Italy. Why? Because it's just not that important. Nazi Germany is a threat because Germany is a big important country. Japan is because they were the only major Asian power. Italy is basically a weak backwater. This relative lack of power would make it (a) easier for them to avoid war with the west and (b) easier to extricate themselves from such a war once it happens. If Germany or Japan had wanted to negotiate towards the end of the war, they certainly would have been rebuffed because they were too dangerous to be left alive. If Italy made similar attempts, the Allies would probably have been more receptive due to a "we've got bigger fish to fry" mentality.
Which of the Axis Powers could have lasted the longest?
- Thread starter Glass Onion
- Start date
What war in the twentieth century did the Italians ever extricate themselves from?
What war in the twentieth century did the Italians ever extricate themselves from?
Well, I'm not saying that Italy in particular has a history of that, I'm just saying that it seems like weaker countries in general would find it easier to get out of a larger war. I think if Italy had wanted out they probably could have done so easier than Germany or Japan.
Gosing said:
You'd find that many Finns would object to you calling Mannerheim a "dictator". Generally you could say that during the Continuation war, true power in Finland was in the hands of the government's "inner circle" that included Mannerheim as well as President Ryti and a few important ministers and generals.
But about Leningrad I more or less agree with you.
Mannerheim was vehemently against attacking Leningrad. Remove him and the situation would be different, yes.
But then you would have to address the issue of capability and strength. During the OTL attack phase of 1941 Finland lost 75 000 men as dead and injured. That is more than 15% of the max. number of men the Finnish Army had during the war, on top of the 25 000 dead and 45 000 injured lost in the Winter War less than two years back. The army had conquered a huge swath of territory very fast and with great cost. It was pretty much exhausted and in several places had reached the end of its logistical capability.
Thus, any leadership that takes the army into an "all-out attack" against Leningrad would have to accept the fact that it will have to fight a devastating urban campaign (for which there are no plans), soon during winter, and in the end look at maybe double the losses received that far. Not to take into account the possiblity to end up having to take care of hundreds of thousands enemy civilians while Finland is soon rationing almost everything just to keep its own population alive.
This campaign might well break the army, if not the backbone of the nation. This is why I find it unlikely that a sane government, with a responsible military leadership (as Finland more or less had, even without Mannerheim) would throw itself to such a quagmire. A minor campaign against the northern parts of Leningrad and some real support for the siege are certainly possible developments. But an "all-out attack" would mean that Finland has deranged Fascists in charge or is lead by an actual puppet government that receives its orders directly from Berlin; both these options would of course require some big changes already before 1941.
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Hkelukka
Banned
I'll answer the short replies first then a longer one to the long reply. So these aren't in chronological order.
Yes, the forum has several dozen, potentially hundred topics or more on "could axis win" since thats what we are essentially discussing. But i think the same convo has been going on from mid 45, latest, almost uninterrupted up until the present moment.
About the all out attack on Leningrad. That is a matter of defining an all out attack as you correctly pointed out.
But a good comparative point would be a Finland that agrees to cut the lake Karelia line to Leningrad and encircle the entire East coast of the Ladoga lake. Historically they waited at the agreed post-war border at the large river there for the Axis units to link up, which would complete the encirclement. If we butterfly that away by saying that in the plans the Finns were handed the entirety of the Ladoga lake they could have advanced south as well. At this point Leningrad would be encircled.
An encircled Leningrad would certainly fall during the winter 42 to a co-ordinated Axis-Finnish force with accetable losses. That would free the Finnish South since the line would be anchored against an Axis force. Then if Finland pushes against the Murmansk rail line and commits itself to occupy murmansk itself it will have the entire Kola peninsula.
For finland, from a cautious democratic nations point of view this would be idiotic. Finland after Winter War had a clear policy of minimizing losses to the finnish soldiers and trying to stay out of the major points of fighting. A POD could very easily be Mannerheim dying at some point and Paavo Talvela and the aggressive expansionists having considerably more power as a result. The situation in Finland was very precarious between the aggressive expansionists and the defensive expansionists. And it would not take much to push Finland into a considerably more aggressive posture. US declaring war on Finland instead of threathning to might be sufficient POD.
Logistics could support a push into Leningrad and a full siege before 41 fall. And during 42 they could support a push to occupy the entire Kola peninsula. But even that would stretch Finland significantly. Either way a far more possible POD is active support to the siege in a major way as well as cutting the Murmansk line. If that happens the SU position becomes significantly worse and German forces are freed from the longest and costliest siege of WW2. Siege of Leningrad, if ended by early 42 in a decisive German-Finnish victory combined with a cutting of the murmansk rail line could, but probably would not be enough to force SU to fold. Though that is very unlikely on its own it would make it a bit more likely.
In the end, helping the siege of Leningrad would, in the medium term, render Finnish logistics better, not worse. Though in the short and long term would be deeply damaging. It all depends on how depopulated the city is after it falls.
Yes, the forum has several dozen, potentially hundred topics or more on "could axis win" since thats what we are essentially discussing. But i think the same convo has been going on from mid 45, latest, almost uninterrupted up until the present moment.
About the all out attack on Leningrad. That is a matter of defining an all out attack as you correctly pointed out.
But a good comparative point would be a Finland that agrees to cut the lake Karelia line to Leningrad and encircle the entire East coast of the Ladoga lake. Historically they waited at the agreed post-war border at the large river there for the Axis units to link up, which would complete the encirclement. If we butterfly that away by saying that in the plans the Finns were handed the entirety of the Ladoga lake they could have advanced south as well. At this point Leningrad would be encircled.
An encircled Leningrad would certainly fall during the winter 42 to a co-ordinated Axis-Finnish force with accetable losses. That would free the Finnish South since the line would be anchored against an Axis force. Then if Finland pushes against the Murmansk rail line and commits itself to occupy murmansk itself it will have the entire Kola peninsula.
For finland, from a cautious democratic nations point of view this would be idiotic. Finland after Winter War had a clear policy of minimizing losses to the finnish soldiers and trying to stay out of the major points of fighting. A POD could very easily be Mannerheim dying at some point and Paavo Talvela and the aggressive expansionists having considerably more power as a result. The situation in Finland was very precarious between the aggressive expansionists and the defensive expansionists. And it would not take much to push Finland into a considerably more aggressive posture. US declaring war on Finland instead of threathning to might be sufficient POD.
Logistics could support a push into Leningrad and a full siege before 41 fall. And during 42 they could support a push to occupy the entire Kola peninsula. But even that would stretch Finland significantly. Either way a far more possible POD is active support to the siege in a major way as well as cutting the Murmansk line. If that happens the SU position becomes significantly worse and German forces are freed from the longest and costliest siege of WW2. Siege of Leningrad, if ended by early 42 in a decisive German-Finnish victory combined with a cutting of the murmansk rail line could, but probably would not be enough to force SU to fold. Though that is very unlikely on its own it would make it a bit more likely.
In the end, helping the siege of Leningrad would, in the medium term, render Finnish logistics better, not worse. Though in the short and long term would be deeply damaging. It all depends on how depopulated the city is after it falls.
Talvela was on my mind too for this role... However, getting rid of Mannerheim brings along other complications. His dying in itself would be a huge blow for national morale in, like you said, a precarious situation. It would look like a historical connection is being severed, one that IOTL joined the Civil War and Winter War to the Continuation War.
ITTL, this will mean that the "Spirit of Winter War" sees, in some ways, an early termination - IOTL, the early part of the Continuation War was really Finland "running on the fumes" of that feeling of unity that had been maintained through -40 and early -41. Now, someone new is giving the order to go to the war, and it will not be Mannerheim's OTL "Sword Scabbard Declaration". We can well ask how much will this change affect how necessary and justified Finns see the war?
Considering the opposition to escalating the war and crossing the old border IOTL, ITTL this "Talvela's War" (or whomever's) might well raise more objections among the people and in fact see a worse performing, more cautious and rebellious army. If this is the case, and the advance is slower than IOTL, the threat by Britain and the US to declare war might carry a lot of weight in the minds of the politicians - and lead to internal strife between those who would advocate "neutralist" policies (that is, those wanting to take into account the Allied views and the possibility that Germany loses the war) and the most aggressive expansionists.
Talvela (or stand-in) wouldn't have the prestige Mannerheim enjoyed, and thus any disagreement might have unpredictable consequences. If the government decides to dismiss the new military leader over a disagreement, he would have to step aside - or do something really regrettable.
So - a lot of moving parts.
Axis victory was ASB due to simple economics. Nazi Germany could not defeat Britain AND Russia AND the United States at the same time, because those countries vastly outproduced anything Germany could sustain.
A lot depends on whether the question refers to after joining in the war or if they didn't join in. Nazi Germany was aggresive and expansionists and would probably have gone to war with someone. Concentrating on one enemy at a time and not declaring war on the Umnited States might have entailed survival for Nazi Germany. Japan was also expansionist and made the error of declaring war on the United States. More limited objectives might have entailed survival but limited war was likely and in any case Japan had been at war with China.
Italy could have stayed out of the war and Mussolini might have died of old age with a reputation that wasn't as tarnished as Franco. However his ego resulted in his attempting to emulate Hitler and his lack of judgement caused him to enter the war when he thought Britain was beaten for a hand in the spoils. However had he exercised more judgement then his regime might have survived but once in the warb he would have lasted less long than the others
Italy could have stayed out of the war and Mussolini might have died of old age with a reputation that wasn't as tarnished as Franco. However his ego resulted in his attempting to emulate Hitler and his lack of judgement caused him to enter the war when he thought Britain was beaten for a hand in the spoils. However had he exercised more judgement then his regime might have survived but once in the warb he would have lasted less long than the others
Markus
Banned
Reminds me of my attempted TL but I got a new idea for how Italy can outlast Germany and Japan. It´s simply bypassed!
From North Africa the Allies go to Sicily, than Sardinia, Corsica and southern France. IIRC the USA was never much into the Med and Churchill might be able to use 8th Army for operations in Greece.
Hkelukka
Banned
This is a massively long post. Sorry.
Are you saying that the doctrine of blizkrieg and armored spearhead supported by CAS is wrong? The Italian military doctrine was geared towards a large infantry army designed to fight a defensive war in the alps. That is a doctrinal choice, the army was in the end used in 2 Desert wars, one civil war, several offensive wars and then one defensive war, which wasn't even in the Alps. The Italian defense and military was geared and designed to defend a specific theater against a specific type of assault that never happened. Germany was designed for specifically the war that it was in. Doctrine is based on having the right goal. Italy had the wrong one and then it switched to an entirely different goal too late to do any good. The Italian armor was good, for the task it was designed to do, support infantry in the alpine mountains where larger tanks would be very hard pressed to move. Where mobility is immaterial and armor piercing high caliber rounds are very unlikely to ever hit you. For that goal, Italian army and armor was splendidly designed. For a desert offensive bliz, almost exactly the opposite.
German army had a spectacular performance considering what it had and when it had it. Making the German army considerably more effective from a doctrinal standpoint pre 42 is very difficult in my opinion. Shake down time corrected most of the bugs.
German army was well equipped considering the time frame it was in. They could be better equipped certainly. And as I said, for a defensive conflict in the alps where large tanks would be stuck and advance would be mostly infantry based, the Italian army was very well designed. The Italian military was not the wildly incompetent group it is seen to be. They simply spent 15 years designing a defensive low mobility infantry army then were told to suddenly change to a high mobility desert offensive army in a few years. Instead of Mussolini starting to view Hitler and Germany as enemies in the 1920's and early 30's if Mussolini sees Hitler and Germany as natural allies and prepares early on for a offensive desert war, which had considerably support in the Military, Italian army would be a different force entirely. Changing goals mid transit without enough time for a major shake up left the Italian army incapable of performing its duty anywhere near the level it could have, given a earlier decision to go after Suez and Mid-East
Yes, that is why Panzer Divs were so remarkable in the offensive, specifically so in the Desert. Italian army scaled from 70ish poor quality inf divs to 20 would see 15 good quality infantry divs and 5 Mech/Arm divisions. If you reduce the Infantry divisions by 30-45 you can get 2-5 high quality Panzer Divs. This was in fact one of the proposed army organizations in the discussion in 1933, quote here:
"In light of the economic difficulties it was proposed, in 1933, by Marshal Italo Balbo to limit the number of divisions to 20 and ensure that each was fully mobile for ready response, equipped with the latest weaponry and trained for amphibious warfare. The proposal was rejected by Mussolini (and senior figures) who wanted large numbers of divisions to intimidate opponents.[25] To maintain the number of divisions, each became binary, consisting of only two regiments, and therefore equating to a British brigade in size. Even then, they would often be thrown into battle with an under strength complement."
POD where Balbo is better at persuasion or Mussolini agrees to the plan would lead to an army that is designed to fight in the desert in a Bliz style war. Near perfect against the brits.
Italy can afford it if they want to. They did have foreign trade at this point, it is not like they didn't trade anything to anyone. The cost associated with maintaining the manpower and training for 70 divisions is much greater than the cost of maintaining the manpower and training for 3-5 divisions. The cost to the civilian economy from keeping many people armed and in militia is enormous, especially when compared with a smaller more effective army. Large militia armies are good for defense in mountains. Bad for offense in the desert. Instead of Mil-Inf-Gar they could very easily go for Mot-Arm-Mech of significantly lower portion, if they plan for it early on. A plausible and in fact quite likely POD would be Mussolini adopting the 1933 proposal by Balbo and going for a motorized smaller army.
Let me answer that with a question. How close do you think Italy came in 1940 to breaking the UK resistance in Egypt? 50%? 25? Would doubling the amount of Tanks, CAS, Mot, Mech be enough? As that would be doable with a 1933 POD without even breaking a sweat? How about tripling or even quadrupling as even that is in the realm of possible, while not probable. Doubling both training and equipment is possible.
My idea of a small POD is when a man in a leadership position is presented with 2 plans, both of which have significant support at high levels and one is adopted over the other. A large POD for a single person would be making Mussolini a peaceful man, or Gandhi a warlike man. But saying that Gandhi stays in SA is a minor POD. Or that Mussolini adopts a offensive army posture in 1933 instead of a defensive army posture is a minor POD. If it calls for someone come up with an entirely new idea out of the blue then yes, it is a medium to major POD. But if it is a different choice made by a single person when both choices were historically presented to the person then a POD and both have significant support is, by any stretch a minor POD. All this army would require is adoption of the proposal by Italo Balbo in 1933.
Once again, I am only proposing a different choice is made between two relatively equal proposals 7-8 years before entry into the war by Italy.
True, during this period in history, it is not. But adoption of a plan presented 7 years earlier and focus on a smaller Mot-Mech-Arm force is quite possible. 7 years is a long time to build, purchase and train units.
Hitting Baku and its oil facilities would certainly be a top priority over anything else at this point for the Axis.
Also, in my opinion you are underestimating the Italian Airforce compared to the task at hand, we are not talking about sending them up against highly trained and equipped UK or US pilots in a large scale operation over a large area. We are talking about hitting a single target badly enough half a dozen times so that it takes years to repair. Oil fields are notorious for tending to catch on fire.
Even if the Italian Airforce gets badly mauled in the process, SU would take a serious hit to its oil production that would take years to recover from, even during wartime.
As the Italian Div was considerably smaller, at around 66% of a German div, at least on paper, arming a single Italian div with German equipment and up to German size would be a large drain on the Italian defense budget certainly.
Therefore when we are talking about the Italian army and updating them we should establish what size are we talking about in terms of brigades / battalions. If we upgrade the Italian army from a 6B to 9B footing as that would on its own eliminate up to 33% of the Italian Div's, most likely less as logistics for 10 small divs is more than if the divs are compressed into 5 larger divs. As smaller divs have overlapping similar goods and training. To put it in another way. 10 divs require 10 HQ's while 5 divs require 5 HQ's. This is ofcourse a wild simplification but you do get the point.
Then upgrading the Italian div to higher degree of staffing and you go from the now present about 50 divs to about 40. That is 40 full strength Ger style 9B infantry divs. Still at rather poor levels of equipment. In the end 40 full stagged inf divs cost less than the same amount of men spread over 70 inf divs. Economics of overlapping demands come to play when you have more of the same demanding the same supplies.
At this point you have the Italian army at 40 divs. Say you aim for 20 good quality divs you can sell the goods for about 30 full inf divs to the global market and purchase the goods for 10 high quality mot-mech-arm divs in exchange. Then you have 10 Italian equipped divs at full stregth and with best Italian equipment and 10 with traded for equipment for the most part.
In this case you have 30 divs worth of goods and 7 years and 50% of the Italian military budget from 33-40 to build or trade for 10 motorized / mechanized / armor divs. It is possible, if difficult to do. If Mussolini adopts the small capable army strategy he has enough political and trade opportunities to make it happen. It is as difficult as the German rearmament pre-war but it is by no means impossible. As i said, what i point as a POD was already suggested to Mussolini and rejected. The official reason is that Mussolini wanted a army larger on paper to intimidate his opponents. Say instead of admiring quantity over quality, he admires the Roman legions quality over quantity approach. That is NOT a large POD. It is a single minor adjustment to the value of one person who was already presented with the plan i suggested.
In the end, if you consider changing the value system of one person by one decision (quality over quantity) a huge POD then i cant help but wonder what would be a minor POD. It is a huge POD in its ramifications, a minor POD in the making, as it is decided by one person. Economic implications and the possibility of growth when you release hundreds of thousands of young men to the labor force is something that should be taken into account as well. Or for the sake of argument, what if the Italian Army uses 20 divisions worth of people to build better infrastructure and economic access for 7 years, instead of teaching them skills for a mountain war that will never come?
Italy did build military goods, not to mention they did actually trade. But not in sufficient quantity to arm 70 divs, they spread the goods too thin to have any real effect. Things like AC's Trucks, Rifles, Artillery. Italy did have a military industrial complex. What they didn't have was enough goods for 70 divs. They spread too thin. Basic goods they can produce for themselves quite well. If they reduce the number of divs men to produce for by 50-75%. At that point the only thing they would really need is the point of the spear for the Panzer Army.
Not in my opinion. The POD required for something like this requires less innovation and effort by the Nazi leadership than developing CAS or Bliz did, a fraction of it in fact. A cursory glance at the logistics of An operation Barbarossa would make it known to them that they need standardization.
So as i said, we disagree on what is a drastic POD. I say drastic is Sweden joining the Axis in 1940. You say this would qualify as a drastic POD. I disagree.
As I said, i disagree, the reason they didn't go for it was to keep the corporations that privatly owned and supported the Nazi party in private hands and competing with one another. The reason standardization wasn't carried out was that the major business interests behind the Nazi movement would go batshit insane if one of them was given wartime dominance over the others in a way required to effectively standardize the gear.
If the Nazi party Leadership went down this road they would piss off major business interests in Germany, this would be dangerous but not lethal to the Nazi movement, especially if it was done well. But as Nazism has been rightly so called Corporatism it was unlikely to happen. If anything the major German corporations and their chairmen benefited from the war in a way that is downright criminal. The leaders of corporations like BMW and IG should have hang right there next to ol Mussolini from a lamppost in the mountains. But thats just my opinion.
To carry out what I said would require Hitler to turn on his allies for his own personal gain. Hardly out of character. I'm simply rather surprised that he didn't end up being MORE ruthless and go after the large business in Germany in this way.
Pre-1940 they had little to no idea how bad Göring was. After Stalingrad he was pushed out real power.
I disagree about Nazis not treating war in an effective organized manner. They were certainly not up to par with modern generals, heck, they arent even up to par with modern good armchair generals. But for their time, they were certainly effective and organized. Thought that is a matter of debate.
As with others, we'll just have to disagree on this. I understand and can relate to the view that they were a bumbling group of buffoons, i don't agree with it. But i understand it.
It made sense, not to a modern person but in the time and place, it made sense. It is the same kind of sense that the Roman Empire made. or the British empire, or the US manifest destiny. It failed, the others did not. So Nazi ideology "makes no sense", because they lost. The desire to conquer and destroy other groups is not only inbuilt, we admire people for it. The reason US is admired is not because of good food. It is because of the US unrivalled military capacity and its subjugation and destruction of millions of people. The same reason why so many admire Caesar, Mao, Stalin. People can claim otherwise but mass murder is what people seem to admire for the most part. Look at the top grossing movies:
http://www.imdb.com/boxoffice/alltimegross?region=world-wide
Avatar (War)
Titanic (Ship sinking and people dying)
LOTR (War)
People admire heroism, war and epic good and evil battles. Where they always think of themselves as Good and everyone else as Bad. Faciscm and Hitler provided the perfect context for the time for their battle of good and evil. For our time there is another similar battle, everyone so convinced of their own cause. Anyway my point is this. In that time and place, Nazism made sense. It was not the ideology of the idiot bumbling fool that it would look like today any more than the Manifest Destiny was. But thats really besides the point.
If the starting assumption is that Nazism as an ideology makes no sense, then any choice where the Nazi's do something that makes sense is, of course, impossible. But that is the core of the issue regarding ww2 is it not. Were the axis a bunch of hollywoodesque morons that managed to almost stumble over 20 million dead soviet soldiers and occupy massive parts of China and Soviet Union. Or were they actually ruthlessly competent military dictators who were within an hairs width of ushering in a dark age that likes of which we haven't seen. It seems this is the core of the issue here. I believe the latter, many people believe the former.
Comparing pre war level of armor to someone after 6 months of constant assaults is not an apt comparison. I am talking of the duration of the whole war, giving them slightly better treatment to urge them to fight better instead of giving them scraps and telling them shoot at IS's with sidearms. In my opinion, it doesn't take much in terms of moral support for the Axis minors to get them to fight considerably better and harder and actually believe in the Nazi ideologue to a larger extent. You disagree, not much more that can be said with that I suppose.
Take one tank army, gut it, distribute the equipment amongst the minors and use the free MP to reinforce the other divs and in my opinion. The striking power the minors gain in total is more than the Germans lose. Sufficient to warrant it. The reason it was done can be debated forever, was it because they thought they would win before 1942, that the minors would never matter, that they wanted to eliminate them anyway, that they were stupid. Potentials are endless. In my opinion the reason it wasn't done was that the Germans really did believe that SU would collapse when the door was kicked in.
They could agree to peace, if they felt it was the extent of their pushing capacity, for now. After 41 winter and before stalingrad it was seriously the case. A Brest-Livotsk treaty negotiation started when the Germans push into the Soviet union in the 42 summer negotations would almost certainly procure good deals. What happens after is a matter for a larger WW2 timeline, something i might write someday.
Facts on the ground remain. At its height the Nazi, the Co-Belligerents and Axis nations comprised:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ww2_allied_axis_1942_jun.png
This is not the result of a bunch of morons. But what amounts to an almost successful subjugation of the Eurasian-continent. If SU collapses for any reason the war ends and Eurasia is lost.
As I said, here is the fundemental difference of opinion I have. I think it came close and they were actually good at what they did, you think it wasnt close and they werent good at what they did. I'll agree to disagree.
I disagree. But like i said, agree to disagree.
True, end of 41 was about the time his grip on sanity started to go. Which would place his loss of sanity about 1 year into his addiction to meth.
And what then if SU falls? Do you really think that US could do a D-Day on its own? Or necceserily even supply the UK if Ger went all out in its U boat warfare in 1943? IF SU really collapses and Germany does a massive shift into U-Boat production in 1943 then no matter how you do the math, UK will be strangled to death. As I said, we disagree, and i would wager that i disagree with a vast majority of the people in this forum about this, so i'll say I agree to disagree and leave it at that.
Imagine just this one POD, nothing else. Before i write this, have you seen a Normal smart cunning man take meth? I have, close, i know how quickly it messes someone up beyond all reason. Hitler displayed all classical signs of Meth addiction and paranoia. A man that was absolutely brilliant and ruthless in 1940. The same man that after the Putz went into hiding for years to ponder his life. The same man that effectively negotiated the entire central Europe into his pocket. The man that was ready to retreat from Narvik and always showed more interest to practicality than politics. In fact, an idea of hitlers... mallability to politics is the racial structure or racial value system he created. And where those that did well were upgraded as a whole "race". Say what you will of the Nazi's they put propaganda to a distant second to practicality. Finns started the war as a "least to survive" inferior race, when they left they were amongst the highest. Practicality before politics.. for the most part.
Now. Forget everything you know about Hitler after 1940. Look at him before that, all that he has done with the purely objective view of "is germany better / larger now than before?"
Then remember that in 1940 he started taking enough Meth to make Charlie Sheen look like a droopy eyed armless children. By 1942 given it intravenously. Since no one knows for sure just how much he was given we'll never have certainty on this issue. But the way it looks is that right up until mid 41 he was relatively sane. Then, he just suddenly goes ape shit crazy, doing things that no sane person, not even a pre 1940 Hitler would do.
Most people seem to think that Hitler in 1945 fuhrer bunker is the "baseline" hitler. To me the guy in the bunker is someone who did 5 years of non-stop meth. If the amount he was given was sufficient to make him lose his mind and start giving out orders like "no retreat" and "destroy leningrad building by building" and "declare war on the US before taking out SU" then if anything, the reason we won the second world war was due to hitler being poisoned. If that is the case then perhaps all in the bunker was not what it seemed, maybe, just maybe, someone else knew that Nazi's cant be allowed to win and risked life and limb to poison the most dangerous person to ever live on this planet. If that is the case, maybe future generations will build a statue to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_Morell Or not, who knows. Either way, say he orders Hitler take enemas instead of meth, as he had ordered before. A hitler that is not poisoned with Meth for years is a creature that could really have his marbles together enough to win.
The odds are very very close to even in 1941-42. After that the war was decided, then it was a mere 1.75-2.5, with most of the allies having no toehold in european continent, and having to supply a large civilian population across thousands of miles of open ocean within free range of Sub and Air warfare.
IF and i stress the IF here:
1942 SU sues for a brest type peace and Germany gains even 10% of the 42 SU capacity added to its real 42 capacity, then the 1943 balance is
Allies at (2065 historical - 305 =) 1760
Axis at (895 historical + 30 =) 925
So instead of the historical 2.31 it would be a a 1.9. Thats under 2:1 GDP for an invasion across an ocean. Thats not an odd for a succesful amfibious invasion against a well entrenched crack army. And that is assuming no country joins the Axis after Su sues. If something like say Spain-Portugal joins then its already down to 1.7:1 This is NOT a plan for a victory.
And no, a few nukes is not sufficient to bring Nazi Germany that holds most of continental europe to its knees. A dozen or so high power hydogen bombs would be, but that would be into the early 50's, latest.
The feeling I have for Hitler is the same I have for say,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_L._O'Sullivan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pol_pot
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mugabe
Or any number of ... shall i say... less than all in the house leaders or men of opinion and power. They are all people that could do with a... proper... slow... talking to by someone with more than 2 braincells firing at random.
In my opinion, if I could go back in time and meet with mussolini in 1933, i would attempt to assasinate him, even at the cost of my own life. But that does not change the fact that I admire him. If for nothing else than doing everything he could for a goal.
I would much rather respect a stupid man who does his best than a smart man who does nothing. Thus i would much rather respect Mussolini for trying to shape the world, and failing. (Even when what he tried to shape the world into is exactly opposed to what I would like for it to be.) Than I would someone such as the current pope, who went along with the crowd. May God save us from apathy.
We might never know why he went from erratic rather odd thinking that was very succesful to delusional bizzare thinking that led him to destroy the empire he created. But a meth addiction is a realistic reason, it explains everything about his behavior without resorting to a random unexplained change in cognition. Thus far, it would fit the best.
Göring was incompetent to a level that brings to mind the Benny Hill show. But for a victorious army the history is written in this form:
"We won despite...."
For a defeated army it is written as:
"We lost because of..."
Görings incompetence was the single largest factor, replace him with someone competent and you have a victorious Germany. But you dont NEED to replace him to have a victorious Germany. Germany can win even with Göring in power until 42-43.
Anyway, holy heck, this was a long post. Congrats if anyone actually read it.
Are you saying that the doctrine of blizkrieg and armored spearhead supported by CAS is wrong? The Italian military doctrine was geared towards a large infantry army designed to fight a defensive war in the alps. That is a doctrinal choice, the army was in the end used in 2 Desert wars, one civil war, several offensive wars and then one defensive war, which wasn't even in the Alps. The Italian defense and military was geared and designed to defend a specific theater against a specific type of assault that never happened. Germany was designed for specifically the war that it was in. Doctrine is based on having the right goal. Italy had the wrong one and then it switched to an entirely different goal too late to do any good. The Italian armor was good, for the task it was designed to do, support infantry in the alpine mountains where larger tanks would be very hard pressed to move. Where mobility is immaterial and armor piercing high caliber rounds are very unlikely to ever hit you. For that goal, Italian army and armor was splendidly designed. For a desert offensive bliz, almost exactly the opposite.
German army had a spectacular performance considering what it had and when it had it. Making the German army considerably more effective from a doctrinal standpoint pre 42 is very difficult in my opinion. Shake down time corrected most of the bugs.
German army was well equipped considering the time frame it was in. They could be better equipped certainly. And as I said, for a defensive conflict in the alps where large tanks would be stuck and advance would be mostly infantry based, the Italian army was very well designed. The Italian military was not the wildly incompetent group it is seen to be. They simply spent 15 years designing a defensive low mobility infantry army then were told to suddenly change to a high mobility desert offensive army in a few years. Instead of Mussolini starting to view Hitler and Germany as enemies in the 1920's and early 30's if Mussolini sees Hitler and Germany as natural allies and prepares early on for a offensive desert war, which had considerably support in the Military, Italian army would be a different force entirely. Changing goals mid transit without enough time for a major shake up left the Italian army incapable of performing its duty anywhere near the level it could have, given a earlier decision to go after Suez and Mid-East
Yes, that is why Panzer Divs were so remarkable in the offensive, specifically so in the Desert. Italian army scaled from 70ish poor quality inf divs to 20 would see 15 good quality infantry divs and 5 Mech/Arm divisions. If you reduce the Infantry divisions by 30-45 you can get 2-5 high quality Panzer Divs. This was in fact one of the proposed army organizations in the discussion in 1933, quote here:
"In light of the economic difficulties it was proposed, in 1933, by Marshal Italo Balbo to limit the number of divisions to 20 and ensure that each was fully mobile for ready response, equipped with the latest weaponry and trained for amphibious warfare. The proposal was rejected by Mussolini (and senior figures) who wanted large numbers of divisions to intimidate opponents.[25] To maintain the number of divisions, each became binary, consisting of only two regiments, and therefore equating to a British brigade in size. Even then, they would often be thrown into battle with an under strength complement."
POD where Balbo is better at persuasion or Mussolini agrees to the plan would lead to an army that is designed to fight in the desert in a Bliz style war. Near perfect against the brits.
Italy can afford it if they want to. They did have foreign trade at this point, it is not like they didn't trade anything to anyone. The cost associated with maintaining the manpower and training for 70 divisions is much greater than the cost of maintaining the manpower and training for 3-5 divisions. The cost to the civilian economy from keeping many people armed and in militia is enormous, especially when compared with a smaller more effective army. Large militia armies are good for defense in mountains. Bad for offense in the desert. Instead of Mil-Inf-Gar they could very easily go for Mot-Arm-Mech of significantly lower portion, if they plan for it early on. A plausible and in fact quite likely POD would be Mussolini adopting the 1933 proposal by Balbo and going for a motorized smaller army.
Let me answer that with a question. How close do you think Italy came in 1940 to breaking the UK resistance in Egypt? 50%? 25? Would doubling the amount of Tanks, CAS, Mot, Mech be enough? As that would be doable with a 1933 POD without even breaking a sweat? How about tripling or even quadrupling as even that is in the realm of possible, while not probable. Doubling both training and equipment is possible.
My idea of a small POD is when a man in a leadership position is presented with 2 plans, both of which have significant support at high levels and one is adopted over the other. A large POD for a single person would be making Mussolini a peaceful man, or Gandhi a warlike man. But saying that Gandhi stays in SA is a minor POD. Or that Mussolini adopts a offensive army posture in 1933 instead of a defensive army posture is a minor POD. If it calls for someone come up with an entirely new idea out of the blue then yes, it is a medium to major POD. But if it is a different choice made by a single person when both choices were historically presented to the person then a POD and both have significant support is, by any stretch a minor POD. All this army would require is adoption of the proposal by Italo Balbo in 1933.
Once again, I am only proposing a different choice is made between two relatively equal proposals 7-8 years before entry into the war by Italy.
True, during this period in history, it is not. But adoption of a plan presented 7 years earlier and focus on a smaller Mot-Mech-Arm force is quite possible. 7 years is a long time to build, purchase and train units.
Hitting Baku and its oil facilities would certainly be a top priority over anything else at this point for the Axis.
Also, in my opinion you are underestimating the Italian Airforce compared to the task at hand, we are not talking about sending them up against highly trained and equipped UK or US pilots in a large scale operation over a large area. We are talking about hitting a single target badly enough half a dozen times so that it takes years to repair. Oil fields are notorious for tending to catch on fire.
Even if the Italian Airforce gets badly mauled in the process, SU would take a serious hit to its oil production that would take years to recover from, even during wartime.
As the Italian Div was considerably smaller, at around 66% of a German div, at least on paper, arming a single Italian div with German equipment and up to German size would be a large drain on the Italian defense budget certainly.
Therefore when we are talking about the Italian army and updating them we should establish what size are we talking about in terms of brigades / battalions. If we upgrade the Italian army from a 6B to 9B footing as that would on its own eliminate up to 33% of the Italian Div's, most likely less as logistics for 10 small divs is more than if the divs are compressed into 5 larger divs. As smaller divs have overlapping similar goods and training. To put it in another way. 10 divs require 10 HQ's while 5 divs require 5 HQ's. This is ofcourse a wild simplification but you do get the point.
Then upgrading the Italian div to higher degree of staffing and you go from the now present about 50 divs to about 40. That is 40 full strength Ger style 9B infantry divs. Still at rather poor levels of equipment. In the end 40 full stagged inf divs cost less than the same amount of men spread over 70 inf divs. Economics of overlapping demands come to play when you have more of the same demanding the same supplies.
At this point you have the Italian army at 40 divs. Say you aim for 20 good quality divs you can sell the goods for about 30 full inf divs to the global market and purchase the goods for 10 high quality mot-mech-arm divs in exchange. Then you have 10 Italian equipped divs at full stregth and with best Italian equipment and 10 with traded for equipment for the most part.
In this case you have 30 divs worth of goods and 7 years and 50% of the Italian military budget from 33-40 to build or trade for 10 motorized / mechanized / armor divs. It is possible, if difficult to do. If Mussolini adopts the small capable army strategy he has enough political and trade opportunities to make it happen. It is as difficult as the German rearmament pre-war but it is by no means impossible. As i said, what i point as a POD was already suggested to Mussolini and rejected. The official reason is that Mussolini wanted a army larger on paper to intimidate his opponents. Say instead of admiring quantity over quality, he admires the Roman legions quality over quantity approach. That is NOT a large POD. It is a single minor adjustment to the value of one person who was already presented with the plan i suggested.
In the end, if you consider changing the value system of one person by one decision (quality over quantity) a huge POD then i cant help but wonder what would be a minor POD. It is a huge POD in its ramifications, a minor POD in the making, as it is decided by one person. Economic implications and the possibility of growth when you release hundreds of thousands of young men to the labor force is something that should be taken into account as well. Or for the sake of argument, what if the Italian Army uses 20 divisions worth of people to build better infrastructure and economic access for 7 years, instead of teaching them skills for a mountain war that will never come?
Italy did build military goods, not to mention they did actually trade. But not in sufficient quantity to arm 70 divs, they spread the goods too thin to have any real effect. Things like AC's Trucks, Rifles, Artillery. Italy did have a military industrial complex. What they didn't have was enough goods for 70 divs. They spread too thin. Basic goods they can produce for themselves quite well. If they reduce the number of divs men to produce for by 50-75%. At that point the only thing they would really need is the point of the spear for the Panzer Army.
I'd take out the three Very's and we would agree. But other than that lets just agree to disagree on this.
Not in my opinion. The POD required for something like this requires less innovation and effort by the Nazi leadership than developing CAS or Bliz did, a fraction of it in fact. A cursory glance at the logistics of An operation Barbarossa would make it known to them that they need standardization.
So as i said, we disagree on what is a drastic POD. I say drastic is Sweden joining the Axis in 1940. You say this would qualify as a drastic POD. I disagree.
As I said, i disagree, the reason they didn't go for it was to keep the corporations that privatly owned and supported the Nazi party in private hands and competing with one another. The reason standardization wasn't carried out was that the major business interests behind the Nazi movement would go batshit insane if one of them was given wartime dominance over the others in a way required to effectively standardize the gear.
If the Nazi party Leadership went down this road they would piss off major business interests in Germany, this would be dangerous but not lethal to the Nazi movement, especially if it was done well. But as Nazism has been rightly so called Corporatism it was unlikely to happen. If anything the major German corporations and their chairmen benefited from the war in a way that is downright criminal. The leaders of corporations like BMW and IG should have hang right there next to ol Mussolini from a lamppost in the mountains. But thats just my opinion.
To carry out what I said would require Hitler to turn on his allies for his own personal gain. Hardly out of character. I'm simply rather surprised that he didn't end up being MORE ruthless and go after the large business in Germany in this way.
Pre-1940 they had little to no idea how bad Göring was. After Stalingrad he was pushed out real power.
I disagree about Nazis not treating war in an effective organized manner. They were certainly not up to par with modern generals, heck, they arent even up to par with modern good armchair generals. But for their time, they were certainly effective and organized. Thought that is a matter of debate.
As with others, we'll just have to disagree on this. I understand and can relate to the view that they were a bumbling group of buffoons, i don't agree with it. But i understand it.
It made sense, not to a modern person but in the time and place, it made sense. It is the same kind of sense that the Roman Empire made. or the British empire, or the US manifest destiny. It failed, the others did not. So Nazi ideology "makes no sense", because they lost. The desire to conquer and destroy other groups is not only inbuilt, we admire people for it. The reason US is admired is not because of good food. It is because of the US unrivalled military capacity and its subjugation and destruction of millions of people. The same reason why so many admire Caesar, Mao, Stalin. People can claim otherwise but mass murder is what people seem to admire for the most part. Look at the top grossing movies:
http://www.imdb.com/boxoffice/alltimegross?region=world-wide
Avatar (War)
Titanic (Ship sinking and people dying)
LOTR (War)
People admire heroism, war and epic good and evil battles. Where they always think of themselves as Good and everyone else as Bad. Faciscm and Hitler provided the perfect context for the time for their battle of good and evil. For our time there is another similar battle, everyone so convinced of their own cause. Anyway my point is this. In that time and place, Nazism made sense. It was not the ideology of the idiot bumbling fool that it would look like today any more than the Manifest Destiny was. But thats really besides the point.
If the starting assumption is that Nazism as an ideology makes no sense, then any choice where the Nazi's do something that makes sense is, of course, impossible. But that is the core of the issue regarding ww2 is it not. Were the axis a bunch of hollywoodesque morons that managed to almost stumble over 20 million dead soviet soldiers and occupy massive parts of China and Soviet Union. Or were they actually ruthlessly competent military dictators who were within an hairs width of ushering in a dark age that likes of which we haven't seen. It seems this is the core of the issue here. I believe the latter, many people believe the former.
Comparing pre war level of armor to someone after 6 months of constant assaults is not an apt comparison. I am talking of the duration of the whole war, giving them slightly better treatment to urge them to fight better instead of giving them scraps and telling them shoot at IS's with sidearms. In my opinion, it doesn't take much in terms of moral support for the Axis minors to get them to fight considerably better and harder and actually believe in the Nazi ideologue to a larger extent. You disagree, not much more that can be said with that I suppose.
Take one tank army, gut it, distribute the equipment amongst the minors and use the free MP to reinforce the other divs and in my opinion. The striking power the minors gain in total is more than the Germans lose. Sufficient to warrant it. The reason it was done can be debated forever, was it because they thought they would win before 1942, that the minors would never matter, that they wanted to eliminate them anyway, that they were stupid. Potentials are endless. In my opinion the reason it wasn't done was that the Germans really did believe that SU would collapse when the door was kicked in.
They could agree to peace, if they felt it was the extent of their pushing capacity, for now. After 41 winter and before stalingrad it was seriously the case. A Brest-Livotsk treaty negotiation started when the Germans push into the Soviet union in the 42 summer negotations would almost certainly procure good deals. What happens after is a matter for a larger WW2 timeline, something i might write someday.
Facts on the ground remain. At its height the Nazi, the Co-Belligerents and Axis nations comprised:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ww2_allied_axis_1942_jun.png
This is not the result of a bunch of morons. But what amounts to an almost successful subjugation of the Eurasian-continent. If SU collapses for any reason the war ends and Eurasia is lost.
As I said, here is the fundemental difference of opinion I have. I think it came close and they were actually good at what they did, you think it wasnt close and they werent good at what they did. I'll agree to disagree.
I disagree. But like i said, agree to disagree.
True, end of 41 was about the time his grip on sanity started to go. Which would place his loss of sanity about 1 year into his addiction to meth.
The cold war would disagree with you on this. Stalin was as much out to conquer the world as Hirohito or Hitler were. He just got jumped first.
And what then if SU falls? Do you really think that US could do a D-Day on its own? Or necceserily even supply the UK if Ger went all out in its U boat warfare in 1943? IF SU really collapses and Germany does a massive shift into U-Boat production in 1943 then no matter how you do the math, UK will be strangled to death. As I said, we disagree, and i would wager that i disagree with a vast majority of the people in this forum about this, so i'll say I agree to disagree and leave it at that.
Imagine just this one POD, nothing else. Before i write this, have you seen a Normal smart cunning man take meth? I have, close, i know how quickly it messes someone up beyond all reason. Hitler displayed all classical signs of Meth addiction and paranoia. A man that was absolutely brilliant and ruthless in 1940. The same man that after the Putz went into hiding for years to ponder his life. The same man that effectively negotiated the entire central Europe into his pocket. The man that was ready to retreat from Narvik and always showed more interest to practicality than politics. In fact, an idea of hitlers... mallability to politics is the racial structure or racial value system he created. And where those that did well were upgraded as a whole "race". Say what you will of the Nazi's they put propaganda to a distant second to practicality. Finns started the war as a "least to survive" inferior race, when they left they were amongst the highest. Practicality before politics.. for the most part.
Now. Forget everything you know about Hitler after 1940. Look at him before that, all that he has done with the purely objective view of "is germany better / larger now than before?"
Then remember that in 1940 he started taking enough Meth to make Charlie Sheen look like a droopy eyed armless children. By 1942 given it intravenously. Since no one knows for sure just how much he was given we'll never have certainty on this issue. But the way it looks is that right up until mid 41 he was relatively sane. Then, he just suddenly goes ape shit crazy, doing things that no sane person, not even a pre 1940 Hitler would do.
Most people seem to think that Hitler in 1945 fuhrer bunker is the "baseline" hitler. To me the guy in the bunker is someone who did 5 years of non-stop meth. If the amount he was given was sufficient to make him lose his mind and start giving out orders like "no retreat" and "destroy leningrad building by building" and "declare war on the US before taking out SU" then if anything, the reason we won the second world war was due to hitler being poisoned. If that is the case then perhaps all in the bunker was not what it seemed, maybe, just maybe, someone else knew that Nazi's cant be allowed to win and risked life and limb to poison the most dangerous person to ever live on this planet. If that is the case, maybe future generations will build a statue to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_Morell Or not, who knows. Either way, say he orders Hitler take enemas instead of meth, as he had ordered before. A hitler that is not poisoned with Meth for years is a creature that could really have his marbles together enough to win.
The odds are very very close to even in 1941-42. After that the war was decided, then it was a mere 1.75-2.5, with most of the allies having no toehold in european continent, and having to supply a large civilian population across thousands of miles of open ocean within free range of Sub and Air warfare.
IF and i stress the IF here:
1942 SU sues for a brest type peace and Germany gains even 10% of the 42 SU capacity added to its real 42 capacity, then the 1943 balance is
Allies at (2065 historical - 305 =) 1760
Axis at (895 historical + 30 =) 925
So instead of the historical 2.31 it would be a a 1.9. Thats under 2:1 GDP for an invasion across an ocean. Thats not an odd for a succesful amfibious invasion against a well entrenched crack army. And that is assuming no country joins the Axis after Su sues. If something like say Spain-Portugal joins then its already down to 1.7:1 This is NOT a plan for a victory.
And no, a few nukes is not sufficient to bring Nazi Germany that holds most of continental europe to its knees. A dozen or so high power hydogen bombs would be, but that would be into the early 50's, latest.
The feeling I have for Hitler is the same I have for say,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_L._O'Sullivan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pol_pot
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mugabe
Or any number of ... shall i say... less than all in the house leaders or men of opinion and power. They are all people that could do with a... proper... slow... talking to by someone with more than 2 braincells firing at random.
In my opinion, if I could go back in time and meet with mussolini in 1933, i would attempt to assasinate him, even at the cost of my own life. But that does not change the fact that I admire him. If for nothing else than doing everything he could for a goal.
I would much rather respect a stupid man who does his best than a smart man who does nothing. Thus i would much rather respect Mussolini for trying to shape the world, and failing. (Even when what he tried to shape the world into is exactly opposed to what I would like for it to be.) Than I would someone such as the current pope, who went along with the crowd. May God save us from apathy.
We might never know why he went from erratic rather odd thinking that was very succesful to delusional bizzare thinking that led him to destroy the empire he created. But a meth addiction is a realistic reason, it explains everything about his behavior without resorting to a random unexplained change in cognition. Thus far, it would fit the best.
Göring was incompetent to a level that brings to mind the Benny Hill show. But for a victorious army the history is written in this form:
"We won despite...."
For a defeated army it is written as:
"We lost because of..."
Görings incompetence was the single largest factor, replace him with someone competent and you have a victorious Germany. But you dont NEED to replace him to have a victorious Germany. Germany can win even with Göring in power until 42-43.
Anyway, holy heck, this was a long post. Congrats if anyone actually read it.
No. They were never close to doing that.
Depopulating whole lands and reaping a body count not seen since the Black Death, YES. Ushering in a Dark Age across the globe, NO.
Because the Austrian hobo was such a brilliant commander?
Göring had been shunted aside by the time the Battle of Stalingrad came along, and the Nazis fucked it up anyway. From then on, a furious Hitler started micro-managing all military operations, which led to the Nazis losing even more battles.
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In defiance of all evidence on the weaknesses of Italy, the fact that Germany and Japans have goals that are not realistic to begin with, and that they are facing grossly superior forces. With or without the USSR.
Responding to this part because responding to your long post with another of my own will be boring and unreadable (I did read all your post, so if there's something specific you want my response to, tell me) and because it seems to be the crux of the argument.
I don't know if Hitler was using meth or not. But I find it very implausible that all his bad decisions came from drugs and that we should just totally ignore the skill of the Allies and their resources.
Just because the leaders in the field were able to win some remarkable victories does not mean that the Axis really had a chance of achieving the objectives of their leaders.
And any point of departure that alters the character of those leaders to the point of being cool headed, rational, and not aiming for only part of the pie when they thought they could have it all would be a major POD.
Minor? Mussolini decides to take up tea instead of coffee (or vice-versa). Or wear tight pants. Or something else where he doesn't need to be a significantly different person.
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Hkelukka
Banned
I have not said we should forget the allied Skills and resources. I have said that invasion of mainland europe if SU is out of the fight is suicidal.
In 1942 before the declaration of the UN many nations were neutral. They joined the war after SU survived the 41 winter and soviet collapse seemed unlikely. Had Su collapsed i find it unlikely that everyone would have declared war on germany as they did in history.
In mid 1942 if soviets fold, as i said, the balance of GDP between axis-allies is ONLY about 1:1.9 in favor of the allies. That is not a sufficient enough advantage to force an amphibious invasion.
The allies in 1942-1943 are not grossly superior, they are just achieving parity. And if SU folds at this time then the allies will, in fact, be grossly inferior in everything but air and surface naval. The E-Front really did settle the war, no E-Front = no war. But, We'll just have to agree to disagree.
In 1942 before the declaration of the UN many nations were neutral. They joined the war after SU survived the 41 winter and soviet collapse seemed unlikely. Had Su collapsed i find it unlikely that everyone would have declared war on germany as they did in history.
In mid 1942 if soviets fold, as i said, the balance of GDP between axis-allies is ONLY about 1:1.9 in favor of the allies. That is not a sufficient enough advantage to force an amphibious invasion.
The allies in 1942-1943 are not grossly superior, they are just achieving parity. And if SU folds at this time then the allies will, in fact, be grossly inferior in everything but air and surface naval. The E-Front really did settle the war, no E-Front = no war. But, We'll just have to agree to disagree.
Hkelukka
Banned
You edited after my reply so I'll write a new reply instead of editing a previous reply, since that would start a chain of edits. Anyway.
Adopting a desert offensive strategy over mountain defensive strategy is what i suggested for Mussolini. It would make Mussolini more, not less aggressive in army design.
But as I said before, we disagree on what the Axis goal actually was, as well as several other points in the war and i think i've said what i wanted to say, unless something new comes up?
Adopting a desert offensive strategy over mountain defensive strategy is what i suggested for Mussolini. It would make Mussolini more, not less aggressive in army design.
But as I said before, we disagree on what the Axis goal actually was, as well as several other points in the war and i think i've said what i wanted to say, unless something new comes up?
I voted for Italy. Japan and Germany were destined to go to war with the USA (eventually) and thus lose... Mussolini I can easily see breaking with Hitler and remaining neutral in the war which increases his chances of survival immensely and then getting into some Balkans shenanigans that don't work out but noone cares because of Hitler and Tojo and then settling down to run what colonial possessions Italy has (probably losing Ethiopia to internal rebellion and international pressure) as well as deciding to retcon himself Franco style.
Fascist Italy dies with him though whenever he goes...
Fascist Italy dies with him though whenever he goes...
But Japan actually has a record of backing down, whereas the Italian response to being repulsed from one country was to invade a stronger one.
I'd have to go with Japan, they may have been unyielding, but from what I've heard/seen their leaders seemed to be a little bit more stable mentally.