I think that at least southern Italy made geostrategic sense. It would protect the Balkans from as western assault, which, as we saw with the Normans in the 1040s-1080s, was vital; With southern Italy they were annoying, but without it they were an existential threat all of the sudden.
WI: Manuel I Komnenos Didn't Make Peace With the Turks and Kept Up the Pressure?
- Thread starter Putnam
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now to respond to your excellent point of view on the geopolitical importance of the imperial control of Southern Italy, as well as the search for important allies on site ( which Manuele initially had, only to unfortunately find himself having to support the rivals of his old ally ), at least for defensive purposes, I am about to quote myself from another discussion, with a fairly long comment
To understand why Manuel's Italian campaign went badly, we need to go back to the second crusade, when we find Manuel who is monitoring what happens with the crusade, he receives information that said that the fleet of King Roger II of Sicily had set in motion, the Sicilian fleet was commanded by George of Antioch ( a Rhomanoi who served first under the Arabs and then with Roger II, becoming his Amirus Amiratus, i.e. today's equivalent of the rank of prime minister and commander-in-chief of the army ) In a very short time the Sicilians conquered Corfu, and raided Athens and Corinth, reaching as far as Thebes ( the nerve center of the empire's textile industry )
Once George of Antioch was paid almost the equivalent of a triumph in Palermo upon his return, as a result of this Manuel turned to the Venetians in search of allies, and in 1148, Venice promised to lend aid to Byzantium with the his navy for six months, in exchange for more commercial privileges, in April of the same year Manuel was ready for the punitive expedition against the Normans, but the situation on the northern border suddenly worsened : when the Cumans entered Byzantine territory and the Venetian ships were stopped due to the death of the doge and a violent storm that had broken most of the fleet's oars. Only in late autumn did the navies of the two states manage to carry out the maritime blockade of Corfu
In the same period Manuel had to go alone to Thessalonica, to reunite with Conrad III of Swabia ( who in the meantime fell ill in Ephesus ), the emperor then decided to take him back to Constantinople, where he had him treated ( in some stories it is said that it was Manuel himself who took care of Conrad ) meanwhile the crusade was going badly, and many blamed this on Manuel ( among them there was also Louis VII ) he returned from Palestine, Conrad was invited by Manuel to Constantinople, ( a friendship had been created between the two ) where at Christmas 1148 a marriage was celebrated between Theodora ( Manuel's niece ) and Duke Henry II of Austria ( Conrad's brother ) furthermore they agreed to carry out a joint campaign in Italy in the shortest time possible
before actually starting the campaign, Manuel had to face the Serbian revolt ( financed by Ruggero ) as well as a fleet of forty Norman ships ( again led by George of Antioch ) which, once they arrived under the walls of Constantinople, had sacked numerous patrician villas along the coast of Bosphorus, launching several arrows as a provocation into the area of the Great Imperial Palace. Furthermore, to avoid the start of the campaign against him, Roger supported the Bavarians ( who were in revolt against Conrad ) to prevent him from undertaking the campaign in Italy and joining the Rhomanois army
but when everything seemed ready for the start of Manuel's Italian expedition ( who had earned the support of Venice, Pope Eugene III and naturally Conrad ) the death of Houestauffen unfortunately upset the plans ( since Frederick I known as Barbarossa , could not fulfill his uncle's promises, due to urgent problems in Germany ) when in 1155 the news reached Manuel that the barons of Puglia ( who had never looked favorably on the Altavillas ) were intending to rebel and were asking for his support, he did not lose heart and sent his two best generals to Italy : Michael Paleologos and john Doukas, with the mission of contacting the Apulian barons and possibly if Frederick was still in Italy ( he was crowned emperor just the year before, and in the following months he was trying to impose his government on the cities municipal councils of northern Italy ) with the aim of meeting him and asking him if he would support the Byzantine Empire against the kingdom of Sicily ( a meeting which took place in Ancona, but which was opposed by the German barons who did not want to prolong their stay on the peninsula any longer ) for the first year the campaign proved to be a resounding success, given that the Byzantines managed to recover the whole of today's Puglia, furthermore even Pope Hadrian IV himself was contributing ( which from a diplomatic point of view was a real coup of prestige and great skill on the part of Manuel ) but unfortunately the death of Michael Paleologos and the flight of the Apulian barons forced the remaining army to fight King William in clear inferiority, and they were obviously defeated
therefore there were many causes that led the Byzantines to the failure of this campaign, but if it had occurred a few years earlier, allowing for greater collaboration between HRE and Byzantium, then it is probable that the Altavillas would not have fared so fortunately like Otl ( it could certainly happen that due to problems between the allies, the expedition fails or is only half successful, but at least in Constantinople for a few decades they wouldn't have to worry about a possible attack from the western front of the Empire ), it is also likely that this campaign ( if it is successful ) unintentionally strengthened the Houffenstaufen's position in the Empire and in Italy, perhaps allowing Conrad his coronation as full-fledged Emperor, particularly if it is actually begun as scheduled in 1148/9, finally, a further marriage in the future between the two imperial families cannot be ruled out, in particular there was talk of marrying Henry Berengar to a Porphyrogenite princess
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If I'm not mistaken, John was not planning before his death the creation of a vassal state which would have seen Armenian Cilicia and Antioch incorporated between them, giving it under the control of Manuel ( especially if we consider his already present and important Latinophilia at the time ) ?, and this would already result in easing the pressure on the southern flank of Byzantium ( given that Antioch would be under a friendly government, it would also theoretically strengthen Outremer's position in the region )
Question, if they got back southern Italy, how would history have changed?
The biggest potential change is that having a military presence so close to Rome might make it easier to force through Manuel’s much dreamed of church reunion, making it a lot easier for someone like bela Alexios to succeed him.
still quoting an old comment of mine on this subject, I see the realization of a scenario you describe as difficult, but the pontiff would never, ever give up his role guide of the church, in order to be on a par with Constantinople, given that just 100 years earlier, the "two souls" of the same church quarreled with each other, it is more it is probable that the Pope allowed an equality of dignity between himself and the Byzantine Emperor rather than with his patriarch ( because already from the 7th century the popes had no problem excommunicating and deposing patriarchs or even in exceptional cases Emperors, certainly at the beginning when the Emperor could still exercise great power in the peninsula, they risked being deposed, but most of the time they managed to prevail ) so it is unlikely that the pope would voluntarily demote himself, as would his political creature ( the Holy Roman Empire ) representative of Latin Christianity, the most I can see is a definitive solution to the problem of the two Emperors, mediated by Rome, which sees Constantinople at least at an ecclesiastical level bowing to the papacy ( but keeping their liturgy almost intact )
certainly if the military campaign succeeds then the Normans are destroyed or greatly weakened, leaving them only with Sicily ( the first place where they had settled 2 centuries ago ) and dividing the South between the papacy, the Byzantines and the HRE (+ any independent Campanian nobles ) , I also see the Latin clergy remaining where they are, even in the new territories taken by Byzantium ( particularly where there is a Romance-speaking majority ), furthermore, the power that emerges potentially most strengthened by this is HRE, which sees its direct rival in the totally fragmented boot ( the Norman kingdom ) while the Papacy will have to struggle to pacify, govern and then incorporate the new possessions thus temporarily diverting attention towards imperial maneuvers, without forgetting that with the Rhomanoi once again with one foot in Italy, I don't know how willing the papacy would be to have good relations with them in the future if they show expansionist ambitions, so it will end up once again seeking the support of the HRE
Especially if we consider that in Otl his subsequent attempts to expand in the region ( both through soft power and militarily ) created profound tensions with Frederick I and the various pontiffs, in particular the question of Ancona, legally a city disputed both by the Papacy and by the HRE, but technically an independent commune that flirted with Manuel ( its main supporter and " feudal lord " ) about the possibility of assistance from Constantinople to expand its territory and to defend this situation from external interference ( such as Venice, which was hostile to it ) if I'm not mistaken it lasted until 1777 ( certainly until 1773, the year in which the city was put under siege by Frederick and Manuel financed his resistance )
without forgetting that even the situation of the Papacy in this period is not exactly excellent, given that technically it has not recovered full control of Rome ( still in the hands of the senators, who had even proposed to Conrad to come to the city to receive the imperial investiture, excluding the Pope from the process )
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I tend to disagree with this point of view. Firstly, I think effectively establishing control over Central Anatolia îs much harder that it seems. I remember that one bizantine writer describes how hard it was for John Komnenos to keep control over reocuppied areas in Asia Minor given the fact that after the main army retreated, the Turks would simply move in again and the status quo will be maintained. From 1071 the ethnic make up of central Anatolia has changed and it would be hard to dominate a sizable hostile population. The economic benefit of controlling central Anatolia îs not great either as Byzantium retained control over fertile western areas of Asia Minor.
Controlling southern Italy was not a bad idea nu any means. The normans remained a significant threat to Byzantium for a long time and at that point in tine there seems to be a golden opportunity to end this treat (favourable relațions with the Papacy, with HRE, italian barons in revolt). However, Manuel should have been aware that as soon as Byzantium set foot in Italy he will lose this advantage. Venice will not want a closed Adriatic sea, the German Empire will be dubious in regards to a more powerful Byzantium, the Pope will feel threatened.
Controlling Syria-Palestine is also important. Sincer the foundation of the Crusader States the region is a hub of comercial activity and intelectual exchanges between Christians and Muslims. Byzantium also was an informal patron of the Latin States in the absence of a continued support from the West.
Killing a close relative like Andronikos I am not sure if it was not something taboo. Exile would be preferable or confinement in a monastery.
Manuel did not have an erratic or fundamentally irational foreign policy. At the end of his reign, Byzantium was probably stilul the most rich and powerful state in Europe. A specific state of circumstances have resulted in the collapse which ended in 1204.
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I never said it would be accomplished easily or quickly, or that it would happen under Manuel's reign.
The immediate goal wouldn't be annexation of the Plateau (that would've been impractical as you so clearly pointed out). So long as there was a unified Turkish realm on the Plateau any attempt to hold on to a part of it would be essentially unlikely to be held for more than a few years at best.
So no, Manuel's goal would be the dissolution of the Sultanate of Rum, leaving the Plateau fragmented and vulnerable to Roman Largess. This essentially transforms the 12th century Anatolian Plateau into something like 10th Century Armenia and a similar pattern would emerge here.
This was a realistic goal considering what ultimately happened to the Sultanate of Rum historically in the 13th Century, it was just that by the time the Turks became fragmented the Romans were too weak, divided, and distracted by events in the West to take advantage.
Reintegration of the Plateau back into the Empire would've likely taken at least a century, if not a bit longer.
Treadgold makes many good points on the emperor. Basically was he was satisfied with short term prestige vs concrete results. A good strategy would have been
1 follop up on his initial victories in his first year
2 stay neutral vs allie with germans against the sicilians
3 focus on consistent nibbling vs the Turks with constant deep raids. Filling in with soldier forts
4 defence in the west when neccessary
5 mild support vs crusaders.
6 each mile of deeper reconquest of anatolia would put a mile of more protected area for better non raided tax area. Capture 50 miles in and you have 50 miles of area the Turks would have to raid thru to get to productive areas.
7 after 25 years of this strategy of deep aggressive army raids with fort construction and farmer soldiers as well as full campaigns vs major targets most of anatolia would have been seized.
8 repopulate anatolia and transfer Turkish captives to the Balkans would have created stability.
9 if Sicily opportunity had come up after these conquests then do it right with a full commitment
A stable shortened border with mountains to protect it, re populated borders with heavy fortifications, and a stable anatolia without constant destructive raids, would have created a great area for excellent tax revenue and a base for military recruiting. Forward support in the crusader states to keep them around. ( low cost good value), and opportunistic conquests in Sicily would again have protected the core tax areas from devestastation.
1 follop up on his initial victories in his first year
2 stay neutral vs allie with germans against the sicilians
3 focus on consistent nibbling vs the Turks with constant deep raids. Filling in with soldier forts
4 defence in the west when neccessary
5 mild support vs crusaders.
6 each mile of deeper reconquest of anatolia would put a mile of more protected area for better non raided tax area. Capture 50 miles in and you have 50 miles of area the Turks would have to raid thru to get to productive areas.
7 after 25 years of this strategy of deep aggressive army raids with fort construction and farmer soldiers as well as full campaigns vs major targets most of anatolia would have been seized.
8 repopulate anatolia and transfer Turkish captives to the Balkans would have created stability.
9 if Sicily opportunity had come up after these conquests then do it right with a full commitment
A stable shortened border with mountains to protect it, re populated borders with heavy fortifications, and a stable anatolia without constant destructive raids, would have created a great area for excellent tax revenue and a base for military recruiting. Forward support in the crusader states to keep them around. ( low cost good value), and opportunistic conquests in Sicily would again have protected the core tax areas from devestastation.
It was to put to a more permanent end the periodic Hungarian invasions of the Balkans.
Unfortunately, I have to disagree with this on one major point: Manuel could not simply chip away territory from the Seljuks. So long as there was a (largely) unified Turkish state on the Plateau, the Turks could easily take back any land taken from them on the Plateau. The Plateau could not be reconquered and defended in piecemeal while there was a unified authority who could gather together the resources necessary to retake it fairly easily. This was the lived experience of the Empire ever since Alexios I and the First Crusade reconquered Western Anatolia. You had to either take the Plateau whole (which outside of very particular circumstances, it's pretty much impossible to do) or convince the Turks to join the Empire and rule bits of the Plateau for Constantinople (similar to what the Empire did to the Armenians during the 10th Century), which isn't happening so long as there's a viable alternate center of authority to the Empire (i.e. the Sultan in Iconium).
In many ways the relationship between the Empire and the Turks was very similar to that between the Empire and the Bulgarians (especially before the Bulgarians converted to Christianity). Both states involved Steppe nomads settling/squatting Imperial land at a time when imperial authority over the land in question was dubious at best. Both states involved the Empire trying to stamp them out so that they could recover the land at their leisure and both states successfully blunted Imperial attempts to do so.
Where they diverge is in three points:
1) The Turks had far more land than the Bulgarians in which to maintain their Steppe Nomad lifestyle.
2) The Turks never converted to any form of Christianity.
3) The Romans were able to reconquer Bulgaria (for a time).
The third one is the most interesting as we're talking about the Empire reconquering the Turks. So how did the Romans reconquer Bulgaria? Well, John Tzimiskes successfully reconquered Bulgaria after the Rus invaded and successfully conquered Bulgaria and the Romans successfully kicked them out. That's what allowed the Empire to reintegrate Bulgaria more or less whole back into the state. It's not quite so simple as that, but for the sake of brevity, I'll leave it there.
Why is that interesting? No one invaded the Seljuk Sultanate... except for the Mongols in the 1240s. Had the Romans been in a stronger position in the 1240s (i.e. get rid of Andronikos Komnenos, I don't care how) it's not impossible that they would take advantage of the Mongol Invasion to retake the Plateau...
I think the best way would have been to use the Second Crusade to his advantage, like I think it's a better idea to crush the Seljuk sultanate than to progressively advance in the plateau and built forts. The crusaders could be perfect for that task, you'd just need Manuel to give them full support (like you could argue that he couldn't, because of Roger II, but what Roger did was just a raiding campaign, never intending to do something similar to Robert Guiscard, Manuel was conscious about this and just use it as an excuse), so why didn't Manuel do that? Because Conrad disrespected him as much as he could, so in the time it must have seemed reasonable for him to not support the crusade that much (I think it's interesting to think about how Alexios would have acted in a similar situation, and I'm pretty sure he would have supported the crusade anyways as literally half of the men from the first crusade did that and he still gave almost as much support as he reasonably could).
I think if he did that, either because Manuel is a bit more like or because Conrad was less of an idiot, victory is assured, it's likely that a success in Anatolia similar or greater to that of the first crusade could happen. Like, the second battle of Dorylaeum was a disaster because the Germans thought that Manuel had a lot more control over those lands than he actually had; as the Turks had a lot more control over the countryside than the Romans even though Dorylaeum was a Byzantine possession; so, if they knew this, and had Byzantine troops they could pretty much have won and advance further, in a similar fashion to that of Frederick in the third crusade, when he pretty much humbled the Seljuks, who at that time were stronger than during the second crusade.
In this situation Manuel has a lot of time and without (or with a weaker) the central authority of the Seljuks he could easily crush Thoros II, like he has a lot of time to progressively consolidate his authority before a threat to his power could arise in Anatolia; his situation is even better considering that at this time the Danishmendids realm is divided and in conflict between Malatya and Sivas.
I think if he did that, either because Manuel is a bit more like or because Conrad was less of an idiot, victory is assured, it's likely that a success in Anatolia similar or greater to that of the first crusade could happen. Like, the second battle of Dorylaeum was a disaster because the Germans thought that Manuel had a lot more control over those lands than he actually had; as the Turks had a lot more control over the countryside than the Romans even though Dorylaeum was a Byzantine possession; so, if they knew this, and had Byzantine troops they could pretty much have won and advance further, in a similar fashion to that of Frederick in the third crusade, when he pretty much humbled the Seljuks, who at that time were stronger than during the second crusade.
In this situation Manuel has a lot of time and without (or with a weaker) the central authority of the Seljuks he could easily crush Thoros II, like he has a lot of time to progressively consolidate his authority before a threat to his power could arise in Anatolia; his situation is even better considering that at this time the Danishmendids realm is divided and in conflict between Malatya and Sivas.
This seems to imply a lot more interest in helping Manuel in Anatolia than either Louis or Conrad ever displayed is also a thing.
I would also have to disagree with this. As long as the empire didn’t just self-destruct like OTL and held the Balkans and the rest of Anatolia etc, It’s far easier for the empire to hold and retake the Plateaus than whoever holds the Plateaus to take the rest of Anatolia. The empire flat out(no pun intended) has far more resources than whoever holds the Plateaus.Indeed, that was the case with the Ottomans taking out the Karamanids . The demographics overall far favoured the empire as well.
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Interesting thoughts. However where I disagree is in the initial years Manuel won a major victory vs the Turks. A combination of major invasions to grab key points, constant major raids to devastate flocks and keep the Turks off balance, and create fortified towns in the conquered lands would have worked well.
And why wouldn't it? The Turks problem is that there just frankly aren't that many of them. That is why you attrition them without stopping. To return to the Bulgarian Empire example, overrunning Eastern Bulgaria wasn't some cheat code. This happened in 970. By 986 they had regained that area. Then Basil 'the Bulgar-Slayer' shifted to more of an attritional focus. From 1001-1018 there were no less than 10 campaigns. This resulted in marginal areas being chipped away and even before Kleidion a clear shift in the tide. There are definitely areas on the north side in Anatolia that could have been chipped off geographically and weren't. But the point is the Byzantines have like 5X the population of Rum. It doesn't matter they can't hold those footholds on the plateau, what matters is the Turks are bleeding just like Byzantines, but they can't take it. It will take a long time to secure core Plateau. There may be some ugly defeats. But the balance will shift and sooner or later the luck of the draw will be a major Turkish defeat, like Kleidion, and then the final conquest begins. Nomads are hard problems, but not unsolvable ones. John actually did press pretty hard in 1130-1140, but that was the only truly consistent period of pressure, and yes it was bitter and 2 steps forward 1 back (eerily like Bulgaria in that way!). Manuel's effort by contrast was a couple campaigns then a long gap in style. Also frankly seems clear John was a better general than him, but then Bulgar-Slayer's record is pretty mixed too. But a 40-year reign was a precious opportunity to for long-term commitment to some problem and instead Manuel was constantly hopping between things.
It would have been similar to a N Phocas strategy of raids to downgrade the enemy then major campaign to capture key cities, forts. Destroy the economy, and the confidence of the enemy.
The real problem of the matter is that Manuel expected to have/obtain treatment very similar to that which Alexios I had with the participants of the first crusade, i.e. an oath of submission ( albeit informal ) which recognizes his superior authority towards Conrad and Louis ( which is a bit difficult to make a King and an aspiring Emperor accept, compared to the "simple" nobles ) certainly the small skirmishes between the Crusaders and the Byzantines during the journey to Constantinople did not help, but it goes Having said that any " feudal Kings " of the time would have extreme difficulty in constantly keeping his soldiers in line compared to the Byzantine army, therefore it is not that all the clashes were actively sought, but rather they arose spontaneously, finally there is consider the small problem of the issue, called the problem of the two Emperors, where it was very common for the two Caesars to " diplomatically insult " each other by denigrating the other as King of the Greeks/Germans, rather than with the official title of Roman Emperor ( only when relations were good or Byzantium was in a weak situation, that HRE was officially recognized as a legitimate Emperor, most of the time of the Franks, in particular cases such as Caesar of the West, prime example Otto III with Basil II ) if Manuel had decided to take the first step ( 1 ), recognizing Conrad's claim to the imperial title ( without specifying whether he was a Caesar of the Romans or not ) then it is likely that relations between the two would have immediately improved ( just see what happens then in Otl , when they became very good friends ) so the chances of the latter helping him slightly in Anatolia against the Seljuks would be good
1 ) of course we must also keep in mind that it was the first time for Manuel in which he met or interacted directly with prominent exponents of Latin Europe, therefore he had not yet developed his diplomatic ability and wide knowledge of Latin politics ( for example just see how he actually wisely tried to seek the support of the Pope and the Italian cities/nobility to take the title of HRE away from Frederick I a decade later ) , which he then naturally had in the future, therefore it can be said that perhaps out of fear of not appearing weak or politically inexperienced / immature, you insist more on his role as legitimate Basileus of the Rhomanoi, unnecessarily creating friction
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