The Rif War is one of the more obscure conflicts of the 20th century, yet it was a pretty big deal. By its end, it had sucked in about a quarter of a million Spanish and French troops and helped launch the careers of Francisco Franco and most of the other major Nationalist figures of the Spanish Civil War. It undoubtedly also played a major role in the collapse of Spanish parliamentary democracy, the rise of Primo De Rivera, the eventual creation of the Second Republic and eventually, the Spanish Civil War.
Spain had always had an interest in Morocco, and towards the end of the 19th century Madrid began serious attempts to encroach into the hinterland from their bases in Ceuta and Melilla. In 1893 and 1909, the Spanish had tried to increase the size of the area under their control in the region; on both occasions, they got horribly over-confident, suffered dreadfully embarrassing defeats at the hands of the locals, and then eventually reversed them through bloody-mindedness and throwing conscripts at the enemy until the other side ran out of men. Finally, in 1911, the Agadir Crisis eventually led to Spain’s claims in the region being recognised. The Treaty of Fez (1912) allotted Spain the northern part of Morocco. The Rifan berbers felt otherwise, however, and if Spain wanted to control the region, she would have to conquer it.
While everyone else was occupied by the First World War, the Spanish began a campaign of expansion. Their first objective was to eliminate the brigand Raisuli. Raisuli, who today is remembered in Morocco as a weird mixture of Robin Hood and Sheriff of Nottingham, spent most of his time kidnapping Europeans and holding them to ransom for exorbitant amounts of money. His most famous exploit was the capture of a Greek playboy named Ion Perdicaris, which earnt him a walk-on part in the 1904 Presidential Election, and the rare accolade of having severely embarrassed Theodore Roosevelt. The Spanish campaign against Raisuli was a long one, and there was desultory fighting throughout the 1910s; one of these skirmishes, in 1916, saw Francisco Franco shot in the stomach while capturing a Rifan encampment, a feat that would see him promoted to Major. By 1920, the western part of Spanish Morocco had largely been pacified, and so the focus of Spanish efforts moved to the East. Sadly, in their attempts to finish off their old foe, the Spanish antagonised a new one.
In the spring of 1921, the Spanish launched a major pacification effort in the hills west of Melilla. The operation was marked by massive complacency on the part of the invaders; the RIfans simply melted into the countryside, and the Spanish simply assumed that the locals had lost the willingness to fight. By the summer, small, isolated Spanish garrisons were strung out across the region, with no clear supply lines or means of communication other than heliographs. By June, the Spanish advance had reached the Amekran River. Here, General Silvestre met representatives sent by Abd el-Krim, a former Qadi of Melilla and a journalist who had been imprisoned for penning anti-Spanish editorials. Krim warned Silvestre that crossing the river would be considered an act of war; the Spanish ignored the warning, and established an outpost on the far bank. A few days later, the camp was utterly destroyed by Rifan guerrillas. Then, in late July, a force of Rifan tribesmen led by Krim stormed Spanish positions around the village of Igueriben. Having captured this outpost, they turned their attention to the garrison at Annual, where General Silvestre had made his headquarters. There was a five-day siege before the Rifans overran this village too.
With the loss of Annual, the entire Spanish position in north-eastern Morocco completely collapsed. Outpost after outpost was surrounded and destroyed by the Rifans. A few Spanish troops under General Navarro managed to escape the unfolding catastrophe and retreated in good order to Monte Arruit, which they fortified; the Rifans surrounded this post too and eventually the defenders were forced to surrender. At a stroke, the gains made by Spain over a decade of fighting and at the cost of thousands of lives were wiped out. Troops rushed from the Spanish Sahara and the new Spanish Foreign Legion eventually managed to stabilise the situation, but it was one of the most humiliating defeats for a colonial power at the hands of the locals in history. It certainly makes Isandlwana or Little Big Horn look like a skirmish; when the dust settled, the Spanish had lost more than 13,000 troops, at the official count, and probably far more in reality. By contrast, the Rifans suffered only about a thousand casualties. The Rifans were able to capture huge quantities of rifles and artillery. Reaction in Spain was about as anguished as might be expected. Indalecio Prieto said that "We are at the most acute period of Spanish decadence. The campaign in Africa is a total failure, absolute, without extenuation, of the Spanish Army." King Alfonso caused outrage when he made various unwise remarks about the disaster. The humiliation, played a major role in the breakdown in relations between Cortes, Army and King, and contributed significantly to Primo de Rivera’s coup in 1923.
Asking what might have happened if Annual was somehow averted is an interest WI in itself, but I'm going to go the other way. Amazingly, the disaster could have been even worse. Spanish forces were so over-stretched in the region that the city of Melilla had been left completely undefended; now, with the destruction of the forces of Generals Silvestre and Navarro, there was absolutely nothing between the advancing Rifans and the port. As it was, it was only luck, and general confusion, that prevented Krim from taking Melilla. Remembering the bloody battle for the citadel of Melilla in 1893, the Rifans did not enter the city itself and instead occupied themselves looting; if they had advanced there would have met no resistance whatsoever, and could have occupied the main port in the eastern part of Spanish Morocco without a fight.
So, WI they do?
For a start, the whole strategic situation abruptly changes at a stroke. The Spanish have not only lost their most secure foothold in the region, but large amounts of supplies with it; the Rifans captured enough materiel IOTL, but ITTL they will have access to heavy artillery, motorised transport and even some of Spain’s war surplus Renault FT-17 tanks, along with the fuel to operate them (for a time, at least). They might also grab some aircraft too, although it may take some time for them to hire pilots. The Rifans will also reap an impressive dividend in men. IOTL a lot of the coastal tribes either stayed neutral or only provided covert aid to the Rifans; here, with the Spanish kicked out, it will be much more difficult for them to avoid joining the rebellion.
The affair is also, of course, an appalling, abject humiliation for Spain. Even OTL Annual caused a significant amount of national trauma; this will be even worse. The position of those on the Left who OTL called for a complete withdrawal from Morocco is considerably strengthened; all the more so when it becomes apparent that the reconquest of Melilla would, of course, only be the first stage of a very long and bloody campaign. Even if the Spanish flag was to fly above the city again in short order, the Rifans still control the countryside, and it is questionable whether Spain had the financial and psychological reserves necessary to accomplish this. The Monarchy is likely to be even more discredited than OTL, but wonder if the damage isn’t so severe that the King does the smart thing and desperately try and shift all the blame on to the Army. Certainly, the whitewash that was the “Expediente Picasso” report into the disaster won’t do; the public will want blood, and I expect Military heads would have to roll. Would the generals let this happen? Probably not, in which case we’re looking at coup two years early, and a military Junta ostensibly established to sort out the national crisis. If royal/military relations are poisonous though, then presumably any earlier coup would overthrow the monarchy as well as the Cortes. That might or might not provide a broader basis for the restoration of parliamentary government later on. I’m not au fait enough with the period to guess as to whether Primo de Rivera still ends up on top in this scenario; any ideas?
So that’s the impact on Spain, what about Morocco?
If the Spanish want to retake Melilla, they will have to capture it from the sea. This is certainly possible; the Spanish fleet would be able to provide covering fire, and the Foreign Legion could conduct landings. Any operation would be very bloody, however; and instead of being the first man in to relieve the city as OTL, Francisco Franco will be the first man on the beaches and very likely to go on to do something stupidly heroic (and fatal). There would also be the widespread use of gas. OTL the Annual disaster provoked this; in August 1921 the Spanish Minister for War authorised its use “with joy”, and promptly ordered a large quantity of mustard gas from Germany to replace Spain’s stock of Phosgene.
Probably the most likely scenario in this case would be a major Spanish operation to retake Melilla, which is probably a pyrrhic victory because of massive casualties and the complete destruction of the town. The Spanish would have to wait quite some time, perhaps years rather than months, to regain their strength for the reconquest of the hinterland; and this would potentially give the Rif Republic time to put down some real roots. However, it’s worth wondering if the Spanish would try all this alone. It would be deeply humiliating to ask for French help, but you could argue the French did much of the heavy lifting IOTL , and Paris certainly has no desire to see an independent Rif Republic, for fear of their own Moroccan subjects getting ideas. If this is the case and the French go all out, then the Rif is screwed; I could imagine the war dragging on to much the same conclusion in 1925-6 as it did IOTL, only with more casualties on all sides and a much weaker Spain into the bargain. If the French only lend minimal support (and the Rifans are too busy in the north to try the same tactics on the French in the south, which OTL was the catalyst for Paris’ intervention), then I could imagine that a stalemate might eventually develop by the mid-20s; the Spanish control Melilla, its immediate hinterland and the modern Tangier-Tetuoan Region, while the Rifans have the rest.
Would the Spanish continue their war? They might, in which case Morocco ends up being a running sore for even longer. I wonder though, by this point, if some sort of deal might be done, officially or otherwise, whereby the Rifans recognise Spanish sovereignty but are left to their own business. I’m not sure of the long-term impacts of this- presumably for a start, it makes staging any military coup attempt out of Spanish Morocco as OTL practically impossible, and means that the Rifans are a power of their own should anything come to civil war; the “declare Moroccan independence” card that was briefly considered by some in the Republic IOTL suddenly becomes a hell of a lot more interesting, especially as it could well lead to French intervention on the other side…
Spain had always had an interest in Morocco, and towards the end of the 19th century Madrid began serious attempts to encroach into the hinterland from their bases in Ceuta and Melilla. In 1893 and 1909, the Spanish had tried to increase the size of the area under their control in the region; on both occasions, they got horribly over-confident, suffered dreadfully embarrassing defeats at the hands of the locals, and then eventually reversed them through bloody-mindedness and throwing conscripts at the enemy until the other side ran out of men. Finally, in 1911, the Agadir Crisis eventually led to Spain’s claims in the region being recognised. The Treaty of Fez (1912) allotted Spain the northern part of Morocco. The Rifan berbers felt otherwise, however, and if Spain wanted to control the region, she would have to conquer it.
While everyone else was occupied by the First World War, the Spanish began a campaign of expansion. Their first objective was to eliminate the brigand Raisuli. Raisuli, who today is remembered in Morocco as a weird mixture of Robin Hood and Sheriff of Nottingham, spent most of his time kidnapping Europeans and holding them to ransom for exorbitant amounts of money. His most famous exploit was the capture of a Greek playboy named Ion Perdicaris, which earnt him a walk-on part in the 1904 Presidential Election, and the rare accolade of having severely embarrassed Theodore Roosevelt. The Spanish campaign against Raisuli was a long one, and there was desultory fighting throughout the 1910s; one of these skirmishes, in 1916, saw Francisco Franco shot in the stomach while capturing a Rifan encampment, a feat that would see him promoted to Major. By 1920, the western part of Spanish Morocco had largely been pacified, and so the focus of Spanish efforts moved to the East. Sadly, in their attempts to finish off their old foe, the Spanish antagonised a new one.
In the spring of 1921, the Spanish launched a major pacification effort in the hills west of Melilla. The operation was marked by massive complacency on the part of the invaders; the RIfans simply melted into the countryside, and the Spanish simply assumed that the locals had lost the willingness to fight. By the summer, small, isolated Spanish garrisons were strung out across the region, with no clear supply lines or means of communication other than heliographs. By June, the Spanish advance had reached the Amekran River. Here, General Silvestre met representatives sent by Abd el-Krim, a former Qadi of Melilla and a journalist who had been imprisoned for penning anti-Spanish editorials. Krim warned Silvestre that crossing the river would be considered an act of war; the Spanish ignored the warning, and established an outpost on the far bank. A few days later, the camp was utterly destroyed by Rifan guerrillas. Then, in late July, a force of Rifan tribesmen led by Krim stormed Spanish positions around the village of Igueriben. Having captured this outpost, they turned their attention to the garrison at Annual, where General Silvestre had made his headquarters. There was a five-day siege before the Rifans overran this village too.
With the loss of Annual, the entire Spanish position in north-eastern Morocco completely collapsed. Outpost after outpost was surrounded and destroyed by the Rifans. A few Spanish troops under General Navarro managed to escape the unfolding catastrophe and retreated in good order to Monte Arruit, which they fortified; the Rifans surrounded this post too and eventually the defenders were forced to surrender. At a stroke, the gains made by Spain over a decade of fighting and at the cost of thousands of lives were wiped out. Troops rushed from the Spanish Sahara and the new Spanish Foreign Legion eventually managed to stabilise the situation, but it was one of the most humiliating defeats for a colonial power at the hands of the locals in history. It certainly makes Isandlwana or Little Big Horn look like a skirmish; when the dust settled, the Spanish had lost more than 13,000 troops, at the official count, and probably far more in reality. By contrast, the Rifans suffered only about a thousand casualties. The Rifans were able to capture huge quantities of rifles and artillery. Reaction in Spain was about as anguished as might be expected. Indalecio Prieto said that "We are at the most acute period of Spanish decadence. The campaign in Africa is a total failure, absolute, without extenuation, of the Spanish Army." King Alfonso caused outrage when he made various unwise remarks about the disaster. The humiliation, played a major role in the breakdown in relations between Cortes, Army and King, and contributed significantly to Primo de Rivera’s coup in 1923.
Asking what might have happened if Annual was somehow averted is an interest WI in itself, but I'm going to go the other way. Amazingly, the disaster could have been even worse. Spanish forces were so over-stretched in the region that the city of Melilla had been left completely undefended; now, with the destruction of the forces of Generals Silvestre and Navarro, there was absolutely nothing between the advancing Rifans and the port. As it was, it was only luck, and general confusion, that prevented Krim from taking Melilla. Remembering the bloody battle for the citadel of Melilla in 1893, the Rifans did not enter the city itself and instead occupied themselves looting; if they had advanced there would have met no resistance whatsoever, and could have occupied the main port in the eastern part of Spanish Morocco without a fight.
So, WI they do?
For a start, the whole strategic situation abruptly changes at a stroke. The Spanish have not only lost their most secure foothold in the region, but large amounts of supplies with it; the Rifans captured enough materiel IOTL, but ITTL they will have access to heavy artillery, motorised transport and even some of Spain’s war surplus Renault FT-17 tanks, along with the fuel to operate them (for a time, at least). They might also grab some aircraft too, although it may take some time for them to hire pilots. The Rifans will also reap an impressive dividend in men. IOTL a lot of the coastal tribes either stayed neutral or only provided covert aid to the Rifans; here, with the Spanish kicked out, it will be much more difficult for them to avoid joining the rebellion.
The affair is also, of course, an appalling, abject humiliation for Spain. Even OTL Annual caused a significant amount of national trauma; this will be even worse. The position of those on the Left who OTL called for a complete withdrawal from Morocco is considerably strengthened; all the more so when it becomes apparent that the reconquest of Melilla would, of course, only be the first stage of a very long and bloody campaign. Even if the Spanish flag was to fly above the city again in short order, the Rifans still control the countryside, and it is questionable whether Spain had the financial and psychological reserves necessary to accomplish this. The Monarchy is likely to be even more discredited than OTL, but wonder if the damage isn’t so severe that the King does the smart thing and desperately try and shift all the blame on to the Army. Certainly, the whitewash that was the “Expediente Picasso” report into the disaster won’t do; the public will want blood, and I expect Military heads would have to roll. Would the generals let this happen? Probably not, in which case we’re looking at coup two years early, and a military Junta ostensibly established to sort out the national crisis. If royal/military relations are poisonous though, then presumably any earlier coup would overthrow the monarchy as well as the Cortes. That might or might not provide a broader basis for the restoration of parliamentary government later on. I’m not au fait enough with the period to guess as to whether Primo de Rivera still ends up on top in this scenario; any ideas?
So that’s the impact on Spain, what about Morocco?
If the Spanish want to retake Melilla, they will have to capture it from the sea. This is certainly possible; the Spanish fleet would be able to provide covering fire, and the Foreign Legion could conduct landings. Any operation would be very bloody, however; and instead of being the first man in to relieve the city as OTL, Francisco Franco will be the first man on the beaches and very likely to go on to do something stupidly heroic (and fatal). There would also be the widespread use of gas. OTL the Annual disaster provoked this; in August 1921 the Spanish Minister for War authorised its use “with joy”, and promptly ordered a large quantity of mustard gas from Germany to replace Spain’s stock of Phosgene.
Probably the most likely scenario in this case would be a major Spanish operation to retake Melilla, which is probably a pyrrhic victory because of massive casualties and the complete destruction of the town. The Spanish would have to wait quite some time, perhaps years rather than months, to regain their strength for the reconquest of the hinterland; and this would potentially give the Rif Republic time to put down some real roots. However, it’s worth wondering if the Spanish would try all this alone. It would be deeply humiliating to ask for French help, but you could argue the French did much of the heavy lifting IOTL , and Paris certainly has no desire to see an independent Rif Republic, for fear of their own Moroccan subjects getting ideas. If this is the case and the French go all out, then the Rif is screwed; I could imagine the war dragging on to much the same conclusion in 1925-6 as it did IOTL, only with more casualties on all sides and a much weaker Spain into the bargain. If the French only lend minimal support (and the Rifans are too busy in the north to try the same tactics on the French in the south, which OTL was the catalyst for Paris’ intervention), then I could imagine that a stalemate might eventually develop by the mid-20s; the Spanish control Melilla, its immediate hinterland and the modern Tangier-Tetuoan Region, while the Rifans have the rest.
Would the Spanish continue their war? They might, in which case Morocco ends up being a running sore for even longer. I wonder though, by this point, if some sort of deal might be done, officially or otherwise, whereby the Rifans recognise Spanish sovereignty but are left to their own business. I’m not sure of the long-term impacts of this- presumably for a start, it makes staging any military coup attempt out of Spanish Morocco as OTL practically impossible, and means that the Rifans are a power of their own should anything come to civil war; the “declare Moroccan independence” card that was briefly considered by some in the Republic IOTL suddenly becomes a hell of a lot more interesting, especially as it could well lead to French intervention on the other side…
