If the High Seas Fleet doesn't come out to fight the RN is going to be looking for ways to go and get them. Otl there was the planned carrier strike in spring 1919 that never happened. Here I could see that plan been pushed harder as the RN will need to be seen to be doing something. The question is if it could be pushed forward so that it goes ahead in say April or May 1918 how does that change things. I can't see any reasonable chance for an earlier attack on the Germans, though attacking the Austro-Hungarians with 184's from sea plane carriers could be done in 1916.
What if there was no major fleet action between the Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet in WW1?
- Thread starter Tangles2
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Coulsdon Eagle
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True - but OTL he didn't get the plaudits he deserved, being sacked as First Sea Lord. Beatty didn't even think to invite him to the surrender of the German Fleet.
The less said about my opinion of Beatty the better. He would have made a good naval attachee to Mongolia.
The distant blockade by the RN in WW1 is seen as one of the major pillers by which Germany was defeated.
So if the Germans did not come out to play and even try to defeat the distant blockade - one would assume for fear of a major defeat - and the only surface battles are between the light forces (which the RN tended to win and out numbered and out matched the KM even more than the Dreadnought forces did) then I would say that was 'mission complete'.
I mean the UK is about to build its 3rd generation of SSNBs - can we argue that they failed in their mission of deterrence as they were never used?
Or NATO's part in ensuring that the Red Army did not invade Western Europe without firing a shot?
I am not aware of the GF being caged up in Scapa Flow by Submarines?
I would certainly agree but how was this viewed by contemporaries?
To quote Nicholas Jellicoe's The Last Days of the High Seas Fleet: 'Beatty never fully agreed with these suggestions [for alternatives to the historical surrender]. [...] [H]e had written to the First Lord saying that the Royal Navy's role in Germany's defeat would only be validated 'if the Sea Power of Germany is surrendered under the eyes of the Fleet it dared to encounter, and in the harbours of the Power that swept it from the sea.' It goes without saying that this would also be a validation of his own role in Germany's defeat.'
So the commander of the GF himself was unsure his role in the victory was clear enough.
The base of operations for the Grand Fleet was far up north, in Scapa Flow, with the British opting for a distant, instead of close blockade, not 'daring' to enter the German Bight out of fear of mines. This was how Dutch contemporaries saw it though, it is certainly possible that this was seen differently in the United Kingdom and I'm curious to read more about that
The Grand Fleet base at Scapa was partially due to submarines. The Grand Fleet didn't base further south for this fear.
If the Germans actively worked in the North Sea and the British failed to make contact (a plausible suggestion without room 40 for a few incidents but not for sustained german activity) the suggestion that German submarines chased the Royal Navy out of the war could be supported.
That said its hard to see an active German Fleet in the North Sea having any level of success.
The original 'Castles of Steel' quote came from an observation by Winston after he witnessed the fleet leaving Portland on the South West coast and heading for Scarpa Flow a few days before Britain went to war.
“We may now picture this great Fleet, with its flotillas and cruisers, steaming slowly out of Portland Harbour, squadron by squadron, scores of gigantic castles of steel wending their way across the misty, shining sea, like giants bowed in anxious thought. We may picture them again as darkness fell, eighteen miles of warships running at high speed and in absolute blackness through the narrow Straits, bearing with them into the broad waters of the North the safeguard of considerable affairs…The King’s ships were at sea.”
The actual fear was that the Germans would send a flotilla of Destroyers/Torpedo boats on a one way mission down the English Channel and cause serious damage to the Home fleet.
Being further north pretty put it out of range of the light forces of the German navy while giving it a great position to intercept any German fleet foray into the North Sea
Also Home fleet units were based at Foray Firth and the Firth of Forth (principally the Battle cruiser force) - not all of it was at Scarpa Flow.
So what I am hearing here is that the RN needed better PR?I would certainly agree but how was this viewed by contemporaries?
To quote Nicholas Jellicoe's The Last Days of the High Seas Fleet: 'Beatty never fully agreed with these suggestions [for alternatives to the historical surrender]. [...] [H]e had written to the First Lord saying that the Royal Navy's role in Germany's defeat would only be validated 'if the Sea Power of Germany is surrendered under the eyes of the Fleet it dared to encounter, and in the harbours of the Power that swept it from the sea.' It goes without saying that this would also be a validation of his own role in Germany's defeat.'
So the commander of the GF himself was unsure his role in the victory was clear enough.
The base of operations for the Grand Fleet was far up north, in Scapa Flow, with the British opting for a distant, instead of close blockade, not 'daring' to enter the German Bight out of fear of mines. This was how Dutch contemporaries saw it though, it is certainly possible that this was seen differently in the United Kingdom and I'm curious to read more about that
Beatty was Beatty (bloke gives me heart burn) and was more interested in his own image.
The Distant blockade was chosen (much to the dismay of the German commander's) instead of the close blockade for fear of mines, littoral warfare (smaller fast expendable ships such as torpedo boats*) and the advantage that such a tactic gave to the Germans fleet so close to the Jade and the risk of damaged ships lost to damage on the much further journey home while German ships damaged in such a fashion would be closer to port and be less likely to be lost.
I don't think anyone who understands naval warfare think's that the Royal Navy made the incorrect decision.
*light destroyers not MTBs
Torpedo Boats in the 1890's 1900's are what (Torpedo Boat) Destroyers were designed to counter. Small (up to 1000 tons), fast, short range ships with light guns and large torpedoes, potentially deadly to a battlefleet.
And in the end, in OTL, the sailors of the HSF mutinied rather than face the GF which say what you like about the other German arms they didn't refuse to face the enemy.
Yes I just wanted to make it clear I was not talking about the smaller MTB or S boats more common in WW2Torpedo Boats in the 1890's 1900's are what (Torpedo Boat) Destroyers were designed to counter. Small (up to 1000 tons), fast, short range ships with light guns and large torpedoes, potentially deadly to a battlefleet.
The thing with all this discussion to date is very much the nuts and bolts of the employment, and hence non-engagement of the two forces during the war. Post war domestic politics very much played a part in the politics of both nations. Unscrupulous politicians can use public misconceptions to further their own agenda. You just have to look at the Weimar republic, and the 'stab in the back' propaganda of the NSDP, and anti-communist sentiment arising in the fervid post war environment. IRL the anti-war sentiment killed the RN post war plans (G3 ships etc.) and fostered an entire generation of austerity measures and bureaucracy (anyone want to discuss the rock show that was the Ministry of Aircraft Production?) and raised a whole raft of liberal and social policies that had to be funded. I'm not familiar enough with all the personalities and players who moved and shaped political events post war to make a coherent offering. People like Gedde's who introduced such sweeping cuts to the post-war RN are an example of the internal response IOTL to these events even with the IRL employment at Jutland. I'm interested in the thoughts of people who possibly have a better grasp of such internal dynamics and wonder beyond any validity of the RN stance and employment, if they would like to suggest how domestic politics would be shaped by agendas and personalities seeking advantage in an environment where there was no confrontation between the two fleets. Your thoughts? T