I've been wondering about this for a while, but never really knew the right way to go about asking it.
Why did the Allied military command decide on an amphibious invasion of Europe through the northern French beachhead?
Now, on the one hand I can understand the benefits of having such a beachhead -- proximity to resupply from Britain being the first and most obvious point. I can also understand why the Allies would want to keep up the threat of such an amphibious invasion -- to keep Nazi attention and resources focused in the north.
But the Allies had already secured much of southern Italy, and was at the time of D-Day making fairly rapid progress northward (if I recall correctly, Allied forces had reached Rome only two days before D-Day went ahead). Sure, after that point the Italian campaign bogged down, but that could just as easily be blamed on Allied troops being diverted to support the major campaign in Normandy.
There's also Operation Dragoon to consider, a smaller but just as successful Allied amphibious assault pushing north through the beaches of southern France. That took place only two months after D-Day and was remarkably successful. Even better, it didn't involved going head-to-head against the Atlantic Wall.
I have no doubt others will have already analyzed the cost-benefits involved, but strategically, an Allied push from the south through Italy just seems to make more sense to me. If you brought the Overlord forces to bear on the Mediterranean, you could launch multiple beachheads in northern Italy (like the abortive Anzio landing in Operation Shingle), southern France (Operation Dragoon, as above), and possibly even the oil-producing Balkans (Churchill's preferred strategy).
Such a strategy might have also given U.S. and Britain the chance to push through and occupy Eastern Europe, gaining additional leverage in the face of the Soviet advance. It was already clear that our alliance with them was one of convenience, and would not last long (at all) once the war was won.
Perhaps I'm just grotesquely misinformed, but even if that's the case I'd love to hear where I went wrong. And if not... well, here's a free ATL in case anyone wants to adopt it.
Why did the Allied military command decide on an amphibious invasion of Europe through the northern French beachhead?
Now, on the one hand I can understand the benefits of having such a beachhead -- proximity to resupply from Britain being the first and most obvious point. I can also understand why the Allies would want to keep up the threat of such an amphibious invasion -- to keep Nazi attention and resources focused in the north.
But the Allies had already secured much of southern Italy, and was at the time of D-Day making fairly rapid progress northward (if I recall correctly, Allied forces had reached Rome only two days before D-Day went ahead). Sure, after that point the Italian campaign bogged down, but that could just as easily be blamed on Allied troops being diverted to support the major campaign in Normandy.
There's also Operation Dragoon to consider, a smaller but just as successful Allied amphibious assault pushing north through the beaches of southern France. That took place only two months after D-Day and was remarkably successful. Even better, it didn't involved going head-to-head against the Atlantic Wall.
I have no doubt others will have already analyzed the cost-benefits involved, but strategically, an Allied push from the south through Italy just seems to make more sense to me. If you brought the Overlord forces to bear on the Mediterranean, you could launch multiple beachheads in northern Italy (like the abortive Anzio landing in Operation Shingle), southern France (Operation Dragoon, as above), and possibly even the oil-producing Balkans (Churchill's preferred strategy).
Such a strategy might have also given U.S. and Britain the chance to push through and occupy Eastern Europe, gaining additional leverage in the face of the Soviet advance. It was already clear that our alliance with them was one of convenience, and would not last long (at all) once the war was won.
Perhaps I'm just grotesquely misinformed, but even if that's the case I'd love to hear where I went wrong. And if not... well, here's a free ATL in case anyone wants to adopt it.
) aren't going to take much pressure of the Russian front let alone win the war against Germany. Only the 70+ Allied divisions in Northern France could achieve this. A key reason for the invasion of Italy was Stalin screaming for a second front from 1941 inwards. It was never meant to be the main Allies effort regardless of how much Churchill want it to be.
