First British logistics get a whole lot easier as others have stated. They can use Suez and have a good choke point at Gibraltar to aggressive patrol and restrict U-boat penetration. Assuming no French North Africa campaign, the German u-boats cannot reliably use Toulon as a base, so they have to leave St. Nazaire, go through Gibraltar, do their monkey business in the Med and then come back through Gibraltar and back to the Bay of Biscay. They don't have the range to stay for long. Escorts might be needed in the Med, but they can be fairly short range, low performance ships.
In 1939 the Germans tried to send some long range Uboats into the Mediterranean and realized that was a massive waste of resources; without Italy in the war they have less than no reason to waste them in the Mediterranean, so won't even bother and will keep them all in the Atlantic. Toulon won't even be an issue, as there is no real point to using the Mediterranean when they can interdict everything going in and out in the Atlantic and its much easier to get to. The main hunting grounds are in the Atlantic and the OTL diversion to the Mediterranean from 1941 on was a waste. IOTL they only reason they got involved at all in the Med was due to Italian entry.
The Brits will need to keep a corps or two supplied in Egypt, but again, logistics are easier as they can go straight through instead of around the cape in fast/high value merchant ships. That Egypt force will also not be using tremendous amounts of consumables nor sucking up the cream of the Imperial armies in terms of talent. Makes LL a bit of a delay as the Brits were spending the last of their hard currency on equipping their North African forces. Won't be much of a delay ( a few months) but a delay none the less.
Agreed, but given the performance of the 8th army IOTL its really hard to say they were the creme of the British military perhaps until Monty showed up. Instead the Brits are going to miss out on valuable combat experience that helped them hone their doctrine and work out there MANY issues in leadership, training, doctrine, combat practices, etc. One the plus side the Brits do save heaps of resources. Of course that could get them in trouble too, as they have them burning a hole in the pocket and will want to get into combat ASAP, which means perhaps an ill considered 1942 invasion of Europe.
Furthermore, the Royal Navy will not be engaged in the Verdun of the Meditarrean. They don't have to supply Malta, they don't have to interdict supplies from Italy to Libya, that don't have to defend Greece etc. IIRC, the RN lost a third of their pre-war cruiser force in the Med. Ships won't be sunk, ships won't be damaged. That means either more ships are available at any one time, or preventive maintenance can be performed on more ships with routine refits/dock periods.
Now what does this mean for the Far East?
The Royal Navy can actually support a modified Main Fleet East movement in the summer of 1941. They have a major commitment to Home Waters to contain the German surface fleet and run convoys to the USSR, but no other major capital ship committments. A few ships will be kept in the Med to watch the Italians, but the R's and non-modernized Queens could be sufficient as a deterrent. Sending a couple of carriers (say Invincible, Formidable and Ark Royal) plus a three or four battleships/battlecruisers and two or three submarine squadrons to the Far East as well as having the Australians and New Zealanders send a full corps to Malaya during the first half of 1941 changes the Pacific war immensely. And since the RN and RAF is not seeing massive losses in North Africa, there should be more modern aircraft with better pilots, better staffs and better equipment available for Far East committments.
There is a decent change of the British security guarantee will be worth its weight in ink.
Agreed. The CW will be considerably stronger post-war and Japan might well be deterred from acting at all if Britain puts that much into the East.
Now let's look at the Germans. The biggest thing is not the formations committed to Africa and the Med. An extra Panzer Corps somewhere will help the initial stages of Barbarossa. The big thing is the logistics. IIRC the Afrika Korps divisions were logistically 10x as expensive to support as a division in Russia. The desert played hell on equipment, mechanized forces were a requirement to fight there, and quite a bit of the supplies intended for the AK were sunk on every run into Libya. Freeing up thousands of trucks and thousands of barrels of gasoline burned every day in Africa probably has a bigger effect in Russia than anything else.
Correct. That was a big issue. Having an extra Panzer corps for Barbarossa, plus the paratroopers, plus hundreds more Ju52s saved from the Mediterranean/Greece, plus thousands more trucks, plus hundreds more aircraft mean that Russia is going to have some problems in 1941. That will likely mean Leningrad falls in July as the paras can effectively decapitate the Soviet Northwestern Front on day 1 of the invasion if they drop on and capture Riga (the Front HQ was based there and the NKVD division holding the city was on a mission away from the city, so it was effectively undefended), which would also cut off a large part of the Soviet 8th army on the retreat, which would mean that Estonia is not really defended then when the Germans clear Latvia and Lithuania. The Soviet 8th army managed to retreat into Estonia and drag out fighting there into September 1941, meaning the ports couldn't be used to supply the effort against Leningrad until then. Here if Rommel's corps is put into the North he can rush out to Riga to relieve the paras, finish off the Soviet 8th army and then liberate Estonia by the beginning of July assuming that the invasion is able to then to start a week or two early due to no Balkan campaign (the weather allowed for a June 10th start date, not the OTL June 22nd start).
By July Rommel and pair with Rheinhardt's Panzer corps on the Luga river and race on to Leningrad with a lot more logistics support than was available IOTL (all that extra truck supply, which can move via Estonia, plus hundreds more Ju52s not needed in the Mediterranean or lost in Crete). Leningrad was highly vulnerable within the 1st month of the war, so could have been taken with a bold move that Rommel was known for (some might say reckless). If Leningrad falls, then the Soviets are in serious trouble, not just because of the industry that would be lost (none of it have been evacuated by the end of July IOTL), the millions of citizens/workers/potential soldiers lost, or the morale effect of losing the spiritual home of the Revolution, but rather the freeing up of Finns to take Murmansk, while AG-North then would be freed up to send the entire 4th Panzer Group against Moscow with its truck support logistics and all Ju52 transports could then be devoted to the central axis. Plus with Leningrad captured its port could be used to supply AG-North leaving the rail conversion forces to aid AG-Center and rail lines meant for AG-North able to also carry supplies for AG-Center instead.
That is a big game changer, especially when coupled with a week or two early start on Barbarossa, as the weather will be less of a factor during the final Moscow push. Its not unlikely that Moscow would then fall in October 1941. That means the German inherit Moscow's all weather air fields and rail network, which badly hobbles Soviet counter offensive organization efforts, as does the likely mass exodus of civilians from Moscow to escape the Germans. 1-2 million people fleeing East in winter will really make it difficult for the Soviets to organize. Plus with the loss of Leningrad 80% of KV tank factories are gone, as is an artillery factory. Losing Moscow then means something like 9% of all Soviet industry is gone, including a disproportionate share of defense production. Plus too the central telecommunications hub for landlines is gone, which the Soviets depended on in 1941-42 because radio production was abysmal.
What's even worse for the Soviets here is that without a Mediterranean theater is that the 2nd air fleet of the Luftwaffe won't be withdrawn in November, so can remain on Moscow's all weather airfields to help blunt any Soviet counter offensive over winter, while the Soviets then lack air fields capable of operating in winter. The Luftwaffe also can use the anti-shipping forces it had in the Mediterranean in 1941 against the Soviet Black Seas Fleet during Barbarossa, which likely means Odessa falls early and Sevastopol also falls to the first assault attempt in 1941, while the Black Seas Fleet is lost in the process. That is a huge burden lifted off of AG-South in 1941.
The Soviets can limp on after all of this in 1941, but they will be badly hobbled and will have a much harder time recovering. They might well implode then during a 1942 Case Blue, even if they have to pull units out to fight in the West due to the Brits doing a more serious Dieppe landing to try and save Russia.