Why is sealion such a sensitive issue on this forum?

[Ian Hathaway]

Probably.

Does After 1900 allow comedy threads? This is unashamedly comedy, though the kind of comedy I prefer with actual action sequences...

Can't see why not ... if it's a problem the mods will just move it ... after all you now have three parts, or is it four?

 

[Saphroneth]

Can't see why not ... if it's a problem the mods will just move it ... after all you now have three parts, or is it four?

Three, it's just one is much longer.

Incidentally, I hope the attacks so far made sense. I may be upping the potency of the Stukas a bit, but then this is 1940 and so fleet air defence is in its infancy. (Er, primary school.)

 

[oldironside]

Probably.

Does After 1900 allow comedy threads? This is unashamedly comedy, though the kind of comedy I prefer with actual action sequences...

Stick it in the Writer's Forum. Of course, it's going to have to be good to be half as funny as The Raid On Scapa Flow.

 

[Saphroneth]

Stick it in the Writer's Forum. Of course, it's going to have to be good to be half as funny as The Raid On Scapa Flow.

Well, yes, there's that...

 

[Saphroneth]

Right, I've chucked it in here:

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=9999604

with all posts to date. I also nabbed the "Youhavegottobefuckingkiddingous" joke from someone - can't remember who, sorry.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Right, I've chucked it in here:

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=9999604

with all posts to date. I also nabbed the "Youhavegottobefuckingkiddingous" joke from someone - can't remember who, sorry.

I cant think who might have been

 

[Saphroneth]

I cant think who might have been

Would it be perhaps your own self?

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Back to the fray

I had asked you what the better strategy was to Sealion that you mentioned existed, and your answer was various forms of sea invasion - which would be the same strategy. I then asked you whether, since your answer implied that sea invasion was the best available strategy, it would be nit picking to talk of different operational plans when the question is between invade or not invade. That is, if the strategy said invade, then any sea invasion would be better than no sea invasion.

As you pointed out they're not exclusive alternatives. Given that launching Barbarossa with Britain still in the war and the US supporting both countries is 100% guaranteed to lose it, then Britain must be dealt with first. Compromise peace rejected in JUN40 so invasion as attempt to knock it out of war. Failure = need to win by other means

In 1917 this strategy[unrestricted sub warfare] led to war with the United States. Upon what basis do you conclude in 1940 that repeating this mistake would lead to an alternative outcome? Why would Britain go to the negotiating table if Germany were pursuing a strategy that will lead to war with the United States? Didn't Britain want Germany at war with the US, as the basic element of its only feasible remaining strategy?

Now, assuming all these strategic hurdles have answers, what precisely was it about a sea invasion attempt that you propose would make impossible a subsequent Atlantic USW campaign? Would not the inevitable heavy damage to the RN's DD forces repelling an invasion, and the fact that few if any U-boats would be sunk, and the fact that the RN would have to stand guard for a repeat attempt, cause a failed invasion to enhance an Atlantic USW campaign?

To what purpose an expanded war in the Med? Let's say Germany actually captures Gibraltar and Egypt. So what? British ships can just go around Africa, can't they? What has been gained for Germany to bringing Britain to make peace, to offset the loss in time of a whole year?

If the preliminary conditions require both that the British to oust Churchill during wartime and the Americans not to follow their own precedent, how do you arrive at a 50% chance of success? Assuming that there was, say, a 5% chance Churchill would be ousted before the culmination of a sea war, and, say, a 25% chance that USW in the Atlantic would not lead to war with the USA, and that there was, say, a 50% chance that a USW campaign would win the war, that would be a 1-in-160 chance of success.

I'd make the odds on US intervention much lower. Isolationist feeling was still strong, Lend-Lease was only narrowly passed and Roosevelt was very careful not to go ahead of public opinion. It's actually in my mind unclear as to whether he actually wanted to take the US to war or prefer simply to bleed both Britain and Nazi Germany. And remember he still didn't seek a DOW after Pearl Harbour.

Why should Britain make peace after losing the war in the Mediterranean and facing strangulation of its trade routes?

Err, It's losing. Its domination of the middle east will be loosened after Cairo and the Suez canal are seized. I'd expect pro-Axis revolts in Iraq to succeed, Persia to turn hostile. Its grip on India is shaky. And Japan has occupied French Indo-China and is threatening Malaya and the NEI.

Unless the US is willing to join the war openly at this point, it will occur to a lot of High Tory's and others in the UK that peace now, however humiliating, will be better than fighting on and losing the Empire. Remember that in June 1940 some cabinet members (Halifax at least, with Butler as his deputy) were prepared (or so some reports have it) to seek Mussolini's intervention even if that meant giving up Malta and Gibraltar.

So Churchill being ousted in this desperate position (possibly beforehand once disaster looked certain) and a peace-minded administration being formed seems highly plausible.

So this strategy is plausible. Maybe 50-50 is too high, but only if you think the US will intervene actively.

A failed Sealion that led to a significant weakening of the RN would be a mixed blessing. Damage to the RN good but offset by morale boost to Britain. So I'd not go ahead with the full sealion.

OTOH, an early "air lion" might be a very different proposition.

FWIW I found this in The Narrow Margin To paraphrase
"On June 4th, General Milch flew over Dunkirk, surveying the relicts of the evacuation and the material left behind. It was clear that the British army had abandoned nearly all its heavy weaponry. [...] On 18 June he proposed to goering that all available paratroopers and air landing forces should be despatched immediately to seize airfields like Manston and Hawkinge. They would be reinforced by regular troops in follow on waves"

'The plan involved considerable risks, but it might have succeeded' was the verdict of the book's authors.

So I think "Airlion" doesn't quite fall under the ban that the unspeakable pinniped does.



You, of course, are entitled to disagree. As are others here.

Is there an ATL with a mid-late June 1940 air-led invasion on the board? If so. I'd like to read it

I can see all the problems but really both Fighter Command and the British army were at a very low ebb in mid-June. Only one organised Division (Canadian0 and probably fewer than 400 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes (331 at June 5th from the Narrow Margin again).

The psychological shock alone could well have pushed Churchill out of office.

 

[mikewrites]

As you pointed out they're not exclusive alternatives. Given that launching Barbarossa with Britain still in the war and the US supporting both countries is 100% guaranteed to lose it, then Britain must be dealt with first. Compromise peace rejected in JUN40 so invasion as attempt to knock it out of war. Failure = need to win by other means



I'd make the odds on US intervention much lower. Isolationist feeling was still strong, Lend-Lease was only narrowly passed and Roosevelt was very careful not to go ahead of public opinion. It's actually in my mind unclear as to whether he actually wanted to take the US to war or prefer simply to bleed both Britain and Nazi Germany. And remember he still didn't seek a DOW after Pearl Harbour.

Why should Britain make peace after losing the war in the Mediterranean and facing strangulation of its trade routes?

Err, It's losing. Its domination of the middle east will be loosened after Cairo and the Suez canal are seized. I'd expect pro-Axis revolts in Iraq to succeed, Persia to turn hostile. Its grip on India is shaky. And Japan has occupied French Indo-China and is threatening Malaya and the NEI.

Unless the US is willing to join the war openly at this point, it will occur to a lot of High Tory's and others in the UK that peace now, however humiliating, will be better than fighting on and losing the Empire. Remember that in June 1940 some cabinet members (Halifax at least, with Butler as his deputy) were prepared (or so some reports have it) to seek Mussolini's intervention even if that meant giving up Malta and Gibraltar.

So Churchill being ousted in this desperate position (possibly beforehand once disaster looked certain) and a peace-minded administration being formed seems highly plausible.

So this strategy is plausible. Maybe 50-50 is too high, but only if you think the US will intervene actively.

A failed Sealion that led to a significant weakening of the RN would be a mixed blessing. Damage to the RN good but offset by morale boost to Britain. So I'd not go ahead with the full sealion.

OTOH, an early "air lion" might be a very different proposition.

FWIW I found this in The Narrow Margin To paraphrase
"On June 4th, General Milch flew over Dunkirk, surveying the relicts of the evacuation and the material left behind. It was clear that the British army had abandoned nearly all its heavy weaponry. [...] On 18 June he proposed to goering that all available paratroopers and air landing forces should be despatched immediately to seize airfields like Manston and Hawkinge. They would be reinforced by regular troops in follow on waves"

'The plan involved considerable risks, but it might have succeeded' was the verdict of the book's authors.

So I think "Airlion" doesn't quite fall under the ban that the unspeakable pinniped does.



You, of course, are entitled to disagree. As are others here.

Is there an ATL with a mid-late June 1940 air-led invasion on the board? If so. I'd like to read it

I can see all the problems but really both Fighter Command and the British army were at a very low ebb in mid-June. Only one organised Division (Canadian0 and probably fewer than 400 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes (331 at June 5th from the Narrow Margin again).

The psychological shock alone could well have pushed Churchill out of office.

After seeing the type of chaos Sealion has caused on this site, I sort of wish it would have actually happened. Just to shut up the amateur hour argument of whether or not it could have succeeded.

 

[Glenn239]

As you pointed out they're not exclusive alternatives.

Correct, it's not like Sealion prevents the USW or Med strategy. So when you had listed these as alternatives to Sealion, it's not like it was an either or situation. In fact, depending on how badly the RAF and RN's DD forces were damaged, and how much the BA is inclined to caution afterwards in terms of overseas movements, a failed Sealion might actually have enhanced these strategies.

I'd make the odds on US intervention much lower.

I don't. Historically US ships and German U-boats were attacking each other in the Atlantic, so it was only a matter of time.

Why should Britain make peace after losing the war in the Mediterranean and facing strangulation of its trade routes? Err, It's losing.

Britain had no chance of victory without the US and/or USSR and no chance of defeat with the US in the war. Therefore, whether the Axis captured Gibraltar and Egypt or not was relevant to British chances only insofar as these things did or did increase the chances of Germany being at war with either the USSR or USA.

So this strategy is plausible. Maybe 50-50 is too high, but only if you think the US will intervene actively.

What would you rate the chances for the strategy assuming that US intervention was a 95% certainty by 1 January 1943?

The psychological shock alone could well have pushed Churchill out of office.

Interesting how in one paragraph the "psychological shock" of a failed air invasion could oust Churchill from office, while in another referencing a failed sea invasion, no such phenomenon exists.

 

[Glenn239]

After seeing the type of chaos Sealion has caused on this site, I sort of wish it would have actually happened. Just to shut up the amateur hour argument of whether or not it could have succeeded.

Not a question of could or couldn't. Was a question of should or shouldn't.

Sealion had many faults, but starting a land war in Asia was not one of them.