What lessons did Britain learn (and forget) from the Boer War?

[ivanotter]

All,

If we try to look at the lessons from the Boer War (1899 - 1902), there was a range of things which Britain should/could/did learn.

On the purely tactical side:
1) Occupy the hill top is a bad idea
2) The spade (e.g. the trench) is a great idea
3) The value of sustained riffle-fire -> this points to the value of the machine gun in a 'European' war

On the political side:
1) Raising enough troops is difficult
2) The creation of a citizen army (Yeomanry) was popular.
3) A unified Empire is a great thing

Economy:
1) Modern war is very expensive
2) Production of ammo and all other things (even uniforms) has to be planned

A lot of political blunders: The search of German vessels (checking for contraband carried to Transvaal) did not sit well with 'Willie'. The German naval bill was accepted very fast. Did this humiliation trigger the naval race or was it just one more link in the chain?

We need to remember that Britain had not operated any large formation since the Indian Mutiny.

The key things are:

Did Britain learn from it at all? Did they 'forget' some of it?

How could lessons learned have impacted the start of WWI?

After all, Ian Hamilton, Kitchener, Haig, Rawlinson, ..... were all in South Africa.

Ivan

 

[pdf27]

Just one one point - they probably learned the lesson about rapid rifle fire too well, with the entire prewar British army trained up to that standard of musketry. With that, you don't really need a machine gun - rifles are a lot more mobile and portable (the Vickers is heavy, particularly when you allow for ammunition). Had they not had that lesson they might well have been more receptive to the machine gun, not less.

 

[CarribeanViking]

The link; https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4C6D17CAE6E13/#.VhYUEvlVhBc

The short version, Britain didn't actually have a general staff until after the Haldane reforms- and one for the navy was rejected at the same time, which is a graspable PoD that somebody must have had a go at.

The army ran on a collection of private, often quite antiquarian drill books and manuals- Caldwell did a lot towards unification, but it was only after the Field Service Regulation manuals came out that British soldiers were really supposed to be interchangeable.

Haldane essentially set a budget that he thought would be politically acceptable, and then set out to see how much army he could get for it- the peacetime establishment became smaller as a result, which meant the territorials were going to be essential for the sort of war the new establishment was designed for.

Not all the army was of the same mind though- Kitchener notoriously did not like or trust the territorials, for one.


On machine guns, incidentally, and the sort of war they make for in general, I have read it suggested (by Liddell Hart amongst others, in a rare moment of generosity) that Haig et al. were perfectly well aware of the potentials and problems of trench warfare, and far from being intellectually unprepared, were actively trying to avoid it.

Field Service Regulations as written were, in his view, aimed towards a style of war that was indeed in the mantra of the time mobile, structured and decisive; being able to fight and win in the open field before the war degenerated into field fortifications, which they saw the potential of perfectly clearly and did not like.

 

[LordKalvert]

Its not that the British forget but that the lessons are not always clear and applying South Africa to Europe is a bit difficult-

Take open order for the attack- it was clear that troops needed to disperse but how much? Too concentrated and they could be mowed down, to disperse and they wouldn't be able to develop enough firepower in an attack

Machine guns versus musketry- not such a clear example. Machine guns were heavy and not as mobile but they produced a lot of fire quickly

For a European War the Russo-Japanese War would provide far more relevant experience

In any event, the Haldane reforms are quite extensive. Khaki uniforms are big improvement

 

[elkarlo]

Just one one point - they probably learned the lesson about rapid rifle fire too well, with the entire prewar British army trained up to that standard of musketry. With that, you don't really need a machine gun - rifles are a lot more mobile and portable (the Vickers is heavy, particularly when you allow for ammunition). Had they not had that lesson they might well have been more receptive to the machine gun, not less.

Going in this vein. I think that the bef was a superb unit. Well trained and effective. What wasn't learnt was that well trained troops still die in heaps. They're so really hard to replace. Hence why even now, first rate armies aren't all semi special forces

 

[Shaby]

In any event, the Haldane reforms are quite extensive. Khaki uniforms are big improvement

This. Imagine the BEF charging ahead in red tunics. They would stand out even more than the French did.

 

[BlueTrousers]

Going in this vein. I think that the bef was a superb unit. Well trained and effective. What wasn't learnt was that well trained troops still die in heaps. They're so really hard to replace. Hence why even now, first rate armies aren't all semi special forces

You can think of the British Army in WW1 as three armies. The initial BEF was very good for its' size, but not nearly big enough to have an effect. The early New Army was mass recruitement and conscription producing barely-adequate infantry to hold the line, but only slightly better than cannon fodder. They bought time for the later units of the New Army to be trained to the standards of the BEF - the sorts of tactics that were hailed as war winning in 1918 were standard British Army practice in 1914 - and these were the troops that defeated the Spring Offensive then fought the Hundred Days.

The Canadian and Australian units developed such a reputation midwar partly because they didn't have that slump where anyone who could carry a rifle was thrown into the trenches to hold the line. All through the war, they were properly-trained infantry in the model of the BEF.

 

[Simon]

Take open order for the attack – it was clear that troops needed to disperse but how much? Too concentrated and they could be mowed down, to disperse and they wouldn't be able to develop enough firepower in an attack.

IIRC to echo CaribbeanViking about Haig not being completely clueless he did actually want attacking troops to be more dispersed but his subordinate commanders convinced him that their men weren't trained enough/up to it to effectively attack like that so they attacked in concentrated groups at slow pace, which led to the less than stellar results we all know.

 

[Simon Darkshade]

Khaki uniforms were introduced well before both Haldane and the Boer War. There is extensive commentary on the artillery and machine gun lessons of the war in a decent book entitled Firepower 1904-1945 that I might have to dig out.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Artillery was one of the weak spots of the BEF

It was excellently equipped and trained - however it tactics were around a mobile war and its main shell for example was of the 'Ahead type' - ie the shell exploded above your own troops sending what was in effect canaster shot into the ranks of the enemy they were attacking or defending against.

It lacked HE shells for Trench work and this took several years to over come

I'm not sure what learnings from the Boer war might have changed this?

 

[yulzari]

For the BEF the machine gun is a red herring. They were highly trained in musketry and capable of a rate of sustained fire to match a larger rate of issue of medium machine guns and of dropping fire at ranges of up to 2 1/2 miles on bodies of troops, stationary cavalry or artillery when the targets could be seen.

The MMG gave a BEF rate of fire to short trained recruits which could be effectively directed and manned by a few more experienced soldiers. The riflemen acted as ammunition carriers, gave short range fire and carried that short range fire forwards in an attack.

The South African War produced the BEF which was, for it's size, the best troops in France but in so small a number too small to make a major difference.

The New Army of volunteers and the conscript armies of 1917/18 were very different. The former were place fillers trained by ex South African War soldiers but with inadequate changes to meet entrenched war. The later armies used the experience and trials of 1916/17 to produce a trained cohesive all arms army that reached it's peak in 1918 and would probably have been a hard nut for the 1940 german Army to crack.

To illustrate the end of the impact of the South African War in 1914. My grandfather was in the BEF as a senior NCO. He served with the army to the end of the war. He saw it from sabre charging shiny steel cuirassiers on horseback with horsehair plumes through to all arms assaults with tanks and tactical air support and radio directed artillery support.

So, to return to the thread question. The lessons learned were expressed in the BEF of 1914. Professionals skilfully trained in using their weapons, in rapid entrenchment. Trained to take responsibility down to smaller units so that even a lance corporal of an infantry section could be expected to deploy his section in the absence of external instruction. At their best in open warfare.

They had also learned that volunteers (ie territorials [and I was one] and the New Army) could only cope with the simplest of actions and had to be given limited tasks if they were to carry them out and (in France) could be trusted to do no more than hold trenches or take trenches before them. Thus the importance of retaining cavalry as the only way the mass army could exploit a breakthrough. By 1918 the trained and experienced army could carry itself forward as an all arms force and cavalry became less necessary to exploit breakthroughs into open ground. But this lies beyond the question.

In OTL context the BEF was pretty well as good as you could get using the lessons of the South African War with the budget available and commitments in hand. A token support for the French that punched well above it's weight until a continental size army could be raised.

A lesson to forget was the effectiveness of well trained rifle fire. This was not a transferrable skill to mass recruitment with a front line that needed to be filled (and expanded to take pressure off the French army) and the MMG lessons of the South African War pointed to that mechanical solution. This lesson was later unlearned as MMGs were withdrawn from line battalions and concentrated into the specialist Machine Gun Corps from 1915 to make best use of the, initially production limited, numbers of MMGs. The Lewis filling in their battalion role at short range. It was in South Africa that the combination of laid line communication between MMGs in safe rear positions allowed them to give support fire indirectly and the Vickers continued in that role until the 1960s with the parachute regiment.

A minor lesson learned was the benefit of webbing personal equipment over leather but this was slow to be introduced but became the norm until the end of the 20th century.

Logistically the South African War reinforced the Crimean War experience that your tactical and strategic options were a function of your logistical capacity. In South Africa mounted mobility was a function of the supply of fodder and the situation developed whereby horses were worked to death to be replaced more easily than being kept properly fed. The temptation to put a rifle in every trained soldiers hand and send him to the front after the collapse of 1914 was stabilised was resisted and experienced troops were withdrawn to train new troops and to set up the logistical train that supported the New Army and it's successors. The British Army in France thus was consistently better looked after than it's peers and able to spend more time away from the front line than in it with the consequent benefit in health and additional training despite fighting on what was basically a marsh.

 

[LordKalvert]

Khaki uniforms were introduced well before both Haldane and the Boer War. There is extensive commentary on the artillery and machine gun lessons of the war in a decent book entitled Firepower 1904-1945 that I might have to dig out.

Introduced yes units in India were wearing it about fifty years earlier,

Made standard for the British army? No Khaki wasn't made the standard dress until 1902

 

[ivanotter]

Again based on Pakenham's book.

Apparently, the 'method' for any good battle at that time was the Aldershot one-day set-piece battle:

Artillery to open up, infantry to storm along and the horse-people to mob up.

One day, neat and tidy and victory is assured. In time for tea.

Buller did what he could at Colenso, Spion-kop etc, but it did not work.

Slowly he got to realise that to get across the Tugela, something new and un-tried was needed. Not just banging away at the enemies strongest position (although he did try to outflank Botha).

According to Pakenham Buller stumbled across the only solution: a systematic offensive, with individual targets, comprising a whole offensive strategy and so on.

Was Pakenham right that it was this new and revolutionary? Had nobody thought that a one-day battle and victory in time for tea and the cucumber sandwich was not possible anymore?

If so, how did it go along in WWI?

Other powers musty also have studied Buller's offensive strategy?

Ivan

 

[MarshalofMontival]

As far as the rifle vs. MMG argument goes, what if the British experiment with a man-portable light machine gun/automatic rifle that can be carried forward with the riflemen? Basically something along the lines of the Lewis or the Bren or the Browning Automatic Rifle? It would pretty neatly bridge the gap between the mobility of the rifles and the sustained firepower of the MMGs.

 

[yulzari]

They did. In development 1913 and production 1914. The Lewis gun for exactly that role. It was the availability of Lewis guns that allowed Vickers to be withdrawn into the Machine Gun Corps (and Vickers production as well of course.)

 

[Gannt the chartist]

MG's

The Vickers MMG is about half the weight of all other Maxim types in the word All up it weighs less than the gun body of a Maxim 08/15 without water, and the scale of issue is actually the same across almost all European armies. Confusion arises because of the British splitting battalions from the same rgt across mutliple brigades.


The British and the French for sure were looking at introduction of Automatic Rifles into the infantry pre WW1, the reason for not doing it was money and priority on the artillery. As it is once the money opens up they procure Lewis and Hotchkiss Mle 09, Cauchat as fast as they can, and because of the higher mobility move the MMG into support fire.

The contemporary perspective was that the sort of semi mobile war experiences from 16 on would have been what thee BEF was trained for, and the New army troops had to be retrined from trench war.

In other lessons the brits learned to use cavalry as mouted infantry and effective scouts. logistics,

 

[marathag]

This. Imagine the BEF charging ahead in red tunics. They would stand out even more than the French did.

Though didn't make any real difference when troops were sent to go 'Over the Top' with bayonets fixed, and ordered not to fire till they got to the German trench, and even then, really should be using the bayonet.

Make sure your magazine cutoff is engaged till the Sergeant allows rapid fire

Might as well given them spears, for charging(well, actually at 'walking pace') straight into Spandau fire.

That lasted until well after the Somme, in 1917 when it was finally put forth that Bayonet charges should be restricted.

The Magazine cutoff was not removed from the SMLE till 1916

 

[Locke01]

One of the lessons learned was to avoid mucking about with the army's logistical arrangements on the spur of the moment. When Roberts and Kitchener took over from Buller, they decided to centralize control of transport by stripping divisions of their organic supply elements. The change didn't work out too well, so they went back to the old system. When the BEF went to war in 1914, divisions had their own organic transport, and kept them throughout the war. See, you can teach an old dog new tricks.

 

[ivanotter]

That, in my opinion, is indeed a very valid point.

If it was a conscious effort to not repeat Robert's folly, it was probably one of the most important one's.

Goes to show: logistics is the game changer!

Ivan

 

[Saphroneth]

Though didn't make any real difference when troops were sent to go 'Over the Top' with bayonets fixed, and ordered not to fire till they got to the German trench, and even then, really should be using the bayonet.

Make sure your magazine cutoff is engaged till the Sergeant allows rapid fire

Might as well given them spears, for charging(well, actually at 'walking pace') straight into Spandau fire.

That lasted until well after the Somme, in 1917 when it was finally put forth that Bayonet charges should be restricted.

The Magazine cutoff was not removed from the SMLE till 1916

The idea behind the magazine cutoff is part of a concern at the time about rates of fire.

Here's how it goes:

A man with an Enfield rifle-musket carries 70 rounds. This is half an hour of fire.

A man with a Martini-Henry carries the same. This is 8 minutes fire.

A man with a Lee-Metford carries 100 rounds. With the magazine, this is about four minutes' fire.


It's the desire not to run out of ammo too soon.