WI: Admiral King in command of US Pacific Fleet before Pearl Harbor

[Meshakhad]

In February 1941, the US Navy abolished the position of Commander-In-Chief, US Navy, and instead established three separate CINC positions. Admiral Thomas Hart got the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Husband Kimmel got the Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Ernest King got the Atlantic Fleet. Then Pearl Harbor happened, Kimmel resigned, and the post of Commander-In-Chief, US Navy was reactivated and given to King.

My question is, what if King and Kimmel's assignments had been swapped, and King had been in command of the Pacific Fleet in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor. King strongly believed that war with Japan was imminent, and had also done everything he could in previous years to bolster the Navy's defenses in the Pacific. I'm not suggesting he would have realized that the attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, but he certainly would have kept the Pacific Fleet ready for war. This might have at least blunted the attack on Pearl Harbor if not stopped it, and also limited US reversals elsewhere early in the war.

 

[Garrison]

Honestly the attack on Pearl Harbor was so out of left field that it would still have been incredibly costly for the US Navy whoever was in charge and I'm not sure King would have been able to change the policy that saw all the fighters lined up wing tip to wingtip for security and the ships would probably still have been at anchor. King would have to fall on hiss sword just as Kimmel did, which might be good news for all those merchant ships on the East Coast in 1942 and might improve co-operation with the Royal Navy, though that does depend on who would get the job of CINC after Pearl Harbor.

 

[USS_Ward]

Honestly the attack on Pearl Harbor was so out of left field that it would still have been incredibly costly for the US Navy whoever was in charge and I'm not sure King would have been able to change the policy that saw all the fighters lined up wing tip to wingtip for security and the ships would probably still have been at anchor. King would have to fall on hiss sword just as Kimmel did, which might be good news for all those merchant ships on the East Coast in 1942 and might improve co-operation with the Royal Navy, though that does depend on who would get the job of CINC after Pearl Harbor.

Yep, Kings disdain for anything British (primarily the convoy system) definitely unintendedly cost a lot of merchant sailor lives (operation drumbeat/second happy time)

How well would have Kimmel or Hart got along with the RN, would they have been quicker to adopt the RN's suggestion of convoys among others?

 

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

Expect worse relations with the ABDA command and the US's allies in the Pacific

 

[Garrison]

Yep, Kings disdain for anything British (primarily the convoy system) definitely unintendedly cost a lot of merchant sailor lives (operation drumbeat/second happy time)

How well would have Kimmel or Hart got along with the RN, would they have been quicker to adopt the RN's suggestion of convoys among others?

Unfortunately I don't know enough about them to judge whether they would definitely be better in that respect, though it would be hard for them not to be.

Expect worse relations with the ABDA command and the US's allies in the Pacific

Given King's notorious Anglophobia its hard to see how those relations could be worse with someone else in charge.

 

[USS_Ward]

Expect worse relations with the ABDA command and the US's allies in the Pacific

Unless Kimmel or Hart seriously drop the ball i doubt it would be worse then OTL.

 

[Migrant_Coconut]

Given ABDACOM's level of functionality, the USN going it alone could be a net improvement over OTL.

 

[Meshakhad]

Honestly the attack on Pearl Harbor was so out of left field that it would still have been incredibly costly for the US Navy whoever was in charge and I'm not sure King would have been able to change the policy that saw all the fighters lined up wing tip to wingtip for security and the ships would probably still have been at anchor. King would have to fall on hiss sword just as Kimmel did, which might be good news for all those merchant ships on the East Coast in 1942 and might improve co-operation with the Royal Navy, though that does depend on who would get the job of CINC after Pearl Harbor.

This might have been the first thing King changed. He was, from what I can tell, much more concerned about a Japanese attack. He also might have had more patrols out, giving some warning.

 

[Vanguard45]

Honestly, I think King would've been a natural fit for the Pacific. He was more focused on battlefleet actions rather than other duties so this may be beneficial for all.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

If this butterflies the Pearl Harbor effect, there are huge effects on the rest of the war. As other commentators have noted, it came out of left field and Kimmel had to fall on his sword, despite not being particularly incompetent. And if the Pearl Harbor attack is somehow prevented, King stays in the Pacific, Nimitz does not take the Pacific command, and presumably Kimmel is CinC Atlantic, and likely does a better job than King did, at least initially. If King prevents Pearl Harbor, he likely becomes CNO eventually and is replaced by Nimitz in the Pacific.

If King doesn't prevent Pearl Harbor, he is replaced by Nimitz right away. Kimmel becomes CNO by process of elimination. Again, this might improve the initial USN response to the u-boats.

 

[Sanderford]

In February 1941, the US Navy abolished the position of Commander-In-Chief, US Navy, and instead established three separate CINC positions. Admiral Thomas Hart got the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Husband Kimmel got the Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Ernest King got the Atlantic Fleet. Then Pearl Harbor happened, Kimmel resigned, and the post of Commander-In-Chief, US Navy was reactivated and given to King.

My question is, what if King and Kimmel's assignments had been swapped, and King had been in command of the Pacific Fleet in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor. King strongly believed that war with Japan was imminent, and had also done everything he could in previous years to bolster the Navy's defenses in the Pacific. I'm not suggesting he would have realized that the attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, but he certainly would have kept the Pacific Fleet ready for war. This might have at least blunted the attack on Pearl Harbor if not stopped it, and also limited US reversals elsewhere early in the war.

The post still existed, actually. It was renamed from CINCUS, which some felt was inappropriate, to COMINCH. Admiral King held it from late in '41 to '45, for most of which he was also Chief of Naval Operations, having been appointed to replace Admiral Harold Stark in that position.

Basically you had the Atlantic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and the Asiatic Fleet, each of which had their own Commander-in-Chief, and then you had the overarching United States Fleet with jurisdiction over them all as well as independent stations, outposts, and other things of that nature wherever they were.

Regarding the original question? I do not envision Admiral King doing much better, overall, than Admiral Kimmel did historically. Too much of the preparations for conflict had been left undone for too long for one man to legitimately hope to reverse all of it in the time available, especially since large portions of what needed fixing would not be in his jurisdiction.

In the end? Admiral King is left holding the can for Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel likely becomes the next COMINCH and CNO.

 

[Garrison]

Its not that King can't do better, its more that he probably can't avoid Pearl Harbor being a shocking blow to the US Navy and having to take the blame just as Kimmel did.

 

[marathag]

He also might have had more patrols out, giving some warning.

A failed Pearl Harbor attack will still enrage the USA, it's still a sneak attack.
Gets interesting if King does a decent job, with limited damage, while Dugout Doug does his thing in the PI, botching it.
Heads will roll, but this way it's likely not to be King

 

[CV(N)-6]

Didn't Kimmel have extensive patrols up from the time he got a war warning to 6 December when the system started to break down and the men and equipment needed maintenance so they were stood down for 7 December? If King kept them up then the Japanese might be noticed sooner. King also seems to have been good at incorporating things like radar so he might've given the people under his command more faith in it and as a result the radar picking up the incoming strike might've been acted upon.

 

[Driftless]

A failed Pearl Harbor attack will still enrage the USA, it's still a sneak attack.
Gets interesting if King does a decent job, with limited damage, while Dugout Doug does his thing in the PI, botching it.
Heads will roll, but this way it's likely not to be King

For Mac to get whacked, it probably has to happen quickly, probably by mid-December, just as Short and Kimmel were relieved of their OTL duties. Just enough time to conduct a cursory analysis of what-went-wrong, and show the enraged public and other commanders that better performance is required...

*edit* Acting quickly, while the outrage is still hot, would nobble the political support Mac had back in Washington. Later on, give him a rehabilitaion gig somewhere far removed from US Press, like Alaska, Panama Canal, or China

 

[Hugh Third of Five]

Given that more than half of the casualties were on the USS Arizona, and most of those resulted (either directly or indirectly) from a bomb hitting the magazine, I think even random butterflies could greatly reduce the body count, though it would take more than that the save the career of the admiral in command.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Didn't Kimmel have extensive patrols up from the time he got a war warning to 6 December when the system started to break down and the men and equipment needed maintenance so they were stood down for 7 December? If King kept them up then the Japanese might be noticed sooner. King also seems to have been good at incorporating things like radar so he might've given the people under his command more faith in it and as a result the radar picking up the incoming strike might've been acted upon.

Yes, when the War Warning was received 27 November Kimmel & ordered a full effort at patrols & combat readiness. So did the Army, who were primarily responsible for the defense of Oahu. The simple fact is the material at had was indaquate for that level of operations, too many missing ground crew, aircraft, spare parts, ect.. After a week to many aircraft were deadlined & the ground crew were exhausted.

Even had the Japanese come the last Sunday of November (when they had originally targeted the attack) its difficult to see the outcome being much different. For one there were not enough long range reconnaissance aircraft to maintain a full 360 degree search. Adding in the Army bombers was tried, but their over water navigation skills and general preparedness would have negated most of the advantage. A second problem is the Japanese approach was timed so they're still out of air recon range when sunset came on the 6th Oahu time. They launched at sunrise & with a partial overcast. To spot the enemy then the reconnaissance plane would have had to launch long before dawn & fly a course that would put it right over the carrier fleet then, & under the thinning clouds. Assuming the reconnisance plane is not shot down by the CAP & gets a radio message off that gives the defense maybe ninety minutes warning, perhaps less. This assumes the radio message is properly responded to 7 not dismissed like the radar report of OTL, or kicked up stairs for a decision like the Wards submarine sighting.

Then there is the problem of the USN & Army command & control. Alert or not it was not set up sufficiently or trained for this emergency. Response to a air recon warning coming in at 06;15 would have been by a air wing and AA artillery with inadequate practice & subject to plenty of confusion.

Of the BB only the Nevada had sufficient steam up to clear the channel & get to sea, a few other destroyers and maybe a cruiser were in the same condition. The best they could do is get to general quarters and set watertight condition.

As it was the Japanese lost 28 aircraft. That might have been doubled to 60 or 70 planes lost.

 

[raharris1973]

If you make King expendable, rather than the hero, this can still be a highly consequential what if, if you put an optimistic spin on the Battle of the Atlantic from the PoD.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Klein in 'A Call to Arms' made a remark on the lack of east coast convoys & if they had been implemented from December 1941. Kleins 800+ page book is a examination of the US industrial mobilization from 1938 through 1943. The observation on the convoy question is but a brief note & only a question, but the question was this: Estimating from British experience it takes four to six months to properly organize a convoy system. The Brits had learned the hard way how severely a abrupt implementation of convoys can disrupt industrial production. They also found that on a good day convoys reduced the efficiency of gross delivery of a cargo fleet by 15 to 20 %. If not well organized up to 30%. Klein asks if cargo deliveries in east coast ports are halted by 2-3 weeks to make up convoys can the industrial disruption be unsnarled in four months, or perhaps six? This also has a knock on effect on convoys to the UK. Those were assembled off Canada from ships that departed individually from east coast ports. delaying those departures abruptly snarls the carefully crafted trans Atlantic convoy system. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' summarizes from British records the Trans Atlantic delivery US to UK in 1942 embarking 28,174,000 GRT cargo. 3,408,000 GRT was lost to submarines or 13.9%. If making up convoys at US east coast ports disrupts the cargo delivery to the UK two weeks thats 941,538 tons not delivered in 1942. That assumes only a two week disruption/delay. A four week delay amounts to 1,900,000 tons. These number may seem high. Perhaps they are. The loss to submarines for two weeks amounted to a average of 130,000 GRT for the year, tho the loss on the US east coast for January/March was higher. If the convoys reduce the losses January through March by one million tons that offsets a hefty part of the loss from disruption to delivery to the UK. How much else in industrial output on the US east coast is lost from a hasty creation of convoys is a whole other calculation.

The Brits were in general correct the US should have paid more attention to convoys & been better prepared. This however requires a PodLong before King took over as CNO Jin 1942. The opposition to the use of convoys was not exclusively Kings. Aside that his predecessor thought them unnecessary no one among those in the Navy, Army, or civilian industrial planning wanted to think about in 1941 the disruption from forming up convoys. There was not yet a war on. Legislation ending the free market & independent business was not in place and procurement lagging badly behind requirements. Isolationists were still existent in latter 1941 & there was still a fair number in Congress who opposed anything that interrupted business as usual.

 

[marathag]

For Mac to get whacked, it probably has to happen quickly, probably by mid-December, just as Short and Kimmel were relieved of their OTL duties.

Or he doesn't get offered the way out, no PT Boat ride.
from the wiki
The doomed defense of Bataan captured the imagination of the American public. At a time when the news from all fronts was uniformly bad, MacArthur became a living symbol of Allied resistance to the Japanese.

Fearing that Corregidor would soon fall, and MacArthur would be taken prisoner, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to go to Australia. A submarine was made available, but MacArthur elected to break through the Japanese blockade in PT boats

So he gets marched into captivity along with Wainwright, since King is that symbol of resistance, while Dugout Doug kept losing