So, using hindsight, what would be the best course of action for Napoleon in 1812? He had an unsolved problem in Spain and Portugal, could his ~450 thousand troops have been better spent there? Or maybe he was right in invading Russia, but should have other objectives and/or strategy, for example, occupying the former PLC territories and/or wait for the Russian armies instead of penetrating deep into Russia?
What would be the best strategy for Napoleon in 1812?
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I've had the same thought. Push the Polish border a little bit further East with each passing Summer, until the Tsar begs for mercy.
FillyofDelphi
Banned
You'll have eaten everything in the area well before that and made every peasent in eastern Europe despise you as you come to confiscate the bulk of their harvest every year to vary it far away and feed the Grand Armee. Then, they start hording and hiding it and ambushing foraging parties out of self-presevation, or run to the Czarist lands where they at least know they wont be taxed into starvation.
You can't keep forces concentrated and sitting still for any reasonable period of time in pre-industrial warfare. And if you try to disperse, the Russian army will defeat you in detail.
Is this a PoD post-22 June 1812?
Because if so, Napoleon has to knock out the Russian Army and force the Tsar to the table before Russia has a chance to really mobilise (once it does, France can't sustain a war forever), before Austria has a chance to say "screw Napoleon" and before the Grande Armee dies of attrition, winter, smallpox or whatever else (the first happens if he moves past Smolensk, winter happens if he takes too long, and smallpox happens whenever it feels like happening).
This would be a combination of a massive and hugely decisive pitched battle, and some decent diplomatic manoeuvring. In my TL, I used the battle of Vitebsk to achieve this outcome: 90k Russians were present (which is about half of the 22 June army), and although Napoleon was outnumbered ~4:1, he had won battles in the past with similar force ratios, so it is certainly possible. Capture the army, inflict a massive morale victory (if the Tsar thinks he is losing badly, he'll request terms as if he is losing badly, even if it isn't quite the case). Then offer lenient terms to get the war wrapped up as quickly as possible: 1811 status quo ante, possibly a return to the Continental System (at least officially, this cannot be enforced if the Russians don't feel like it), perhaps a scrap of land to Poland. Anything too harsh, the Tsar keeps fighting and France loses eventually.
Then Napoleon should return to Spain. As long as he was there personally, the territory was reasonably loyal to Joseph. It was when he left that trouble really happened. If he can knock out a major British force or two, it is possible that London eventually gives up on the war.
- BNC
Because if so, Napoleon has to knock out the Russian Army and force the Tsar to the table before Russia has a chance to really mobilise (once it does, France can't sustain a war forever), before Austria has a chance to say "screw Napoleon" and before the Grande Armee dies of attrition, winter, smallpox or whatever else (the first happens if he moves past Smolensk, winter happens if he takes too long, and smallpox happens whenever it feels like happening).
This would be a combination of a massive and hugely decisive pitched battle, and some decent diplomatic manoeuvring. In my TL, I used the battle of Vitebsk to achieve this outcome: 90k Russians were present (which is about half of the 22 June army), and although Napoleon was outnumbered ~4:1, he had won battles in the past with similar force ratios, so it is certainly possible. Capture the army, inflict a massive morale victory (if the Tsar thinks he is losing badly, he'll request terms as if he is losing badly, even if it isn't quite the case). Then offer lenient terms to get the war wrapped up as quickly as possible: 1811 status quo ante, possibly a return to the Continental System (at least officially, this cannot be enforced if the Russians don't feel like it), perhaps a scrap of land to Poland. Anything too harsh, the Tsar keeps fighting and France loses eventually.
Then Napoleon should return to Spain. As long as he was there personally, the territory was reasonably loyal to Joseph. It was when he left that trouble really happened. If he can knock out a major British force or two, it is possible that London eventually gives up on the war.
- BNC
Not exactly, it is a post December 1811 POD.
Do you think that it would be better to use the Grande Armée to invade Portugal and secure Spain?
FillyofDelphi
Banned
And he will spread this news and enforce it... how exactly? Not to mention how throwing the region's agricultural system into chaos will make logistics a nightmare. That's assuming the serfs even beleive them, especially when the French forces confiscating a large share of their crop would look suspiciously like continued repression.
Oh, and good luck getting Russia to come to terms of you can get them into a major battle and win. You just made their only hope of the system of government's survival a crushing victory, so they'll fight to the death. And you've alienated any potential local elite who'd be willing to play clients/collaberators.
True but look at it from a slightly different perspective:
(a) If we assume that Nappy decides to concentrate on settling things in Spain and Portugal, he does not need all these allied troops assembled in the Eastern Europe. It is not even clear if he needs all the French troops that he had in OTL (well, it can be argued that it would be difficult to raise them again, etc.). He can use fraction of what he had as reinforcements in Spain (and take charge there). IMO, he would be much netter off by simply restoring Ferdinand and evacuating the French forces from the Peninsula: whatever was damage from the Spanish non-compliance with the Continental System, the never-ending bleeding there was worse.
(b) Strictly speaking, Nappy was not 100% one-sided aggressor in his Russian campaign. Of course, he attacked 1st but Alexander was actively increasing the Russian forces. Between Tilsit and 1812 Russian military budget raise 400 - 500% and size of the Russian army increased at least 2 - 3 times. Even with the British subsidies this was a heavy burden on the Russian economy (and on the estate owners from whom the recruits had been taken) and could not continue forever. Of course, it was against Nappy's style to sit idly waiting for enemy to attack but taking into an account everything we know now perhaps it would be strategically better for him to wait for Alexander to make the 1st move. With the Duchy of Warsaw having a sizable army, Saxony being more or less reliable ally and Austria being at least a reluctant ally, Nappy would be able to met the advancing Russian armies in Poland or Germany where they would not have an advantage of the strategic depth (as in OTL) and had to operate far from their supply bases. He would still have the high quality troops (mostly lost in OTL by the end of 1812) and operational theater which he knew very well. OTOH, Alexander would not have the prestige he got as a result of OTL 1812 and the Russian army would not have victory in 1812 as a moral factor and, anyway, what looks as an unprovoked aggressive war would be a cabinet war with a resulting shortage of enthusiasm, etc. The same goes for the Russian leadership: in OTL they suffered from its inadequacy (Wittgenstein proved to be unfit for the task, especially when saddled with a couple of more senior generals) for a big part of 1813 but in ATL situation is even worse because there would be an open competition between Barclay and Bagration (not killed as in OTL) and if Kutuzov is put in charge (unlikely, taking into an account his views on a war outside Russia), it is even worse.
Max Sinister
Banned
I also thought that advancing slowly and being defensive (securing conquered territory with fortresses) would be the best way. Plus end of serfdom. But @FillyofDelphi has a point. Unless they find a way to feed the Grande Armee without bleeding Poland dry... maybe he needs fewer soldiers for a defensive strategy? If the Russian army has 90k men only...
And I think that at least Poland and the Baltic states would be happy to get rid of the tsar. Finland too, if he could find a way to take it.
In WW2, the nazis BTW did NOT dissolve the kolkhozes - because they thought they were more reliable (or better controllable) delivering grain they needed. But they did in "Ostland" - so much for consistency.
And I think that at least Poland and the Baltic states would be happy to get rid of the tsar. Finland too, if he could find a way to take it.
In WW2, the nazis BTW did NOT dissolve the kolkhozes - because they thought they were more reliable (or better controllable) delivering grain they needed. But they did in "Ostland" - so much for consistency.
That would destabilize Russia and make the Tsar hate him even more, when what he really wanted was to "teach a lesson" to Alexander and make him return to the Continental system.
Garetor
Gone Fishin'
Is the Continental System really sustainable long term, though, knowing what we know? The British had markets in America, India, and Asia they were able to sell to more, as well as the occasional blockade runners that took excess supply off their hands. Is detente with the British possible at this point? Certainly the Russians and the British will never be *friends*, per se, but you don't really need them as your friends if you can get everyone else.
FillyofDelphi
Banned
It dosen't need to be. Its an economic negative for Europe, yes... but virtually any war measure is a net lose of resources. The goal was to put enough financial pressure on the British commercial class (particularly the moneylenders of the City of London who want access to the massive European market... and are the ones providing the cash for the subsidies they'd been using to keep drumming up Coalitions), who have such influence in Parliament as well, that they'll give up on the hardline stance of "Napoleon must go" and be willing to sit down and reach that desired detente. Getting a long-term peace requires all sides to agree to stop.
I'd certainly argue that Britain will, eventually, try to reach mutually acceptable terms with France if there's no prospect of getting an army drummed up on the Continent in the forseeable future. The terms would have to be a good compromise (IE Something that leaves everybody unhappy, but to a level they can live with). Once that happens normal commerce will return as a matter of course, though I imagine there'll still be pretty high tariff walls thrown up in both power's domestic markets as the rivalry morphs into a sort of trade war more reminicent of the "race for colonies"/merchantalism of the previous centuries than a purely military affair.
Look, there was no "scorched earth" to any noticeable degree in 1812: this is mostly a part of the patriotic legend propagated both by Tsarist regime and during the Soviet rule. Then, how exactly would Napoleon make such an announcement: AFAIK, the serfs in the Russian Empire circa 1812 were not listening radio or watching TV on a daily basis and as a result would have certain difficulties with finding out that as of yesterday they are free.
Neither would such an announcement eliminate the fact that the passing through French troops are taking food from them. Actually, one of the contemporary Russian generals (IIRC, Yermolov but not 100%) wrote that if the peasants were offered payment in gold for their products (as opposite to the counterfeit paper money which peasants never saw before and which they did not trust) supply situation for the French could be quite different.
Not immediately. Spain isn't a direct threat to France (and the British can't really launch a land invasion of France via Spain due to insane logistics). Russia is a direct threat to France once it mobilises enough, because it has the potential to turn Austria and Prussia against the French as soon as Napoleon stops looking so threatening.
Napoleon's best move (and ultimately, the only one that will get him a victory) is to convince both Russia and Britain to stop fighting him. In early 1812 he was at the height of his power, and had already achieved everything that he could reasonably want, and that logistics would allow. And everyone was actually scared of him still.
So how to achieve it? With Russia, convincing the Tsar to make a lasting agreement, of anything from a non-aggression pact (for say 10 years) up, will effectively accomplish this. Failing that, an invasion with a decisive battle will also work. Napoleon's plan to invade Russia was sound, the only problem was that he never caught the Russian army and chased it far beyond where he should have.
With Britain, it is just a matter of convincing them that they can't defeat France and that they might as well end the effectively 20-year long war that they were already getting sick of. A successful Russian campaign gives them the ability to say "look at what we just did", but in the end it isn't totally necessary. Smashing a British army in Spain gives a similar, although more direct, message to London. Invading Portugal probably won't help matters at the peace conference, unless Napoleon is willing to give it up, perhaps for some concession elsewhere (what exactly I don't know).
Truly "securing" Spain will only really be possible once the British stop running guns to the Spanish. The main importance of such a move in a "defeat Russia in 1812 then Spain in 1813" plan is to 1) secure French supply lines and 2) chase the British out.
- BNC
Garetor
Gone Fishin'
What's maddening is that before the campaign launched, Napoleon himself said it would be idiotic to get caught in an endless drive towards Moscow.
His original plan, IIRC, was a 3 year one. First year is marching east and securing Poland/byelorussia. Second year is to swing North and grab the Baltic up to St Petersburg. Third year is turning the screws by smashing armies sent into the conquered areas and entrenching local puppets. If he had stuck to that and stayed close to coasts and rivers where his army could be supplied, I think he would have brought the Tsar to terms.
Edit: Hmm, though apparently THAT conversation comes from Metternich's memoirs, which are not entirely reliable.
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FillyofDelphi
Banned
I've been of the opinion that the real sticking point of allowing a potentially hostile Spain for France was the problem it would pose for her naval ambitions. Spain had a solid position to exert control over the Biscay region of the Atlantic and the Western Med., and had the capacity and motivation to build a respectable naval force. If they cooperated with Britain, they combined Anglo-Iberians could easily maintain naval supremacy which would frustrate French colonial ambitions and market securing potential (Unless France aligns and helps advise and stabilize the Turks, who have the building blocks to be a naval player if it can be tapped and be comfortable enough at home to be willing to look out). One way around this concern might be to propose a partition of the nation: Joseph being allowed to retain Aragon, the Basque regions, and Catalan regions in a "Kingdom of Aragon/Cistetior" while Ferdinand gets reappointed to the rest of the Empire. There was some legalistic precident alongside the practical (there was a great deal more French control in the Northeast)
Never heard that before, and I'm not sure it could work (how exactly is he going to keep >1M men active in Russia for 3 years exactly?). Certainly at Vitebsk, Smolensk and Borodino he was trying to defeat the Russian Army and their fighting spirit rather than try to just occupy everything. A victory like that is certainly doable. A Barbarossa-esque occupation strategy almost certainly isn't.
That's true, but I'm not sure that Napoleon was in a position to be worrying about major naval affairs and colonial efforts by 1812. A peace that gets him the status quo (as of 1811) and a third of Spain is a much better outcome than continuing to fight the Coalition with a vague hope of the Spanish Navy never being rebuilt to oppose him.
- BNC
Few considerations:
(a) Russia could not "mobilize enough" because its ability to do so had been limited both by its recruit-based system (in 1812 3 "recrutsky nabor" with total of 20 men from every 500 which was rather extraordinary; usually it was 1 - 5 men from 500) as opposite to the universal military system in France and economic considerations. Taking into an account that Russia had overall smaller population (in 1800 France 44,596,000 and Russia 35,005,000) a much less effective mobilization system meant a MUCH lesser army. Its military budget already skyrocketed (and big part of the cost had been ultimately paid by the nobility) and could not keep growing forever even with the British subsidies. Even dressing and arming the increased number of troops was problematic: in 1812 some of the newly raised contingents had been arriving to the front without the weapons and uniforms because Russian industries were not up to the task.
(b) Short of a spectacular victory and clear weakening of Napoleon Prussia would not change sides and Austria would be even less inclined to do so.
(c) Prior to 1812 Alexander had only the defeats to his international "credit" and the same goes for prestige of the Russian army (if outcome of the Battle of Eylau could be disputed, Friedland was unmitigated disaster).
(d) While some of the Russian pre-1812 plans included the offensive component, they were mostly concentrating on the defensive operations.
(e) Russian army had a shortage of the experienced officers and general and on the top level situation was almost catastrophic: few very old generals and 3 capable commanders of the somewhat younger generation, Bennigsen, Bagration and Barclay, hated each other guts (as was convincingly demonstrated in 1812).
Launching an aggressive campaign in that situation, even with a hope that may be Prussia is going to change sides, would be a recipe for disaster (especially taking into an account that inj 1812 Alexander kept meddling into the military affairs with the disastrous results being avoided just because he freaked out and left the army).
Actually, he was trying really hard with Alexander but it did not work out. Of course this was partially Nappy's fault but Alexander did not want peace either.
One would think that Tilsit was an attempt to do just that. But as soon as Russia recuperated from a defeat Alexander started preparing for the war. It was combination of his general Anglophilia, personal hate of Napoleon and Russian economy being traditionally oriented toward Britain (the last factor could be dealt with but not with two other factors in place).
In other words, short of a complete Russian incompetence, this option was impractical.
For this he would need combination of 2 things: (a) a crushing defeat of the British forces in Spain & Portugal (loss of prestige, national morale is sinking, etc.) and (b) there should be no continental suckers (Russia in this case) ready to fight for the British money. Alexander should go the same way as his father and probably the same goes for Constantine leaving 16 years old Nicholas as an Emperor of a rather confused empire.
Garetor
Gone Fishin'
Yes, I realised when I looked again that the plan was from Metternich's memoirs, which is also described as "inaccurate" and "self serving". So, if it's a really bad plan, Napoleon probably didn't actually have that conversation with Metternich.
FillyofDelphi
Banned
That's precisely the kind of peace I was proposing; simply with the fact the third of Spain under French influence is kept under Joseph rather than annexed directly into France so the Empire proper can mostly leave affairs south of the Pyranees and focus on keeping up/shoring up their position in centeral Europe so Russia and Austria don't get any funny ideas. The thing about whatever peace Napoleon and Britain establish, both are going to be very warry about the possability of the other reneging on their side of the deal and this turning into yet another in a series of breif lulls in the fighting rather than a lasting desscalation. To gurantee this I imagine Napoleon is going to insist on terms that secure the west coast of France and the Western Med. from easy penetration by any power not firmly under their thumb (IE make any future temptation to re-impose a blocakde not worth the risk and cost)