Many apologies if this has been discussed before (I'm sure it has, but the Search function refuses to cooperate with me this morning), but what would be the impact if the German High Command had taken Napoleon's lesson to heart regarding Russia and General Winter? Let's say Barbaross is launched per OTL, but with winter clothing and other supplies already laid in and ready for distribution when the weather turns colder in September/October. Could a better-prepared German army have taken Moscow, for example?
WI German Army prepared for "General Winter"
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BlairWitch749
Banned
No taking Moscow within the context of OTL barbarossa was impossible
all that does is save the germans a lot of frostbite casualties; it doesn't change that they had advanced too far from their supply zones and that the spearhead divisions were exhausted from 6 months of vigorous campaigning and required a multi month overhaul
BlondieBC
Banned
Germany attack in Poland in 1914/1915 in a heavy blizzard. The lessons were there, the Germans chose to not learn. The logistical commanders told the GHQ that there was not enough ammo, replacement equipment, etc. Hitler went ahead anyway.
To more uniforms only. I have read accounts they did not exist in large enough numbers, I have read accounts it was mostly a distribution issue. But ok, they have them. The offense still bogs down because of low ammo and other supplies. Basically each week in 1941, the amount of supplies in corp level depot declines (i.e. consumption higher than supply). With better uniforms a bit more of Moscow is taken, and the German army defends a good bit better. So take map of max extent of German lines in 1941, and the April 1942 lines around Moscow. The new line is somewhere in between these two lines. Helps Germans not war winner.
Now take the number of men dead or crippled by frost bites, form into light infantry division, Germany has that many more formations in 1942. You will have to research two topics, but if you do, you will have a good feel for this what if.
Extra units(replacement soldiers) probably go to Army group south, and are ground up in Stalingrad. More Russians die in Stalingrad area, but unless it is a huge number of German frostbite losses, it changes little in the big scheme of things. WW2 was not that close by late 1942, so unless Germany has hundreds of thousands of extra soldiers with equipment, it is hard to see a big change to the war. Russia has 599 divisions in this war, the USA had 100 division or so. Germany was 200 to 300 divisions. Saving say 60,000 casualties (2 corp) is not so large in this war. WW2 is so much bigger in scale than wars these days.
Snake Featherston
Banned
A German Army prepared for General Winter would have followed Hitler's advice and stopped their advance in October, instead of trying to push on and overextending itself. If that's the POD then it may wind up buying the Axis quite a fair amount of time before Hitler's distrust of his generals and vice-versa turns the German war effort completely to a bunch of jostling mutually hating factions each more interested in itself than in the war as a whole. There is absolutely no means to advance to Moscow in a Barbarossa scenario as per OTL, and if the Germans shift to capturing cities instead of destroying the Red Army as their goal Barbarossa's not only failed in concept but it starts failing in execution, too.
The Germans had already take high casualies before Operation Typhoon. Even with winter uniforms they may not have had the strength to take and hold Moscow. An August version of OperationTyphoon might have worked but Army Group Centre would have had the strong Soviet armies around Smolensk on their flank/rearso it still might have failed.
Deleted member 1487
The critical issue was the ability to bring up anything. Beyond Smolensk its tenuous. Read "Supplying War: From Wallenstein to Patton", which discusses this very issue. Moscow was just too far. The Russians hadn't fully tapped into their manpower and could have held anything the Germans threw at them, regardless of winter cloths. As it was the Germans were defeated before Winter really kicked in. The clothing only made a difference in the russian counterattacks. Machines would have still frozen with or without the cloths anyway.
The best thing the Germans could have done was avoid Typhoon and dig in for the winter at Smolensk. They would have been far better prepared for winter and the Russian counter attacks, plus would have saved a lot of equipment and casualties. They may have even been able to avoid the Demyansk pocket too, with all the losses to men and transport planes and experienced pilots that entailed.
Okay, first thing: Napoleon got defeated by General Winter is a myth. Take a note, Napoleon was defeated before winter.
As for Barbarossa, while the germans were aware of the harsh russian winter, they expected a shorter campaing, they planned to achieve their objectives before winter. Well, ambitous plan, and widely known, so.. lets go further.
Winter clothing and supplies and cold-proof equipment distribution in the middle of an attack is something next to impossible (the logistically superior US had "some" problems with it in 44/45). Any re-equip would have needed a serious re-think of the campaign (practically, no race towards moscow, but the complete cut of Leningrad, and prepairing for a mobile defense) - wich one is quite impossible, when Hitler commanding.
Wow! practically a consensus about Typhoon...
As for Barbarossa, while the germans were aware of the harsh russian winter, they expected a shorter campaing, they planned to achieve their objectives before winter. Well, ambitous plan, and widely known, so.. lets go further.
Winter clothing and supplies and cold-proof equipment distribution in the middle of an attack is something next to impossible (the logistically superior US had "some" problems with it in 44/45). Any re-equip would have needed a serious re-think of the campaign (practically, no race towards moscow, but the complete cut of Leningrad, and prepairing for a mobile defense) - wich one is quite impossible, when Hitler commanding.
Wow! practically a consensus about Typhoon...
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BlairWitch749
Banned
postponing typhoon till spring and taking winter quarters on the Oka line is the most logically superior alternative to what the germans did in otl that passes the plausibility test (given that Hitler postponed sickle cut numerous times due to concerns about weather; and he himself heard and considered arguments for taking up winter quarters)
the most superior alternative that doesn't pass the plausibility test (from a Hitler and German command perspective, not from a physically possible point of view) is to launch the briansk and vyzama encirclements to disorganize and wreck the soviet western front THEN pull back to the oka line leaving a scortched earth in their wake
It's not just a case of handing out winter clothes, German engines ran on petrol and guess what petrol does at low temperatures that Soviet diesel doesn't do? That left only the horses and horses inevitably did the same thing as the engines eventually. You'd have to change every engine in the German army to overcome this problem.
Do you mean the opposite of that, perhaps? At low temperatures, diesel uncut with kerosene gels. Gasoline does become more difficult to use because of lower volatility at low temps, but it is still usable.
Riain
Banned
I see you took MVC to heart. It really does change the way you look at war.
Try to find Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue if you can. He spells out exactly why Barbarossa wasn`t launched earlier, dispelling the common myths of a late thaw and the Greek delay.
Snake Featherston
Banned
And this is where the major defect of the WWII German Army comes in: it was completely and myopically obsessed with the tactical level of warfare. Its conduct of war was tactical opportunism without any regard for a strategic or even operational concept in a serious sense. German generals repeatedly and stupidly sought to fight battles with no actual pattern except what their Dolchstosslegende-ridden memoirs said existed after the fact, and this is the major reason the Soviets bitchslapped them repeatedly with the simple matter of a strategic reserve: it's fine to wipe out a dozen armies but if there's no actual pattern to wiping it out it's a waste of ammunition, vehicles, and lives as the enemy has a broader pattern and concept and is at least *trying* to follow that concept.
Bad strategy is ten thousand times better than tactical opportunism, and Barbarossa proved this.
The issue is that to take winter into consideration you need to remove the idea of mobile warfare, and remove the idea that Russia will not fall inside of the week. Better coats is not enough as you must include shelter. That shelter is a serious burden when you think of how many horses are used for supplies.
In a really, really odd way, not issuing winter gear made some sense. If the Wehrmacht hadn't defeated the Soviet Union before the first snowfall in the Fall of 1941, they were pretty much screwed.
The Reich had 1 shot, a flash knockout. We all know how well that turned out.
The Reich had 1 shot, a flash knockout. We all know how well that turned out.
I agree. I mean the only victory in Russia I see is the USSR not fighting the Finns, as this allows the army to remain foolish, and avoid most of the reforms. However to not fight the Finns takes away the image that the USSR is weak.
amphibulous
Banned
You'd also need much wider tracks on German tanks, decreasing performance and increasing fuel consumption in Western Europe.
And the winter isn't even why the German's lost:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
At the start of the war in the dry summer, the Germans took the Soviets by surprise and destroyed a large part of the Soviet Red Army in the first weeks. When good weather gave way to the harsh autumn and winter and the Red Army recovered, the German offensive began to falter. The German army could not be sufficiently supplied for prolonged combat; indeed there was not enough fuel for the whole army to reach its objectives.
This was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation, but their warnings were disregarded.[105] The entire German plan assumed that within five weeks they would have attained full strategic freedom due to a complete collapse of the Red Army. Only then could they have diverted necessary logistic support to fuelling the few mobile units needed to occupy the defeated state. German infantry and tanks stormed 300 mi (480 km) ahead in the first week, but their supply lines struggled to keep up. Soviet railroads could at first not be fully used due to a difference in railway gauges and dismantled railroad facilities in border areas.[106] Lack of supplies significantly slowed down the blitzkrieg.
The German logistical planning also seriously overestimated the condition of the Soviet transportation network. The road and railway network of former Eastern Poland was well known, but beyond that information was limited. Roads that looked impressive on maps turned out to be just mere dust roads or were only in the planning stages.[105]
A paper published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 1981 concluded that Hitler's plans miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather.
In summary:
- German plans gambled on a quick knock out - they really had no other chance of winning.
But
- The Soviets were much more resilient than they expected
- Fuel shortages and poor roads made the German strategy impossible
So let;s suppose that the Germans fight the battles of Smolensk and Kiev to secure the flank as they did in OTL. But Operation Typhoon is postponed until Spring 1942.
The Soviets still bring up the Siberian divisions and will almost certainly stll mount a winter offensive. But with the Wehrmacht defending better positions and with less extended suply lines winter clothing may be in better supply and the beteer trained and more experienced Germans have a good chance of repelling this with heavy losses.
In April, May or June the Germans can renew the offensive either to Mosocow or a Fall Blau style offensive. Either way success is more likely with te Germans not losing the men they did in Operation Typhoon and facing a Red Army similar in strength to that of June 1942.
Alternatively the Red Army can dig in, rest, train and regroup over the winter and is in a better position to face a renewed German offensive in 1942. Perhaps the Germans forsaw this possibility, realised victory would be impossible at that stage and gambled on Operation Typhoon as a means of winning the war fast before it could not be won outright at all.
But the Germans could still have negotiated from a position of strength even in a military stalemate. Militarily they could still fight on the defensive in 1942 and try to bleed the Red Army into collapse. Perhaps this strategy, adopted as early as 1942, would have had a much better chance of working than it would have had later in the war.
The Soviets still bring up the Siberian divisions and will almost certainly stll mount a winter offensive. But with the Wehrmacht defending better positions and with less extended suply lines winter clothing may be in better supply and the beteer trained and more experienced Germans have a good chance of repelling this with heavy losses.
In April, May or June the Germans can renew the offensive either to Mosocow or a Fall Blau style offensive. Either way success is more likely with te Germans not losing the men they did in Operation Typhoon and facing a Red Army similar in strength to that of June 1942.
Alternatively the Red Army can dig in, rest, train and regroup over the winter and is in a better position to face a renewed German offensive in 1942. Perhaps the Germans forsaw this possibility, realised victory would be impossible at that stage and gambled on Operation Typhoon as a means of winning the war fast before it could not be won outright at all.
But the Germans could still have negotiated from a position of strength even in a military stalemate. Militarily they could still fight on the defensive in 1942 and try to bleed the Red Army into collapse. Perhaps this strategy, adopted as early as 1942, would have had a much better chance of working than it would have had later in the war.
BlondieBC
Banned
This is the most likely way for the Germans to "win", but it is very hard to quantify the threshold that makes the Soviets sue for peace, or the Germans be interested for peace. The same for the British.
In looking at history, most leaders don't realize themselves that they will be asking for a harsh peace 6-18 months before the event. At some point in an ATL, the soviets lose the last division that forces the peace deal. The tough part even with hindsight is know about where that would be, and the Germans would have even less information than we have.
Even without the USA directly entering the war, by middle of 1942, there was little chance of the UK leaving the war soon. Even giving the Germans the extra winter losses back from 41/42, the 6th Army not being trapped, and Kursk not being launched; the Russians were as strong as the Germans by mid 1943. In the winter of 43/44 the Soviets would launch a major attack, and yes the Germans would be in much better shape, but at best it is a bloody stalemate. The whole German plan to attack had issues. I have seen lots of arguments that Stalin would have attacked in 42, 43 or 44, and this would have been hard for the Germans. But the plan they chose had a 99% + chance of failure, so was it really 99% likely that Stalin attacks later and wins?
"The best move is no move."
Does anyone have a guess for how many more divisions must be lost by the soviets before they sue for peace?
If the Germans halt earlier, they give the Soviets more breathing room to become stronger in 1942, Winter Counteroffensive or not. In fact, if the Winter Counteroffensive out-and-out fails instead of the partial success it was OTL then that might make Stalin more cautious and inclined to preserve the Red Army's strength much like the Second Battle of Kharkov did.
So come 1942, the Soviet defenses around Moscow will be even heavier then they were OTL 1942 because the Soviets would still have additional manpower, resources, and (even more importantly) time whether the Germans went for Kiev and/or Vyazma or not. So whilke a postponement of Typhoon to 1942 helps the Germans, it also helps the Soviets quite a bit.
With the Red Army growing in skill as well as size and equipment, I can't help but picture Moscow taking Stalingrad's place in 1942 as a crushing defeat for the Germans.
So come 1942, the Soviet defenses around Moscow will be even heavier then they were OTL 1942 because the Soviets would still have additional manpower, resources, and (even more importantly) time whether the Germans went for Kiev and/or Vyazma or not. So whilke a postponement of Typhoon to 1942 helps the Germans, it also helps the Soviets quite a bit.
With the Red Army growing in skill as well as size and equipment, I can't help but picture Moscow taking Stalingrad's place in 1942 as a crushing defeat for the Germans.
The problem is that the Soviets might gain in size, the experience doesn't increase just with time. It took all of 41,42 and the better half of 43 of repeated failed attacks for the soviets to gain enough experience to fight the Germans on anything approaching equal terms. And even then the Germans had their share of victories in 44 and 45. So if the German pause before Moscow in 41 they will face a larger soviet force but one will still alot of tactical and operational deficiencies .