What if Mitsuo Fuchida leads the attack on Midway Island on June 4th 1942?

[Glenn239]

We all know the story. When Nagumo's Kido Butai departs Japan, shortly after leaving port, unexpectedly the fleet's combat air commander Fuchida came down with appendicitis and had to undergo surgery aboard Akagi, which also happened to be the fleet's hospital ship. By the morning of the battle, Fuchida's stitches had been removed but he still was quite weak and incapable of flight operations. So instead Nagumo's staff arranged for Hiryu's B5N2 squadron leader, Joichi Tomonaga, to lead the assault. The rest is history.

So what if Fuchida never is afflicted with an illness, and instead leads the attack on Midway Island as per the established custom of Fuchida always leading the initial attack on an objective? In his memoires Fuchida offers these observations of Tomonaga's tactics,

"Following this action, <the destruction of Midway's combat air patrol> Tomonaga issued an order for all forces to strike and to commence bombing Midway airfield. However, there was not a single airplane on the airfield. The US side, already aware the day before of the Nagumo Task force's presence, had evacuated the airplanes just ahead of the anticipated air raid at dawn.

As for Tomonaga, it was extremely careless to have dropped all the bombs without confirmeing the presence of enemy airplanes on the ground. His duty was to blow up the enemy's airpower, not to dig holes in the airfield
Admittingly, Tomonaga was a fearless pilot with actual combat experience tin the China campaign. However he had limited experience in over-ocean operations, and it was only before the mission to Midway that he was assigned to the Hiryu's Group Aviation Commander.

Under these circumstances, he should have been perceptive enough to survey the landscape, then make the judgement that the enemy aircraft must be in the skies nearby. Midway was an isolated island in the middle of the ocean, so he should have waited for them to return, then pummel them."

So let's say that Fuchida leads the attack on Midway and this quote informs us of his tactics. In this case:

1. Akagi and Kaga have provided the Kates for the Midway attack, and the Kates in naval reserve are aboard Hiryu and Soryu (Yamaguchi).
2. When Fuchida arrives directly over Midway around 0600 and sees that there are no aircraft on the airfield, he will not attack Midway. Instead, he will order the striking force to wait, and radios the following message to Nagumo, "Enemy airbase is empty. I am deferring my attack until they return".
3. At Pearl Harbor, Fuchida remained in the air for six hours, from about 0600 to about noon. So here, launched at 0430, he needs to be back aboard the carriers by 1030. It takes about 1.5 hours to return to the carriers, so when Fuchida starts to orbit, he can wait until about 0830 before he must attack or withdraw. At 0830, he signals Nagumo that he is attacking.

Because Fuchida did not attack Midway at 0600, Nagumo never receives the 0715 signal that another attack is required. Instead, Nagumo knows that his strike force is orbiting Midway ready to pounce on returning American aircraft. The order to switch armament to attack Midway did not happen, so that when Tone 4's report of a carrier comes in at 0820/0830, Nagumo's reserves are ready to spot immediately.. Yamaguchi now controls the Kate reserve force aboard Soryu and Hiryu and advises a strike on that target.

How does the battle play out?

 

[Sekhmet_D]

I do not believe it would have been possible for Tomonaga, Fuchida or any other strike leader to carefully monitor Midway for the presence of absence of US aircraft on the runways, let alone loiter and orbit, not with a swarm of Marine Wildcats rising up to intercept and every flak gun belching fire. In any case, even if Fuchida notes no US aircraft present, his strike would have to jettison their ordnance in order to mount a successful escape from the American fighters and AAA.

 

[muskeg13]

I'm just about finished reading Alan Zimm's "Attack on Pearl Harbor" that presents an absolutely scathing assessment of Fuchida's Pearl Harbor and immediate post-PH performance. Fuchida was famous for concocting a version of events, or what should have happened, with himself being the brilliant hero. Given this, it was probably best for the Japanese that Fuchida remained in sick bay. However the most important questions concerning this thread should be:

1. Had Japanese radio communications (ship to aircraft and aircraft to aircraft) significantly improved since Pearl Harbor? This was a major weakness in the PH attack force. Japanese aerial radio communication was very unreliable, particularly air-to-air voice, with most of the PH attackers either unable to use and understand voice radios, and with some lacking a radio at all.

2. Had Japanese command and control significantly improved since PH? From Zimm's book, I feel this was the biggest failure of the PH attack force. Once the 1st, then 2d waves took off from their carriers, individual aircraft were bound to "the plan" or to the last orders received to carry out their missions on their own, with little possibility of any deviation in flight brought on by changing circumstances and almost no possibility of airborne mission leaders being able to control operations over the target area.

Fuchida may have loitered over Pearl Harbor for several hours (sightseeing) with no personal contribution to exerting any degree of Command and Control after he fumbled with his flares. He fired first one flare signifying "Surprise has been achieved", and when he thought some aircraft may not have seen the flare, he shot off another. This caused aircraft that had seen the first flare, to now believe "Surprise not achieved. Enemy is alerted." Confusion and chaos ensued, with an "every man for himself" uncoordinated attack that lasted until munitions were expended or they were shot down. Beyond very small groups of aircraft where the flight leader took charge and guided his flight by visual signals, there was no command and control, certainly not by the overall attack leader, Fuchida.

Maybe of even more importance, was the reverence of Japanese aviators for personal, one-on-one, combat, so they were less inclined to look for or follow in-flight guidance from mission commanders. Unless that mindset had changed in the few months since Pearl Harbor, it really didn't matter who "led" the mission at Midway.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Had Japanese radio communications (ship to aircraft and aircraft to aircraft) significantly improved since Pearl Harbor? This was a major weakness in the PH attack force. Japanese aerial radio communication was very unreliable, particularly air-to-air voice, with most of the PH attackers either unable to use and understand voice radios, and with some lacking a radio at all.

Given that it did not significantly improve even by 1945, well...

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

I do not believe it would have been possible for Tomonaga, Fuchida or any other strike leader to carefully monitor Midway for the presence of absence of US aircraft on the runways, let alone loiter and orbit, not with a swarm of Marine Wildcats rising up to intercept and every flak gun belching fire. In any case, even if Fuchida notes no US aircraft present, his strike would have to jettison their ordnance in order to mount a successful escape from the American fighters and AAA.

My imperfect info is that, of the midway based fighters, only 1 each of the Buffalo and Wildcats that intercepted the inbound airstrike, were left in a flyable state afterwards. All the rest were either shot down, or crash-landed/damaged to badly to fly again.

As for the AA fire, these have a very short range, and the Japanese could simply orbit a few miles out.

OTOH, orbiting until "the american planes come back" would have ensured all of the first wave aircraft are forced to ditch, because orbiting with their bombs still attached uses more fuel than the historical attacking aircraft did, and they all run out of fuel and have to ditch not around their carriers, but around midway island, instead. The Japanese have no idea how many aircraft were assigned to midway, nor when they will be returning to base, so this idea would have the strike twiddling their thumbs, sitting over midway, burning more fuel by the minute, while the very planes they are waiting for are meanwhile attacking their carriers.!!!

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Because Fuchida did not attack Midway at 0600, Nagumo never receives the 0715 signal that another attack is required. Instead, Nagumo knows that his strike force is orbiting Midway ready to pounce on returning American aircraft. The order to switch armament to attack Midway did not happen, so that when Tone 4's report of a carrier comes in at 0820/0830, Nagumo's reserves are ready to spot immediately.. Yamaguchi now controls the Kate reserve force aboard Soryu and Hiryu and advises a strike on that target.

How does the battle play out?

Assuming the American aircraft from Midway still attack Kido Butai between 0700 and 0820 as they did IOTL, the majority of Kido Butai's A6Ms (including those from the reserve force) will be busy defending the fleet and not be in any position to immediately serve as an escort for any strike. If Yamaguchi chooses to let the B5Ns launch unescorted or with a minimal escort of, say, 1 A6M for every 3 or 4 B5Ns, they will undoubtedly be slaughtered when they reach their target.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

My imperfect info is that, of the midway based fighters, only 1 each of the Buffalo and Wildcats that intercepted the inbound airstrike, were left in a flyable state afterwards. All the rest were either shot down, or crash-landed/damaged to badly to fly again.

The A6M pilots handled the Marines very roughly, no question. 23 Buffalos and Wildcats were effectively lost out of a total of 25, for the loss of no more than one or two A6Ms. But what people often overlook is that the Marines inflicted a decent amount of damage on the B5Ns before the A6Ms reacted - they killed no less than eight (three went down immediately, one ditched on the way home and four more were deemed unsalvagable/unserviceable upon return).

 

[CalBear]

Fuchida's reputation profited greatly by well, accidentally surviving the war (he was on assignment in Hiroshima and was called back to Tokyo by the General Staff for a meeting on August 5th). He wrote what has, over the years, a very self serving account of the war that has been having holes punched into it for decades (including in Shattered Sword).

In any case Fuchida would have been unable to have useful impact on the first wave strike on Midway. The attack was exactly what would be expected for strikes against an atoll base's defenses, of limited effectiveness, same as USN strikes, including strikes of considerably more strength, proved to be at Tarawa and across the Central Pacific.

 

[muskeg13]

Fuchida offers these observations of Tomonaga's tactics,
"Following this action, <the destruction of Midway's combat air patrol> Tomonaga issued an order for all forces to strike and to commence bombing Midway airfield. However, there was not a single airplane on the airfield. The US side, already aware the day before of the Nagumo Task force's presence, had evacuated the airplanes just ahead of the anticipated air raid at dawn.

As for Tomonaga, it was extremely careless to have dropped all the bombs without confirmeing the presence of enemy airplanes on the ground. His duty was to blow up the enemy's airpower, not to dig holes in the airfield
Admittingly, Tomonaga was a fearless pilot with actual combat experience tin the China campaign. However he had limited experience in over-ocean operations, and it was only before the mission to Midway that he was assigned to the Hiryu's Group Aviation Commander.

Under these circumstances, he should have been perceptive enough to survey the landscape, then make the judgement that the enemy aircraft must be in the skies nearby. Midway was an isolated island in the middle of the ocean, so he should have waited for them to return, then pummel them."

I missed it in my first reading, that this is a typical Fuchida quote, disparaging Tomonaga's leadership, and boasting how he would have done things better. Yeah, right.

Dropping all of the bombs against infrastructure, including damaging the airfield, is not a bad use of resources in the absence of higher priority targets. This is arguably a better use the forces at hand than Fuchida had done with the second wave at PH.

 

[mack8]

Since i love Midway scenarios, i'll chip in.

So in this scenario Cardiv 1 and Cardiv 2 roles are reversed in regards to providing aircraft for the attack, ie 45 B5Ns from Akagi and Kaga (OTL they launched 36 D3As), and 36 D3As from Hiryu and Soryu led by Egusa (36 OTL B5Ns)? Would this arrangement be up to Fuchida/Tomonaga as to which Cardiv provides which aircraft, or come from higher up? i seem to recall perhaps reading somewhere that Murata and Egusa were kept aboard for the eventuality of a strike against USN because they were the best kanko/kanbaku airgroups for antiship strikes.

What time did the US planes started returning from their strikes against KB? Given the times of the actual attacks against KB i don't think they would be back even by 08.30, apart from a handful of F2A/F4Fs and just maybe the surviving 1 TBF and 2 B-26.

Do we assume that all strikes planes orbit with Fuchida and stay airborne for 6 hours? To be honest, i don't think Fuchida would just hang around for that long, at PH there were TWO waves of planes, so he orbited waiting for the SECOND attack there, but here it's only 1 wave. So i think he will select whatever targets he thinks are worthy, and then return. Perhaps he might take a bit more time to carefully observe the target area before attacking, but i don't think he will wait 2 hours with all his planes? Of course the big question is what message does he send to Nagumo, is he asking for another attack, or not.

The Ceylon attack could be a good reference, what message did he sent there, did he requested a second strike? There was a rearming mess at Ceylon aswell pretty much like at Midway.

IF there is no request for a second attack, then of course a launch against the USN (TF16 or TF17? iirc the Tone scout was looking at TF16) could be made in the window between 08.30 and 09.00. There would be 36 B5N and 36 D3A along with some Zeros, but they were very short of Zeros ( i counted 6 on Hiryu and 2 on Soryu in SS) around that time unless they quickly land some from the CAP to refuel and rearm before fully spotting the strike. Maybe they could get 12 Zeros as escorts. So they launch about 09.00-09.15 but then they have to land the returning strike while VT-8 TBDs attack. Then VT-6 attacks. etc. etc.

So it will pe probably chaos trying to land the planes, but this is also a blessing in disguise. There would be much fewer planes on board at 10.20 compared to OTL and if most are still not armed and fueled that would have a huge impact in the chances of survival of the carriers hit. I made the point in the past that imo NOT ONE japanese carrier will be lost even with the OTL hits because there will not be armed and fueled planes exploding in the hangars. Rather, the damage would be more like what Shokaku suffered at Coral Sea or Santa Cruz. So Kaga and Soryu would lose maybe couple hundred crew each and Akagi even less, maybe 75-100 or so if hit as OTL (which i like to butterfly away in my ATL, remember since we are changing the chain of events the carriers will be in a different patch of ocean/cloud cover when the strikes arrive even if it's only a few miles, so anything is possible ).
So that leaves a lot more hands to fight any fires and save the ships. Soryu's engine damage if it still happens might be problematic, but probably they might get at least some boilers going and move the ship out of the battle area (same happened with Yorktown). Kaga will probably remain fully underway even with 4 hits, there may or may not be hits on the island that decimated the command, but either way, there are a lot more hands to fight the much smaller fires and save the ship.

As to the KB strike, it depends who they find, is it TF16 or TF17? If TF17 of course Yorktown will be overwhelmed and will be sunk there and then , i estimate easily 6-8 bomb hits and 4-6 torpedo hits and that being conservative. Maybe some will attack the escorting cruisers. There will be losses from the attacking force of course, but there are more Zeros for escort. But say between flak and fighters and ditchings, about 20 planes in all fail to return, say 3-4 Zeros and 15-16 attack planes. Note, this is higher than OTL but there are also a lot more KB planes.

If they find and attack TF16, there is more CAP over TF16 so losses will be higher, i reckon in the region of 30 japanese planes. But quite likely both carriers will be hit (but not sunk outright), and any torpedo hits will probably cripple them. I reckon one will be crippled and unable to move (say Hornet, 2-3 torpedo and 3-4 bombs hit) and one badly damaged and just about moving (the lucky Enterprise, say a torpedo and 2-3 bombs hit). Both will be in mortal danger thereafter, either from further air attack or from surface attack.

In this case , Yorktown remains the surviving carrier. What will Fletcher do, launch VS-5 to attack Nagumo as soon as he sees on radar the japanese strike (about 10.00 AM) or still sends his search of 10 SBDs? The same applies if Yorktown is the target as in the previous scenario. Imo he will probably launch to get the planes off and hope for the best. If the planes find KB they might hit a carrier, in my scenario let's say the Akagi which was not hit at 10.25.

Then of course based on the scenarios above we can try to extrapolate what will happen in the afternoon. It may be that we have Hiryu vs Yorktown with Hiryu having the advantage since it will be ready to strike about 12.20 and maybe even earlier, plus all the planes remaining from the first antiship strike. Or Hiryu vs Enterprise and Hornet which is steep but still doable (Hiryu prevailing i mean, or at least mutual mission kill) . Or Hiryu and Akagi vs Yorktown, or finally Hiryu and Akagi vs Enterprise and Hornet.

So all in all, Midway will have been a carrier brawl like Coral Sea or Santa Cruz. Both sides will take heavy damage but any carriers hit by torpedoes are likely dead, so in the end most or all KB carriers live to fight another day and most or all US are sunk. In my scenario anyway.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

i seem to recall perhaps reading somewhere that Murata and Egusa were kept aboard for the eventuality of a strike against USN because they were the best kanko/kanbaku airgroups for antiship strikes.

This is correct. The Murata/Egusa/Itaya 'first team' was held in reserve to launch against any American shipping, with Egusa as overall leader. In the event, almost none of Murata's veterans ended up sortieing in the torpedo role and most of Itaya's aces were stuck defending the fleet against the American strikes. The fighter and bomber pilots that attacked Yorktown, barring Michio Kobayashi's crew, did not wholly comprise the best of the prewar elite and included many less tried replacements.

 

[Glenn239]

I do not believe it would have been possible for Tomonaga, Fuchida or any other strike leader to carefully monitor Midway for the presence of absence of US aircraft on the runways, let alone loiter and orbit, not with a swarm of Marine Wildcats rising up to intercept and every flak gun belching fire. In any case, even if Fuchida notes no US aircraft present, his strike would have to jettison their ordnance in order to mount a successful escape from the American fighters and AAA.

The US CAP attacked the IJN formation and was completely defeated. Once this occurred there was no US fighter defense. This occurred some distance from the island. The US AA was ineffective outside a certain distance, while an IJN strike leader had binoculars and could easily see aircraft on the runway.

 

[Glenn239]

OTOH, orbiting until "the american planes come back" would have ensured all of the first wave aircraft are forced to ditch, because orbiting with their bombs still attached uses more fuel than the historical attacking aircraft did, and they all run out of fuel and have to ditch not around their carriers, but around midway island, instead. The Japanese have no idea how many aircraft were assigned to midway, nor when they will be returning to base, so this idea would have the strike twiddling their thumbs, sitting over midway, burning more fuel by the minute, while the very planes they are waiting for are meanwhile attacking their carriers.!!!

As stated in the first post, I think that Fuchida would have to attack around 0830, before the Midway strike aircraft had to return to the carriers to avoid running out of fuel. The problem is that if the strike is hovering around MIdway, Nagumo will not rearm the naval reserve, meaning that after 0800 when naval sightings are made, the situation aboard the IJN carriers is considerably different than the historical.

 

[jlckansas]

Having Fuchida orbiting means nothing. You would have to change both the Doctrine and plan for anything other than what happened IOTL. Unless the plan said to do that, and the plan was done way before the Kido Butai left Japan, they are going to do what the plan said to do. Genda out, next man up, Fuchida out next man up, etc etc. Fuchida was proven more than once to have embellished his war record and what happened around him to look good.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

As stated in the first post, I think that Fuchida would have to attack around 0830, before the Midway strike aircraft had to return to the carriers to avoid running out of fuel. The problem is that if the strike is hovering around MIdway, Nagumo will not rearm the naval reserve, meaning that after 0800 when naval sightings are made, the situation aboard the IJN carriers is considerably different than the historical.

When did the historical attack take place time wise? Those aircraft then had to fly back to the carriers, and wait till they were not under attack to lan, and even then, some had to ditch because they were running out of fuel, right. And that was without the notion of them flying around midway, bomb laden, without getting any closer to their carriers, for hours, and then heading back home, and likely all of them running out of fuel on the way back, right?

Fuchida's self serving claims to the contrary, there would not be any such use of the attacking force, they would attack, drop their bombs, and head back to base, to rearm and be ready for whatever needed doing once they were back on board.

Instead, what could have been done, was decide beforehand to leave a few Zero's on a kind of "Combat suppression air patrol" around midway, specifically to wait around and pick off returning aircraft, in case the US got it's aircraft off before the IJN got there, as this would allow for further attritioning the midway based aircraft (not that that would really be needed given the losses they suffered already, and their complete lack of success historically), while the rest of the attacking planes RTB as historically.

Granted, it's an intriguing idea, but throwing away the whole attack wave by flying around for an extra hour or two, with bombs, means all the bombers are out of fuel before they can return to their carriers, given that the historical attacks are still going to take place, at the historical times, the attacking planes were running short on fuel without wasting time and gas orbiting midway, and only then heading home.

 

[Glenn239]

Assuming the American aircraft from Midway still attack Kido Butai between 0700 and 0820 as they did IOTL, the majority of Kido Butai's A6Ms (including those from the reserve force) will be busy defending the fleet and not be in any position to immediately serve as an escort for any strike. If Yamaguchi chooses to let the B5Ns launch unescorted or with a minimal escort of, say, 1 A6M for every 3 or 4 B5Ns, they will undoubtedly be slaughtered when they reach their target.

1st Division had no escort reserve at 0830 and this is reflected in the fighter records from the battle. The 2nd Division probably did, maybe six but maybe more.

Kaga launched 5 fighters at 0815 and three more at 0830. Akagi launched 4 fighters at 0832. The 7 fighters launched around 0830 was probably done because the decision to land the Midway strike while rearming the Kates of 1st Division had just been taken. But in this scenario the Kates of 2nd Division are armed with torpedoes already, and do not need to be rearmed. Had the decision been made to strike, these could have been assigned to escort instead. So perhaps about 12 fighters available.

 

[Glenn239]

Having Fuchida orbiting means nothing. You would have to change both the Doctrine and plan for anything other than what happened IOTL. Unless the plan said to do that, and the plan was done way before the Kido Butai left Japan, they are going to do what the plan said to do. Genda out, next man up, Fuchida out next man up, etc etc. Fuchida was proven more than once to have embellished his war record and what happened around him to look good.

Having Fuchida orbiting changes events significantly because Nagumo will not receive Tomonaga's signal that another strike is required at 0715, and therefore, will not order his reserve armed with bombs at that time. It would make no sense for Nagumo to break his ready reserve if the original strike had not yet been delivered.

 

[Glenn239]

I missed it in my first reading, that this is a typical Fuchida quote, disparaging Tomonaga's leadership, and boasting how he would have done things better. Yeah, right.

I read Zimm's book. Seemed like a giant exercise in proving Zimm is the smartest guy in the room. His alternative "better" attack had to be one of the most bizarre Alice in Wonderland chapters I've ever read.

In terms of Fuchida, he was the Air Commander of 1st Air Fleet, at Pearl Harbor with the aviators of six fleet carriers under his direct tactical command. He was appointed to this role on merit, the brightest of the bright in the IJN carrier aviation community. So I have no idea what you are talking about, that Fuchida would critique Tomonaga's performance. That was his bloody job, and he did it all the time.

 

[Glenn239]

When did the historical attack take place time wise? Those aircraft then had to fly back to the carriers, and wait till they were not under attack to lan, and even then, some had to ditch because they were running out of fuel, right. And that was without the notion of them flying around midway, bomb laden, without getting any closer to their carriers, for hours, and then heading back home, and likely all of them running out of fuel on the way back, right?

US CAP pounces the strike at 0621, the attack goes in at 0634-0640, departs at 0725.

Fuchida's self serving claims to the contrary, there would not be any such use of the attacking force, they would attack, drop their bombs, and head back to base, to rearm and be ready for whatever needed doing once they were back on board.

During the attack on Rabaul in 1942, Fuchida delayed his bombing attacks because the airfields were empty. Eventually, after waiting and searching and lacking anything better, they hit a coastal gun emplacement. So, what he's describing as the proper procedure is what he actually did on at least one occassion.

Granted, it's an intriguing idea, but throwing away the whole attack wave by flying around for an extra hour or two, with bombs, means all the bombers are out of fuel before they can return to their carriers, given that the historical attacks are still going to take place, at the historical times, the attacking planes were running short on fuel without wasting time and gas orbiting midway, and only then heading home.

The Akagi's fuel consumption stats are in the Nagumo Report. Akagi’s fighters expended 5.29 kiloliters of fuel during the Midway mission, (8.7 max) and the Val bombers 14.4 kilolitres, (19.4 max). This translates into about 7hrs flight time for the Zeros and 5.8hr for the Vals under normal combat conditions. So the Zeroes could stay longer than the Vals, and would be more suitable in the role. But in this case, we're talking about a period of low-speed loitering, and I do not know how much fuel a plane saves if killing time a bit above stall speed. I think that if trying to wait as long as possible, the order of attack and departure is Vals first, then Kates, then Zeros.

Edit - my brother flies Harvards and thinks that if a Val were to consume 46 gallons/hr under the Midway combat conditions, that in a slow speed holding pattern, it might be more like 25 or 30 gallons an hour.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

I read Zimm's book. Seemed like a giant exercise in proving Zimm is the smartest guy in the room. His alternative "better" attack had to be one of the most bizarre Alice in Wonderland chapters I've ever read.

In terms of Fuchida, he was the Air Commander of 1st Air Fleet, at Pearl Harbor with the aviators of six fleet carriers under his direct tactical command. He was appointed to this role on merit, the brightest of the bright in the IJN carrier aviation community. So I have no idea what you are talking about, that Fuchida would critique Tomonaga's performance. That was his bloody job, and he did it all the time.

Fuchida was wont to critique only long after the person he critiqued was dead and unable to refute. See how he blamed Takahashi for the gaffe with the flares and disparaged the man as a 'blockhead' in his memoir, released only years after Takahashi was killed in action at Coral Sea. He was also biased with his criticism - see how he fudged the BDA reports in favour of Egusa who was his close friend but arguably less skilled than Takahashi.

As for Zimm's hypothetical 'perfect attack' scenario, I can't fault it. Flak suppression using strafing fighters and HE equipped dive bombers before the torpedp planes come in for the kill, choosing to attack vulnerable cruisers instead of well armoured battleships with dive bombers, attacking Neosho to bottle up the channel instead of Nevada, posting fighters as guards over the airfields - all of these are solid tactical choices.