I had a book called the "Rise and Fall of the British Navy" by Richard Humble and IIRC he wrote that the Luftwaffe should have concentrated on bombing Britain's west coast during the Blitz because one of the OTL raids on Liverpool put umpteen percent out of its port out of action for umpteen weeks. I've written umpteen because I don't remember the exact figures and can't find a copy of the book on the internet.
WI: Luftwaffe focused on Liverpool docks
- Thread starter Icarus II
- Start date
When I first read this I thought that you meant during the Blitz. Now that I've read it again, do you mean that they concentrate on the ports in daylight during the Battle of Britain by bombing ports during the day instead of bombing British airfields?
Something to consider about attacking the west coast ports is that the British air defence system was designed to defend Britain from unescorted bombers coming across the North Sea from bases in Germany and the Low Countries. Even No. 10 (Fighter) Group in SW England (whose creation was planned well before the Fall of France) was designed with that in mind rather than to defend the area from attack by aircraft based in NW France.
Therefore, even unescorted daylight attacks on SW ports like Plymouth, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea & Milford Haven are likely to have taken proportionally lighter losses than escorted attacks on airfields in SW England due to there being fewer fighters, anti-aircraft balloons, radar stations and a less well developed control & reporting network than SE England.
I've been skimming through the AHB narrative on Fighter Command in 1941 and the air defences of SW England and the Irish Sea were considered inadequate even then. In the case of the Irish Sea it was thought that it couldn't be made secure until Fighter Command was allowed to extend itself into Southern Ireland and contingency plans were made to do that.
Therefore, even unescorted daylight attacks on SW ports like Plymouth, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea & Milford Haven are likely to have taken proportionally lighter losses than escorted attacks on airfields in SW England due to there being fewer fighters, anti-aircraft balloons, radar stations and a less well developed control & reporting network than SE England.
I've been skimming through the AHB narrative on Fighter Command in 1941 and the air defences of SW England and the Irish Sea were considered inadequate even then. In the case of the Irish Sea it was thought that it couldn't be made secure until Fighter Command was allowed to extend itself into Southern Ireland and contingency plans were made to do that.
Outside of some discussion in the case of invasion there wasn't much planning for any extension of Fighter Command into Ireland that I've seen mentioned from the Irish side?
I've seen maps showing the names and boundaries of the fighter sectors that it planned to create.
Here's a link to the Air History Branch's website.
You want The Air Defence of Great Britain Vol IV The Beginning of the Fighter Offensive 1940-1941 which also has National Archives file reference AIR 41/18.
Lot's more attrition of Luftwaffe units. As pointed out, Liverpool is a long haul from bases in Northern France and the Low Countries, they will have to fly across a lot more defended territory to get to Liverpool and it's going to be beyond the range of their navigation aids so they will be bombing using dead reckoning so accuracy is going to be awful. Also if it becomes apparent Liverpool is the primary target the Army is going to be moving a lot of AAA units, searchlights, balloons and night fighters into the area.
In addition, if the docks are being hammered there is nothing to stop the ships being sent to Glasgow.
Had a read through that, and went looking at some notes from the Irish side and it seems plans and positions jumped around fairly wildly as to what the Staff ideas were for operations in Ireland both before and during this period of the war, with a range of different deployments. Seems the furthest it got on the Irish side was agreeing to do a few surveys of potential airbases, but nothing came of those either.
If Liverpool docks are temporarily out of action, it can provide a source of skilled dockworkers.
I am actually intrigued. Did the Germans even know this at the time?
Yeah we went along the disused one as the brother and his family are around Carlisle, have to be honest the bits of the old embankments didn't look wide enough to have a double track?
And as pointed out Luftwaffe night raids suffered 1% loss rate from June 1940 to May 1941 IOTL.
And as pointed out Liverpool was the second most heavily bombed area of the UK IOTL, so the Luftwaffe was able to find the place at night.
Does anyone know the effective rangers of Knickebein, X-Gerät & Y-Gerät?
And as pointed out the British air defences (including No. 10 Group) were designed to to fight enemy aircraft coming across the North Sea from bases in Germany and the Low Countries.
And as pointed out the searchlights, AA guns & night fighters weren't rather ineffective until April 1941.
E.g. in November 1940 the Luftwaffe launched 5,495 night sorties against land targets and the British defences claimed 22 aircraft or 0.39% of which 20 (0.36%) were claimed by AA guns & 2 (0.04%) were claimed by fighters.
And there's nothing to stop the Luftwaffe from hammering Glasgow after they've bombed Liverpool and when the ships are sent to Bristol there's nothing to stop the Luftwaffe hammering Bristol and so on.
It's true that the local AA defences and fighter allocation would have been less intense in the west compared with the South East, but the aircraft have to cross the North Sea then cross Britain and then return which means they will face a possibility of interception.
Given night time navigation issues [1], there would be a need for more or less standard routes, there and back which makes interception a bit more likely even for very early night fighters.
And, of course, resources can be redirected go deal with specific challenges.
[1] Assuming unescorted daytime raids are undesirable - to the Luftwaffe, as Big Wing fans would love to play on the return trip - night raids are the only option.
Except that it's more likely that they'll be coming from bases in Northern France (preferably in Britany & the Contentin Peninsula) and fly over Cornwall & Wales to Liverpool.
They've got Knickebein, X-Gerät & Y-Gerät and Kampfgruppe 100 which is more than RAF Bomber Command had in 1940. I haven't discovered the effective ranges though.
And said resources were rather ineffective a night until April and May 1941. Proof is on the way.
Plus the Luftwaffe can make the odd raid on SW England or the East Midlands which would prevent Fighter & AA Commands from concentrating on Western Britain.
On Liverpool and Glasgow yes. However, if the Luftwaffe bombs a port in SW England or South Wales, e.g. Cardiff during there's no big wing between them and home. There still wasn't in 1941 IOTL.
As I've already written the effectiveness of the RAF's night fighters and AA units was awful until April 1941. See the table below.
And here it is.
- More enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by fighters in April 1941 (48½) than Jne 1940 to February 1941 combined (42).
- More than twice as many enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by night fighters in May 1941 (96) than June 1940 to February 1941 (42).
- About 50% of the enemy aircraft claimed destroyed were in the period April to May 1941.
Last edited:
Your proposal is to use the Luftwaffe in cooperation with the Atlantic campaign in order to place greater stress on the UK's import/export logistics. Not the worst idea ever posted on a coherent German post-Battle of France strategy. A couple notes
- The UK's convoy system required seamless dockyard operations because, unlike during peacetime, when convoys showed up, it instantly placed a premium on dock space, to get dozens of loaded freighters all unloaded as quickly as possible. If the system were disrupted then the British might have to increase independent sailings in order to better space out dock requirements, and this in turn would increase losses, or they would be forced to leave ships at anchor for weeks at a time waiting for dock space.
- Using German twin engine bombers at night during the BoB would have reduced overall casualties, but at the same time, the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic was probably not strong enough to fully exploit a coordinated strategic strategy.
- I think posters suggesting navigation problems for Liverpool are not correct. Liverpool was a coastal target sitting in a distinctive, "angle" with the rivers Dee and Mersey, all this combining to make this area very distinctive to bomber crew. I think overall coastal targets, with their visible contrast between sea and land, were always easier for night bombing than inland targets were.
- Had the Luftwaffe kept magnetic mines in reserve rather than squander the advantage in 1939, a sea mining component to a bombing strategy might have had a few months of extreme shock to the system.
- On the topic of mines, it's ahistorical but I think there is a case for aerial mining having employed larger numbers of smaller mines, as damaging ships was often more lucrative to tying up dockyard resources than sinking them.
Last edited:
Curious. In comparing this to actual German bomber losses here, (near the bottom of the article)
The Blitz - Wikipedia
The claimed kills from October 1940 to March 1941 are understated (126.5 claimed vs 201 actual), while for April and May 1941 the pattern flips (144. 5 claimed vs 113 actual).
For what it's worth here's the Wikipedia article and my table side by side.Curious. In comparing this to actual German bomber losses here, (near the bottom of the article)
The Blitz - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
The claimed kills from October 1940 to March 1941 are understated (126.5 claimed vs 201 actual), while for April and May 1941 the pattern flips (144. 5 claimed vs 113 actual).
My source (which is the night sorties only) has fewer sorties but more kills.
And here are the two sources showing October 40 to March 1941 & April to May 1941.
My source has fewer night sorties than Wikipedia in both periods. However, as you wrote claims were less than losses in the first period and more than losses in the second period.
Last edited:
I meant nighttime raids during the Blitz. I really should've said "From the summer of 1940 forwards" since the Luftwaffe would ideally keep the campaign going until either Britain surrenders or losses get prohibitively high.
ITTL, bombing the airfields by day could still happen, but it would be to facilitate the Liverpool Blitz rather than getting air superiority for Sealion.
I'm not sure. I believe the Germans had access to some ship manifests from New York harbor early in the war. They might pick up on how many are arriving at Liverpool
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Whatever else, this saves the world from trite evolutions of pop music most likely. 
Last edited:
One of my uncles (by marriage), an ex-seafarer, did fire-watch on the river-facing side of Liverpool's Anglican Cathedral's vast roof. Armed with a short shovel and a half-bucket of sand, he'd jog to and fro, pry flaring incendiaries out of the roof's lead sheathing before they could burn through.
He also had an excellent view of raids' progress.
Not as good a view as the spotters atop the cathedral tower, though. Their secure phone-lines to the famous underground control centre near Castle Street meant that even when street-level was in chaos, their reports allowed best use of resources, mapping of open routes. Down-side, if, like the unfortunate French cathedral, fire got set in the roof timbers, it would roar up the tower. The spotters knew they'd have to report as long as they could, then jump to quick deaths...
The Luftwaffe knew the tower was used for this 'C&C' spotting, many aircraft tried to strafe it. However, along the steep ridge behind the cathedral, there was a line of barrage balloons. The prospect of clipping a wing sufficiently discouraged such attacks...
Also, the Luftwaffe had promised fame and Iron Cross to the crew that managed to hit, flood the famous Mersey Tunnel. So, many bombs that would otherwise be dropped on ships, docks, rail-stations, warehouses etc went into the river. Even though the tunnel lay no deeper than a shallow submarine, all missed.
Mind you, the risk of catastrophic flooding meant that the main tunnel and its two branches could not be used as an air-raid shelter or factory, only as storage...
He also had an excellent view of raids' progress.
Not as good a view as the spotters atop the cathedral tower, though. Their secure phone-lines to the famous underground control centre near Castle Street meant that even when street-level was in chaos, their reports allowed best use of resources, mapping of open routes. Down-side, if, like the unfortunate French cathedral, fire got set in the roof timbers, it would roar up the tower. The spotters knew they'd have to report as long as they could, then jump to quick deaths...
The Luftwaffe knew the tower was used for this 'C&C' spotting, many aircraft tried to strafe it. However, along the steep ridge behind the cathedral, there was a line of barrage balloons. The prospect of clipping a wing sufficiently discouraged such attacks...
Also, the Luftwaffe had promised fame and Iron Cross to the crew that managed to hit, flood the famous Mersey Tunnel. So, many bombs that would otherwise be dropped on ships, docks, rail-stations, warehouses etc went into the river. Even though the tunnel lay no deeper than a shallow submarine, all missed.
Mind you, the risk of catastrophic flooding meant that the main tunnel and its two branches could not be used as an air-raid shelter or factory, only as storage...