Other than the Japanese being able to build the Amagis and Tosa's I can see another way the Japanese are sort of alright with agreeing to this treaty that is not having to give up their Aliance with the British. So they still have the world's biggest navy on their side.
What if the British Royal Navy was allowed to keep the two power standard and build 3 more battlecruisers and 2 more battleships?
- Thread starter Repulse212
- Start date
A WNT limit of 7 - 7,500 tons would suit the RN much better than the OTL 10,000.
I think everybody building 10,000 ton 8" cruisers as the only type came as a nasty surprise, and the RN felt obliged to do the same.
Being able to build a larger number of cruisers to cover the worldwide needs of the RN, at a lower cost, would be good for them.
Everybody else's cruisers would be subject to the same limit, so no pressure to build bigger.
So no Raleigh or County cruisers (but also no Pensacola, Northampton, Furutaka, Myoko, Duquesne, Suffren, Trento, Zara).
Notable that after the OTL London Naval treaty France, Italy, and the UK all switched to smaller cruisers, while the US and Japan kept going with 10,000+ tonners.
As speculation, an ATL treaty analogous to the London Naval Treaty may well have allowed larger cruisers, as both Japan and the US wanted the bigger ships for Pacific use.
However GB could have extracted concessions for that, such as quotas or ratios (?e.g 2 10K 8" = 3 8K 6" = 6 5K 5"?).
After the OTL London Naval treaty UK went back to building some larger cruisers in a perceived need to compete with the US/Japan large cruisers.
After a hypothetical ALT LNT follow on treaty, who knows?
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In addition to what @sparky42 and @I lurk therefore I am wrote, it would be unnecessary, because the TTL Treaty would allow the RN to keep 13.5in gunned capital ships (Orion, KGV & Lion classes) that had to be scrapped under the OTL Treaty.
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In addition to what @Belisarius II wrote, why re-gun captured German dreadnoughts (armed with 11" and 12" guns) when the TTL version of the Treaty allowed the RN to keep all of its 13.5in gunned capital ships and possibly some of its 12in gunned capital ships?
For what it's worth.
IOTL GB was allowed to build 70,000 tons of capital ships between 1922 and 1930 which was used to build Nelson & Rodney 1922-27 (i.e. over the next 5 years) at a total cost of about £15 million. GB wasn't allowed to lay down another capital ship until 1931. Except that it didn't lay down any capital ships until 1937 because the First London Naval Treaty extended the battleship building holiday from the end of 1930 to the end of 1936.
ITTL GB would have been allowed to build 140,000 tons of capital ships between 1922 and 1930 which would have been used to build 4 Nelson class 1922-27 (i.e. over the next 5 years) at a total cost of about £30 million. In common with OTL GB wouldn't be allowed to lay down another capital ships until 1931. Except, that it would have laid down any capital ships until 1937 because (all other things being equal and @Repulse212 who wrote the OP hasn't said that they weren't) the First London Naval Treaty extended the battleship building holiday from the end of 1930 to the end of 1936.
That's £15 million more than OTL, which as a lot of money in those days. However, it would be spent over 5 years (for an average of £3 million a year) in an era when total British Government expenditure was an average of £833 million a year, so it won't break the Bank of England.
Yes, most of the extra tonnage will consist of older hulls that were basically obsolete and I wrote as much in an earlier post. However, it won't be because the UK didn't have the money to build more ships, it will be because the Treaty forbade the British Empire from building more than 4 new 35,000 ton capital ships.
Most if not all of these older hulls would have been be put into reserve. Furthermore, its possible that (in common with what France & Italy IOTL) some of the ships that the TTL version of the Treaty allowed the British Empire to keep would have been scrapped by 1930 anyway despite of the negligible cost of keeping them in the Reserve Fleet. Failing that, the majority of the extra older hulls would have been scrapped under the TTL version of the First London Naval Treaty. The OTL version reduced the USN & IJN to 15 & 9 capital ships respectively and the TTL version would reduce the RN to 24 capital ships (15 + 9). The ships retained would be the 4 Nelson class, 5 Queen Elisabeth class, 5 Revenge class, 4 Iron Duke class, 2 King George V class, Hood, Repulse, Renown & Tiger. (The OTL version of the 1st LNT reduced the RN to 15 capital ships which were the 2 Nelson class, 5 Queen Elisabeth class, 5 Revenge class, Hood, Repulse & Renown).
By maintaining revenue and expenditure at 1921-22 levels. That was perfectly feasible if there had been the political will and public support for it. However, the politicians and public wanted exactly the opposite IOTL, which is why revenue and expenditure were slashed in the 1922-23 Financial Year by the so-called "Geddes Axe".
To Summarise what was in Post 59 on Page 3
For what it's worth Revenue and Expenditure for the 1921-22 Financial Year was more than the averages for the last 3 financial years of peace (1936-37 to 1938-39) too:
£950.5 million Revenue
£947.0 million Expenditure consisting of:
£226.9 million Total National Debt Service
£212.6 million Total Defence Expenditure
Exclusive of issues under the Defence Loans Act, 1937 which were an average of £96.5 million for the two financial years 1937-38 and 1938-39.
£507.5 million Total Other Expenditure
There was an average surplus of £3.5 million (0.4% of Revenue).
However, I repeat that there was no political will and public support for maintaining revenue and expenditure at 1921-22 levels IOTL. I also repeat that in fact the politicians and public wanted exactly the opposite, which is why both were slashed in the 1922-23 Financial Year by the so-called "Geddes Axe". That must be changed ITTL as having a British Government that wants to spend more money and a British Electorate that will accept higher taxes is essential for the British Government (and British Electorate) to want to maintain the Two-Power Standard in the first place.
And there you have the real problem. The government and populace (a lot more of whom could now vote) didn't want to spend money on new battleships that had no perceived utility. What were they for? The Great War was over and there was no requirement for new construction in sight in 1922.
Remember the basic definition of Economics: the social science that studies human behaviour within the relationship between objectives and limited means, which have alternate uses.
Actually, the approval for the Super Hoods (G3) was passed with little comment. Blind Freddie could see that the RN needed to be maintained.
Hindsight, at least, probably indicates that additional capital ships were far from the greatest need of the RN in WW 2. People love to talk about more new captal ships for the RN but as WW II showed the RN needed to improve other areas far more. That’s why Admiralty put the Lions on hold.
What probably would’ve benefitted the RN most would have been more and better convoy and antisubnarine vessels and technology. The success of the U-boats in WWI pointed towards this. A strong argument can be made that the RN failed to learn from lesson fully. Possibly, this failure was due to the an overvaluation on major fleet actions involving prestigious capital ships as being the most important role of the RN.
Other areas areas that probably would’ve also benefited from better base defenses and better AA technology.
Improvements in these 3 areas might’ve made the Battle of the Atlantic less close and also may have saved several of the capital ships lost early in the war. It’s less clear what additional capital ships would’ve done.
However, as the RN’s budget was so tight during the interwar period they did n t even have sufficient funds to pay reasonable wages to their personnel , its hard to imagine how they’d pay for any of these things. The US Navy didn’t spend much during these yyears but they still never had anything like an Invergordon mutiny.
What probably would’ve benefitted the RN most would have been more and better convoy and antisubnarine vessels and technology. The success of the U-boats in WWI pointed towards this. A strong argument can be made that the RN failed to learn from lesson fully. Possibly, this failure was due to the an overvaluation on major fleet actions involving prestigious capital ships as being the most important role of the RN.
Other areas areas that probably would’ve also benefited from better base defenses and better AA technology.
Improvements in these 3 areas might’ve made the Battle of the Atlantic less close and also may have saved several of the capital ships lost early in the war. It’s less clear what additional capital ships would’ve done.
However, as the RN’s budget was so tight during the interwar period they did n t even have sufficient funds to pay reasonable wages to their personnel , its hard to imagine how they’d pay for any of these things. The US Navy didn’t spend much during these yyears but they still never had anything like an Invergordon mutiny.
It wasn't the biggest problem, but the lack of fast capital ships (which the G3s would have fixed) was certainly one of the major problems.
Technology and training weren't issues - numbers were, which was caused by everyone expecting the war to start 2-3 years later than it actually did. That isn't an issue of planning, but of some dipshit Austrian underestimating just how badly Prague had pissed off Neville Chamberlain.
Catching up on maintainence of the old Scapa defences was an issue, but a long way down the to-do list, and RN AA defences were as good as anyone's in 1939 (and better than quite a few).
I would say letting Britain bare the cost of policing the trade lanes and keeping them safe and secure but they got that anyway
My mini head canon/PoD for this would be a trafalgar like stomp of the HSF at Jutland with little to no casualties for the GF which is so loop-sided that the USN and IJN just go "fuck that noise" after seeing what happened to the last navy that tried to upset the 2 power standard. So its less of what they are gaining and more what they are avoiding.
Is it realistic? No but probably more so than the two just shrugging and going "alright" if theres no WW1 PoD
I agree with you that the RN needed more ASW forces in the late 1930's but battleship construction was also critical. In the second half of the 30's it was clear that Germany was back in the game, and Japan & Italy had to be counted in the ranks of potential hostile powers. Everyone was modernizing and expanding their battlelines and the RN had to keep up. In the late 30's the Germans built the Scharnhorst's, were building the 2 Bismarck's, and in 1939 started building 3 H Class BB's. The Italians rebuilt 4 older BB's and were constructing 4 modern Littorio Class BB's. Japan had up graded most of their older BB's and planned to build at least 3 Yamato Class BB's. Granted no one in the West know how big the Yamato's were, but they had to be taken into account. Even the USSR was planning to build 4 modern BB's.
If the outbreak of WWII was delayed 5 years the number of modern Fast Battleships in service in all Axis nations would've been much higher than in the OTL. The RN would need all 5 KGV Class, and the 8 Lion I & II Classes to match them. As it was the outbreak of war in 1939 aborted the H Class BB's and most of the German surface ship building program. The Italian program was slowed, and the Japanese only built 2 Yamato's. That's why the British could afford to hold off on the Lion's, but heavy wartime loses pushed them to build the Vanguard. Battleships were still needed in WWII, and no one was willing to seed battleship supremacy to the enemy.
It's not the Battleships themselves that make the difference but the industry to support the construction, shipyards, armour production, gun foundries that OTL were scrapped after the London treaty. Here those industries are mostly intact and able to be used for construction of other types of ships as well, when the build up to war takes off.
The success of the U-Boats was a target rich environment and Biscay Bases. The naval treaties signed had actually prohibited the form of attack that Germany used and that it had failed was lost on no one. Criticising the RN for this is in the realms of 'Monday's Experts'. While some things could have and were anticipated, the fall of France was a watershed for the 20th century, probably outside what the RN should have been concentrating on.
The Treaty kicked the can for replacement costs by 10 then 15 years. For ships with a design life of 20 years they were not only just overtaken by age. There is little point in ever rebuilding a battleship as from pre WW1, armament improved 30% through elevation and improved shell design while machinery improved 400% by being lighter and more powerful but unable to overcome a hull form designed for 21 knots and fuel efficiency. Armour improved 10% but the arrangement accounts for far more and is essentially unfixable. However, each of these is about a third of the cost of the ship so replacing any one of them is prohibitively expensive. This is also what made Vanguard appealing as even old 15" guns were still competitive.
The RN ordered 5 ships as 'fully-armoured battlecruisers' as soon as it could. The USN also ordered 2 then 4 then 6 or so new battleships while only oreding1 new carrier as the BB were urgent replacements. Only Japan took the logical outcome and replace old ships with 'of the most up to date type' by building a ship big enough to counter percieved threats. It still took the airgroups of 10 carriers to sink a single modern ship. If anything it was the loss of Roma rather than Yamato that pointed the way ahead not just for battleships but any surface ship.
The success of the WNT was that it settled differences on China that then made the naval forces unecessary and so disarmament was safe in a secure environment. This is often not acknowledged when people look at what ships should be kept or what size a navy should be. The WNT was run by politicians, the Geneva talks in 1927 failed because naval officers derailed it and then LNT 30 succeeded because politicians gained control again.
There are many claims that GB couldn't afford the naval race but naval security was at foundation of its existance. GB went to Washington because they needed the US to RE-ENGAGE and PARTICIPATE IN the global order that had floundered after 1919.
The Treaty kicked the can for replacement costs by 10 then 15 years. For ships with a design life of 20 years they were not only just overtaken by age. There is little point in ever rebuilding a battleship as from pre WW1, armament improved 30% through elevation and improved shell design while machinery improved 400% by being lighter and more powerful but unable to overcome a hull form designed for 21 knots and fuel efficiency. Armour improved 10% but the arrangement accounts for far more and is essentially unfixable. However, each of these is about a third of the cost of the ship so replacing any one of them is prohibitively expensive. This is also what made Vanguard appealing as even old 15" guns were still competitive.
The RN ordered 5 ships as 'fully-armoured battlecruisers' as soon as it could. The USN also ordered 2 then 4 then 6 or so new battleships while only oreding1 new carrier as the BB were urgent replacements. Only Japan took the logical outcome and replace old ships with 'of the most up to date type' by building a ship big enough to counter percieved threats. It still took the airgroups of 10 carriers to sink a single modern ship. If anything it was the loss of Roma rather than Yamato that pointed the way ahead not just for battleships but any surface ship.
The success of the WNT was that it settled differences on China that then made the naval forces unecessary and so disarmament was safe in a secure environment. This is often not acknowledged when people look at what ships should be kept or what size a navy should be. The WNT was run by politicians, the Geneva talks in 1927 failed because naval officers derailed it and then LNT 30 succeeded because politicians gained control again.
There are many claims that GB couldn't afford the naval race but naval security was at foundation of its existance. GB went to Washington because they needed the US to RE-ENGAGE and PARTICIPATE IN the global order that had floundered after 1919.
Tiger was probable the only old capital ship worth saving. Like the Kongo's Tiger could be re-boiled to all oil firing, with higher steam pressure to push her speed above 30kts. Armor would be up graded, and more anti-aircraft guns mounted. She'd serve like Renown & Repulse as fast escorts and in a pinch on the battleline. It's just my guess but being almost 50 ft shorter than Repulse she might have been even more maneuverable at high speed. Repulse did a fine job of dodging Japanese aerial torpedoes as part of Force Z in December 1941 until the odds caught up with her. Tiger might have done even better but would still be doomed.
I have always felt Tiger would not have been all that useful in WW2, despite what many on this site claim. The only use I can see would be for hunting down raiding Deutschland or Hipper class ships... against one of the Twins I wouldn't bet on her, even modernized. Sure she is very fast. But has weak armor and only 13.5" guns. Even a Hipper or Deutschland, should its captain decide to fight rather than run would be able to do heavy damage... other than that she could be used as a convoy escort, or for shore bombardment to free up a more modern ship for something else. After that give her to the Soviets instead of Royal Sovereign.
If it came down to a gunfight against another capital ship, I think Tiger is only really capable of holding its own against Kongo and the 4 modernized Italian dreadnoughts. Anything else and she is asking for trouble. Compare this to the Revenge class, usually considered the least useful RN capital ships historically and indeed were planned to be decommissioned by 1942 had war not come. While they were pretty slow, at least they could handle getting into a scrap having powerful guns and reasonably good armor albeit outdated fire control by 1939.
Tiger was designed as a cruiser killer not a battle ship, but its 13.5 inch guns are going to make any raider including the twins have second thoughts about attacking a convoy. A Revenge class hurts you then Tiger runs you down and hurts you more. An extra battle cruiser is always handy .
My reply to Post 67. In reverse order . . .
So the Government's revenue for the 14 financial years after 1921-22 was 26% less than it had been in that financial year, while the total expenditure for the same period was 23% less than it had been in 1922-22. The cost of servicing the National Debt couldn't be reduced until it was refinanced in the early 1930s (which is why it was only 3% less than 1921-22) but Total Defence Expenditure was slashed by 40% and Total Other Expenditure was cut by 30%.
FWIW and IMHO the only way I can think of the OP happening is that ITTL someone invents Keynes' General Theory 15-20 years before Keynes' did IOTL, it's adopted by all the major British political parties, it's supported by enough of the British electorate to keep them in power and it's part of an economic policy where all Government spending (rather than only military spending) was maintained at 1921-22 levels. Therefore, the British Government (with the support of the British electorate) wanted to maintain the Two Power Standard as part of its Keynesian economic policy.
I don't have to remember The Basic Economic Problem and the concept of Opportunity Cost (the first two things I was taught when I did economics at school) as I haven't forgotten them in the first place.
No.
- It wasn't that the government and populace didn't want to spend money on new battleships that had no perceived utility.
- Except that they had some perceived utility or else Nelson and Rodney wouldn't have been built.
- And I suggest the following for what they were for as the Great War was over and there was (according to you) no requirement for new construction in sight in 1922.
- Creating jobs in areas of high unemployment. The Admiralty used that as an argument for its 1924 Plan, specifically the 8 cruisers that it wanted to be laid down in 1924.
- Maintaining the naval armaments industry, which was vital to Great Britain's national security.
- Although the first of the 20 capital ships that the Treaty allowed the British Empire to retain wouldn't become overage until 1934 their average age was higher than the capital ships that the USA and Japan were allowed to retain, which is why the British Empire was allowed to build Nelson & Rodney.
- It wasn't that the government and populace didn't want to spend money on the Royal Navy as a whole.
- It wasn't that the government and populace didn't want to spend money on the Fighting Services as a whole.
This is a revised version of the table in Posts 59 and 66
I've altered the difference column to show the reduction in spending from 1921-22 more clearly
and
added a second difference column showing the difference from 1921-22 as a percentage of 1921-22
I've altered the difference column to show the reduction in spending from 1921-22 more clearly
and
added a second difference column showing the difference from 1921-22 as a percentage of 1921-22
So the Government's revenue for the 14 financial years after 1921-22 was 26% less than it had been in that financial year, while the total expenditure for the same period was 23% less than it had been in 1922-22. The cost of servicing the National Debt couldn't be reduced until it was refinanced in the early 1930s (which is why it was only 3% less than 1921-22) but Total Defence Expenditure was slashed by 40% and Total Other Expenditure was cut by 30%.
FWIW and IMHO the only way I can think of the OP happening is that ITTL someone invents Keynes' General Theory 15-20 years before Keynes' did IOTL, it's adopted by all the major British political parties, it's supported by enough of the British electorate to keep them in power and it's part of an economic policy where all Government spending (rather than only military spending) was maintained at 1921-22 levels. Therefore, the British Government (with the support of the British electorate) wanted to maintain the Two Power Standard as part of its Keynesian economic policy.
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