WI Falklands war in late 1982

torten

One of the biggest issues the Royal Navy and the British government had to contend with was the rapidly approaching winter, as attempting to invade during the middle of winter would be far harder than invading when they did which meant thing had to happen very quickly So my question is - what if Thatcher and the government decide to delay the retaking of the islands until after the winter, and decide to retake the islands in October/November/December.

This means that the Royal Navy could call up reservists, and organise the fleet for maximum availability - for example they might have more type 42 destroyers, and a extra aircraft carrier. HMS Tiger and HMS Blake would also be available - ideal for shore bombardment, and could be used to refuel Harriers. Maybe HMS Hermes could be refitted to carry Buccaneers?

In the meantime, SSBN could be sent to annoy the Argentinians and attempt to sink Argentinian ships in the exclusion zone, while Vulcans could be used to carry out air raids and generally be annoying.

The army and royal marines could also better prepare for the invasion, and some reservists and territorials could be called up, to relieve regulars for service in the Falklands by taking over deployments in less dangerous parts of the world (Probably wouldn't send them to Northern Ireland.) Maybe they could even take over deployments in Germany? (Admittedly a tank or mechanised infantry wouldn't be that helpful in the Falklands, but some of the light infantry) might be useful.)

The political impact would be interesting as well. Might the Americans encourage the British government to leave the Islands? Meanwhile, would the Argentinina government go and dump 3000 pro-junta people on the island, and deport the Falkland islanders back to the United Kingdom, and then claim the entire population was Argentinian. (And obiviously the British government would have to deport them after the war.)
 

Carl Schwamberger

Thatcher & Co had to contend with economic costs, which increased over time, and were riding on public opinion which they could not predict would last. Nuetralize those & it is easier to get to a extended war.
 
David Flin

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
The big problem would be political. It would be seen as de facto acquiescing to the situation, and essentially leaving the Islands to their fate. By waiting six months before undertaking any actions of note, one is essentially appearing to shrug and say: "No big deal."

If I understand the mood in the UK in early April, not being seen to do something significant would have gone down very badly. Abroad, the USA is given time to think and isn't pressed to choose between political backing of Argentina or the UK. There were voices in the US Administration in April saying essentially that Argentina needed to be kept sweet, and the UK was stuck, so best support the Argentinians in this escapade. If the UK does nothing of note, those voices are going to get a lot stronger.

Six months gives time for the Argentinians to ensure that a referendum demonstrates that the islanders actually want to be part of Argentina. The Dirty War was going on, and there are plenty of people from Argentina who could be persuaded to come to the islands.

Politically, waiting wasn't an option.
 

yulzari

This is essentially the other of the two schemes offered to HMG after the invasion. They went with the quick and dirty option for political reasons. The other was to wait until the southern summer and assemble a far more impressive fleet with extra aircraft and helicopter carriers, 8" cruisers, airborne AEW and a whole shopping list of possibilities. The option above was an all but a certain liberation and capable of removing the entire Argentinian air force and navy and command the whole Argentinian coast. The one OTL went with was to skip any political issues. I suspect that HMG chose the OTL option as the other could be used for a second attempt if the first failed. The first was a mismatch with the Task Force being the smaller so had to be aggressive in tactics and take risks. The other option as above allowed for an extended isolation of the Falklands and might avoid land fighting at all.
 
David Flin

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
According to Thatcher in Downing Street Years (with all the inherent uncertainties about a politician's memory and description of events written about after they have taken place), John Nott and the MOD said categorically: "That the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized" (p179). This was flatly contradicted by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Henry Leach, who just happened to be in the area (how terribly convenient. It was almost as though he was derailing the do-nothing approach), and he said that he could put together a Task Force in 48 hours. (p179).

The Foreign Office basically advised on 2 April (after the invasion) that there were so many complications that the UK should let the USA sort it out. (p181). She went on to say that the longer things went on, a number of key international players, most notably the USSR, were being more difficult. In the April UN debate, the USSR had not vetoed the resolution that Argentina should withdraw immediately. Come May, and it was fairly clear that if the matter came up before the UN again, it would veto any resolution in Britain's favour.
 

Archibald

Banned
I often wonder, how long would it takes to rebuild Hermes and Bulwark catapults and arrestor wires ? Buccaneers would be an absolute must, but AEW Gannets would be as much as useful. Or perhaps a prototype Sea King AEW.

When Hermes and Bulwark were converted to commando carriers, what did happen to the catapults ? what was removed ?
I have difficulty grasping how an aircraft carrier catapult works, and how do you remove it from the ship.
 

torten

David Flin said:
The Foreign Office basically advised on 2 April (after the invasion) that there were so many complications that the UK should let the USA sort it out. (p181). She went on to say that the longer things went on, a number of key international players, most notably the USSR, were being more difficult. In the April UN debate, the USSR had not vetoed the resolution that Argentina should withdraw immediately. Come May, and it was fairly clear that if the matter came up before the UN again, it would veto any resolution in Britain's favour.
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On the other hand, if a resolution came to the security council demanding that the British cease hostile actions in the South Atlantic, say they sink that old Argentinian carrier in July 1982 with a SSBN torpedo after some peace talks fail, then Britain could just veto it, which makes the UN rather pointless. I suppose if the Americans voted for the measure then you might have a slight problem, but if Thatcher decided to launch alt Operation Corporate anyway, then what can Reagan do to the British which wouldn't shoot the Americans in the foot? Also, if the Argentinians dump 2000 Kelpies on the doorstep of the British Ambassy in Buenos Aires, then the British are sure to milk the publicity value of that, which might make the American and Western European public more sympathetic to the British viewpoint.
 
David Flin

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
torten said:
On the other hand, if a resolution came to the security council demanding that the British cease hostile actions in the South Atlantic, say they sink that old Argentinian carrier in July 1982 with a SSBN torpedo after some peace talks fail, then Britain could just veto it, which makes the UN rather pointless. I suppose if the Americans voted for the measure then you might have a slight problem, but if Thatcher decided to launch alt Operation Corporate anyway, then what can Reagan do to the British which wouldn't shoot the Americans in the foot? Also, if the Argentinians dump 2000 Kelpies on the doorstep of the British Ambassy in Buenos Aires, then the British are sure to milk the publicity value of that, which might make the American and Western European public more sympathetic to the British viewpoint.
Click to expand...

Launching Corporate* in total defiance of the express wishes of the USA publicly shown at the UN would be bold. UK can veto anything it doesn't like till the cows come home, but the international political consequences might be unfortunate.

(Incidentally, I really think you mean SSN rather than SSBN re the submarines).
 
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