WI: Great encirclement outside of Stalingrad

[Diego]

What if the Germans are able to encircle the 62nd and 64th Soviet Armies outside of Stalingrad?

So the situation at August 23rd, 1942 outside of Stalingrad was that Paulus, or at least one of his panzer corps had reached the Volga north of Stalingrad. In the south Hoth's Army was preparing an offensive that would take place the next day and their objective was to reach the Volga from the south. Meanwhile the two Soviet Armies that were defending Stalingrad at the time, the 62nd and the 64th, where in advanced positions mostly outside the prepared defenses around Stalingrad, the urban area itself was defended mostly by militias.

In OTL on August 24th the XIV Panzer Corps (the spearhead unit of Paulus' 6th Army) failed to advanced inside the city, not only they failed to overcome the Soviet Militias, but they even lost some ground (Rynok) to them, the XIV Panzer Corps was cut off from the rest of Paulus' Army and faced both lack of fuel and ammo as the soviets couter attacked them to the point that the entire unit almost tried a breakthrough back to the Don. In the south Hoth made even less progress, his offensive failed and he was able to beat the soviet resistance ahead of him, making little to zero progress.

What if Paulus was able to take Stalingrad on August 24th, with Hoth making at least the same type of advance? Maybe Paulus could use better the VIII Army Corps, using one of the divisions to support the XIV Panzer Corps and the LI Army Corps securing a corridor between the XIV Panzer Corps and the rest of the Army, meanwhile for "reasons" the Soviet resistance is not so fierce neither against Hoth, nor against the XIV Panzer.

What would happen if Paulus and Hoth are able to meet inside Stalingrad with the 62nd and 64th Soviet Armies still outside of the city? Would the Germans be able to reduce this pocket and advance to Astrakhan as planned? Or does it change nothing?

 

[Popcorn]

They were still at the end of a long supply chain, and the Soviets had more troops ready to hammer them.

 

[Phantasm]

If the 62nd and 64th armies are encircled and Stalingrad subsequently falls then elements of the 6th army will be used to remove the remaining Soviet bridgeheads left behind on the Don during the initial advance. This brings the anti-tank line right up to the river and was what Axis allies like the Romanians and Italians had been demanding for ages due to their paucity of anti-tank weaponry. This also eliminates the jump-off point for the Northern pincer of Operation Uranus. Stalingrad itself its probably garrisoned by one of the Allied formations which frees up most of the German formations for defense of the extended flank.
If you consider the time for all this then you are looking at Mid-Late September which probably precludes an advance on Astrakhan since Hitler was about to issue Operations Order No. 1 on 14th of October anyway. This basically ordered most of the German army (*with certain exceptions) to prepare winter positions along the existing lines. Also road conditions were basically non-existant between Stalingrad and Astrakhan which mean a much slower advance than the 400km distance would imply even in the unlikely event of an absense of Soviet resistance.
Its far more likely that with issues settled around Stalingrad, Hitler will divert as much as he can get away with into supporting Army Group A in the Caucasus, Maikop and Grozny were his obsession after all. Perhaps the extra luftwaffe striking power and whatever extra logistical support sent their way, might enable Army Group A to take Ordzhonikidze or Grozny or both. They were quite close in OTL as it was.
Also around October OTL, Hitler had realised that the oilfields of the Caucasus might remain out of reach anyway and ordered the luftwaffe to destroy them to deny them to the Soviets. The luftwaffe attempted strategic attacks on the oilfields but failed due to the need to continually divert aircraft to support operations at Stalingrad. Absent this need and the luftwaffe are probably going to hammer Grozny (* assuming its not captured in this ATL) and Baku. They will also be running a greater number of interdiction raids against Soviet road and rail networks and sea traffic in the Caspian (*again attempted OTL but only on a minor scale) which will greatly complicate Soviet logistics.

 

[Skulduggery]

If the 62nd and 64th armies are encircled and Stalingrad subsequently falls then elements of the 6th army will be used to remove the remaining Soviet bridgeheads left behind on the Don during the initial advance. This brings the anti-tank line right up to the river and was what Axis allies like the Romanians and Italians had been demanding for ages due to their paucity of anti-tank weaponry. This also eliminates the jump-off point for the Northern pincer of Operation Uranus. Stalingrad itself its probably garrisoned by one of the Allied formations which frees up most of the German formations for defense of the extended flank.
If you consider the time for all this then you are looking at Mid-Late September which probably precludes an advance on Astrakhan since Hitler was about to issue Operations Order No. 1 on 14th of October anyway. This basically ordered most of the German army (*with certain exceptions) to prepare winter positions along the existing lines. Also road conditions were basically non-existant between Stalingrad and Astrakhan which mean a much slower advance than the 400km distance would imply even in the unlikely event of an absense of Soviet resistance.
Its far more likely that with issues settled around Stalingrad, Hitler will divert as much as he can get away with into supporting Army Group A in the Caucasus, Maikop and Grozny were his obsession after all. Perhaps the extra luftwaffe striking power and whatever extra logistical support sent their way, might enable Army Group A to take Ordzhonikidze or Grozny or both. They were quite close in OTL as it was.
Also around October OTL, Hitler had realised that the oilfields of the Caucasus might remain out of reach anyway and ordered the luftwaffe to destroy them to deny them to the Soviets. The luftwaffe attempted strategic attacks on the oilfields but failed due to the need to continually divert aircraft to support operations at Stalingrad. Absent this need and the luftwaffe are probably going to hammer Grozny (* assuming its not captured in this ATL) and Baku. They will also be running a greater number of interdiction raids against Soviet road and rail networks and sea traffic in the Caspian (*again attempted OTL but only on a minor scale) which will greatly complicate Soviet logistics.

So overall, the Germans would be in the better position if I'm reading you right? However, speaking longer term, would it significantly change the outcome of the war, even if only in the east?
Stalingrad is often heralded as "the turning point" of the war...is that actually true, and if so what does the lack of said turning point do?

 

[fastmongrel]

The German supply chain couldn't keep the 6th Army fully fueled, armed and fed when they were on the west bank of the Don and Volga. How is it going to supply the army when it crosses the Volga there were no bridges and the Soviets aren't going to be generous and leave lots of ferries for the Germans to use. The 6th army was already on short rations by August and in September they only received about 40 to 50% of supplies. In October they started to eat the horses which moved a majority of supplies.

Stalingrad was a useless diversion that stopped any chance of taking the Caucasus oil wells.

 

[Phantasm]

So overall, the Germans would be in the better position if I'm reading you right? However, speaking longer term, would it significantly change the outcome of the war, even if only in the east?
Stalingrad is often heralded as "the turning point" of the war...is that actually true, and if so what does the lack of said turning point do?

Yes so long as they can hold their positions into 1943. In principle, this would leave Army Group A holding Maikop and Grozny-15% of Soviet oil and in position to interdict the remaining 80% being supplied by Baku. There were back up oil fields elsewhere in the Soviet Union of a lower capacity ( Kazak/Kubiyshev/Sakhalin regions) and lend-lease could presumably compensate to a degree but it leaves about a year of reserves to act with impunity. So by 1944, the Soviets will have to keep a watch on what oil is being used and why in terms of training and armoured operations.
More critical though is the food and manpower issue. The continued loss of the Kuban, Ukraine and Belorussian agricultural areas is certainly going to cause starvation. Even in OTL 1943 food rations had been cut to the lowest possible level and workers were beginning to suffer and that was after the success at Stalingrad. This was compounded as well by crop failures through 1943 in the Urals and other parts of the east. If you factor in a protracted loss of agricultural land mentioned due to the enhanced German position then you are going to end up with a famine that could cripple war production. Lend-lease was already maxed out at this period so it can't be used to mend this issue.

Finally the manpower issue. A total failure in 1942 is going to result in manpower losses equal to or greater than the losses endured in Barbarossa in 1941. The ability of the Soviet military to enhance its manpower reserves would also be denied by the Germans holding position over the winter 42/43. This would leave the Soviets unable to re-capture and utilise the populations in the west lost to the Germans. This would compel a greater reliance on manpower from Central Asia and the Caucasus which presented extreme difficulties in terms of language integration, motivation and training often proving inferior or unreliable in combat encounters. Needless to say this is not going to be good for the performance of the Soviet armies in 1943 if they have to rely on this specific manpower pool to continue the fight.

In short, I think a German victory at Stalingrad certainly sets up conditions for a vastly weakened Soviet Union going into late 43/44 which at the very least extends the war. Its possible that the agricultural, oil and manpower issues combined with further Soviet defeats forces Stalin into serious peace negotiations with the Germans. Alternatively, in the absolute worse case it prompts a total collapse in Soviet morale and trust in the Soviet leadership prompting a coup against Stalin or a general disintegration of state as in WW1.

 

[Diego]

Yes so long as they can hold their positions into 1943. In principle, this would leave Army Group A holding Maikop and Grozny-15% of Soviet oil and in position to interdict the remaining 80% being supplied by Baku. There were back up oil fields elsewhere in the Soviet Union of a lower capacity ( Kazak/Kubiyshev/Sakhalin regions) and lend-lease could presumably compensate to a degree but it leaves about a year of reserves to act with impunity. So by 1944, the Soviets will have to keep a watch on what oil is being used and why in terms of training and armoured operations.
More critical though is the food and manpower issue. The continued loss of the Kuban, Ukraine and Belorussian agricultural areas is certainly going to cause starvation. Even in OTL 1943 food rations had been cut to the lowest possible level and workers were beginning to suffer and that was after the success at Stalingrad. This was compounded as well by crop failures through 1943 in the Urals and other parts of the east. If you factor in a protracted loss of agricultural land mentioned due to the enhanced German position then you are going to end up with a famine that could cripple war production. Lend-lease was already maxed out at this period so it can't be used to mend this issue.

Finally the manpower issue. A total failure in 1942 is going to result in manpower losses equal to or greater than the losses endured in Barbarossa in 1941. The ability of the Soviet military to enhance its manpower reserves would also be denied by the Germans holding position over the winter 42/43. This would leave the Soviets unable to re-capture and utilise the populations in the west lost to the Germans. This would compel a greater reliance on manpower from Central Asia and the Caucasus which presented extreme difficulties in terms of language integration, motivation and training often proving inferior or unreliable in combat encounters. Needless to say this is not going to be good for the performance of the Soviet armies in 1943 if they have to rely on this specific manpower pool to continue the fight.

In short, I think a German victory at Stalingrad certainly sets up conditions for a vastly weakened Soviet Union going into late 43/44 which at the very least extends the war. Its possible that the agricultural, oil and manpower issues combined with further Soviet defeats forces Stalin into serious peace negotiations with the Germans. Alternatively, in the absolute worse case it prompts a total collapse in Soviet morale and trust in the Soviet leadership prompting a coup against Stalin or a general disintegration of state as in WW1.

I was going to ask exactly about that, the effects on the civilian side of the Soviet Economy, but your answer go hand in hand with what I thought, the effects could be catastrophic, in the worst case scenario we could see an economic collapse of the Soviet Union.

How is it going to supply the army when it crosses the Volga there were no bridges and the Soviets aren't going to be generous and leave lots of ferries for the Germans to use.

They wouldn't need to cross the Volga, they would take the city itself that is lightly defended at this point and encircle the Soviet Armies outside of the urban area.

The 6th army was already on short rations by August and in September they only received about 40 to 50% of supplies. In October they started to eat the horses which moved a majority of supplies.

Not fighting the Soviets for the control of Stalingrad would probably help the Germans by lowering their consumption of ammunition and fuel, the fact that the Soviets would have two armies less to counter attack would also help (German) logistics by lowering the consumption.

 

[Skulduggery]

Yes so long as they can hold their positions into 1943. In principle, this would leave Army Group A holding Maikop and Grozny-15% of Soviet oil and in position to interdict the remaining 80% being supplied by Baku. There were back up oil fields elsewhere in the Soviet Union of a lower capacity ( Kazak/Kubiyshev/Sakhalin regions) and lend-lease could presumably compensate to a degree but it leaves about a year of reserves to act with impunity. So by 1944, the Soviets will have to keep a watch on what oil is being used and why in terms of training and armoured operations.
More critical though is the food and manpower issue. The continued loss of the Kuban, Ukraine and Belorussian agricultural areas is certainly going to cause starvation. Even in OTL 1943 food rations had been cut to the lowest possible level and workers were beginning to suffer and that was after the success at Stalingrad. This was compounded as well by crop failures through 1943 in the Urals and other parts of the east. If you factor in a protracted loss of agricultural land mentioned due to the enhanced German position then you are going to end up with a famine that could cripple war production. Lend-lease was already maxed out at this period so it can't be used to mend this issue.

Finally the manpower issue. A total failure in 1942 is going to result in manpower losses equal to or greater than the losses endured in Barbarossa in 1941. The ability of the Soviet military to enhance its manpower reserves would also be denied by the Germans holding position over the winter 42/43. This would leave the Soviets unable to re-capture and utilise the populations in the west lost to the Germans. This would compel a greater reliance on manpower from Central Asia and the Caucasus which presented extreme difficulties in terms of language integration, motivation and training often proving inferior or unreliable in combat encounters. Needless to say this is not going to be good for the performance of the Soviet armies in 1943 if they have to rely on this specific manpower pool to continue the fight.

In short, I think a German victory at Stalingrad certainly sets up conditions for a vastly weakened Soviet Union going into late 43/44 which at the very least extends the war. Its possible that the agricultural, oil and manpower issues combined with further Soviet defeats forces Stalin into serious peace negotiations with the Germans. Alternatively, in the absolute worse case it prompts a total collapse in Soviet morale and trust in the Soviet leadership prompting a coup against Stalin or a general disintegration of state as in WW1.

Another thing to keep in mind is the potential blow to moral and prestige in general that losing the city bearing the leaders name would entail...or maybe slightly more accurate, the lack of the moral boost from gaining a major victory against the German invaders in said city

I'd imagine there's going to be a lot more people that will be doubting Stalins leadership if he can't even keep the city bearing his name safe...although that's mostly speculation on my part, I am no expert on the subject

 

[Alanith]

Another thing to keep in mind is the potential blow to moral and prestige in general that losing the city bearing the leaders name would entail...or maybe slightly more accurate, the lack of the moral boost from gaining a major victory against the German invaders in said city

I'd imagine there's going to be a lot more people that will be doubting Stalins leadership if he can't even keep the city bearing his name safe...although that's mostly speculation on my part, I am no expert on the subject

Doubting the leadership in private is one thing. Does anyone have the balls to stage a coup against Stalin?

 

[Skulduggery]

Doubting the leadership in private is one thing. Does anyone have the balls to stage a coup against Stalin?

Good question...might take more than a failure at Stalingrad for that...see: Valkery only happened when Germany had as good as lost

yet still, it'll be another source of potential instability

 

[kham_coc]

It's hard to say - personally I would say that if the nazis hadn't been utter pieces of shit to the conquered and captured people, the ussr would have collapsed.
On the other hand, well you know.
Which means that coups against Stalin would only proceed if the state apparatus started to deem him a liability and felt that any resultant internal conflict either would be negligible or "worth it".
Or its a local Revolt rather than a coup - f.e the Kazakh ssr simply stops listening to Moscow and effectively declare independence.