The Imperial Japanese Army was messed up. Soldiers and officers were of course brutal both to Chinese people and each other, and the command was all over the place. Even by 1939 the only thing they could agree on was that they wanted to find a way to solve the "China Incident" without losing face. This chaotic situation led to not just Japanese but Japanese military actions and policies between 1920 and 1945 often being contradictory and counterproductive.
Why Didn't China Surrender in WWII?
- Thread starter CthulhuFhtagn
- Start date
Well it might not have been in the Japanese governments ideology, but it wasn't the japanese government in China, it was the Japanese army. And the japanese army simply wanted to destroy China and the Chinese people.
Rape of Nanking was genocide, plain and simple. It was an act of terror on the population not because they resisted occupation but because the Japanese soldiers simply wanted to destroy the population of Nanking. this happened not only in Nanking but on many locations, also in Manchuria(although that land was considderd part of Japan already and needed to stay intact). All in all more then 17 million Chinese civilians were killed because the Japanese army wanted to get rid of them, either through military operations or massacres.
Japanese might not have build extermination camps and decided upon a "final solution", but it was Genocide nontheless.
Beijing was lucky as it almost completely escaped wartime destructions, both during Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War.
My grandmother was in Hefei at that time, and she was forced to abandon school and went on hiding in the mountains when the Japanese struck. She did not have such a favourable opinion on the Japanese.
There was
1) indiscriminate bombing on civilians zones, my grandmother's classmate was killed with 9 other family members.
2) savage machine-gun attacks by Japanese cavalrymen on refugee columns
3) the attacks stopped once the refugees reached the mountains, as the Japanese feared an ambush. In this case, the Japanese expectations of an existing resistance SAVED the civilians, not endangered them.
After a year or so in the counties, when things settled down, she returned to Hefei and saw:
1) her house turned into a stable
2) local girls were often forced to marry Chinese collaborators from the Northeast.
3) tales of rape. I don't want to specify on that.
Again, if the Japanese killed only to deal with "resisting armies and insurgent operations", how are you going to explain the Soo Ching massacre in Malaya and Singapore, when there was very little resistance to speak of.
Aside from the refugee killings my grandmother experienced, I recall reading that in Singapore, anyone with tattoo was killed as "triads", and almost all Hainanese were killed as "communists". Difference between this and a genocide was technical.
In a nutshell, they were willing to kill anyone they deem with the potential to rebel, no real sign of rebellion was needed to justify a killing.
In addition to all of the obvious responses posted in this thread, the Chinese government to some degree expected (accurately, albeit for different reasons than they probably imagined) that at some point, there would be a western intervention, in part because Japanese atrocities had completely blackened Japan's name in the West, in addition to the geostrategic reasons,
Also, typically, it happens that most governments consider it their duty to engage in self-defence when attacked, especially when it's literally the one thing they aren't being criticized for by their people (for that matter, it's debateable as to how much the French surrender qualifies as a surrender, seeing as to how the country had literally fallen apart and was about a week and a half from simply ceasing to exist, or whether being democratic had any influence on it, since many of those who surrendered ended up in prison post-war).
That said, you do have a point in your last sentence, in the sense that by the early 40s, Japanese demands effectively boiled down into demanding unconditional surrender, primarily because setting up a rubber-stamp puppet government meant that the only way to keep any permanent peace in force would be to ensure that the puppet government could not be deposed, which without Japanese support and the elimination of Chiang's government, would be somewhat difficult. However, before this, Japanese demands were actually fairly consistent, mostly boiling down to recognization of Manchukuo, economic and political concessions, preservation of Japan's existing concessions, indemnities, etc. but always adding a little too much to be considered acceptable.
Also, while we are on the subject, technically, the Rape of Nanjing and Japanese occupational policy were not genocides, but this is mostly because genocide has a very strict and narrowly defined definition, which takes intent to exterminate in totality a culture or people as a major requirement, and which for this reason, excludes many historical episodes of mass-murder and crimes against humanity.
Also, typically, it happens that most governments consider it their duty to engage in self-defence when attacked, especially when it's literally the one thing they aren't being criticized for by their people (for that matter, it's debateable as to how much the French surrender qualifies as a surrender, seeing as to how the country had literally fallen apart and was about a week and a half from simply ceasing to exist, or whether being democratic had any influence on it, since many of those who surrendered ended up in prison post-war).
That said, you do have a point in your last sentence, in the sense that by the early 40s, Japanese demands effectively boiled down into demanding unconditional surrender, primarily because setting up a rubber-stamp puppet government meant that the only way to keep any permanent peace in force would be to ensure that the puppet government could not be deposed, which without Japanese support and the elimination of Chiang's government, would be somewhat difficult. However, before this, Japanese demands were actually fairly consistent, mostly boiling down to recognization of Manchukuo, economic and political concessions, preservation of Japan's existing concessions, indemnities, etc. but always adding a little too much to be considered acceptable.
Also, while we are on the subject, technically, the Rape of Nanjing and Japanese occupational policy were not genocides, but this is mostly because genocide has a very strict and narrowly defined definition, which takes intent to exterminate in totality a culture or people as a major requirement, and which for this reason, excludes many historical episodes of mass-murder and crimes against humanity.
oohhh this brings back memories of one of my worst scenario's, ehehehehe 
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=271645
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=271645
The Japanese Army, as powerful as they were, did not have the sheer ideological prestige or even the single-mindedness of their Nazi counterparts.
Even though the massacre of millions of Chinese civilians and POWs was totally unnecessary and skin-crawlingly evil does not mean that the destruction of the Chinese people was a set goal (as opposed to the dismemberment of the Chinese state, which the Japanese had always seen as a threat). It was not the case that people who collaborated with the Japanese were eventually betrayed and themselves systematically killed, as was the fate of Jewish and Ukrainian police in the Reichskommisariats, because that was Hitler's explicit policy.
@Green Painting: Again, if it wasn't already clear, I don't think the Japanese were nice by any stretch of the imagination. They killed millions of people for no reason other than to feel like they were getting something done, as well as to satisfy their bloodlust, this is true. But whether or not the Japanese were evil is not my point. In fact, whether or not their actions constituted genocide is not my point either. What I am concerned with is the exact intent.
How were the Japanese different from the Nazis, and why? I have already explained this: Killing Chinese people, even millions of them, was not their dead-set ideology. Killing millions of Slav was, however, the Nazi ideology. There was one way the Russian people west of the Urals could come out of a Nazi victory scenario and that was not one that involved them living as humans, if at all. In Japanese-occupied areas, this was not the case, as I explained in the previous post.
It was possible to work with the Japanese so long as you acknowledged their supremacy as colonial masters. It should be remembered that in addition to the Japanese Imperial Army, there were also Japanese firms and businesses that were to profit from the invasion; it was not just the IJA that was in China, even though, on account of there being a war, the IJA of course took an overwhelming role. In the long run, however, regardless of what some army officers may have thought, business concerns would have wanted to use locals, which would not have been possible if all the locals were dead. While this would be a life of half-subservience at very best, it would still be survival. Again, compare this to German plans to do away with the Slav as the White Man had done with the American Natives, and we get two different pictures.
Recently I read a book by a White Russian from Harbin. I'm not sure exactly how authentic it was since it was published in the USA in 1943, and since I could find only one single reference to it online, but in it the author described the brutality of the Japanese in Manchuria. However, it was by and large IJA-inspired - the killing, raping, plunder, and forced prostitution. On the other hand, the author described the Southern Manchurian Railway (Mantestu) as being staffed by at least a few decent folk, including some Japanese police who actually did their jobs properly, or tried to. This didn't do much good for the local people, especially poor people, but it shows that the Japanese colonial policy, while contradictory in light of the Army's behavior, was not single-mindedly set on extermination.
My view of Japanese brutality is that generally speaking the harder it was for them to govern an area, the more the Army had their way with it. The more of a hand the Army had in an area, the more death and misery there would be. Some of this had to do with resistance, whether actual or perceived; mostly it had to do with the fact that the Army was generally full of crooks. In a Japanese victory scenario, I believe that we would see the Army's position rolled back a bit to make way for colonial administration, as I suspect was the case in Taiwan and Korea. Regarding China in particular, the size of the country was so huge that the Japanese would by necessity have to allow some degree of autonomy to independent warlords or vassals in western and other backwater areas. After all, the main goal of invading China was that of strategic denial: The Japanese were scared to hell by the notion of a strong, unified China. This would allow the IJA to declare victory and reduce its strength.
In practice, this did not happen, and a lot of it had to do with the chaotic nature of the Army that could neither figure out what their specific aims in China were, nor control themselves even when it was possibly in their own interest. I do believe that such horrible atrocities as the Rape of Nanjing reinforced the Chinese will to resist. At the same time, the fact the Japanese did find many collaborators to use shows that with a few minor changes, a "successful" puppetization of China was possible and not fully incompatible Japanese colonial policies and tradition.
I think besides the standard Japanese atrocities, anti-Japanese sentiments etc. (LeoXiao puts it best imho) you could also argue that it was Chiang Kai-Shek's strategy to give up large sections of land to Japan. Early in the war you had relocation of factories from the coastal regions to Sichuan and Yunnan, which indicated a willingness to go through with a long struggle. Even on a map you could arguably say that it was inevitable that the Japanese would penetrate very far into the Chinese mainland, given the fact that the Yangtze was navigable for ships up until Yichang in Central China.
There's also the postulation (I think it's likely, but others may disagree) that Chiang/von Falkenhausen devised a strategy at the battles of Shanghai and Songhu that would force the IJA to move east -> west along the Yangtze, instead of the north-> south strategy along the Pinghan railroad which would have forced the KMT armies into the sea. If this strategy was to be carried out, then giving up large chunks of land was virtually inevitable. I don't think Chiang expected to lose Wuhan, but the possibility of it falling must have factored into his calculations.
I also agree that Chiang placed an (unrealistic, as it turns out) premium on Western/Soviet intervention in favor of China, and that helped keep hopes alive. Events like the Pitman Act, or more importantly Chasan Lake & Khalkin Gol must have convinced him to fight on through the worst days of the war.
There's also the postulation (I think it's likely, but others may disagree) that Chiang/von Falkenhausen devised a strategy at the battles of Shanghai and Songhu that would force the IJA to move east -> west along the Yangtze, instead of the north-> south strategy along the Pinghan railroad which would have forced the KMT armies into the sea. If this strategy was to be carried out, then giving up large chunks of land was virtually inevitable. I don't think Chiang expected to lose Wuhan, but the possibility of it falling must have factored into his calculations.
I also agree that Chiang placed an (unrealistic, as it turns out) premium on Western/Soviet intervention in favor of China, and that helped keep hopes alive. Events like the Pitman Act, or more importantly Chasan Lake & Khalkin Gol must have convinced him to fight on through the worst days of the war.
Interesting you brought up Taiwan, since you could build a convincing argument that the retaliation towards the Seediq after the Wushe rebellion was genocide. It was a rather different situation than WWII though.
RousseauX
Donor
They were actually do disorganized there were several puppet governments in China, and I don't mean Manchuku, but several governments claiming to be the legitimate Chinese government.
RousseauX
Donor
Because the KMT didn't look like it was actually going to lose the war.
The Japanese had hit the limits of their expansion by 1941 and the war was essentially a stalemate. Unless the Japanese are willing to offer significant concessions, the KMT had little incentive to negotiate, if the KMT cannot inflict a significant defeat on the Japanese, the Japanese had little incentive to negotiate.
I agree it was not the Japanese army's policy, nor did they openly propagate Genocide. But even if they didn't, it still happened. Thats all i'm saying. Just because they didn't "intent" to doesn't mean it didn't happen.
You mentioned a difference that the japanese were merely colonials while the Nazis sought out to destroy another race. Well, colonialism ultimately leads to genocide. Look at the USA, its native population almost fully wipedo ut by colonial.s It was not their intent, but nobody can deny the colonialism murdered all those people.
According to Wikipedia Article 2 of the CPPCG states Genocide as: "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnicalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnicity, racialhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_(classification_of_human_beings) or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
In what way was the killings of Chinese by Japanese not genocide then? It says also in part, not only in the whole like what the Nazis tried to do.
I mean even the mass rapes were a part of it, so the purity of the Chinese ethnicity dissappeared, perhaps not intentional, but definitly effectively. It happened in former Yugoslavia too, as orders for soldiers to rape. Genocide
I have mentioned above that I am relatively unconcerned with whether or not it was genocide that the Japanese army was doing in China. I know that they did horrible things that were just as evil as the Nazis' crimes. But still their ultimate intent was different, and when looking at such a variable subject as AH scenarios, we need to be aware of such differences.
Well I must say that I don't know much about the colonial history of Taiwan, just that things did stabilize after some initial revolts and anti-rebel operations. The Taiwanese population was not destroyed, and IIRC Taiwanese people were theoretically allowed to live as full Japanese citizens.
a) To a certain extent I agree with you. There was not formal extermination policy. However, I believe you understate the ideological issues at hand. The Japanese population totally believed that they were superior to other Asians in general and to the Chinese in particular. It was a heady mix of propaganda, chauvinism and historical rivalry. The fact is that the Japanese people at that time believe they are superior as they are the only Asians to have ever defeated the 'White Man'. This also allows them to justify them taking any actions against lesser people. Sounds familiar doesn't it? I'm not sure which is worse, a formal policy of extermination or 'those people don't matter enough, shoot them if needed or otherwise use them as you see fit'.
b) I disagree with you on Japanese brutality is based upon the difficulties of occupation. In many areas such as Malaya and Singapore, there was little if any resistance during the early stages of their conquest. It was their brutality which gave rise to resistance. Chin Peng and his merry band of brothers only obtain the support of the Malayan Chinese (and later on from Malays and Indians too) due to pure unthinking Japanese brutality. My grandfather lost a cousin because the man failed to bow 'fast' enough for a Japanese patrol passing him. Pray tell what resistance was that?
Pretty much; it was in the middle of a Warring States era since 1911. Even if the KMT surrendered, the rest of the warring states would have to be dealt with. In 1940, China's government was slightly more functional than that of modern Somalia. Some of the warlords wouldn't surrender. Mao and the Reds would keep on harassing the Japanese until their regime came to an end (and naturally claim credit for bringing it down. Mao; "I'd like to thank the USA for helping us destroy Japan".)
@andyheong:
The Japanese did see themselves as superior, this is true. But it was a vaguer kind of superiority complex than that of the Nazis. There were after all Japanese political philosophers who believed that if one bowed sincerely in the direction of the Imperial Palace, they could be considered Japanese. There were other scholars who said different things. Some people followed a more Nazi ideal. The point is that the whole thing was a mess and the people in power didn't ultimately care what people believed as long as it was good for their war or business aims.
As for Japanese brutality and lack of resistance, there is of course the "killing people for fun" aspect. This is partly why the Japanese are indeed so hated. But it was not uniformly applied; it happened a lot but was not policy, the way the Holocaust was. When the Japanese felt like it, they could and did work with locals. It was by no means "rape and stab everyone to death" everywhere.
The Japanese wanted to be the new Mongols. They wanted to rule over Asia and kill as many people as it took to achieve that, but extermination was a means, a weapon of war if you will, not an end.
The Japanese did see themselves as superior, this is true. But it was a vaguer kind of superiority complex than that of the Nazis. There were after all Japanese political philosophers who believed that if one bowed sincerely in the direction of the Imperial Palace, they could be considered Japanese. There were other scholars who said different things. Some people followed a more Nazi ideal. The point is that the whole thing was a mess and the people in power didn't ultimately care what people believed as long as it was good for their war or business aims.
As for Japanese brutality and lack of resistance, there is of course the "killing people for fun" aspect. This is partly why the Japanese are indeed so hated. But it was not uniformly applied; it happened a lot but was not policy, the way the Holocaust was. When the Japanese felt like it, they could and did work with locals. It was by no means "rape and stab everyone to death" everywhere.
The Japanese wanted to be the new Mongols. They wanted to rule over Asia and kill as many people as it took to achieve that, but extermination was a means, a weapon of war if you will, not an end.
To add to this: I think this is why Chiang kai-shek did not attempt to put a death grip on Wuhan the way Stalin did on Moscow or Stalingrad. Had the NRA been wiped out at Wuhan, rather than forced to retreat, then the result could have simply been more disastrous as the collaborationist faction would have had more fuel. As others have mentioned, CKS knew he could, in the worst case, retreat to Sichuan.
replies in bold. This just to let it be known that what the Japanese army did in China was genocide.
And to stay on topic, i think the genocide commited against the Chinese people by Japan was also a large factor in why the Chinese never surrendered. How can you surrender when the only thing that would lead to is death, the same thing that would happen if you would keep on fighting?