Well, this thread is already sinking like a u-boat
in the South Atlantic, like a US battleship at Pearl Harbor!
Anyway I'll post one more time, to remind someone it still exists.
I believe more could be said about the whole appeasement crowd who had so much influence in Western politics even after Poland and Norway had started. The British military really didn't get full clearance to really go to War until Churchill became PM after Chamberlain left.
Meanwhile, in France the same government remained. There numerous opportunities for the French and British both to have gone further on the offensive than they did, as has beens noted probably ad nauseum.
The idea France would have extended the Maginot Line all the way to the Channel, somehow (assuming the engineering side could be worked out, such issues as water table, etc, by just moving further in away from the questionable ground surfaces), is, I thought, somewhat more LIKELY than some of the other things the involved the French actually attacking Germany, during this point in time, because it all has to be viewed in the context of the Appeasers and their high levels of influence during this time.
One historian called it "the sinister trance". Conservatives were hypnotized by Hitler's vague promises to attack Communists. What they weren't being told so clearly, was his very definite commitment to kill a whole lot of other folks, and to avenge Germany against France, Britain--and, if possible, that ostrich across the Atlantic.
The US did much the same as the other Allied democracies. We suffered the same fate at Pearl Harbor at the hands of the Japanese as France suffered trying to believe the war with Germany might be a "phony war".
FDR had attempted to beef up the US air arsenal and was "exposed" by McCormick's newspapers as being a "warmonger".
So we had to pull back and sit on our haunches and wait for the enemy to hit us before building up.
As one reporter had said about the British in Malaya and Singapore a little later, the United States had to "get ready for a war with the war already going on."
France, at least, had done some goodly amount of preparation a few years before for a war, and a bit of updating of her forces. But the conservatives gradually fell under Hitler's "sinister trance", and preferred to focus on the idea of an alliance with him against Stalin. Though they were getting close to being ready at one point, the French began to slough off again, under influence, in part, of the Appeasers.
So, that's why, toward the later year or two before War started, I could find it relatively easy to believe that extending Maginot would have been the appropriation the Appeasers might have approved, and so, might have been the single most likely major change from otl.
It would have taken Hitler a little while to adjust, to compensate his planning for war, with the longer Maginot as a factor. An attack on France by way of Belgium became more problematic. Ironically, though numerous posters here have asserted that the Maginot Line "forced" Hitler to attack France through Belgium--and therefore "would have" worked if extended across the area bordering Belgium, I believe a powerful case could be made that just the opposite would have have happened:
Hitler would ignore Belgium, short run, and go straight for France, using heavy siege guns against the longer Maginot, and a beefed up airborne contingent to jump over it, accompanied by a couple of amphib ops already described.
While air resupply was in its infancy, Hitler had some capacity for it already, and could have beefed up that capacity. With even more resources freed to use against France by avoiding the Netherlands and Belgium--and perhaps Denmark/Norway, though that's more questionable--he'd have been a tough foe. Getting panzers in by air would be a challenge, but probably not insurmountable, given the Allies were clearly weak on AA and also on aircraft. The inexorable pattern would have formed yet again--as we saw it form over and over for the early years: Allied forces, taking a drubbing from the air, because they were not equipped to cope yet.
On top of more Germans on the ground available, you've got more French troops residing in the Maginot Line, unavailable to counter-attack against the paratroopers. Yet, even with all those limits, just this one change could have produced a longer campaign, one with more potential to get the French fleet out to the Allies, and to keep more French colonies for Free France, and to spare Paris the occupation and possibly more of France.
On seeing a more passive France than in otl, Hitler might have felt less intimidated by a smaller occupied area in France. Meanwhile, the BEF is entirely in France, with no campaign in Belgium, at the time of the last phases of the Battle of France. There's no reason they couldn't complete a successful withdrawal as Dunkirk. That tends to get the remainder of the time line on track with otl. Battle of Britain would or could still boil down to air, although there is more potential for a paratrooper attack against Britain--as well as more in the way of really heavy artillery to aim across the Channel.
The Allies have more ships afloat, and better anti-sub capacity. They also may have more of North Africa, including Libya. This precludes the Axis counter-attack against Wavell and probably means North Africa is over by early 1941. Meanwhile, with his forces freed up, Wavell can assist the Greeks more effectively. Whether effectively enough, is entirely questionable, as there were still numerous parties stubbornly insisting the Brits fight on without adequate air cover. This was to persist well past December 1941, with Churchill still trying the airless approach at Kos and Leros years later. I doubt, therefore, that they can really defeat any German attack in Greece and Crete. They just...will have a more solid base in North Africa and less tied down having to defend it.
Meantime, with a larger force for the Brits to use in Greece, the campaign there might last slightly longer than otl, just meaning the likelihood of Barbarossa succeeding is even less than otl, too. I say "slightly" longer, because there is no indication the Brits will have better air support than otl, just more lightly-armed people on the ground.
The French fleet is a big help, too. Good to have them on board.
And, in 1942 and again in 1944, they will have been and will continue to be a big help to the Allied re-invasion activities. Meanwhile, the French Resistance will have a much bigger area to start from, and Hitler will have his work cut out for him, in moving into that much larger area to occupy it in advance of D-Day.
Could we get some D-520s out to North Africa, it might be possible to equip them with radios--possibly even before America's entry into the War. They could prove of some help to the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, providing air support for some areas that wasn't there otl.
France, in short, is going to be a more active player here, than otl.
Well, I guess this is goodbye to this thread, then. By the time I can see it again, it will be heading for the bottom, I suppose.
in the South Atlantic, like a US battleship at Pearl Harbor!
Anyway I'll post one more time, to remind someone it still exists.
I believe more could be said about the whole appeasement crowd who had so much influence in Western politics even after Poland and Norway had started. The British military really didn't get full clearance to really go to War until Churchill became PM after Chamberlain left.
Meanwhile, in France the same government remained. There numerous opportunities for the French and British both to have gone further on the offensive than they did, as has beens noted probably ad nauseum.
The idea France would have extended the Maginot Line all the way to the Channel, somehow (assuming the engineering side could be worked out, such issues as water table, etc, by just moving further in away from the questionable ground surfaces), is, I thought, somewhat more LIKELY than some of the other things the involved the French actually attacking Germany, during this point in time, because it all has to be viewed in the context of the Appeasers and their high levels of influence during this time.
One historian called it "the sinister trance". Conservatives were hypnotized by Hitler's vague promises to attack Communists. What they weren't being told so clearly, was his very definite commitment to kill a whole lot of other folks, and to avenge Germany against France, Britain--and, if possible, that ostrich across the Atlantic.
The US did much the same as the other Allied democracies. We suffered the same fate at Pearl Harbor at the hands of the Japanese as France suffered trying to believe the war with Germany might be a "phony war".
FDR had attempted to beef up the US air arsenal and was "exposed" by McCormick's newspapers as being a "warmonger".
So we had to pull back and sit on our haunches and wait for the enemy to hit us before building up.
As one reporter had said about the British in Malaya and Singapore a little later, the United States had to "get ready for a war with the war already going on."
France, at least, had done some goodly amount of preparation a few years before for a war, and a bit of updating of her forces. But the conservatives gradually fell under Hitler's "sinister trance", and preferred to focus on the idea of an alliance with him against Stalin. Though they were getting close to being ready at one point, the French began to slough off again, under influence, in part, of the Appeasers.
So, that's why, toward the later year or two before War started, I could find it relatively easy to believe that extending Maginot would have been the appropriation the Appeasers might have approved, and so, might have been the single most likely major change from otl.
It would have taken Hitler a little while to adjust, to compensate his planning for war, with the longer Maginot as a factor. An attack on France by way of Belgium became more problematic. Ironically, though numerous posters here have asserted that the Maginot Line "forced" Hitler to attack France through Belgium--and therefore "would have" worked if extended across the area bordering Belgium, I believe a powerful case could be made that just the opposite would have have happened:
Hitler would ignore Belgium, short run, and go straight for France, using heavy siege guns against the longer Maginot, and a beefed up airborne contingent to jump over it, accompanied by a couple of amphib ops already described.
While air resupply was in its infancy, Hitler had some capacity for it already, and could have beefed up that capacity. With even more resources freed to use against France by avoiding the Netherlands and Belgium--and perhaps Denmark/Norway, though that's more questionable--he'd have been a tough foe. Getting panzers in by air would be a challenge, but probably not insurmountable, given the Allies were clearly weak on AA and also on aircraft. The inexorable pattern would have formed yet again--as we saw it form over and over for the early years: Allied forces, taking a drubbing from the air, because they were not equipped to cope yet.
On top of more Germans on the ground available, you've got more French troops residing in the Maginot Line, unavailable to counter-attack against the paratroopers. Yet, even with all those limits, just this one change could have produced a longer campaign, one with more potential to get the French fleet out to the Allies, and to keep more French colonies for Free France, and to spare Paris the occupation and possibly more of France.
On seeing a more passive France than in otl, Hitler might have felt less intimidated by a smaller occupied area in France. Meanwhile, the BEF is entirely in France, with no campaign in Belgium, at the time of the last phases of the Battle of France. There's no reason they couldn't complete a successful withdrawal as Dunkirk. That tends to get the remainder of the time line on track with otl. Battle of Britain would or could still boil down to air, although there is more potential for a paratrooper attack against Britain--as well as more in the way of really heavy artillery to aim across the Channel.
The Allies have more ships afloat, and better anti-sub capacity. They also may have more of North Africa, including Libya. This precludes the Axis counter-attack against Wavell and probably means North Africa is over by early 1941. Meanwhile, with his forces freed up, Wavell can assist the Greeks more effectively. Whether effectively enough, is entirely questionable, as there were still numerous parties stubbornly insisting the Brits fight on without adequate air cover. This was to persist well past December 1941, with Churchill still trying the airless approach at Kos and Leros years later. I doubt, therefore, that they can really defeat any German attack in Greece and Crete. They just...will have a more solid base in North Africa and less tied down having to defend it.
Meantime, with a larger force for the Brits to use in Greece, the campaign there might last slightly longer than otl, just meaning the likelihood of Barbarossa succeeding is even less than otl, too. I say "slightly" longer, because there is no indication the Brits will have better air support than otl, just more lightly-armed people on the ground.
The French fleet is a big help, too. Good to have them on board.
And, in 1942 and again in 1944, they will have been and will continue to be a big help to the Allied re-invasion activities. Meanwhile, the French Resistance will have a much bigger area to start from, and Hitler will have his work cut out for him, in moving into that much larger area to occupy it in advance of D-Day.
Could we get some D-520s out to North Africa, it might be possible to equip them with radios--possibly even before America's entry into the War. They could prove of some help to the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, providing air support for some areas that wasn't there otl.
France, in short, is going to be a more active player here, than otl.
Well, I guess this is goodbye to this thread, then. By the time I can see it again, it will be heading for the bottom, I suppose.
