WI 1945 Tory victory in British general election.
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
It is now official, I have created a monster.
Please, someone, take over. I have no idea what should/would happen next.
Call it a competition if you like.
Please, someone, take over. I have no idea what should/would happen next.
Call it a competition if you like.
Overlooked Iran
1946 Oil workers at Abadan go on strike for better housing, decent health care and enforcement of Iranian labor laws. OTL British management brings in Arab and tribal strike breakers. TTL rule of law observed. These well cared for oil workers would later be a vital ally in keeping Iran a liberal capitalist state. Books audited in Tehran as well as London to satisfy Iran that they were getting a fair deal. Churchill insists that Britain and Iran benfit equally from the AIOC profits, while extending the concession until 2046. Oil revenues are used to care for and educate the masses and to pay for the import of British technology. This includes transport and telecoms, sanitation infrastructure, hospital equipment, military equipment and industrial tooling. [A more democratic model than OTL Saudi Arabia].
Democracy is a luxury that many countries feel they can't afford, but a share the AIOC profits ensure that Iran is happily not in this position. Churchill pushed the AIOC to play fair and Iran to democratise in order to prevent the spread of communism. Revolutionaries are people with nothing to lose. The Iranian people now have much to lose. The cost to Britain is high. The Abadan oilfield is Britain's most profitable asset. Churchill knows it is better to lose some of that profit than all of it. And that it is better (and cheaper) to be a friend and ally of a powerful oil rich state than an oppressor.
This prevents Britain and the USA embarrassing themselves by overthrowing a democratically elected government in 1953 (operation Ajax OTL). The CIA never get into the Coup business as a consequence.
1946 Oil workers at Abadan go on strike for better housing, decent health care and enforcement of Iranian labor laws. OTL British management brings in Arab and tribal strike breakers. TTL rule of law observed. These well cared for oil workers would later be a vital ally in keeping Iran a liberal capitalist state. Books audited in Tehran as well as London to satisfy Iran that they were getting a fair deal. Churchill insists that Britain and Iran benfit equally from the AIOC profits, while extending the concession until 2046. Oil revenues are used to care for and educate the masses and to pay for the import of British technology. This includes transport and telecoms, sanitation infrastructure, hospital equipment, military equipment and industrial tooling. [A more democratic model than OTL Saudi Arabia].
Democracy is a luxury that many countries feel they can't afford, but a share the AIOC profits ensure that Iran is happily not in this position. Churchill pushed the AIOC to play fair and Iran to democratise in order to prevent the spread of communism. Revolutionaries are people with nothing to lose. The Iranian people now have much to lose. The cost to Britain is high. The Abadan oilfield is Britain's most profitable asset. Churchill knows it is better to lose some of that profit than all of it. And that it is better (and cheaper) to be a friend and ally of a powerful oil rich state than an oppressor.
This prevents Britain and the USA embarrassing themselves by overthrowing a democratically elected government in 1953 (operation Ajax OTL). The CIA never get into the Coup business as a consequence.
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Zionist intervention
There is a school of thought that Zionists, agitating for a State of Israel, co-operated with the soviets in exchange for recognition of Israel.
Benjamin V. Cohen's advice to recognise soviet governments in eastern Europe fits in with this theory. As do the terms of the Lend Lease act (weakens Britain's hold on Palestine).
Nathaniel Mayer Victor Rothschild, 3rd Baron Rothschild's collusion and involvement in cold war spying might involve a blind eye until recognition of Israel in 1948. He left MI5 and got a civilian job soon after in Cambridge's zoology* department.
This is very obscure conspiracy theory stuff, but there might be something to it. The Israelis are very good at the great game.
N.b. This is post is speculation on OTL not part of the ATL. Please don't take respect for Zionist international politics as anti-Semitism. If anyone else would like to explore this possibility, please start a thread in chat and let me know.
*I feel Zoology should have three 'ohs' in a row (zooology).
There is a school of thought that Zionists, agitating for a State of Israel, co-operated with the soviets in exchange for recognition of Israel.
Benjamin V. Cohen's advice to recognise soviet governments in eastern Europe fits in with this theory. As do the terms of the Lend Lease act (weakens Britain's hold on Palestine).
Nathaniel Mayer Victor Rothschild, 3rd Baron Rothschild's collusion and involvement in cold war spying might involve a blind eye until recognition of Israel in 1948. He left MI5 and got a civilian job soon after in Cambridge's zoology* department.
This is very obscure conspiracy theory stuff, but there might be something to it. The Israelis are very good at the great game.
N.b. This is post is speculation on OTL not part of the ATL. Please don't take respect for Zionist international politics as anti-Semitism. If anyone else would like to explore this possibility, please start a thread in chat and let me know.
*I feel Zoology should have three 'ohs' in a row (zooology).
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Umm... No, because the 'study' part is 'logy', not 'ology', despite popular misconceptions. If the subject ends in a vowel, just add 'logy'. If it ends in a consonant, add 'ology'. Zoo+logy = zoology; bio+logy= biology; ornith+o+logy = ornithology; etc.
Alive. Dozing. In training.
This thread is not dead, just short on ideas. As things strike me, I shall return to it. The initial flood is over, but I shall be topping up until I have enough for a time line. Then I shall have to learn to write.
I must say I am surprised at the interest. Nay, flattered.
This thread is not dead, just short on ideas. As things strike me, I shall return to it. The initial flood is over, but I shall be topping up until I have enough for a time line. Then I shall have to learn to write.
I must say I am surprised at the interest. Nay, flattered.
Much of US reluctance to share nuclear research (some of it by our scientists!) was based on Britain being compromised by soviet agents (ironic huh?). So what you say is true. This will save a lot of money repeating research and development.
Another case of cold war freeze out? Either way Churchill shall go ahead* with the Miles M52 and smash the sound barrier first. A swept wing, area ruled version (the Miles Delta) will use successive jet engine improvements to retain the airspeed record for some time. It was replaced in 1952 by the Miles Delta 2.
* anyone have a good excuse for this?
I think one of the themes of this story will be how much better things would be if the bright people of merit took over from 'the establishment'. Churchill is an unlikely champion of this, but he was an outsider. The establishment will be a tough nut to crack, even after the soviet spy rings come to light. Ideas in this area are also welcome.
A New Deal on democracy:
- Healthcare
- Education
- Federal Commonwealth
- Land Tax
- PR
I'll take a look at the Civil Service.
Decapitation? Who could possibly be brought in to improve the Civil Service?
I like the new code:
I think we should make MP's much more accountable in their public life and less in their private life. A clear guideline to the press is needed here. I don't want MP's open to blackmail and scandal, but I do expect them to be hard working, able and honest. Decriminalisation of homosexuality and drug use will help reduce the risk of blackmail. We can't give the soviets a way in.
I'd like to adapt these priorities to suit 1945:
- Training and Skills
- Diversity (anti-discrimination in favour of the establishment)
- Lower cost of staff retention (retaining and letting go)
- Positive vetting
The pension scheme works for retention but is a poor work incentive and costs too much. A performance related pay scheme is needed to attract and retain the brightest and best. The first step towards that are these Awards (medals and money).
I'm looking for a Civil service that is like a practical university (why I have co-opted the LSE) that has the rewards of working well with large budgets (like in the city*). Training and skills will be sought from all the major universities (on secondment).
A British Ivy league:
- Cambridge
- Oxford
- Imperial (London and Commonwealth)
- London (including London School of Economics and Political Science among others)
- Victoria (a remerger of Manchester, Leeds and Liverpool joined by Sheffield and UMIST)
*without letting the city get silly with bonuses either
That reminds me. Dis-establishing the city.
The establishment works on the honour code and keeping the oiks out. We shall ensure that opportunity is open to all and that honour is audited. All of the Ivy League would form post-graduate business schools. The London Business School was the first (1948) and is still the best.
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I'm smitten with the Mediterranean-Qattara Depression Hydroelectric Scheme.
Masses of electricity for Egypt in exchange for the suez canal in perpetuity?
To think we wasted a load of explosives trying to blow up a North sea island after WW1 when we could have been using it all for massive civil engineering projects. Churchill won't waste the opportunity. He needs money again. This time private capital for massive hydroelectric projects in Egypt(Qattara), India and Canada(Across Quebec, Newfoundand and Labrador). We spent the war unable to build without a rain of bombs undoing our labours. Now we can let the Empire bloom.
Masses of electricity for Egypt in exchange for the suez canal in perpetuity?
To think we wasted a load of explosives trying to blow up a North sea island after WW1 when we could have been using it all for massive civil engineering projects. Churchill won't waste the opportunity. He needs money again. This time private capital for massive hydroelectric projects in Egypt(Qattara), India and Canada(Across Quebec, Newfoundand and Labrador). We spent the war unable to build without a rain of bombs undoing our labours. Now we can let the Empire bloom.
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I'm trying to suggest that booming is the natural state of the empire and that German aggression inhibited that natural growth.
Not necessarily; British rates of growth had been below German ones, among others, long before even late 19th century invasion scare literature, caused and then compounded by a number of factors.
The original focus on education, housing, healthcare, employment and a Tory welfare state is all good and straightforward
However, some of the ideas you propose are very good and viable; others extend quite beyond what the Conservative Party (be it the @ one or the amalgam you describe) or indeed any British political party would be able to propose, let alone implement.
Specifically:
a weaker military than even @ at a time when Britain needed strength and modernity;
abolishing/amalgamating the RAF;
the wholesale change to the Civil Service (some are doable in parts, others will need to wait for better times) ;
cutting taxation to 30% and spending to 25% at a time when Britain is in a dire economic situation (gradual small cuts in taxation will have perhaps a better effect, starting from 1948 or 1949)
actually going through with Qattara;
disestablishment of the City of London;
decriminalization of homosexuality and drug use;
rationing of certain meats;
free floating currency (against the pre-existing Bretton Woods system that is impossible to break given the POD)
metrication and decimalization (as pointed out by bm79, the rationalization is fairly slim)
changing the very English language itself;
anti-tobacco moves in the late 1940s (impacts British jobs, British exports, British business and tax revenue)
Hannover and the British zone joining Britain
These strike me more as ideas that people think are good in hindsight, or good on their own individual merits, or 'cool', or are simply causes close to their own hearts and opinions rather than as viable and realistic ideas that could be implemented by a Tory Government between 1945 and 1950.
As I've mentioned before, I don't see how any British government could go down the path of amalgamating the RAF for supposed sins committed in the 1930s, the burden of which also can be borne by ministries and governments, not to mention additionally explained by severe constraints on interwar defence establishments and spending and the quite widely accepted doctrine of the day. Putting RAF officers in charge of RN commands and creating a bizarrely anachronistic Royal Army Flying Corps does cross over from the realm of the doable to the realm of the fantastic.
Put simply, the RAF has a lot of clout, is still involved in defeating Japan, then supplying forces around the world; then Berlin; then the small matter of being the only force that can viably deliver British atomic weapons for many years.
The path of technology pointed towards aircraft and air forces, with designs for long range bombers, jet bombers and advanced jet fighters being the order of the day. Britain is a world leader in aviation technology at this time and has the second most powerful air force in the world.
And it gives it all up...for what? Letting the country down over the FAA, which was not a major factor in the war? It is very, very flimsy reasoning.
Putting the RAF under army control flies in the face of differences in doctrine, differences in perspective on the use of strategic airpower, differences in role, foreign experience, precedent, 27 years of independent evolution and many other factors.
A combined arms approach is good, but doesn't need an RAF under Army suzerainty.
Bringing in huge numbers of MB.5s and Sea Furies is a bit of a retrograde and unnecessary action. As much as possible, the jet force should be concentrated upon - there is sufficient numbers of legacy late model Spitfires, Tempests and incoming Hornets to fill the role of prop planes. MB.5 is a nice plane, but it is obsolete technology competing for funds with much more useful developments when funds are short.
Given an early 1945 POD, there is a possibility for a number of things:
- a less protracted development of the Canberra (that will depend on economic circumstances)
- ordering the swept wing variants of the Sea Hawk and Attacker to be developed (basically, one of the scenarios from 'Project Cancelled' with the result that there are 'intermediate' jet fighters available for the RAF and for export in 1950 that are the equal of the F-86 and the Mig-15, thus giving vital experience before the move into supersonic fighters...however, without British engine transfer, the Mig-15 may not be about, further enhancing the edge of the Western allies)
- cancelling a lot of unnecessary aircraft development for both the RAF and the FAA
- consolidation of aircraft design and consolidation of some aircraft firms, with some of the smaller ones perhaps being joined into an early BAC
- issuing different requirements for development of what became the V-Bombers...larger airframes, longer range, tweaked performance could help the Valiant, with the Vulcan being developed as a very heavy bomber somewhat analogous to the B-52, and the Victor being channeled into a longer term project for a supersonic reconnaissance bomber, designed to kick in the door for the other two aircraft (vaguelly analogous to the B-58)... Valiants could also be potentially sold to a few close countries, such as Australia, Canada, India, South Africa
For a floating pound, an early version of the ROBOT plan can be considered for the early 1950s.
Something could be done with India, but it would be difficult and involve getting Congress and the Muslim League to concur with the earlier iteration of the Cabinet Mission Plan through more solid guarantees and carrots, addressing a lot of the problems that arose in the second half of 1945, and general manipulation. A most complex conundrum.
National Service is most probably necessary, as is a larger army given Imperial commitments, occupation of Japan, British roles in Indonesia, Indochina, China, defence of Hong Kong, NATO commitments, strategic reserves, home defence, anti aircraft forces and other calls upon the British Army. Some of these can be shortened (Indonesia and Indochina perhaps) but others are clear demands on the Army.
Having an agreement with India on regiments other than the Gurkhas could be useful for both parties, with volunteers joining regiments and getting a certain portion of their pay sent home, along with bonuses and payments to the Indian government...a Sikh Regiment to join the Gurkhas; also, to gain more Gurkha units would be a useful goal.
Another way to extend manpower is the formation of an Imperial Regiment and a Commonwealth Regiment, with battalions recruited from the relevant zones; also consider the Poles, although the vast majority will demob.
The main goal for the RN will be to scrap as much as possible as quickly as possible...Jukra had a decent thread on this matter. As said:
- Scrap or sell all frigates, destroyer escorts, corvettes and sloops
- return to civilian service of trawlers
- scrap all surviving pre Tribal destroyers
- sell as many as possible of the post Tribals
- scrap or sell as many as possible of all cruisers save the Crown Colonies and Towns; put half into reserve
- Build the Tigers to an all gun standard; once they are in service, sell the older cruisers
Other points in post #116
Re: Furious. It being mentioned on the RN website is nothing more than an odd choice. Certainly, if one polled a lot of naval observers, historians and personnel, Furious would come up neither as a famous ship, nor a successful one, nor one that had anything going for it regarding preservation.
Free trade could be confined to the Commonwealth and sterling zone, and then relations with other states liberalized on a case by case basis; given that Germany, France, Italy, etc will be competitors, it doesn't make full sense in 1945 to give them unfettered access to captive British markets.
The major issue with Israel joining the Commonwealth would be the Arab backlash, with a lot of British influence and interests in the area possibly being negatively affected. A more moderate path could be taken, such as a much earlier pull out to save money, but no official path of favouring either side.
For intelligence purposes, not deactivating SOE is an idea to pursue.
Some of the other ideas are fine, such as:
- Building and zoning codes;
- the enhanced Brabazon;
- going through with the Miles M52 (which would only need pressure from above from Churchill to get it through the hard period of early 46...can't see them taking over Fairey, though, so there is no reason for that project to change in nature)
- A fairer deal between the AIOC and Iran
- Demob Bill (would be costly, though, and manpower is need for global committments)
- Not supplying engines to the Soviets
- Intense focus on computing
- embarking on an initially small scale British space programme (can anyone say 'Ministry of Space'? )
What would really help is a bigger and non convertible Anglo-American loan, a continuation of Lend Lease (albeit on very heavily reduced basis and concentrating mainly on food and coal), and more effective use of the funds obtained from the Marshall Plan (Britain got the most, but spent a lot on funding military deployments and other non productive areas rather than a reform and modernization of British business).
LL, or some version of it from Canada and Australia for food, would allow a much quicker easing of rationing, which has not only broad social effects (such as continuation of the relative decline of British food) but also economic ones - both positive and negative.
Devaluation of the pound in 1945 rather than 1949 would probably be a good move, going down to 2.5 USD rather than 2.8; this would assist British exports during their window of opportunity, but would be a shock to prestige.
1947 is the year where a lot of things went wrong, starting with the bad winter causing coal shortages, thus leading to power cuts and industry grinding to a halt in some cases.
Rather than opposing unions strongly, some sort of accord with them at this time of relative strength could be reached with an aim towards minimising time lost to industrial disputes.
There is a distinct window for British business and industry to seize opportunities provided by a dearth of competition from the Continental nations - in automotive, aviation, shipbuilding, engineering, machine tools, consumer goods and a number of other areas.
The two books I would commend to you and others on the era are Peter Hennessy's 'Never Again: Britain 1945-51' and 'Austerity Britain' by David Kynaston.
It is an era of interest to me, so do keep going with this, and if you need any help turning it into a TL, give a shout.
The original focus on education, housing, healthcare, employment and a Tory welfare state is all good and straightforward
However, some of the ideas you propose are very good and viable; others extend quite beyond what the Conservative Party (be it the @ one or the amalgam you describe) or indeed any British political party would be able to propose, let alone implement.
Specifically:
a weaker military than even @ at a time when Britain needed strength and modernity;
abolishing/amalgamating the RAF;
the wholesale change to the Civil Service (some are doable in parts, others will need to wait for better times) ;
cutting taxation to 30% and spending to 25% at a time when Britain is in a dire economic situation (gradual small cuts in taxation will have perhaps a better effect, starting from 1948 or 1949)
actually going through with Qattara;
disestablishment of the City of London;
decriminalization of homosexuality and drug use;
rationing of certain meats;
free floating currency (against the pre-existing Bretton Woods system that is impossible to break given the POD)
metrication and decimalization (as pointed out by bm79, the rationalization is fairly slim)
changing the very English language itself;
anti-tobacco moves in the late 1940s (impacts British jobs, British exports, British business and tax revenue)
Hannover and the British zone joining Britain
These strike me more as ideas that people think are good in hindsight, or good on their own individual merits, or 'cool', or are simply causes close to their own hearts and opinions rather than as viable and realistic ideas that could be implemented by a Tory Government between 1945 and 1950.
As I've mentioned before, I don't see how any British government could go down the path of amalgamating the RAF for supposed sins committed in the 1930s, the burden of which also can be borne by ministries and governments, not to mention additionally explained by severe constraints on interwar defence establishments and spending and the quite widely accepted doctrine of the day. Putting RAF officers in charge of RN commands and creating a bizarrely anachronistic Royal Army Flying Corps does cross over from the realm of the doable to the realm of the fantastic.
Put simply, the RAF has a lot of clout, is still involved in defeating Japan, then supplying forces around the world; then Berlin; then the small matter of being the only force that can viably deliver British atomic weapons for many years.
The path of technology pointed towards aircraft and air forces, with designs for long range bombers, jet bombers and advanced jet fighters being the order of the day. Britain is a world leader in aviation technology at this time and has the second most powerful air force in the world.
And it gives it all up...for what? Letting the country down over the FAA, which was not a major factor in the war? It is very, very flimsy reasoning.
Putting the RAF under army control flies in the face of differences in doctrine, differences in perspective on the use of strategic airpower, differences in role, foreign experience, precedent, 27 years of independent evolution and many other factors.
A combined arms approach is good, but doesn't need an RAF under Army suzerainty.
Bringing in huge numbers of MB.5s and Sea Furies is a bit of a retrograde and unnecessary action. As much as possible, the jet force should be concentrated upon - there is sufficient numbers of legacy late model Spitfires, Tempests and incoming Hornets to fill the role of prop planes. MB.5 is a nice plane, but it is obsolete technology competing for funds with much more useful developments when funds are short.
Given an early 1945 POD, there is a possibility for a number of things:
- a less protracted development of the Canberra (that will depend on economic circumstances)
- ordering the swept wing variants of the Sea Hawk and Attacker to be developed (basically, one of the scenarios from 'Project Cancelled' with the result that there are 'intermediate' jet fighters available for the RAF and for export in 1950 that are the equal of the F-86 and the Mig-15, thus giving vital experience before the move into supersonic fighters...however, without British engine transfer, the Mig-15 may not be about, further enhancing the edge of the Western allies)
- cancelling a lot of unnecessary aircraft development for both the RAF and the FAA
- consolidation of aircraft design and consolidation of some aircraft firms, with some of the smaller ones perhaps being joined into an early BAC
- issuing different requirements for development of what became the V-Bombers...larger airframes, longer range, tweaked performance could help the Valiant, with the Vulcan being developed as a very heavy bomber somewhat analogous to the B-52, and the Victor being channeled into a longer term project for a supersonic reconnaissance bomber, designed to kick in the door for the other two aircraft (vaguelly analogous to the B-58)... Valiants could also be potentially sold to a few close countries, such as Australia, Canada, India, South Africa
For a floating pound, an early version of the ROBOT plan can be considered for the early 1950s.
Something could be done with India, but it would be difficult and involve getting Congress and the Muslim League to concur with the earlier iteration of the Cabinet Mission Plan through more solid guarantees and carrots, addressing a lot of the problems that arose in the second half of 1945, and general manipulation. A most complex conundrum.
National Service is most probably necessary, as is a larger army given Imperial commitments, occupation of Japan, British roles in Indonesia, Indochina, China, defence of Hong Kong, NATO commitments, strategic reserves, home defence, anti aircraft forces and other calls upon the British Army. Some of these can be shortened (Indonesia and Indochina perhaps) but others are clear demands on the Army.
Having an agreement with India on regiments other than the Gurkhas could be useful for both parties, with volunteers joining regiments and getting a certain portion of their pay sent home, along with bonuses and payments to the Indian government...a Sikh Regiment to join the Gurkhas; also, to gain more Gurkha units would be a useful goal.
Another way to extend manpower is the formation of an Imperial Regiment and a Commonwealth Regiment, with battalions recruited from the relevant zones; also consider the Poles, although the vast majority will demob.
The main goal for the RN will be to scrap as much as possible as quickly as possible...Jukra had a decent thread on this matter. As said:
- Scrap or sell all frigates, destroyer escorts, corvettes and sloops
- return to civilian service of trawlers
- scrap all surviving pre Tribal destroyers
- sell as many as possible of the post Tribals
- scrap or sell as many as possible of all cruisers save the Crown Colonies and Towns; put half into reserve
- Build the Tigers to an all gun standard; once they are in service, sell the older cruisers
Other points in post #116
Re: Furious. It being mentioned on the RN website is nothing more than an odd choice. Certainly, if one polled a lot of naval observers, historians and personnel, Furious would come up neither as a famous ship, nor a successful one, nor one that had anything going for it regarding preservation.
Free trade could be confined to the Commonwealth and sterling zone, and then relations with other states liberalized on a case by case basis; given that Germany, France, Italy, etc will be competitors, it doesn't make full sense in 1945 to give them unfettered access to captive British markets.
The major issue with Israel joining the Commonwealth would be the Arab backlash, with a lot of British influence and interests in the area possibly being negatively affected. A more moderate path could be taken, such as a much earlier pull out to save money, but no official path of favouring either side.
For intelligence purposes, not deactivating SOE is an idea to pursue.
Some of the other ideas are fine, such as:
- Building and zoning codes;
- the enhanced Brabazon;
- going through with the Miles M52 (which would only need pressure from above from Churchill to get it through the hard period of early 46...can't see them taking over Fairey, though, so there is no reason for that project to change in nature)
- A fairer deal between the AIOC and Iran
- Demob Bill (would be costly, though, and manpower is need for global committments)
- Not supplying engines to the Soviets
- Intense focus on computing
- embarking on an initially small scale British space programme (can anyone say 'Ministry of Space'?
)What would really help is a bigger and non convertible Anglo-American loan, a continuation of Lend Lease (albeit on very heavily reduced basis and concentrating mainly on food and coal), and more effective use of the funds obtained from the Marshall Plan (Britain got the most, but spent a lot on funding military deployments and other non productive areas rather than a reform and modernization of British business).
LL, or some version of it from Canada and Australia for food, would allow a much quicker easing of rationing, which has not only broad social effects (such as continuation of the relative decline of British food) but also economic ones - both positive and negative.
Devaluation of the pound in 1945 rather than 1949 would probably be a good move, going down to 2.5 USD rather than 2.8; this would assist British exports during their window of opportunity, but would be a shock to prestige.
1947 is the year where a lot of things went wrong, starting with the bad winter causing coal shortages, thus leading to power cuts and industry grinding to a halt in some cases.
Rather than opposing unions strongly, some sort of accord with them at this time of relative strength could be reached with an aim towards minimising time lost to industrial disputes.
There is a distinct window for British business and industry to seize opportunities provided by a dearth of competition from the Continental nations - in automotive, aviation, shipbuilding, engineering, machine tools, consumer goods and a number of other areas.
The two books I would commend to you and others on the era are Peter Hennessy's 'Never Again: Britain 1945-51' and 'Austerity Britain' by David Kynaston.
It is an era of interest to me, so do keep going with this, and if you need any help turning it into a TL, give a shout.
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This is the kind of feedback that I value most. Thank you for your well considered post. I have ordered the books you recommended. I believe that the loan gained from Canada was almost as large as the one from America, which gives some indication of our relative popularity at the time.
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Do some digging on the full amount of the Anglo-American Loan - it comes to $4336 million in direct 'cash' and a line of credit...I don't have precise figures on how much that would be in modern terms, but it would be somewhere about 5.5 times higher.
If a different LL settlement or better yet, continuation, can be negotiated (with appropriate remuneration of various kinds going to the US) then that removes the need to spend 1075 million pounds on purchasing essential LL goods at 10% of value in 1946.
That money, coming from the loan, could go into other areas of expenditure. If combined with either non convertability, or a more generous schedule for convertability, then there is the potential for somewhat less of a blow in 1945-48, and somewhat less long term negative effects from that blow - it wasn't just the immediate dire economic circumstances, but the subsequent ripples over the 50s, 60s and 70s.
This interview extract contains some interesting thinking from the time:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/snyder25.htm
Another idea related to your previous thoughts on shipping is making an effort to expand the Port of London over the course of the 1950s. Whilst this happened historically, and the Port reclaimed the position of busiest in the world, this was something of an Indian summer.
By the late 60s and 70s, the London Docks were closed or closing. Whilst most are very much too small for viable merchant traffic after the 1950s with expanding ship size, it may be possible to use the Royal Docks, if their gates were expanded, dredging carried out etc. It is something I've been trying to look into without the best of success, but if they could accomodate 20-25 000 ton ships, then a certain market for Handysized ships could be maintained, in combination with the bigger ships being serviced further up the Thames Estuary.
For a substantive and detailed examination of transport, look no further than (what I consider to be) the quite marvellous 'Green and Pleasant Land' TL.
Other texts include
the very expensive 'Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945-1955',
the detailed monograph 'Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945-1951',
'The British Economy Since 1945: Economic Policy and Performance 1945-1995',
'Project Cancelled: The Disaster of Britain's Abandoned Aircraft Project'
'Vanguard to Trident'
If a different LL settlement or better yet, continuation, can be negotiated (with appropriate remuneration of various kinds going to the US) then that removes the need to spend 1075 million pounds on purchasing essential LL goods at 10% of value in 1946.
That money, coming from the loan, could go into other areas of expenditure. If combined with either non convertability, or a more generous schedule for convertability, then there is the potential for somewhat less of a blow in 1945-48, and somewhat less long term negative effects from that blow - it wasn't just the immediate dire economic circumstances, but the subsequent ripples over the 50s, 60s and 70s.
This interview extract contains some interesting thinking from the time:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/snyder25.htm
Another idea related to your previous thoughts on shipping is making an effort to expand the Port of London over the course of the 1950s. Whilst this happened historically, and the Port reclaimed the position of busiest in the world, this was something of an Indian summer.
By the late 60s and 70s, the London Docks were closed or closing. Whilst most are very much too small for viable merchant traffic after the 1950s with expanding ship size, it may be possible to use the Royal Docks, if their gates were expanded, dredging carried out etc. It is something I've been trying to look into without the best of success, but if they could accomodate 20-25 000 ton ships, then a certain market for Handysized ships could be maintained, in combination with the bigger ships being serviced further up the Thames Estuary.
For a substantive and detailed examination of transport, look no further than (what I consider to be) the quite marvellous 'Green and Pleasant Land' TL.
Other texts include
the very expensive 'Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945-1955',
the detailed monograph 'Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945-1951',
'The British Economy Since 1945: Economic Policy and Performance 1945-1995',
'Project Cancelled: The Disaster of Britain's Abandoned Aircraft Project'
'Vanguard to Trident'
The Battle of the Atlantic was more damaging to post war Britain than while on a war footing. Imports had shifted from raw materials to (semi)processed goods. Exports had stopped. The former boosted the industries of competitors while whithering away domestic raw material processing industries (especially iron and steel production). The later left Britain's export markets open for competitors to snap up. The cost of importing steel and finished goods and halting exports was much higher than increased imports of raw materials would have been. This debt didn't come 'home to roost' until after the war (thanks to the LL programme).
Some of the limitation on the scale of raw material imports was port capacity however. An area of pre war preparation that was neglected. Even with less merchant shipping losses, there would be a limit on the amount of shipping that could import tonnage into Britain. Processed and finished goods reduce the volume of imports. Since nearly half of wartime imports were for the ministry of food, a greater pre-war expansion of domestic agriculture would have freed up some port capacity for raw materials.
I'd be looking to correct for that, not just in London, but throughout the British ship industry (Shipbuilding, Repair, Port Capacity). Handysize is a good minimum standard for the empire. I shall look into the vessel dimensions likely to offer a capacity of 35,000 tonnes of cargo with a draft of 10m in hot water. I wonder if Ferries could be built this large too?
[I'll check out G&PL, but it will take a while - I have mild flu. The Dean? Found it.]
Nice engine:
I'll take 30. On condition that Bullied inspects and signs off every drawing before building work begins and stays to complete the order. Then another 30 when the first fifteen are in revenue service. Expect orders for further batches of 30 ordered halfway through building the last batch should the 30 before prove good enough. Exports in batches of 30 only after British orders for 120 have been completed.
Reading for lining out
Newly elected in 1950 Clem Attlee proposes "an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of public inland transport and port facilities within Great Britain for passengers and goods" :- the British Transport Commission.
Some of the limitation on the scale of raw material imports was port capacity however. An area of pre war preparation that was neglected. Even with less merchant shipping losses, there would be a limit on the amount of shipping that could import tonnage into Britain. Processed and finished goods reduce the volume of imports. Since nearly half of wartime imports were for the ministry of food, a greater pre-war expansion of domestic agriculture would have freed up some port capacity for raw materials.
I'd be looking to correct for that, not just in London, but throughout the British ship industry (Shipbuilding, Repair, Port Capacity). Handysize is a good minimum standard for the empire. I shall look into the vessel dimensions likely to offer a capacity of 35,000 tonnes of cargo with a draft of 10m in hot water. I wonder if Ferries could be built this large too?
[I'll check out G&PL, but it will take a while - I have mild flu. The Dean? Found it.]
Nice engine:
I'll take 30. On condition that Bullied inspects and signs off every drawing before building work begins and stays to complete the order. Then another 30 when the first fifteen are in revenue service. Expect orders for further batches of 30 ordered halfway through building the last batch should the 30 before prove good enough. Exports in batches of 30 only after British orders for 120 have been completed.
Reading for lining out
The first Leader engine in revenue service, 1950
Newly elected in 1950 Clem Attlee proposes "an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of public inland transport and port facilities within Great Britain for passengers and goods" :- the British Transport Commission.
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Simon: More on your excellent post
Interesting that you don't rule out the political parties in all countries. I do have my Robespierre moments. That such extreme measures can't be taken in extremis shows that there are limitations in the British political system that prevent potentially vital measures.
I was pushing against an open door. I accept that a post war Liberal government would face more opposition from interested parties. I'm keen to hear of any that occur to any of you.
Some of the other ideas are fine, such as:
- Building and zoning codes;
- the enhanced Brabazon;
- going through with the Miles M52 (which would only need pressure from above from Churchill to get it through the hard period of early 46...can't see them taking over Fairey, though, so there is no reason for that project to change in nature)
- A fairer deal between the AIOC and Iran
- Demob Bill (would be costly, though, and manpower is need for global committments)
- Not supplying engines to the Soviets
- Intense focus on computing
- embarking on an initially small scale British space programme (can anyone say 'Ministry of Space'?
What would really help is a bigger and non convertible Anglo-American loan, a continuation of Lend Lease (albeit on very heavily reduced basis and concentrating mainly on food and coal), and more effective use of the funds obtained from the Marshall Plan (Britain got the most, but spent a lot on funding military deployments and other non productive areas rather than a reform and modernization of British business). [those extra armed forces and commitments you want written in stone?]
LL, or some version of it from Canada and Australia for food, would allow a much quicker easing of rationing, which has not only broad social effects (such as continuation of the relative decline of British food) but also economic ones - both positive and negative. [I like this]
Devaluation of the pound in 1945 rather than 1949 would probably be a good move, going down to 2.5 USD rather than 2.8; this would assist British exports during their window of opportunity, but would be a shock to prestige. [Acceptable under the circumstances. How do you see this affecting ROBOT in the fifties?]
1947 is the year where a lot of things went wrong, starting with the bad winter causing coal shortages, thus leading to power cuts and industry grinding to a halt in some cases. [Coal strikes, Dock Strikes. Getting coal into the country will involve strike breaking, count on it]
Rather than opposing unions strongly, some sort of accord with them at this time of relative strength could be reached with an aim towards minimising time lost to industrial disputes. [Socialists in the unions will be seeking conflict no matter what. This conflict is more likely with Churchill or any non-socialist government and will facilitate a rapid change in industrial direction...]
There is a distinct window for British business and industry to seize opportunities provided by a dearth of competition from the Continental nations - in automotive, aviation, shipbuilding, engineering, machine tools, consumer goods and a number of other areas.
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Loading Gauge
G&PL argues that military transport will not require motorway style roads and that railway transport will do fine.
The Centurion tank alone (without the rail waggon it sits on) asks a loading gauge of 11'1" x 3.01m
As of 2007 structures along main lines are being rebuilt to acommodate W12 loading gauge: 9' 6" by 2.6m. While in the US a loading gauge of around 10'8" x 4.6m high is more typical.
A military requirement would be a loading gauge of 14' x 4.5m. A challenger 2 tank with appliqué armour is just under 14' wide.
If you go that route, you may as well opt for a wider gauge (Raj/Indian/Commonwealth 5'6" - 1676mm gauge makes sense as you can add a third rail to retain standard 1435mm gauge while in transition) and a height suited to double deck passenger cars and double stacked cargo boxes (6m). This has bonuses in terms of stability and air space for high speed trains later. Although there is a lot to be said for Brunel's 7 foot gauge. This could be used for harbour railways too. Rail mounted cranes would make cargo transfer to trains easier.
G&PL argues that military transport will not require motorway style roads and that railway transport will do fine.
The Centurion tank alone (without the rail waggon it sits on) asks a loading gauge of 11'1" x 3.01m
As of 2007 structures along main lines are being rebuilt to acommodate W12 loading gauge: 9' 6" by 2.6m. While in the US a loading gauge of around 10'8" x 4.6m high is more typical.
A military requirement would be a loading gauge of 14' x 4.5m. A challenger 2 tank with appliqué armour is just under 14' wide.
If you go that route, you may as well opt for a wider gauge (Raj/Indian/Commonwealth 5'6" - 1676mm gauge makes sense as you can add a third rail to retain standard 1435mm gauge while in transition) and a height suited to double deck passenger cars and double stacked cargo boxes (6m). This has bonuses in terms of stability and air space for high speed trains later. Although there is a lot to be said for Brunel's 7 foot gauge. This could be used for harbour railways too. Rail mounted cranes would make cargo transfer to trains easier.
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This will take a while, but each point or counter point will be answered:
1.) Britain was holding the line in a lot of areas across the globe, was faced with insurgency in Malaya, defence of the Suez Canal Zone Hong Kong surrounded by a communist state, had a commitment to securing their zone of occupation in Germany through the BAOR...and have reserves for any other crises.
Cutbacks in @ did push things rather thin; adopting a force structure considerably less than that is going to result in an inability to fulfill global commitments commesurate with the role of a great power, something that Churchill in particular was in favour of doing.
2.) The MoD simply merged the ministries, rather than the forces themselves. There is a distinct difference for command, support, doctrine, operations and other requirements. So far, there hasn't been much of an argument in favour of swimming against the tide of the rest of the world and abolishing an independent air force. Acting as a means of pseudo punishment is not really the best option - it would be like abolishing the Cavalry after WW1, rather than gradually mechanizing them.
3.) Money can be saved through spacing out various schemes and concentrating on areas of maximum return and reward.
4.) Jolly good.
5.) It is a grandiose and extremely expensive scheme at the wrong time with no direct reward to Britain, and no guarantee of any political amity resulting from it. In 1945-50, there are far more important calls on British resources.
6.) There is no pressing need for it, it add unnecessary complication and instability at a time when British finances need neither. Auditing honour would not be a popular objective, and would erode key support and capital- both political and financial - that other, more pressing priorities need.
7.) There wasn't the Liberal support to justify doing either of these at this time, and both sides of Parliament were relatively socially conservative, with strong religious opinion leaning against the; simply not viable without an earlier PoD, and doesn't give any direct benefit to Britain - the opportunity cost of less blackmail opportunities would simply not win out in a political balance.
8.) Wartime nutrition was marked by overall improvement, but with the end of war and the hopeful expedited cessation of rationing, it would strike the public as a petty assault on liberty and the British character akin to the kerfuffle over identity cards. The alternatives served up during the rationing regime (snook, whale, etc) were quite disliked. The benefits are far too slim to justify Churchill putting restrictions on the Roast Beef of Old England.
9.) They didn't serve as much of a trade barrier previous to the war, or subsequent to it in @ up to the 1970s. Without any accompanying justifications such as joining the EEC, there is no reason to throw out the measures and systems used not only by Britain, but by most of her significant trading partners. As said previously, the rationalization supplied is not enough - there needs to be some tangible gain, or it simply comes down as authorial preference rather than a viable development.
10.) This matter was very cogently examined in an episode of Yes, Prime Minister, with the figure of 7 billion pounds bandied about in the 1980s. 40 years earlier, with a much higher portion of the population smoking, revenue increases. As Sir Humphrey pointed out, not all those people die at once, and not all of them live in marginal constituencies. It smacks too much of prenatural foresight.
11.) It doesn't matter how closely they were aligned - there weren't going to be any annexations, willing or not. The West needed a whole democratic West Germany as part of the economic and military counterbalance to the Soviet bloc. Much more than that, the US would not wear it whatsoever, and it is not worth picking a fight with Suez like ramifications at the exact time when goodwill and charity from across the Atlantic is needed in spades. It robs the West of the moral high ground of condemning Soviet expansionism and dastardly deeds.
12.) "Unfit for purpose (even now)"
Leaving apart the unneeded inclusion of any modern comment, let us examine the notion.
What is the purpose?
How was the RAF unfit for it?
The purposes of the RAF in 1945 were strategic bombing, mining, anti ship operations, ASW, tactical air support, transport, reconnaissance, communications, air defence, electronic warfare and many others.
Now, it can be logically argued that some of these things were done better than others, and that they had differing impacts of differing import on the overall war effort. However, it is a different matter to make a broad and sweeping judgement on the whole organization - its operations, commanders and men.
Air power was king in 1945, with the future thought to hold more and more powerful strategic bombing. Now, this didn't eventuate historically, but there is no way of predicting that from the time.
13.) The RAF has the organizational and experience to do all these things, and the command structures to understand them, rather than the Army and Royal Navy, which had different purposes and goals.
14.) The RAF was by no means alone in holding to such doctrines in the 1930s, which also came from politicians, public commentators and experts. Many air forces believed strongly in the Douhet/Trenchard view, as vocalized by Baldwin. It is a bit rich to hurl this branding reproach at the RAF without context.
So far, we have fairly slim point on the Fleet Air Arm and some sense that a bomber centric outlook in the 1930s was not, in retrospect, the most accurate one. Hardly a basis for the type of thing you propose.
15.) Independence allows concentration on direct specialities, rather than having a service try to be a jack of all trades.
Now, if you were proposing some form of a Key West Agreement, whereby the RN get the FAA and Coastal Command, the Army get tactical transport and rotary aircraft, and the RAF commit to the understanding of providing close air support (which is something the force was structured for anyway) then a relatively strong case could be made.
Instead, what has been put forth just seems to be a vengeance wrought with hindsight from personal opinion, rather than what the perspective of Churchill, the Conservative Party, the political establishment in general and the population of Britain overall may be.
The RAF had a very good war, in terms of public relations and glamour. Trying to amalgamate the Few, the heroes of the Battle of Berlin, the Dambusters, the groundbreaking jet fighter pilots...it would not stick, and smacks of the bizarre.
16.) A combined arms approach was successfully implemented by Britain numerous times during the Cold War, along with other nations that had evil independent air forces. It does not follow that it is impossible to achieve a force capable of combined arms operations and accompanying approach without fully amalgamated forces.
17.) There are a lot of Spitfires to sell off, not to mention all the disparate types of aircraft accumulated for the war. The size of the force will also contract to an armed peacetime level, which reduces requirements. There is no need to introduce a new prop fighter with a small to middling performance advantage over the current inventory.
There is also not going to be a pressing need to operate forces of the size of the Tactical Air Forces of the War
It is an aircraft that came at the wrong time.
Funds will be limited, so it is better to spend them on projects at the cutting edge of technology where Britain currently enjoys a relative advantage.
Rather than spend money on 2000 MB.5s, these funds could go into the Canberra, the swept wing fighter projects, Nene powered Meteors and Vampires, V bomber projects, procurement of strategic transports, accelerated development of the ADEN, guided weapons research, rocketry, the Miles M.52 and related supersonic research, or funding of jet engine development.
It can also go towards procuring Meteors and Vampires at a slightly increased rate.
Air support is comfortably provided by the Tempests, late model Spitfires, P-47s (if they can be kept), Mustangs (if they can be kept), Typhoons, Brigands, Mosquitoes, Hornets, etc, even with substantial offloading to the relevant parties.
18.) A Soviet Union without the Mig-15 still has jet fighters, still has thousands of planes, a large naval programme, still has 170 divisions, is still poised across the centre of Europe eyeing the Allied forces with increasing suspicion and hostility. It still has a strategic bomber programme and an atomic bomb programme, although these were not known at the time. However, Britain is far more vulnerable than the US.
The presence or not of the Mig-15 does not impact Malaya, Hong Kong, Korea, Kenya, the Occupation of Germany, Austria, Trieste and Japan, the British role in the Middle East and Far East, colonial duties and the need for a general reserve.
So it is not an argument for further cutbacks from the force structure that was already arguably below what Britain needs to maintain her status and pretensions as a great power.
19.) For each:
An enlarged Valiant would entail a larger plane, a range of perhaps 3600 miles with a 10000lb bomb...basically akin to a Victor in performance
A Vulcan with the length and wingspan of half way between the @ Vulcan and a B-52 with a (design goal) 4500 mile combat range, a speed up around 680+ mph, an increased conventional bomb load over a useful distance, ceiling of around 60000ft, and increased engine power from the later versions of the Olympus...there is the Avro 732 Supersonic Vulcan for later, but that does look like a different aircraft.
For the Handley Page supersonic recon bomber (due in about 1958/59 to give time for development) something akin to a cross between a B-58C and the supersonic Victor designs; less range is required than the USAF planes.
For this force, a tanker would be needed, and one based on the V-1000/VC.7 would be reasonably optimal.
Whether funding allows these planes, and if so, in what numbers, is a different matter. With 328 V Bombers of three types built historically, a force level of 256 Valiants and 128 Vulcans would be absolutely marvellous, but would require cuts in some other projects, as well as not wasting money on funding projects then cancelling them close to completion.
20.) The planes wouldn't make any difference to the concerns of various groups within India (historically, a lot of equipment was gifted or sold to India and Pakistan...there are some limits to how much they need and can operate).
Help industrializing would be useful, but could be taken the wrong way - more specifics would be needed on this.
India was past the stage where it could be assuaged with Dominion status or a say within a Commonwealth as a lesser party.
Effectively, you'd have to kill off Gandhi and Nehru and even then, it would be pushing it; leadership does help, though. As people have observed elsewhere, Dominion status is a bit too little for India in the 30s and 40s, and even the 20s.
You have to offer them something really tangible and useful, and Britain can't really afford such a gesture even if there was one possible and India was willing to enter into such an agreement.
21.) No interest in doing so, and more than a little sympathy towards anti-colonial struggles and rhetoric. Now, entering into an arrangement to recruit Indian manpower under a new and different Gurkha style arrangement is a potential option, if approached in a diplomatic and advantageous enough manner.
22.) Re: Poles - Indeed
23.) No, they were destroyers and too expensive and completely unsuited.
24.) Why give what they don't need? The RCN is going to contract majorly, and has its own shipbuilding. The RAN is also going to shrink, and has limited needs...South Africa and New Zealand have very limited naval capacity, and India will not need more than the historical level.
Selling them to other nations, as was historical, in a more expedited fashion does raise hard currency.
25.) As above, with more emphasis on the hard currency. Cruisers were the capital ships of smaller navies, and could command a decent enough price, even second hand.
26.) None of the Dominions that could operate carriers would need or want Furious - the RAN, RIN and RCN all had dibs on new Colossus and Majestic CVLs of modern construction and design. Britain, on the other hand, need scrap metal for the housing programme - an honourable use.
27.) The zone is one of occupation, rather than a League of Nations mandate. It cannot be considered part of British territory or the sterling zone.
It can be used as a source of capital, ideas and equipment for Britain - grab a lot of industrial plant, confiscate the Volkswagen Beetle as one officer suggested, take patents, steel making processes from particular places in Austria and nab as many useful personnel as possible.
28.) Britain copped a fair bit for their help and their troubles - lots of expenses, a loss of some goodwill for trying to curtail immigration and sending Holocaust survivors to German DP camps, the need to keep troops in place, and an ongoing terrorist insurgency.
Getting involved decisively is going to cause more trouble than it is worth.
Britain needs the Arab states on side for the Canal, for the oil, for the prestige of being regional hegemon and for the balance of payments (good arms customers).
Benevolently neutral and making money off both sides leads to the least amount of possible problems for Britain.
29.) They aren't extra commitments - they are the historical ones.
The force level needed to fulfill them and keep a useful reserve isn't inordinantly bigger than historical - perhaps a brigade or two of infantry (can be provided by the additional Indian regiments idea, or in addition to it), keep the Army Commandos, more towards a Centurion based force quicker, begin projects for APCs and SPA based on Centurion hull and go for the EM-2, as well as an LMG and a GPMG to replace the Vickers MG* ; slightly more Royal Marines; a much stronger late 40s and early 50s Fighter Command for the air defence of Great Britain, improved transport capacity and a strong, capable Bomber Command for strategic purposes, with an earlier phaseout of prop planes; an RN based around 6 or preferably 8 decent sized carriers (4 Maltas, Ark Royal, Eagle, Indefatigable,Implacable...rebuild the last two if there are funds...based on 1 carrier at home, 1 at Singapore, 1 at Gib, 1 working up, 2 in maintenance, and the extra two, if there, in reserve) with the 4 CVLs used as ASW/commando carriers, Vanguard kept semi-active (KGVs in reserve), a dozen cruisers, 32 destroyers, 64 frigates (begin conversions in 1948, and new construction of a standard type in 1950) and 48 submarines. Reserve Fleet scrapped, all slow escorts scrapped, Coastal Forces cut.
Reach that level by 1954 or so and things are decent. Costs a bit, but if spread out over 10 years and combined with a rational approach to procurement, somewhat within the vague realms of possibility.
If funds really aren't an issue, then break out those plans for a Super Lion or two.
30.) Much obliged.
31.) It would probably lessen the initial shock of ROBOT, and may even alter the desirability of it, for at least a decade. In the long run, a floating pound is a good notion.
32.) Most certainly. The stockpiling would need to be done either using troops, or with some degree of subterfuge - Britain is only being used as a transhipment point for coal bound for Europe as aid, or some such nominally true cover.
33.) What is needed is an earlier 'In Place of Strife' combined with an approach to the more moderate unions...something that Labour is better positioned to do.
34.) Trains and shipping ideas good.
The issue with a Labour Government coming into power in 1950 is that, without major changes to their manifesto and approach, they will be keen on nationalization and even reversing some previous policies. 1950 is the halfway point for a lot of these measures...they will take until 1954 or 1955 to be fully felt in Britain, even taking into account the potential for a softened postwar fall and a stronger recovery from 1948-50.
A key will be avoiding the big rearmament spending put in place by Labour in response to the Korean War and continued by Churchill, including the illfated 'superpriority' programmes and the Swift saga. This can be in part ameliorated by not being so savage in 1945-50, or rather, choosing better areas to cut costs in, and demobilising less important capacities.
* = Whilst the Taden was historically aimed at replacing the Bren and Vickers, a light 0.280" version to replace the Bren could be well complemented by a GPMG firing a heavier round with the range and effect of the Vickers...the notion of having all weapons fire the same round is reasonable and worthwhile, though, for the 7mm calibre.
1.) Britain was holding the line in a lot of areas across the globe, was faced with insurgency in Malaya, defence of the Suez Canal Zone Hong Kong surrounded by a communist state, had a commitment to securing their zone of occupation in Germany through the BAOR...and have reserves for any other crises.
Cutbacks in @ did push things rather thin; adopting a force structure considerably less than that is going to result in an inability to fulfill global commitments commesurate with the role of a great power, something that Churchill in particular was in favour of doing.
2.) The MoD simply merged the ministries, rather than the forces themselves. There is a distinct difference for command, support, doctrine, operations and other requirements. So far, there hasn't been much of an argument in favour of swimming against the tide of the rest of the world and abolishing an independent air force. Acting as a means of pseudo punishment is not really the best option - it would be like abolishing the Cavalry after WW1, rather than gradually mechanizing them.
3.) Money can be saved through spacing out various schemes and concentrating on areas of maximum return and reward.
4.) Jolly good.
5.) It is a grandiose and extremely expensive scheme at the wrong time with no direct reward to Britain, and no guarantee of any political amity resulting from it. In 1945-50, there are far more important calls on British resources.
6.) There is no pressing need for it, it add unnecessary complication and instability at a time when British finances need neither. Auditing honour would not be a popular objective, and would erode key support and capital- both political and financial - that other, more pressing priorities need.
7.) There wasn't the Liberal support to justify doing either of these at this time, and both sides of Parliament were relatively socially conservative, with strong religious opinion leaning against the; simply not viable without an earlier PoD, and doesn't give any direct benefit to Britain - the opportunity cost of less blackmail opportunities would simply not win out in a political balance.
8.) Wartime nutrition was marked by overall improvement, but with the end of war and the hopeful expedited cessation of rationing, it would strike the public as a petty assault on liberty and the British character akin to the kerfuffle over identity cards. The alternatives served up during the rationing regime (snook, whale, etc) were quite disliked. The benefits are far too slim to justify Churchill putting restrictions on the Roast Beef of Old England.
9.) They didn't serve as much of a trade barrier previous to the war, or subsequent to it in @ up to the 1970s. Without any accompanying justifications such as joining the EEC, there is no reason to throw out the measures and systems used not only by Britain, but by most of her significant trading partners. As said previously, the rationalization supplied is not enough - there needs to be some tangible gain, or it simply comes down as authorial preference rather than a viable development.
10.) This matter was very cogently examined in an episode of Yes, Prime Minister, with the figure of 7 billion pounds bandied about in the 1980s. 40 years earlier, with a much higher portion of the population smoking, revenue increases. As Sir Humphrey pointed out, not all those people die at once, and not all of them live in marginal constituencies. It smacks too much of prenatural foresight.
11.) It doesn't matter how closely they were aligned - there weren't going to be any annexations, willing or not. The West needed a whole democratic West Germany as part of the economic and military counterbalance to the Soviet bloc. Much more than that, the US would not wear it whatsoever, and it is not worth picking a fight with Suez like ramifications at the exact time when goodwill and charity from across the Atlantic is needed in spades. It robs the West of the moral high ground of condemning Soviet expansionism and dastardly deeds.
12.) "Unfit for purpose (even now)"
Leaving apart the unneeded inclusion of any modern comment, let us examine the notion.
What is the purpose?
How was the RAF unfit for it?
The purposes of the RAF in 1945 were strategic bombing, mining, anti ship operations, ASW, tactical air support, transport, reconnaissance, communications, air defence, electronic warfare and many others.
Now, it can be logically argued that some of these things were done better than others, and that they had differing impacts of differing import on the overall war effort. However, it is a different matter to make a broad and sweeping judgement on the whole organization - its operations, commanders and men.
Air power was king in 1945, with the future thought to hold more and more powerful strategic bombing. Now, this didn't eventuate historically, but there is no way of predicting that from the time.
13.) The RAF has the organizational and experience to do all these things, and the command structures to understand them, rather than the Army and Royal Navy, which had different purposes and goals.
14.) The RAF was by no means alone in holding to such doctrines in the 1930s, which also came from politicians, public commentators and experts. Many air forces believed strongly in the Douhet/Trenchard view, as vocalized by Baldwin. It is a bit rich to hurl this branding reproach at the RAF without context.
So far, we have fairly slim point on the Fleet Air Arm and some sense that a bomber centric outlook in the 1930s was not, in retrospect, the most accurate one. Hardly a basis for the type of thing you propose.
15.) Independence allows concentration on direct specialities, rather than having a service try to be a jack of all trades.
Now, if you were proposing some form of a Key West Agreement, whereby the RN get the FAA and Coastal Command, the Army get tactical transport and rotary aircraft, and the RAF commit to the understanding of providing close air support (which is something the force was structured for anyway) then a relatively strong case could be made.
Instead, what has been put forth just seems to be a vengeance wrought with hindsight from personal opinion, rather than what the perspective of Churchill, the Conservative Party, the political establishment in general and the population of Britain overall may be.
The RAF had a very good war, in terms of public relations and glamour. Trying to amalgamate the Few, the heroes of the Battle of Berlin, the Dambusters, the groundbreaking jet fighter pilots...it would not stick, and smacks of the bizarre.
16.) A combined arms approach was successfully implemented by Britain numerous times during the Cold War, along with other nations that had evil independent air forces. It does not follow that it is impossible to achieve a force capable of combined arms operations and accompanying approach without fully amalgamated forces.
17.) There are a lot of Spitfires to sell off, not to mention all the disparate types of aircraft accumulated for the war. The size of the force will also contract to an armed peacetime level, which reduces requirements. There is no need to introduce a new prop fighter with a small to middling performance advantage over the current inventory.
There is also not going to be a pressing need to operate forces of the size of the Tactical Air Forces of the War
It is an aircraft that came at the wrong time.
Funds will be limited, so it is better to spend them on projects at the cutting edge of technology where Britain currently enjoys a relative advantage.
Rather than spend money on 2000 MB.5s, these funds could go into the Canberra, the swept wing fighter projects, Nene powered Meteors and Vampires, V bomber projects, procurement of strategic transports, accelerated development of the ADEN, guided weapons research, rocketry, the Miles M.52 and related supersonic research, or funding of jet engine development.
It can also go towards procuring Meteors and Vampires at a slightly increased rate.
Air support is comfortably provided by the Tempests, late model Spitfires, P-47s (if they can be kept), Mustangs (if they can be kept), Typhoons, Brigands, Mosquitoes, Hornets, etc, even with substantial offloading to the relevant parties.
18.) A Soviet Union without the Mig-15 still has jet fighters, still has thousands of planes, a large naval programme, still has 170 divisions, is still poised across the centre of Europe eyeing the Allied forces with increasing suspicion and hostility. It still has a strategic bomber programme and an atomic bomb programme, although these were not known at the time. However, Britain is far more vulnerable than the US.
The presence or not of the Mig-15 does not impact Malaya, Hong Kong, Korea, Kenya, the Occupation of Germany, Austria, Trieste and Japan, the British role in the Middle East and Far East, colonial duties and the need for a general reserve.
So it is not an argument for further cutbacks from the force structure that was already arguably below what Britain needs to maintain her status and pretensions as a great power.
19.) For each:
An enlarged Valiant would entail a larger plane, a range of perhaps 3600 miles with a 10000lb bomb...basically akin to a Victor in performance
A Vulcan with the length and wingspan of half way between the @ Vulcan and a B-52 with a (design goal) 4500 mile combat range, a speed up around 680+ mph, an increased conventional bomb load over a useful distance, ceiling of around 60000ft, and increased engine power from the later versions of the Olympus...there is the Avro 732 Supersonic Vulcan for later, but that does look like a different aircraft.
For the Handley Page supersonic recon bomber (due in about 1958/59 to give time for development) something akin to a cross between a B-58C and the supersonic Victor designs; less range is required than the USAF planes.
For this force, a tanker would be needed, and one based on the V-1000/VC.7 would be reasonably optimal.
Whether funding allows these planes, and if so, in what numbers, is a different matter. With 328 V Bombers of three types built historically, a force level of 256 Valiants and 128 Vulcans would be absolutely marvellous, but would require cuts in some other projects, as well as not wasting money on funding projects then cancelling them close to completion.
20.) The planes wouldn't make any difference to the concerns of various groups within India (historically, a lot of equipment was gifted or sold to India and Pakistan...there are some limits to how much they need and can operate).
Help industrializing would be useful, but could be taken the wrong way - more specifics would be needed on this.
India was past the stage where it could be assuaged with Dominion status or a say within a Commonwealth as a lesser party.
Effectively, you'd have to kill off Gandhi and Nehru and even then, it would be pushing it; leadership does help, though. As people have observed elsewhere, Dominion status is a bit too little for India in the 30s and 40s, and even the 20s.
You have to offer them something really tangible and useful, and Britain can't really afford such a gesture even if there was one possible and India was willing to enter into such an agreement.
21.) No interest in doing so, and more than a little sympathy towards anti-colonial struggles and rhetoric. Now, entering into an arrangement to recruit Indian manpower under a new and different Gurkha style arrangement is a potential option, if approached in a diplomatic and advantageous enough manner.
22.) Re: Poles - Indeed
23.) No, they were destroyers and too expensive and completely unsuited.
24.) Why give what they don't need? The RCN is going to contract majorly, and has its own shipbuilding. The RAN is also going to shrink, and has limited needs...South Africa and New Zealand have very limited naval capacity, and India will not need more than the historical level.
Selling them to other nations, as was historical, in a more expedited fashion does raise hard currency.
25.) As above, with more emphasis on the hard currency. Cruisers were the capital ships of smaller navies, and could command a decent enough price, even second hand.
26.) None of the Dominions that could operate carriers would need or want Furious - the RAN, RIN and RCN all had dibs on new Colossus and Majestic CVLs of modern construction and design. Britain, on the other hand, need scrap metal for the housing programme - an honourable use.
27.) The zone is one of occupation, rather than a League of Nations mandate. It cannot be considered part of British territory or the sterling zone.
It can be used as a source of capital, ideas and equipment for Britain - grab a lot of industrial plant, confiscate the Volkswagen Beetle as one officer suggested, take patents, steel making processes from particular places in Austria and nab as many useful personnel as possible.
28.) Britain copped a fair bit for their help and their troubles - lots of expenses, a loss of some goodwill for trying to curtail immigration and sending Holocaust survivors to German DP camps, the need to keep troops in place, and an ongoing terrorist insurgency.
Getting involved decisively is going to cause more trouble than it is worth.
Britain needs the Arab states on side for the Canal, for the oil, for the prestige of being regional hegemon and for the balance of payments (good arms customers).
Benevolently neutral and making money off both sides leads to the least amount of possible problems for Britain.
29.) They aren't extra commitments - they are the historical ones.
The force level needed to fulfill them and keep a useful reserve isn't inordinantly bigger than historical - perhaps a brigade or two of infantry (can be provided by the additional Indian regiments idea, or in addition to it), keep the Army Commandos, more towards a Centurion based force quicker, begin projects for APCs and SPA based on Centurion hull and go for the EM-2, as well as an LMG and a GPMG to replace the Vickers MG* ; slightly more Royal Marines; a much stronger late 40s and early 50s Fighter Command for the air defence of Great Britain, improved transport capacity and a strong, capable Bomber Command for strategic purposes, with an earlier phaseout of prop planes; an RN based around 6 or preferably 8 decent sized carriers (4 Maltas, Ark Royal, Eagle, Indefatigable,Implacable...rebuild the last two if there are funds...based on 1 carrier at home, 1 at Singapore, 1 at Gib, 1 working up, 2 in maintenance, and the extra two, if there, in reserve) with the 4 CVLs used as ASW/commando carriers, Vanguard kept semi-active (KGVs in reserve), a dozen cruisers, 32 destroyers, 64 frigates (begin conversions in 1948, and new construction of a standard type in 1950) and 48 submarines. Reserve Fleet scrapped, all slow escorts scrapped, Coastal Forces cut.
Reach that level by 1954 or so and things are decent. Costs a bit, but if spread out over 10 years and combined with a rational approach to procurement, somewhat within the vague realms of possibility.
If funds really aren't an issue, then break out those plans for a Super Lion or two.
30.) Much obliged.
31.) It would probably lessen the initial shock of ROBOT, and may even alter the desirability of it, for at least a decade. In the long run, a floating pound is a good notion.
32.) Most certainly. The stockpiling would need to be done either using troops, or with some degree of subterfuge - Britain is only being used as a transhipment point for coal bound for Europe as aid, or some such nominally true cover.
33.) What is needed is an earlier 'In Place of Strife' combined with an approach to the more moderate unions...something that Labour is better positioned to do.
34.) Trains and shipping ideas good.
The issue with a Labour Government coming into power in 1950 is that, without major changes to their manifesto and approach, they will be keen on nationalization and even reversing some previous policies. 1950 is the halfway point for a lot of these measures...they will take until 1954 or 1955 to be fully felt in Britain, even taking into account the potential for a softened postwar fall and a stronger recovery from 1948-50.
A key will be avoiding the big rearmament spending put in place by Labour in response to the Korean War and continued by Churchill, including the illfated 'superpriority' programmes and the Swift saga. This can be in part ameliorated by not being so savage in 1945-50, or rather, choosing better areas to cut costs in, and demobilising less important capacities.
* = Whilst the Taden was historically aimed at replacing the Bren and Vickers, a light 0.280" version to replace the Bren could be well complemented by a GPMG firing a heavier round with the range and effect of the Vickers...the notion of having all weapons fire the same round is reasonable and worthwhile, though, for the 7mm calibre.