In OTL, Alp Arslan learned that Romanos was marching on Armenia while he was at Aleppo preparing to march against the Fatimids. We have had several threads talking about Byzantine Victories at Manzikert but, what if Alp Arslan hadn't learned that the Byzantines were marching toward Armenia and he had pressed on against the Fatimids, only finding out about Romanos's betrayal after the Byzantines back some of the lands lost in Armenia? What would happen next ? Arslan would have been deeper into Fatimid Egyptian lands so he wouldn't be able to simply turn back like he did from Aleppo. Does Arslan write off Armenia for now, abandon his war with the enemy that he felt was a greater threat or divide his forces? What are Romanos's chances of holding re-captured Armenian lands ? What would become of the Diogenes - Doukas tensions without Manzikert occurring ?
WI: Manzikert Avoided ; Alp Arslan Doesn't Learn of Byzantine March Toward Armenia
- Thread starter Sevarics
- Start date
The Byzantines still are by far the greatest enemy and the one with the best political dividends to give; with the Fatimid raids shut down, there's not really anything that beats punishing the infamous Christian traitor. It probably wouldn't be as bad as OTL, but I think eventually some kind of Manzikert is likely to happen, with much of the same causes.
Yeah, if Alp Arslan learns about it within the year I'm not sure it would make that much difference to Byzantine affairs (even with a bit more of Armenia a bit more secure) - although this raises an intriguing sort of butterfly. The exact circumstances that lead to Alp Arslan's (relatively) early death OTL may not happen here, which will sure have consequences for the Seljuks.
Romanos will have a united army and Arslan will have lost men attacking the Fatimids.
True but it does still seem like a lot of people wanted to kill him for one reason or another. Hell even his son was assassinated
This is true. But it may be in better circumstances, or worse ones, than OTL. The details are interesting.
The reality is Manzikert did not cause the loss of Anatolia (which is obviously what OP is attempting to avoid) all it did was lead to the loss of Armenia and the loss of control over the mountain passes into and out of Anatolia.
All Alp Arslan wanted was Armenia, not Anatolia, in order to secure his flank for his true prize: The Levant and beyond. So long as he held a fortified Armenia along side the mountain passes into and out of Anatolia he dictated the terms of engagement with the Romans, thus negating the Roman threat to a large degree.
What really led to the loss of Anatolia is three fold:
1) The lack of legitimacy that the man at the top had, caused by the collapse of the Macedonian Dynasty over the course of the 11th Century.
2) The lack of flexibility in the Imperial Roman response to the arrival of Turkic Nomads in both East and West almost at the same time.
3) Internal Roman division in the Empire as a result of said lack of Imperial Legitimacy.
All Manzikert did was burst the dam holding back the flood of Turkic Nomads. But all this did was recreate the same conditions the Romans had faced against the Pechenegs in the Balkans (the only difference being that Central Anatolia was far more favorable in terms of terrain to the nomads than the Balkans). Had the Romans been united around an Emperor with actual legitimacy they could've recreated similar conditions they faced in the Balkans (i.e. decades of stalemate and temporary truces leading to an eventual victory).
Indeed, the conditions found in Anatolia post-Manzikert and pre-1st Crusade almost resemble that of the conditions found in 5th century Gaul and Hispania.
All Alp Arslan wanted was Armenia, not Anatolia, in order to secure his flank for his true prize: The Levant and beyond. So long as he held a fortified Armenia along side the mountain passes into and out of Anatolia he dictated the terms of engagement with the Romans, thus negating the Roman threat to a large degree.
What really led to the loss of Anatolia is three fold:
1) The lack of legitimacy that the man at the top had, caused by the collapse of the Macedonian Dynasty over the course of the 11th Century.
2) The lack of flexibility in the Imperial Roman response to the arrival of Turkic Nomads in both East and West almost at the same time.
3) Internal Roman division in the Empire as a result of said lack of Imperial Legitimacy.
All Manzikert did was burst the dam holding back the flood of Turkic Nomads. But all this did was recreate the same conditions the Romans had faced against the Pechenegs in the Balkans (the only difference being that Central Anatolia was far more favorable in terms of terrain to the nomads than the Balkans). Had the Romans been united around an Emperor with actual legitimacy they could've recreated similar conditions they faced in the Balkans (i.e. decades of stalemate and temporary truces leading to an eventual victory).
Indeed, the conditions found in Anatolia post-Manzikert and pre-1st Crusade almost resemble that of the conditions found in 5th century Gaul and Hispania.
While I agree with everything else, the overall health of the two polities was different, as was the severity of the threat (the Turks only would settle as the disarray became clear, whereas most invaders of the WRE were determined to fight for their stay).
That's why I said "almost". There are obvious differences, but there are plenty of similarities.
Do you not think that the erosion of the akritai and theme system in favor of professional armies played a major part ?
It most certainly did but one can say that a result of the crisis the lack of legitimacy let to problems example Constantine IX led to Maniakes revolting and thus allowing the Normans so indirectly that could also be attributed to the collapse of the Macedonian line
Obviously, but that could be fit into the "lack of flexibility in the imperial response" bit I mentioned.
John Fredrick Parker
Donor
If Romanos had performed better militarily, would that, in itself, have given him and potentially his dynasty the legitimacy needed to negate issues (1) and (3)?
Both Leo III and Constantine V were able military commanders in the 8th century, winning substantive military victories and they still had to content with coup attempts during their respective back to back reigns.
Legitimacy is a quality that's easy to lose and extremely hard to build up. It takes many years of hard work and often multiple generations to build up a dynasty's legitimacy.
Like of the four revolts 3 of them were do to iconoclasm
Not that much Heraclius did it in 10 years to the point even when he lost to the Muslims when general valetinus tried to take the throne form constans II the mob lynched him, why a dynasty or a ruler stays in the roman empire is complicated but Romanos even after he had lost manzikert could have kept his throne had some battles gone differently
They were only about Iconoclasm if you take the word of the Iconophile historians at face value, which I personally wouldn't. They clearly had an ax to grind with the whole dynasty.
Except that the Heraclian Dynasty was also wracked with failed coup attempts after the titular Emperor died, so clearly Heraclius wasn't that successful.
The guy was likely betrayed by the Doukas family in the battle itself and Romanos himself was captured by the Seljuks in the battle. What exactly was Romanos going to do following Manzikert?
The venitian revolt was due to him wanting to install iconoclast policies same with 727, Artabasdos was likely an oportunist who used the religious controversy
What he did in the otl have a series of battles work the Doukas that he lost the fact that he had enough support to rally Anatolian soldiers to his banner is what I mentioned
As others have said, I think this would probably kick the can further down the road; the Turkmen raids into Asia Minor would continue, and at some point, the Seljuks would probably turn on the Byzantines - they were still considered to be one of, if not the preeminent power in the Middle East at the time, and they were the traditional enemy of the caliphs. With the Byzantine army still around, and the consequent threat of action against his rear, I think Alp Arslan would try to end the war with the Fatimids more quickly - perhaps not advancing beyond Aleppo and Damascus, and prepare for confrontation with the Byzantines.
However, the political situation in Constantinople would still be rather problematic. Relations between Romanos and the Doukai had hit a new low in 1070, when he had declared his sons from Eudokia as co-emperors, as it was becoming increasingly clear that he was most likely planning to replace the Doukai with a dynasty of his own - he had been marginalising Eudokia from government for some time, and the banishment of John Doukas was a further sign, plus there was bad blood between the two sides since the days of Constantine X, so I think that the fears of John Doukas and his allies were justified. If Romanos has managed to complete the operation in the East without much trouble and perhaps no sign of the enemy, he might decide to return to the capital. I am not sure how the Doukai would react to this: on the one hand, the possibility of further unfavourable dynastic settlements was very real, on the other, there was little they could do about it yet. However, were the threat of overthrow to be seen as dangerous enough, I think they would get into action: by accusing him of breaking the terms and oaths from his marriage with Eudokia about protecting the interests of the dynasty, they could launch a coup at the capital and thus declare Romanos unfit of the imperial title, while in the army itself, Andronikos and others could rouse trouble with the mercenaries.
Best case scenario, Romanos is caught off guard and imprisoned, his allies are neutralised for the most part, and the Doukai manage to consolidate their control in the short term at least; they would still have to deal with remaining loyalists of Romanos, the problems of the Seljuks and raids in the Balkans, the need for reforms (mainly to find funds for defence), and the rivalries with other aristocratic families, particularly the Komnenoi, but with Anatolia mostly stable and the field army mostly intact, they would have a good starting point. At some point, John Doukas would probably remove Eudokia Makrembolitissa from power, leaving only him and Michael; I am not sure how relations between the two would develop, because from the record of his reign, I think we can say he did have plans of or aspired to implement large scale reforms to restore imperial finances and the administration, as well as contain the powers of the aristocracy, which could bring him in conflict with his aristocratic uncle.
Worst case scenario, the army mutiny is suppressed, Romanos marches on Constantinople, a full civil war breaks out, the Seljuks press their advantage by raiding eastern Anatolia and are perhaps introduced in the conflict as the Doukai could think of using them to distract and weaken Romanos' forces while they are raising an army of their own. We get a rerun of the OTL 1070s to a large extent, perhaps a more limited version with fewer usurpers, but still messy.
When Romanos was made emperor, there was a clear and spoken understanding, that Romanos would respect and protect the interests of the members of the Doukas family already holding imperial titles - Michael VII, Eudokia Makrembolitissa etc. However, by his actions, I think that it's fair to assume that he was actually trying to undo this settlement, and create a new order, and dynasty, with him at its helm. The marginalisation of Eudokia, the continued seclusion of Michael VII from the affairs of government, the exile of John Doukas (the main potential threat on such a plan), and the elevation of his sons with Eudokia to the imperial rank - which was a direct threat on the rights of Michael and his brothers, were all at least worrisome signs about his intentions, and at least personally, I don't think that all these were just misunderstandings - the creation of the co-emperors in particular was a rather clear indication. So, I think we can argue that Romanos himself played a crucial role in creating this political crisis and, and perhaps that he fired the first shots; it was clear the Doukai would react to any move seeming to endanger their position, so he most likely expected that they would react.
However, the political situation in Constantinople would still be rather problematic. Relations between Romanos and the Doukai had hit a new low in 1070, when he had declared his sons from Eudokia as co-emperors, as it was becoming increasingly clear that he was most likely planning to replace the Doukai with a dynasty of his own - he had been marginalising Eudokia from government for some time, and the banishment of John Doukas was a further sign, plus there was bad blood between the two sides since the days of Constantine X, so I think that the fears of John Doukas and his allies were justified. If Romanos has managed to complete the operation in the East without much trouble and perhaps no sign of the enemy, he might decide to return to the capital. I am not sure how the Doukai would react to this: on the one hand, the possibility of further unfavourable dynastic settlements was very real, on the other, there was little they could do about it yet. However, were the threat of overthrow to be seen as dangerous enough, I think they would get into action: by accusing him of breaking the terms and oaths from his marriage with Eudokia about protecting the interests of the dynasty, they could launch a coup at the capital and thus declare Romanos unfit of the imperial title, while in the army itself, Andronikos and others could rouse trouble with the mercenaries.
Best case scenario, Romanos is caught off guard and imprisoned, his allies are neutralised for the most part, and the Doukai manage to consolidate their control in the short term at least; they would still have to deal with remaining loyalists of Romanos, the problems of the Seljuks and raids in the Balkans, the need for reforms (mainly to find funds for defence), and the rivalries with other aristocratic families, particularly the Komnenoi, but with Anatolia mostly stable and the field army mostly intact, they would have a good starting point. At some point, John Doukas would probably remove Eudokia Makrembolitissa from power, leaving only him and Michael; I am not sure how relations between the two would develop, because from the record of his reign, I think we can say he did have plans of or aspired to implement large scale reforms to restore imperial finances and the administration, as well as contain the powers of the aristocracy, which could bring him in conflict with his aristocratic uncle.
Worst case scenario, the army mutiny is suppressed, Romanos marches on Constantinople, a full civil war breaks out, the Seljuks press their advantage by raiding eastern Anatolia and are perhaps introduced in the conflict as the Doukai could think of using them to distract and weaken Romanos' forces while they are raising an army of their own. We get a rerun of the OTL 1070s to a large extent, perhaps a more limited version with fewer usurpers, but still messy.
Well, I think it's a bit more complicated.
When Romanos was made emperor, there was a clear and spoken understanding, that Romanos would respect and protect the interests of the members of the Doukas family already holding imperial titles - Michael VII, Eudokia Makrembolitissa etc. However, by his actions, I think that it's fair to assume that he was actually trying to undo this settlement, and create a new order, and dynasty, with him at its helm. The marginalisation of Eudokia, the continued seclusion of Michael VII from the affairs of government, the exile of John Doukas (the main potential threat on such a plan), and the elevation of his sons with Eudokia to the imperial rank - which was a direct threat on the rights of Michael and his brothers, were all at least worrisome signs about his intentions, and at least personally, I don't think that all these were just misunderstandings - the creation of the co-emperors in particular was a rather clear indication. So, I think we can argue that Romanos himself played a crucial role in creating this political crisis and, and perhaps that he fired the first shots; it was clear the Doukai would react to any move seeming to endanger their position, so he most likely expected that they would react.
John Fredrick Parker
Donor
@Tanaka did nothing wrong What would you say Alp Arsulan is doing in your “best case scenario”?