régime royal princes as well as princes du sang had a right to attend to Conseil d'État / Conseil d'en Haut.
The main irritant that probably struck a major blow to Louis XVIII's popularity was instead probably the dreaded biens nationaux, the lands confiscated during the revolution from the church and the émigrés. Returning émigrés and the Catholic Church sought to regain the lands they had lost, and they tried to put pressure upon those who now held them. The issue of the biens was a pretty large issue throughout the Restoration period, since it caused confusion on who truly owned the land and in some cases caused property prices to soar. Obviously it was not an issue that Louis XVIII directly meddled in, but it definitely effected his position in 1814-1815. It's a big reason why Charles X finally forward the legislation initially proposed by Louis XVIII in 1825 to indemnify the émigrés with government bonds: they received compensation but also had to renounce any ownership to their former territories. It settled the land issue and ended disputes.
With Louis XVIII holding the King of Rome, he at least has a card close to his chest. But if he still chooses to not pay Napoleon's pension, there will likely be issues. Napoleon made the decision to slip from Elba for a myriad of reasons: financial issues, Marie Louise choosing not to follow him to Elba, possible rumors/plans to move him to St. Helena, but also because he could see that there were cracks in Louis XVIII's restoration and much of that initial popularity had faded. Considering how quickly Napoleon was able to reestablish himself in 1815, it points to some weakness within Louis XVIII's initial restoration that will need to be remedied if he decides to cut Napoleon off as he did IOTL.
Indeed, he was promised two million francs (which was something in the ball park of £80,000) iirc? France is also not in good financial shape. Louis XVIII inherited a deficit of 75 million francs from Napoleon.
IOTL, he worked pretty closely with his Controller-General, Baron Louis to get things under control. This meant slashing army expenditures (which to be fair, were bloated for peace time: in 1814, military costs had consumed 55% of the total budget). Slashing the army budget is necessary, but it also means releasing many soldiers from service who may or may not be able to find peacetime jobs. These financial issues also meant that Louis XVIII maintained unpopular taxes on tobacco, wine and salt that he'd promised to abolish. Apparently riots even broke out in Bordeaux over this, one of the first cities in 1814 to host demonstrations of support for the Bourbons. France also entered an economic slump in 1814: primarily because of cheap British imports, which effected many workers.
The other main issue IMO is that Louis XVIII's initial popularity and goodwill from Frenchmen who were tired of war and wanted peace blew away pretty quick. Part of it may have been because of symbolic choices that Louis XVIII made, though they likely only irked a small segment of the population: like the adoption of the white flag, Louis XVIII taking his regnal number as a successor to Louis XVII, taking back the old title as King of France and not King of the French, and monarchy recognizing the anniversaries of the deaths of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette. I do not think any of these things truly effected Louis XVIII's popularity—perhaps it irritated certain political segments such as the Republicans or perhaps the Bonapartists, but I do not think the average Frenchmen was profoundly impacted by any of these decisions. IIRC, there were concerns about the role that the Comte d'Artois might play in the king's government, too. Louis XVIII allowed both Artois and Angoulême to join the re-established royal council in 1814 headed by Talleyrand, though this wasn't a wild idea, since during the ancien régime royal princes as well as princes du sang had a right to attend to Conseil d'État / Conseil d'en Haut.
The main irritant that probably struck a major blow to Louis XVIII's popularity was instead probably the dreaded biens nationaux, the lands confiscated during the revolution from the church and the émigrés. Returning émigrés and the Catholic Church sought to regain the lands they had lost, and they tried to put pressure upon those who now held them. The issue of the biens was a pretty large issue throughout the Restoration period, since it caused confusion on who truly owned the land and in some cases caused property prices to soar. Obviously it was not an issue that Louis XVIII directly meddled in, but it definitely effected his position in 1814-1815. It's a big reason why Charles X finally forward the legislation initially proposed by Louis XVIII in 1825 to indemnify the émigrés with government bonds: they received compensation but also had to renounce any ownership to their former territories. It settled the land issue and ended disputes.
With Louis XVIII holding the King of Rome, he at least has a card close to his chest. But if he still chooses to not pay Napoleon's pension, there will likely be issues. Napoleon made the decision to slip from Elba for a myriad of reasons: financial issues, Marie Louise choosing not to follow him to Elba, possible rumors/plans to move him to St. Helena, but also because he could see that there were cracks in Louis XVIII's restoration and much of that initial popularity had faded. Considering how quickly Napoleon was able to reestablish himself in 1815, it points to some weakness within Louis XVIII's initial restoration that will need to be remedied if he decides to cut Napoleon off as he did IOTL.
TBH, Napoléon wasn't exactly showing himself as being patient for those subsidies. Given that France was slapped with a massive war indemnity (that IIRC took until 1820 to pay off). One would think that he of all people would understand that the state paying that indemnity took precedence over paying his upkeep. Secondly, he was the one who wanted to take over 1000 people with him to Elba so he could have a court*, an army and a navy (not counting the Mamluks, Polish lancers and Imperial Guard). If he was so worried about his finances, why didn't he downscale? Sorry, his whole "you didn't pay your protection money on time" doesn't buy him a lot of sympathy from me. I understand Elba didn't have a whole ton of natural resources to exploit (pretty sure Saint Helena had still less), but as said, the problem was Napoléon not either the exile or the location of it (the Stuarts, Bourbons, Savoys, Brunswicks and Nassaus were in exile for a lot longer, went with a lot less, and managed to cope)
thank you
any suggestions for remedying some (if not all) weaknesses (i.e. particularly stupid or obvious ones)
It's not about sympathy. It's about what Napoleon's expectations are and what he's going to do when he can't meet them. He either knocks over the weak and tottering Bourbon monarchy as OTL or accepts a *radically* reduced lifestyle (which is already radically reduced from when he was the Emperor). I don't know if his son being in Bourbon hands changes anything.
It seems likely that he leaves Elba as in OTL and everything runs more or less as in OTL except Frankie accompanies the fleeing Bourbons to Ghent.
It seems likely that he leaves Elba as in OTL and everything runs more or less as in OTL except Frankie accompanies the fleeing Bourbons to Ghent.
So to this question ( Napy's period on Elba ) I can tell you some curiosities about it : first of all there are his residences, Villa dei Mulini ( the town one, located in the historic center of Portoferraio ) and Villa San Martino ( the larger, surrounded by greenery, a few kilometers from the island's capital towards Procchio - Marina di Campo ) then we have the splendid Teatro dei Vigilanti
at the beginning his relationship with the population was very tense, in fact before his arrival he asked to control the circulation of weapons owned by local veterans of the Grand Army, he also tried to make friends of the locals, with the presentation of the new flag ( designed by himself ) white with a red band, inspired by the grand ducal merchant flag, to which three golden bees were added ( the French cockade will also be replaced with another with the new colors ) all with the aim of decreasing resentment towards the French ( which was on the rise ) demonstrating that he would arrive as one of them rather than as a foreign ruler ( even if it must be said that Napoleon, as a precaution, secretly landed at the Warehouses to carry out a brief inspection, and only on the day following May 4th 1814 at 3.30 pm he officially landed for the first time in the main port of his new dominion )
among his main works there was a complete reform of the administration and the local Navy ( given that technically Napoleon ruled over almost the entire Tuscan archipelago, excluding the island of Giglio and Capraia ) so was important for communication and the economy of the principality, as soon as he arrived he transformed Portoferraio into a large open-air construction site : an underground conduit was built to avoid flooding of the streets ( which were widened, widened and paved, also to adapt them to the passage of the imperial carriage ) he gave instructions for the exploitation of the mines of Rio ( which had fallen into disuse ) I dedicate great attention to the improvement of the road system to connect the various island towns to each other, public hygiene also receives its attention, so much so as to require the owners of houses without latrines to take action in this regard within two months, otherwise they would have to pay a heavy fine, finally, in true Napy style, he wasted no time in forming and training a tiny army to be used to fight banditry and as a police force
However, I would love to see Napoleon making a mess in Greece, since by doing so he would solve two problems in one: first of all he would remove one of his personal regrets, secondly it would force the great powers to include the Ottomans in the system of the Council of Europe with at least 30 years of advance ( given that his actions in the Balkans will certainly create huge discussions between the powers, it is that they cannot easily be resolved by giving Greece back to the Ottomans and then pretending nothing happened regarding Russian policies in the region ( which in this period were based on strengthening the Danubian principalities, Serbia and any possible minor rivals of the Sublime Gate )
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Resolving the land / property ownership question earlier would perhaps help some.
The ideal would be a reconciliation between the émigrés and the idea of emigration vs. those that stayed behind and the idea of the revolution. Obviously there's no real way to make the émigrés whole again: at best, as Louis XVIII did IOTL, he can release whatever émigré properties and lands which are still held by the state, but would only be a small section of the émigrés who were effected. The Indemnity Bill wasn't a bad idea, as it helped settle ownership questions and attempted to make the émigrés 'whole' again, but one can see why giving them almost 1 billion francs in government bonds that would eventually have to be repaid out might cause issues: it essentially meant that when they were paid out, the rest of France would be footing the bill.
If at all possible, Louis XVIII should try and temper extravagance of his initial court. In his initial return, he reestablished the old Maison du Roi as it had been in 1789, and it's positions were essentially reserved for the old nobility, with émigrés having priority. The Marquis of Dreux-Brézé even harbored plans with Blacas to restore the ettiquette of Versailles in all of it's minutiae within the Tuileries. There was also a rush for nobles to attempt to claim military titles: Louis XVIII commissioned close to 400 general officers, all émigrés, and many of whom had never ever commanded troops in battle. The main reason they wanted such commissions was primarily for the right to wear a military uniform at court, rather than long trousers worn about town, which they considered bourgeois. Uniforms at court had been popularized by Napoleon's court, but it was also the typical uniform of the princes at this point too.
The former Imperial Guard should be dealt with. Napoleon uttered that if he were Louis XVIII, he was absolutely not retain his guard because he (Napoleon) was the only one who could handle them. His idea was that Louis XVIII should grant pensions to the non-coms and privates, and offer promotions and transfers to those wanting to stay in the army. Instead, Louis XVIII turned the former guard into grenadiers and chasseurs and they were scattered about France's provincial garrisons. The former officers were allowed to keep a rank higher than their assignments, but they were put on half-pay.
Louis XVIII also attempted to restore the old units of the Maison Militaire. He and other royalists were obsessed with the idea that the monarchy might not have fallen if Louis XVI had surrounded himself with a strong and faithful guard. This plan wasn't fully carried out before the Hundred Days, but many of the former ceremonial units were reestablished with their old names and even old uniforms, which would be primarily staffed by émigrés as it was an easy way to reward them without disturbing the actual army or civil administration. The Cent-Suisse were restored, and in September 1814 a treaty was even signed with Bern to provide five Swiss regiments: some 6000 men that received the rank and pay of officers which cost Louis XVIII some 20 million francs.
The problem, for the Bourbons, is that no matter how much they try to indoctrinate l'Aiglon into royalism, what is the most they can offer him? To be a minister? Advisor to the King? The Bonapartistes will offer him his father's throne. The Bourbons can't compete with that ... and consequently can never truly trust him in the end.