I think bombing London less and the west coast ports more in combination with a more intensive aerial mining campaign would have been a good idea (for the Germans) but it won't be a panacea.
For the benefit of people who have been writing that it was harder to find Liverpool at night than London, the Luftwaffe was a lot better at night navigation than the RAF in 1940 & 1941 (because it had the Knickebein, X-Gerät & Y-Gerät navigation aids and a pathfinder unit in the form of Kampfgruppe 100) which is evidenced by the fact that IOTL Liverpool was the most heavily bombed area of the UK outside London.
It has also been written that losses would be higher, which is probable, but they would not have been prohibitively higher. This is because because the British night fighters and anti-aircraft guns didn't become effective until April & May 1941 when (according to the Air History Branch Narrative) 215½ enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. This was more than half of the 419 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by night fighters & AA guns between 01.06.40 & 31.05.41. However, the 419 aircraft destroyed between 01.06.40 & 31.05.41 represented only 1.02% of the Luftwaffe's sorties against land targets. Furthermore, the 88 aircraft claimed destroyed in April 1941 were only 1.07% of the 4,535 enemy sorties against land targets & the 127½ claimed destroyed in May 1941 were a more respectable 3.14% of the 4,055 enemy sorties against land targets.
The Luftwaffe did conduct an aerial mining campaign against Britain IOTL, which was conducted by a special, which was formed on 01.02.40 as 9. Flieger-Division and was redesignated IX. Fliegerkorps in November 1940. Its commander from its formation until 29.12.42 was Joachim Coeler who IIRC was a Reischsmarine officer who transferred to the Luftwaffe in its early days.