(snip)
Trying to mount ASMs and land attack CMs onto a ship that is only useful as a shorebombardment platform was an idiotic waste of funds in the first place. Maybe not using a battleship base with all the history behind it could avoid that messup at least. Certainly, there is no particular reason to pack on just as many missiles, and there are still 2 more useless 5in turrets to remove. And why exactly would the Alaska refit need to serve as a flagship? The assault carriers that it would be operating with would and do serve perfectly well. At least with an Alaska, there wouldn't be any idiocy about building a BBBG around them as if they were still capital ships.
Actually, that was the entire rationale behind the reactivation & modernization of the
Iowas in the 1980s- a
political, not operational requirement for something that'd look big & impressive and could carry a lot of missiles to give the appearance of something that could counter the Soviet
Kirov's as the centerpiece of a SAG- not sure if it was in Friedman's or something that I picked up from a Navweaps discussion, but at the time of their reactivation, there was serious talk of not bothering to reactivate the
Iowa's main battery turrets since not having to man all those 16" guns would save a lot of manpower. Had one of the assorted 'strike cruiser' proposals of the 1970s had been built (think of a nuclear powered
Ticonderoga on steroids with
the lightweight 8" gun that had been experimented with in that decade), I'd say it'd be rather unlikely that the Iowas would have been reactivated in the 80s since the USN would already have an 'equivalent' of the
Kirov. (Perhaps in the TL where the strike cruisers get built, one or two get an austere modernization, sort of an updated version of what
New Jersey got for her Vietnam service, to act as part of an amphibious strike group, if Congress can be convinced to cough up the money without cutting something else in the defense budget to pay for it ITTL)
Perhaps a little OT now, but here's the comparative maneuverability data for WW2-era US warships taken from the appropriate volumes of Friedman's:
Alaska, according to the data tables in the back of the cruiser book had a tactical diameter of 1150 yards @ 20 kts & 915 yds. @ 30 kts
Battleships:
- Arkansas: (post-1920s rebuild): 630 yds @ 23 kts, 605 yds @ 15 kts
- Tennessee: (post-1943 rebuild) 610 yds @ 20 kts
- North Carolina: (model tests)- 620 yds @ 20 kts, 759 yds @ 27.5 kts; trials performance- 575 yds @ 14.5 kts, 683 yds @ 27.5 kts
- South Dakota: (model tests)- 700 yds @ 16 kts, 733 yds @ 26.5 kts
- Iowa: (model tests)- 760 yds @ 20 kts. 1430 @ 33 kts; (trials performance)- 814 yds @ 30 kts
As a further battleship comparison, Friedman's battleship book quotes a parts of a comparative study between
North Carolina & HMS
King George V done by the British Admiralty mid-war, which has the KGV having a tactical diameter of 930 yds @ 14.5 kts.
Carriers:
- Lexington: (model tests)- 1950 yds @ 33 kts (the worst of any US warship of WW2)
- Yorktown: 790 yds @ 30 kts
- Essex: 765 yds @ 30 kts
- Midway: 990 yds @ 30 kts
- Casablanca CVE: 450 yds @ 15 kts
Cruisers:
- Pensacola: 570 yds @ 20 kts
- Northampton: 750 yds @ 20 kts
- New Orleans: 567 yds @ 20 kts
- Atlanta: (model tests)- 870 @ 30 kts; (trial performance)- 675 yds @ 30 kts
- Cleveland: 565 yds @ 20 kts, 670 yds @ 30 kts
- Baltimore: 700 yds @ 20 kts, 780 @ 30 kts
- Des Moines: (model tests)- 750 yds @ 20 kts, 835 yds at 30 kts
- Worcester: (model tests)- 867 yds @ 20 kts, 833 yds @ 30 kts; (trials performance)- 730 yds @ 30 kts
Destroyers:
- Clemson: 750 yds @ 25 kts
- Farragut: 850 yds @ 35.5 kts
- Somers: 1240 yds @ 20 kts, 860 yds @ 30 kts
- Bagley: 880 yds @ 30 kts
- Benson: 960 yds @ 30 kts
- Fletcher: 950 yds @ 30 kts
- Allen M. Sumner: 700 yds @ 30 kts (first US destroyer design to use twin rudders)
- John C. Butler DE (WGT-type): 395 yds @ 25 kts
- Mitscher DL (laid down 1949, product of study into large destroyer suited as fast TF escort or SAG element started in 1944): 540 yds @ 20 kts, 600 yds @ 30 kts.
Note: poor maneuverability was a constant complaint with US destroyers through the WW2 era, and was apparently the combination of a number of causes, including designs that turned out to be overweight as built or in service configuration, too-small single rudders, and stern forms optimized for speed, fuel economy, or the ability to drop depth charges or allow the ship to carry more weapons or fuel.